BG Electrical & Air Con Pty Ltd v Electrical Licensing Committee [2026] QCAT 295

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: BG Electrical & Air Con Pty Ltd v Electrical Licensing Committee [2026] QCAT 295 PARTIES: BG ELECTRICAL & AIR CON PTY LTD (applicant) v ELECTRICAL LICENSING COMMITTEE (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: OCR339-22 MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters DELIVERED ON: 29 June 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member Aughterson ORDERS: The application for costs is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – costs – where application for a Builder-Low Rise licence refused – where subsequent reconsideration of the decision and licence granted – where applicant withdrew review application and applied for costs – approach to costs orders in the Tribunal – whether order for costs should be made Electrical Safety Act 2002 (Qld), s 115, s 121 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 100, s 101, s 102, s 103, s 104, s 105, s 106, s 107, s 108, s 109 Austin v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2025] QCAT 328 Fuge v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2014] QCAT 383 Health Ombudsman v du Toit [2024] QCA 235 Marzini v Health Ombudsman (No 4) [2020] QCAT 365 Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2017] QCA 42 Motor Vehicle Industry Board and Dawson [2006] WASAT 8 RDH v Medical Board of Australia [2025] QCAT 151 Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135 -- 1 of 6 -- 2 Young v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2022] WASCA 52 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) REASONS FOR DECISION Background [1] The applicant has applied for costs in relation to his application to review the decision of the respondent, made on 14 November 2022, that a ground existed for taking disciplinary action against it and the decision to suspend its electrical contractor licence, pursuant to ss 115 and 121 of the Electrical Safety Act 2002 (Qld). The initial application for review was filed on 12 December 2022 and an amended application was filed on 21 April 2023. [2] It was alleged that the applicant failed to ensure a safe system of work and procedure in circumstances where a worker received electric shock, resulting in a fatality. By consent of the parties, the matter was adjourned to the Registry pending the outcome of a Coroner’s Inquest. [3] On 31 July 2025, the Coroner delivered her ‘Findings of Inquest’ in relation to the death. The Coroner did not make any findings adverse to the applicant. Indeed, the findings tend to support the applicant’s position that its work systems were appropriate at the time of the incident in question. [4] After reviewing the Coroner’s findings, on 31 October 2025 the respondent determined that it could not continue to defend the proceedings. On 12 December 2025, the Tribunal made the decision to set aside the decision of the respondent and substitute it with a decision that grounds do not exist for taking disciplinary action against the applicant. Relevant Legislation [5] Sections 100 to 109 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) deal with the issue of costs. Section 100 of the QCAT Act is headed ‘Each party usually bears own costs’ and provides: Other than as provided under this Act or an enabling Act, each party to a proceeding must bear the party’s own costs for the proceeding. [6] Section 102 is headed ‘Costs against party in interests of justice’ and provides: (1) The tribunal may make an order requiring a party to a proceeding to pay all or a stated part of the costs of another party to the proceeding if the tribunal considers the interests of justice require it to make the order. (2) However, the only costs the tribunal may award under subsection (1) against a party to a proceeding for a minor civil dispute are the costs stated in the rules as costs that may be awarded for minor civil disputes under this section. (3) In deciding whether to award costs under subsection (1) or (2) the tribunal may have regard to the following— -- 2 of 6 -- 3 (a) whether a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including as mentioned in section 48(1)(a) to (g); (b) the nature and complexity of the dispute the subject of the proceeding; (c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties to the proceeding; (d) for a proceeding for the review of a reviewable decision— (i) whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker for the decision; and (ii) whether the applicant genuinely attempted to enable and help the decision-maker to make the decision on the merits; (e) the financial circumstances of the parties to the proceeding; (f) anything else the tribunal considers relevant. [7] In Health Ombudsman v du Toit (‘du Toit’),1 the Court of Appeal, at [50], cited with approval what was said by Judicial Member D J McGill SC in Marzini v Health Ombudsman (No 4)2 (references omitted): “[36] In my opinion the correct approach to the operations of s 100 and s 102 of the QCAT Act is similar to that formulated by the Hon P Lyons QC in Thompson v Cannon … : The ultimate question posed by the statutory provisions is whether in a particular case the interests of justice require the Tribunal to make a costs order. That is the effect of the terms of the statute. Because of the use in s 102(1) of the word “require”, the default position of no order as to costs should not be too readily departed from. I respectfully agree with the approach of the Hon J B Thomas QC in Lee … to the comments of Keane JA in Tamawood … [37] I do not consider that there is any justification in the words of the statute for any further constraint on the operation of the power to order costs under s 102, although the section directs attention to a number of matters which may in a particular case be usefully considered. The reference to ‘any other matter the Tribunal considers relevant’ shows that this list is not to be read in a confining sense. One matter which is relevant is that this proceeding is one where there was a right to legal representation.” [8] As noted, while the appropriate focus is on the interests of justice, with particular regard to the matters set out as s 102(3) of the QCAT Act, the default position of no order as to costs ‘should not be too readily departed from’.3 [9] The applicant submits that costs should be awarded on an indemnity basis because of what is said to have been a defective or incomplete investigation by the respondent. On the other hand, the respondent submits that the only material available to it at the time of its disciplinary hearing was the material included in the bundle of material 1 [2024] QCA 235. 2 [2020] QCAT 365. 3 See also RDH v Medical Board of Australia [2025] QCAT 151 [19], [21] and [50] per Judicial Member Rinaudo AM; Austin v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2025] QCAT 328 [51] per Judicial Member WS Isdale. -- 3 of 6 -- 4 filed pursuant to s 21(3) QCAT Act, whereas the Coroner had access to a much more comprehensive brief of evidence as well as being able to hear from relevant witnesses. The Coroner’s findings extended to 29 pages. [10] Each of the factors listed at s 102(3) of the QCAT Act is addressed in turn. (a) Whether a party acted in a way that caused unnecessary disadvantage [11] There is no express allegation that the respondent acted in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the applicant. However, the essence of the applicant’s submissions in support of the costs application is that there were deficiencies in conducting investigations into the incident. [12] The applicant makes particular reference to an audit conducted by Mr Andrew Lucy, a detective of the Queensland Police Service who worked with the Office of Industrial Relations and to documents taken by him as part of that audit.4 It is submitted that Mr Lucy took a significant number of documents and, it was understood, they were not presented to and did not appear to be held by the respondent. [13] It is noted that that reference is taken from the evidence in the Coroner’s proceedings. Further, the nature and content of those documents is not clear from the transcript of the proceedings or the submissions of the applicant. The respondent submits that Mr Lucy did not give evidence in the disciplinary hearing before the respondent and did not give any statement that was filed by the respondent in the Tribunal proceedings. [14] The applicant further refers to the respondent’s submission that ‘it was the significant material provided by four parties which led the respondent to determine not to defend the (Tribunal) proceedings’. It is then submitted that the four parties did not provide evidence which addressed the applicant’s safe system of work and that they did not have the requisite knowledge to do so. [15] However, the respondent did not submit that that it was the material provided by the four parties that led to the decision not to defend the proceedings. The only reference made to other parties was that the applicant was represented at the Inquest, ‘as were four other parties’. The respondent submits that the decision not to defend the proceedings in the Tribunal followed the obtaining of legal advice subsequent to the Inquest findings. It is also submitted that there were many witnesses and that the transcript of the Inquest hearing ran for some 311 pages, indicative of ‘the significant volume of documentary material’ received into evidence. [16] Other than the specific matters outlined above, the applicant’s submissions in this regard rest on the assumption that the initial findings of the Coroner are indicative of a lack of proper investigation and analysis by the respondent. On the other hand, as submitted by the respondent, there was material available to the Coroner that was not available to the respondent. Further, the Coroner had the benefit of hearing the witnesses give evidence in person and be cross-examined, including by the applicant’s counsel. [17] Against that, the applicant submits that while there has been no significant canvassing of the applicant’s material by the Tribunal, it is ‘unlikely’ that the Tribunal would come to a different conclusion to that reached by the Coroner. 4 Inquest Transcript. 2-78; 2-82 L17-29. -- 4 of 6 -- 5 [18] Even if that were so, that in itself is not a basis for awarding costs. This is not a jurisdiction in which generally costs follow the event. [19] On the available material, there is no clear indication that the respondent acted in a way that caused unnecessary disadvantage. (b) The nature and complexity of the dispute [20] The complexity of the matter is not in dispute. A significant amount of material was considered by the Coroner. The transcript of the proceeding covered 312 pages. At the Directions Hearing held before the Tribunal on 16 July 2024, the parties indicated that it was anticipated that at the Tribunal Hearing there would be in the order of 10 witness and that the hearing would extend over 3 days. This is a factor to be taken into account. [21] The nature of the dispute is discussed under (f), below, in the context of the role of the respondent as a regulator. (c) The relative strengths of the claims made [22] In retrospect, it is evident that the applicant had a relatively strong case. (d) In review proceedings, whether the applicant was afforded natural justice by the decision-maker and whether genuine attempt to assist decision-maker [23] Other than the circumstance referred to under (a), above, this factor has not been raised by the parties. (e) The financial circumstances of the parties [24] This factor is not addressed in the submissions of the parties. (f) Anything else the Tribunal considers relevant [25] As noted in du Toit, at [7] above, one matter that is relevant is that, by s 43(2)(b) of the QCAT Act, where the proceeding relates to taking disciplinary action there is a right to legal representation. [26] Another factor is the nature of the proceeding. In the present case it involves a review of a decision of a regulator. In Young v Legal Profession Complaints Committee,5 the Western Australia Court of Appeal cited several cases that had considered the award of costs for and against vocational regulatory bodies, including the following comments made in Motor Vehicle Industry Board and Dawson,6 which were made in response to a proposition that an affected person in proceedings brought by a vocational body is entitled to an award of costs for the portion of the proceedings in which they were successful:7 … If this approach were to be adopted, vocational regulatory bodies may well feel inhibited in commencing proceedings that should be commenced and maintained in the public interest even though 'success' cannot be guaranteed. Consequently, the Tribunal considers that, ordinarily, unless it can be demonstrated that an application made by a vocational regulatory body lacked any reasonable basis or was not made in good faith, costs should not be awarded 5 [2022] WASCA 52 [260]. 6 [2006] WASAT 8. 7 Ibid [47]. -- 5 of 6 -- 6 against a vocational regulatory body simply because the application was not successful. [27] In Fuge v Queensland Building and Construction Commission (‘Fuge’) it was stated:8 I reiterate that under the QBCC Act, the Commission has a dual function in administrating the Act. That is, to protect the public interest and also the interests of building contractors. In doing so it must not be reticent in discharging its obligations for fear of adverse costs orders against it if it is unsuccessful in responding to an application for review of its decisions unless it can be demonstrated, there is some specific conduct on the part of the Commission, that would ‘so compellingly’ overcome the strong contra-indication against costs orders in s 100 of the QCAT Act. I am not satisfied that this is the case here. [28] The qualification of the need to ‘so compellingly’ overcome the strong contra- indication against costs, has since been rejected by the Court of Appeal in du Toit. However, the primary observation made in Fuge remains. Consistent with the considerations under s 102(3) QCAT Act and the ‘default position’ of not readily departing from no order as to costs, the fact that a party is a vocational regulator is a factor that should be taken into account. [29] The Court of Appeal in du Toit, at [56]-[58], also considered the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Medical Board of Australia v Wong (‘Wong’),9 which referred to the statutory responsibility of, in that case, the Medical Board for the protection of the public and stated: …It must be kept in mind that the Board has a statutory responsibility for the protection of the public in this context and the fact that the outcome was not that which was sought should not of itself burden the Board with an order for costs, especially in a proceeding in QCAT where the starting position is that prescribed by s 100… [30] In du Toit it is then stated, at [59]: ‘The Court’s decision in Wong simply confirms that the usual rule is as provided in s 100; namely, that each party bear their own cost’. [31] For the reasons outlined, and given the default position of not readily departing from the starting position in s 100 of the QCAT Act that there be no order as to costs, it is not in the interests of justice that costs be awarded in the present case. [32] Accordingly, the application for costs is dismissed. 8 [2014] QCAT 383 [28]. See also Stuart v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 135 [58]. 9 [2017] QCA 42 [37] (McMurdo JA, with whom Morrison JA and Mullins J agreed). -- 6 of 6 --