Cummins Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2026] QCAT 200

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Cummins Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2026] QCAT 200 PARTIES: CUMMINS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD (applicant) v QUEENSLAND BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: GAR101-26 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters DECISION MADE: 5 March 2026 REASONS DELIVERED ON: 30 April 2026 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member Lember ORDERS: The application to extend a time limit filed on 6 February 2026 is refused. The application to review a decision filed on 6 February 2026 is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – where application for review filed out of time – whether to extend time to file application for review – where review process exhausted – where direction under review was outcome of external review process – where application for review was not for a reviewable decision Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601AH Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) s 86, s 86E, s 87, schedule 3 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 3, s 19, s 20, s 24, s 32, s 33, s 47, s 61 Anderson-Barr v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 438 Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman & Anor [2011] QCAT 229 Hansen v QBSA [2012] QCAT 616 -- 1 of 7 -- 2 Jensen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCATA 232 Krishnan v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCAT 63 Pavlovic v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 128 Quinlan v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2019] QCAT 349 The Pot Man Pty Ltd v Reaoch [2011] QCATA 318 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: Respondent: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). McInnes Wilson Lawyers. Submissions were not requested from the respondent. REASONS FOR DECISION Preamble [1] In the ordinary course, applicants are directed to serve initiating applications on responding parties who are then given an opportunity to make submissions on them. For the reasons following, the subject applications were so patently futile that, consistent with its objects of efficiency, cost-effectiveness and informality,1 the Tribunal has decided them without burdening the respondent with the time and costs of making submissions that would not assist the matter to be determined. What is this decision about? [2] On 5 March 2026, the Tribunal refused an application by Cummins Constructions Pty Ltd (‘Cummins’) filed on its behalf by McInnes Wilson Lawyers for an extension of time to file an application for review, and consequently dismissed its application for review that was filed out of time. [3] Reasons for the decision refusing the extension of time to file have been requested by McInnes Wilson Lawyers and they now follow, but, put simply, the application to extend time to file the application for review was refused because the application for review does not seek to review a reviewable decision. Background facts [4] On 23 December 2021, Ms Austin, a homeowner, filed an application to review a decision of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (‘Commission’) made 9 August 2021 not to direct rectification of building work undertaken by Cummins (‘the No DTR decision’). [5] The review of the No DTR decision travelled through the Tribunal as proceeding GAR003-22. 1 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’), 3. -- 2 of 7 -- 3 [6] On 27 August 2024, Judicial Member Isdale set aside the No DTR decision and substituted it with a decision directing rectification. [7] An appeal process concluded on 15 August 2025, with a decision that, again, set aside the 9 August 2021 decision not to direct rectification and substituted it with a decision that directed rectification. [8] As Cummins had been deregistered in 2023, to give effect to any decision made directing rectification, Ms Austin had applied for, and on 7 August 2025 obtained,2 an order of the Supreme Court of Queensland reinstating Cummins’ company registration under s 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). [9] Cummins was reinstated on 22 August 2025 pursuant to that order. The direction of 1 October 2025 is not a reviewable decision [10] On 1 October 2025, the Commission directed rectification in accordance with the Tribunal’s decision of 15 August 2025. That direction is the ‘decision’ that Cummins, through McInnes Wilson Lawyers, purported to review in these proceedings. [11] The 1 October 2025 direction was expressly made under section 72 of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (‘the QBCC Act’) ‘and in accordance with direction 1 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Directions dated 15 August 2025’. [12] Whilst the schedule 3 dictionary to the QBCC Act defines a ‘decision’ of the Commission as including an order or ‘direction’, the direction was made pursuant to a decision of the Tribunal (standing in the shoes of the Commission), following an exhaustive external review process that included an appeal to the Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal. [13] The tribunal’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commission is enlivened by section 87 of the QBCC Act which states that: 87 Application for review A person affected by a reviewable decision of the commission may apply, as provided under the QCAT Act, to the tribunal for a review of the decision. [14] Under section 86E of the QBCC Act, the definition of a reviewable decision for the purposes of a review to the tribunal (external review) is: reviewable decision means— (a) a reviewable decision within the meaning of subdivision 1, other than a decision that was the subject of an internal review under subdivision 1; or (b) an internal review decision within the meaning of subdivision 1. [15] Section 86 of the QBCC Act contains the exhaustive list of reviewable decisions under subdivision 1 and, relevantly, section 86(1)(f) states: 86 Reviewable decisions (c) Each of the following decisions of the commission under this Act is a reviewable decision— 2 Decision of Registrar Gowreah in Supreme Court of Queensland matter no 2651/25. -- 3 of 7 -- 4 … (f) a decision that building work undertaken at the direction of the commission is or is not of a satisfactory standard; [16] Section 19 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the QCAT Act’) stipulates how the tribunal should exercise its review jurisdiction, namely: 19 Exercising review jurisdiction generally In exercising its review jurisdiction, the tribunal— (a) must decide the review in accordance with this Act and the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision being reviewed was made; and (b) may perform the functions conferred on the tribunal by this Act or the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision being reviewed was made; and (c) has all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed. [17] Pursuant to se ction 20(1) of the QCAT Act, the purpose of a review proceeding is to, ‘produce the correct and preferable decision’, which is done ‘by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.’3 [18] On review, section 24(1) limits the power of the Tribunal to: (a) confirming or amending the decision; or (b) setting the decision aside and substituting its own decision; or (c) setting the decision aside and returning the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate. [19] McInnes Wilsons Lawyers’ submissions of 6 February 20264 appear to overlook the express words of section 24(2)(a) that stipulate that the tribunal’s decision to set aside a decision and to substitute its own decision (emphasis added): is taken to be a decision of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision except for the tribunal’s review jurisdiction… [20] In other words, once the Tribunal’s review process, including avenues of appeal, have been exhausted, the process ends. It does not continue in perpetuity, as the applicant appears to request. [21] Pursuant to section 24(2)(a), the 15 August 2025 decision and consequential direction made 1 October 2025 were not reviewable decisions for the purpose of the tribunal’s review jurisdiction. The application to extend time [22] Section 33(3) of the QCAT Act requires that an application to review a ‘reviewable decision’, ‘must be made, by filing it in the registry, within 28 days after the relevant day’. 3 QCAT Act, s 20(2). 4 Paragraphs 27 and 35 in particular. -- 4 of 7 -- 5 [23] The relevant day, for the purpose of this application, is, ‘the day the applicant is notified of the decision’.5 [24] Section 61(1) of the QCAT Act empowers the tribunal to extend time limits and waive compliance with procedural requirements, as an exercise of discretion.6 [25] Assuming that the application to review was of a reviewable decision, the application to extend time would be necessary because Cummin’s review application was filed more twenty-eight days after Cummins received the 1 October 2025 direction. [26] In Crime and Misconduct Commission v Chapman & Anor [2011] QCAT 229 the relevant factors to consider when exercising a section 61 power were identified as:7 (a) whether a satisfactory explanation is shown to account for the delay, (b) the strength of the case the applicant wishes to bring, (c) prejudice to adverse parties, (d) length of the delay, and (e) whether, on balance, it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension. An explanation for the delay & the length of the delay [27] The tribunal has commented as follows on the length of the delay in other matters: (a) Pavlovic v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2020] QCAT 128 at [13] where the Tribunal considered that a delay of six weeks was ‘a considerable delay’, (b) Anderson-Barr v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2018] QCAT 438 at [12] where the Tribunal considered that a delay of six weeks was ‘a considerable delay’, and (c) Quinlan v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2019] QCAT 349 at [23] where the Tribunal considered that a delay of over six months was ‘a very lengthy delay’. [28] The application for review ought to have been filed by 5 November 2025 but it was not filed until 6 February 2025, some three months late. This is a more than considerable delay. [29] In Krishnan v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCAT 63 at [40] the tribunal observed that the length of delay must be viewed in tandem with the account provided for the delay. [30] Cummins says that its sole director, Mr Cummins was holidaying on a cruise ship between 4 October 2025 and 24 October 2025 and did not receive the 1 October letter until 24 October 2025. [31] He then says he was ‘misled’ by the Commission’s letter dated 18 December 2025 into believing that the 1 October direction was not reviewable, was unable to contact 5 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the QCAT Act’), s 33(4)(a). 6 Hansen v QBSA [2012] QCAT 616, [6]. 7 At [9]. -- 5 of 7 -- 6 his lawyer at McInnes Wilson until 19 January 2026 ‘given the Christmas break’ and then his lawyer was unwell between 20 and 27 January 2026. [32] It is trite to say that the information given to Cummins on 18 December 2025 was correct – the 1 October 2025 direction was not reviewable. [33] In any event, Cummins’ explanations are, respectfully, flimsy, at best: (a) The 1 October 2025 direction was the outcome of a four-year process issued pursuant to the 15 August 2025 Tribunal decision to direct rectification. (b) It follows that Cummins knew or ought to have known it was coming and, if the sole director of Cummins wished to travel shortly after the company was reinstated, he ought to have made alternate arrangements for company correspondence to be monitored in his absence. (c) Cummins have not explained why it did not refer the 1 October 2025 letter to its lawyer between 24 October 2025 and 18 December 2025 when it says it then relied on the Commission’s information that the ‘decision’ was not reviewable to take no further action. (d) McInnes Wilson Lawyers are not a sole-practitioner practice, by any means. Cummins has not explained why steps could not be taken by it through that firm to obtain advice and to protect its interests between 18 December 2025 and 19 January 2026, given Christmas shut-downs do not, even for QCAT Registry, typically endure for an entire month. [34] In The Pot Man Pty Ltd v Reaoch [2011] QCATA 318 at [9], the Appeal Tribunal observed that: The QCAT statutory regime itself places obligations upon parties to take care in their dealings with Tribunal matters and to act in their own best interests. [35] In Jensen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCATA 232 Member Traves (as she then was) observed that, ‘the 28-day time limit is there for a reason’.8 With this in mind, it is fair for the parties to expect that these timeframes will be followed, and if they are not, that the proceeding will not proceed. [36] Cummins has not acted in its own interests. The delay is more than considerable and the explanation for the delay is entirely inadequate. These factors do not favour granting Cummins an extension of time. Strength of the case of the applicant’s case [37] The application for review did not seek to review a reviewable decision and was groundless and futile from the outset. Had an extension of time been granted, the application for review would likely be struck out on tribunal-initiative – if not on an application by the Commission - pursuant to section 47 of the QCAT Act. This does not favour granting an extension of time to file. Prejudice to adverse parties [38] Putting any party, in this case, including the homeowner, as an affected party, and the Commission to the cost of responding to a futile application would be to expose them 8 At [94]. -- 6 of 7 -- 7 to unnecessary time, resource and cost burdens and, in this case, to the trauma of continuing a five-year review process without merit. This does not favour granting an extension of time. Whether it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension [39] It is not in the interests of justice to commit the parties’ or tribunal’s resources to the pursuit of a futile application for review. Outcome [40] In the circumstances and for the reasons given: (a) The application to extend a time limit filed on 6 February 2026 is refused. (b) The application to review a decision filed on 6 February 2026 is dismissed. -- 7 of 7 --