Bull v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCAT 236

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Bull v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCAT 236 PARTIES: WENDY JOY BULL (applicant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE – WEAPONS LICENSING (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: GAR130-24 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters DELIVERED ON: 27 May 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Cosgrave ORDERS: The Respondent’s application to strike out the Application for Review is dismissed. The Application for Review is to proceed to hearing on 10 June 2026. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – strike out – where Respondent applied under s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) for the Application for Review to be struck out – where Applicant is subject to a Firearm Prohibition Order issued by the Commissioner of Police in New South Wales on 6 October 2021 – whether the New South Wales order is an order that “corresponds to a firearm prohibition order” within s 5D(1)(c) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) as amended with effect from 1 May 2026 – whether the deletion of s 141H and the consequential amendment of s 5D(1)(b) resolves the construction question in the Respondent’s favour – whether the Applicant’s position is arguable – remaining issues as to the meaning of “corresponds”, retrospective operation and discretionary factors – strike out application dismissed. Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 47 -- 1 of 6 -- 2 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), s 5D, s 10, s 10B, s 141G (as amended by the Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld)) Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld), s 55, s 77, s 79, s 80; transitional s 204 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The Applicant, Ms Wendy Joy Bull, applied to the Tribunal under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) for review of a decision of the Respondent refusing her application for a Queensland weapons licence. [2] On 20 February 2025, the Respondent applied for the Application for Review to be struck out under s 47 of the QCAT Act. [3] The Respondent’s case has evolved since its original application. The strike out application is now founded on s 5D(1)(c) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (‘Weapons Act’), as amended by the Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns out of the Hands of Terrorists and Criminals Amendment Act 2026 (Qld) (‘the 2026 Amendments’), which was proclaimed on 1 May 2026. [4] The Respondent contends that Ms Bull is a “disqualified person” within the meaning of s 5D(1)(c) because of a Firearm Prohibition Order (‘FPO’) issued against her in New South Wales on 6 October 2021 by the Commissioner of Police of that State (‘the NSW Order’). The NSW Order remains in force. [5] The deletion of s 141H and the consequential amendment of s 5D(1)(b) of the Weapons Act remove Ms Bull’s strongest arguments against the strike out application. However, Ms Bull still has several arguable grounds. The strike out threshold is not satisfied, and the Respondent’s application is dismissed. Background [6] On 6 October 2021, the NSW Order was served on Ms Bull. The New South Wales Commissioner of Police (or their delegate) made the order under to the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). The order is administrative in character, made ex parte and without notice to Ms Bull, of indefinite duration, and subject to internal review and merits review in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. [7] The Respondent originally relied on s 10(2)(d) of the Weapons Act. The Respondent later invoked s 5D(1)(c), which commenced on 1 September 2025. The 2026 Amendments have since further altered the statutory landscape, taking effect on 1 May 2026, some six weeks before the listed hearing date of 10 June 2026. The strike out threshold [8] The Tribunal’s power to strike out an application under s 47 of the QCAT Act is to be exercised sparingly. An application for review will be struck out only in the clearest -- 2 of 6 -- 3 of cases where an applicant cannot raise even an arguable case. Where a matter turns upon a genuine and unresolved question of statutory construction, or where the issues require evidence and argument at a merits hearing, summary determination is inappropriate. [9] The question for the Tribunal at this stage is not which party’s construction of s 5D ultimately prevails. It is whether the Applicant’s construction is so plainly untenable that the matter should be terminated without a hearing. The amended legislative framework after the 2026 Amendments [10] Prior to 1 May 2026, the Weapons Act contained two regimes for the making of FPOs. Section 141G empowered the Commissioner of Police to make an FPO for a period not exceeding 60 days. Section 141H empowered a court to make an FPO for up to ten years for adults or five years for children. Section 5D(1)(b) confined the disqualifying effect of a Queensland FPO to orders “made under section 141H” – that is, court-issued orders only. A Queensland Commissioner-made FPO under s 141G did not render its subject a “disqualified person”. [11] As of 1 May 2026, the position is materially different. Section 141H has been omitted from the Weapons Act. The Commissioner of Police is now the sole initial decision- maker for all FPOs. Section 141G(4) has been amended so that a Commissioner-made FPO runs for ten years for adults and five years for children – the same fixed periods as the former court-issued orders. The reference to “made under section 141H” has been removed from s 5D(1)(b), which now disqualifies any person who “is or has been subject to a firearm prohibition order” without reference to the maker of the order. [12] Section 5D(1)(c) remains in its original terms. It provides that a disqualified person is a person who: is or has been subject to an order made under a law of another jurisdiction that corresponds to a firearm prohibition order. [13] Section 10B continues to provide that a person who is a disqualified person is not a fit and proper person to hold a weapons licence. The effect of the 2026 Amendments on Ms Bull’s case [14] The deletion of s 141H and the consequential amendment of s 5D(1)(b) remove the strongest part of Ms Bull’s arguments against the strike out application. [15] Under the previous regime, s 5D(1)(b) was expressly anchored in court-made orders, and Ms Bull could argue that “corresponds” in s 5D(1)(c) required correspondence with an order of that judicial character. That argument depended on the structure of s 5D(1)(b) as it then stood. [16] Under the amended Act, that argument is no longer available. Section 5D(1)(b) now captures any Queensland FPO, irrespective of who makes it. There is therefore no longer a basis in the text of s 5D(1)(b) for the proposition that “corresponds” in s 5D(1)(c) requires correspondence with a court-issued order specifically. The Respondent’s “nullity” argument also falls away: with only Commissioner-made FPOs in Queensland, the word “corresponds” can meaningfully compare an interstate order to a Queensland Commissioner-made order. -- 3 of 6 -- 4 [17] The Respondent also relies upon the Explanatory Notes to the 2026 Amendments, which describe the removal of the words “made under section 141H” from s 5D as “a minor technical amendment” that “does not otherwise change the meaning of this section.” The Respondent contends that this confirms that s 5D’s substantive effect was always to capture Commissioner-made interstate FPOs. That is a plausible reading of the Explanatory Notes. [18] For these reasons, the Respondent’s case on the construction question is considerably stronger under the amended and now proclaimed Act than it was beforehand. However, Ms Bull retains three independently arguable grounds. The Tribunal addresses each in turn. Ground 1: the meaning of “corresponds” under the amended Act [19] Even under the amended Act, the word “corresponds” in s 5D(1)(c) is not self- executing. The question remains whether the NSW Order corresponds to a Queensland Commissioner-made FPO. Notwithstanding the greater structural similarity between the two regimes, material differences persist. [20] First, there is a difference in duration. A Queensland Commissioner-made FPO under the amended s 141G runs for a fixed period of ten years for adults or five years for children. The NSW Order is of indefinite duration. Whether an order of indefinite duration “corresponds” to an order of fixed maximum duration is a question of statutory construction that should not be resolved in considering a strike-out application. [21] Second, there are differences in procedural safeguards. The amended s 141I requires a Queensland FPO to include notice to the subject of their right to apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision to make the order. No equivalent protection was afforded prior to the making of the NSW Order. The NSW Order was made ex parte, without notice, on undisclosed intelligence material, with the order’s subject left to seek any subsequent review in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Whether an order made under materially different procedural conditions “corresponds” to a Queensland FPO raises a question of construction that is arguable. [22] Third, the 2026 amendments do not address whether “corresponds” connotes functional correspondence in subject-matter and outcome only, or whether it also requires correspondence in the legal and procedural character of the order. Ms Bull has an arguable case that the word “corresponds” requires more than mere subject- matter overlap. [23] The Explanatory Notes argument advanced by the Respondent is also double-edged. If the amendment “does not otherwise change the meaning” of s 5D, then the provision carried the same meaning before the amendment as after it. That is effectively Ms Bull’s pre-amendment submission: that s 5D(1)(c) was always concerned with correspondence to a Queensland court-issued order, and the deletion of the reference to s 141H was a technical tidying up to remove a now-redundant cross-reference, rather than a substantive change. The Notes cannot simultaneously confirm that the meaning is unchanged and then be relied on to support the proposition that the 2026 Amendments have now resolved the question in the Respondent’s favour. -- 4 of 6 -- 5 Ground 2: temporal application of the amended Act [24] A further arguable question arises as to which version of the Weapons Act governs the Tribunal’s determination. The NSW Order was made in October 2021. The original refusal decision under review predated the 2026 Amendments. The 2026 Amendments commenced on 1 May 2026. [25] On one view, the Tribunal conducting a merits review under the QCAT Act must determine whether the decision under review was correct or preferable by reference to the law and facts as they exist at the time of the hearing, including the amended Act. [26] On another view, the Tribunal’s function is to review the correctness of the original decision by reference to the law as it stood when that decision was made. If this view is correct then the pre-2026 Amendments s 5D, with its anchor to s 141H court-made orders, applies. [27] The correct approach to this temporal question engages principles of statutory construction concerning the retrospective operation of legislation altering individual rights and status. [28] The 2026 Amendments contain no express provision addressing how they apply to applications for review that were already on foot at the date of commencement. The absence of such a transitional provision addressing pending reviews is itself a matter that requires argument and determination. It cannot be resolved on a strike-out. [29] In this regard the Tribunal notes that the transitional provision at s 204 of the 2026 Amendments addresses persons who had been the subject of a former s 141H court- made order, preserving their status as disqualified persons. No equivalent transitional provision expressly addresses the characterisation of pre-commencement interstate orders or their treatment in proceedings already on foot. The gap in the transitional regime itself gives rise to an arguable question. Ground 3: discretionary factors under s 10(2) [30] Even if Ms Bull were ultimately held to be a disqualified person under s 5D, there remain live issues as to the Respondent’s exercise of the discretionary factors under s 10(2) of the Weapons Act in connection with the original refusal decision. Those issues require a merits hearing and cannot be resolved on a strike-out. Conclusion [31] The 2026 Amendments substantially weaken Ms Bull’s position on the merits. The deletion of s 141H and the amendment of s 5D(1)(b) remove the foundation to court- made orders upon which Ms Bull’s principal construction argument rested. The Respondent’s case that the NSW Order corresponds to a Queensland FPO is, under the amended Act, stronger than it was. [32] However, the strike out threshold is not whether the Respondent’s case is the better one. It is whether Ms Bull cannot muster even an arguable case. That threshold is not met. [33] Ms Bull still has at least three arguable grounds: the meaning of “corresponds” under the amended Act remains contested in light of the differences in duration and procedural character between the NSW Order and a Queensland FPO; the temporal question as to which version of the Act governs the review is an unresolved legal -- 5 of 6 -- 6 question; and the Explanatory Notes relied upon by the Respondent cut in both directions rather than settling the matter. [34] The Respondent’s application to strike out the Application for Review is dismissed. The Application for Review is to proceed to hearing on 10 June 2026. -- 6 of 6 --