Colt v Director-General, Department of Justice (Blue Card Services) [2026] QCAT 140

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Colt v Director-General, Department of Justice (Blue Card Services) [2026] QCAT 140 PARTIES: JAMES GEOFFREY COLT (A PSEUDONYM) (Applicant) v DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (BLUE CARD SERVICES) (Respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: CML380-23 MATTER TYPE: Childrens matters DELIVERED ON: 26 March 2026 HEARING DATE: 2 December 2025 DECISION OF: Dr R W Haddrick, Member ORDER: 1. The application filed by the Applicant on 4 December 2024 to review the decision is allowed. 2. Pursuant to s 24 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the decision of the Respondent, made on 19 October 2023, to issue the Applicant with a negative notice pursuant to s 221 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) is set aside. 3. Pursuant to s 24 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the decision of the Respondent, made on 19 October 2023, to issue the Applicant with a negative notice pursuant to s 221 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) is substituted with a decision that the Applicant is not an “exceptional case” for the purposes of s 221 of that statute. 4. Pursuant to s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the identity of the Applicant shall be anonymised, and the Applicant will be identified in the reasons for decision by way of a pseudonym. 5. Pursuant to s 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administration Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the publication of: -- 1 of 14 -- (a) the contents of a document, or other thing, produced to the Tribunal; and (b) evidence given before the Tribunal; is prohibited to that extent that it could identify, or lead to identification of, the Applicant, or any third party, save as is necessary for the parties and the Tribunal to give effect to these orders. CATCHWORDS: WORKING WITH CHILDREN CLEARANCE – ISSUANCE OF A NEGATIVE NOTICE – ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT – allegations of sexual misconduct made in the context of a personal injuries claim – the compromise of a personal injury claim where the alleged perpetrator was not involved in the compromise of the civil claim – what relevance is the issuance of a compromise notice upon the finding of facts – allegations of sexual misconduct made where the alleger is not called as a witness, nor has the alleger made any complaint to the police Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 16, s 17 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24, s 28, s 66, s 164 Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), s 221, s 228 Briginshaw v Briginshaw & Anor (1938) 60 CLR 336 BJM v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 372 Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v FGC [2011] QCATA 291 TNC v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency [2015] QCAT 489 Volkers v Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian [2010] QCAT 243 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Mr C Bowman of counsel for the Applicant, instructed by Sunshine Coast Legal Pty Ltd. Mr T Janes, Advocacy Officer for the Respondent. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction [1] This application for the review will be allowed. As will become apparent in these reasons, the Tribunal is critical of the basis upon which the Respondent decided that the disclosed information in respect of the Applicant constituted an exceptional case. Given the decision that this Tribunal has arrived at, and the basis for arriving at that decision, this Tribunal has formed the view that the Applicant ought to enjoy anonymity. It is for that reason that it will be an order of this Tribunal that the Applicant be anonymised, and that a pseudonym be used to refer to the Applicant. -- 2 of 14 -- The Tribunal has also sought in these reasons to not use real names, or other information that would identify the Applicant, the schools that he worked at, or other persons involved in the dispute. [2] The Applicant has had an almost 40-year career as a teacher. He was issued with a working with children exemption (otherwise known as a “Blue Card”) on 10 February 2021. The Applicant made self-disclosures to the Respondent agency on 8 July 2021, 25 August 2021, 18 July 2022 and 26 September 2022. As a consequence of those disclosures, on 19 October 2023 the Respondent cancelled the Applicant’s Blue Card, and issued the Applicant with a negative notice under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) (the “WWC Act”). [3] In short, the Respondent’s delegated decision-maker determined that they were satisfied that there is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children to issue a working with children exemption to the Applicant, pursuant to s 221(2)(b) of the WWC Act (as in force at the time). And therefore, the delegate was required to issue a negative notice to the Applicant pursuant to s 221(1) of the WWC Act. The issuance of the negative notice was the decision (the “Decision”) which was the subject of challenge in this proceeding. [4] On 28 November 2023, the Applicant applied for a review of the Decision by filing an application to review in this Tribunal, pursuant to s 354 of the WWC Act. Background [5] The Applicant is a person who previously held a working with children exemption (or Blue Card). The Applicant has worked (on and off) as a teacher in the non- government secondary schools sector for more than 40 years. [6] On 19 October 2023, the Respondent cancelled the Applicant’s working with children exemption. That is, the Applicant’s Blue Card was cancelled. The Respondent issued the Applicant with a negative notice under the WWC Act. [7] The reason for the Respondent’s exercise of power to issue a negative notice (thereby cancelling the Applicant’s Blue Card) was because the Applicant self- reported to the Respondent that he (the Applicant) had been named in a civil matter alleging that he had “abused someone while working as a House Tutor” at a non- government school (the “School”) in South-East Queensland in the early 1980’s. [8] The Applicant became aware that he was named as a perpetrator in a personal injury claim brought by a former student (the “Claimant”) of the School against the corporate entity that employed the Applicant in the school (the “Employing Entity”). [9] In the personal injury claim, the Claimant was a resident of a boarding house attached to the School, and the Applicant was a residential tutor in that boarding house. In addition to being a residential tutor in the boarding house, the Applicant was also at the time a student of a South-East Queensland university. [10] The Claimant in the personal injury claim alleges that the Applicant engaged in the following conduct (the “Alleged Conduct”): (a) the Applicant groomed the Claimant including befriending the Claimant, “turning a blind eye” to the Claimant’s smoking, allowing the Claimant to smoke, and supplying the Claimant with alcohol; (b) the Applicant supplied the Claimant with Serepax tablets; -- 3 of 14 -- (c) the Applicant anally raped the Claimant on at least six occasions; and (d) on at least two occasions when the Applicant raped the Claimant, an unidentified male perpetrator held the Claimant’s head down, put his penis on the Claimant’s lips and face, then masturbated “into the Claimant’s face and ejaculated on the Claimant’s lips, cheek and in his hair”. [11] In 2024, the Claimant brought a claim under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (the “PIPA”). The Claimant sought against the Employing Entity damages for the alleged historical sexual abuse which he (the Claimant) alleges that the Applicant subjected the Claimant to in the early 1980’s. The cause of the action in the claim is one of negligence; alleging that the Employing Entity failed to have in place at the School (in essence): (a) systems protecting the Claimant, and a level of supervision of the residential tutors; and (b) “an environment that encouraged students to report misbehavior by boarding house masters”. [12] Alternatively, the Claimant alleged that the Employer Entity was vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, the Applicant, who had “the benefit of access to and control over the Claimant as his boarding house master” at the School. [13] It is important to note that the Applicant was not, at any stage, made a party to the personal injury claim. It is also important to observe that: (a) at no time was the Applicant the subject of any complaint to the police in respect of any alleged criminal conduct; (b) the Applicant vehemently denied (and continues to deny) the allegations made by the Claimant in the personal injury claim; (c) the Claimant and the Employing Entity reached a compromise – or a settlement – of the personal injury claim, without there being any findings by any court or tribunal that the Applicant engaged in any of the alleged criminal conduct; (d) the Applicant was not a party (or participant) in the agreement between the Claimant and the Employing Entity to compromise the personal injury claim; (e) there was no admission of guilt or liability made by the Employing Entity in compromising the personal injury claim; (f) the Applicant has never been approached, or been contacted by, the police in relation to the Claimant’s allegations; (g) the Applicant has no criminal record; (h) the Applicant has adduced excellent character references as part of this application to review the decision of the Respondent – references of long standing, senior and highly qualified leaders of other non-government schools that the Applicant has worked at; who are persons (and their spouses) who have personally known the Applicant for many years (indeed, decades) and attest to his good character; -- 4 of 14 -- (i) the Applicant only became aware of the Claimant’s allegations when the solicitors for the Employing Entity contacted the Applicant and asked him for his response to the allegations; and (j) importantly, the Claimant was not called as a witness by the Respondent, and the Applicant has not had an opportunity to put to the Claimant a variety of inconsistencies or improbable aspects in the Claimant’s version of events. [14] In making these observations, the Tribunal notes that the Applicant provided significant testimony in relation to the way in which the boarding house was run, and its physical structure, in the early 1980’s that the Applicant says demonstrates the implausibility of the allegations made by the Claimant. This testimony, and information, might very well be correct, and of significant probative value, but it has limited utility as there was no opportunity for the Applicant to put his case to the Claimant who made the complaint about the Applicant’s conduct approximately 45 years ago. Legislative framework [15] This is an application for review of the Decision. The Tribunal is invested with original, review and appellate jurisdiction. The review jurisdiction is an authority to stand in the shoes of the original decision-maker and decide afresh (either on existing or using fresh or new evidence) the “correct and preferrable” decision. [16] Pursuant to s 625 of the WWC Act currently in force, the review application must be determined according to the provisions of the WWC Act, as in force on 26 May 2025. The legislation has subsequently been amended. [17] At the relevant time, s 221 of the pre-amended WWC Act provided, in part: 221 Deciding application—no relevant information or conviction etc. for non-serious offence (1) The chief executive must issue a working with children clearance to the person if the chief executive— (a) is not aware of any relevant information about the person; or (b) is not required to issue a negative notice to the person under subsection (2). (2) The chief executive must issue a negative notice to the person if the chief executive— (a) is aware of relevant information about the person; and (b) is satisfied it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children for the chief executive to issue a working with children clearance to the person. [18] Subsection 221(3) of the pre-amended WWC Act then provided: (3) For subsections (1) and (2), the following information about the person is relevant information— (a) information that the person has— (i) a charge for an offence other than a disqualifying offence; or -- 5 of 14 -- (ii) a charge for a disqualifying offence that has been dealt with other than by a conviction; or Note— For charges for disqualifying offences that have not been dealt with, see chapter 7, part 4, division 4 and sections 199, 295(1) and 296. (iii) a conviction for an offence other than a serious offence; (b) investigative information; (c) domestic violence information; (d) disciplinary information; (e) adverse interstate WWC information; (f) other information about the person that the chief executive reasonably believes is relevant to deciding whether it would be in the best interests of children for the chief executive to issue a working with children clearance to the person. [19] The legislative scheme is advanced by the requirements of s 228 of the WWC Act, which provided (as at the relevant date), in part: 228 Deciding exceptional case if other relevant information exists (1) This section applies if the chief executive— (a) is deciding whether or not there is an exceptional case for the person; and (b) is aware of— … (iv) other information about the person that the chief executive reasonably believes is relevant to deciding whether it would be in the best interests of children for the chief executive to issue a working with children clearance to the person. (2) The chief executive must have regard to the following matters in relation to the information— … (d) if the chief executive is aware of other information about the person mentioned in subsection (1)—the nature of the information, including the circumstances and gravity of the behaviour or conduct the subject of the information; (e) the length of time that has passed since the event or conduct the subject of the information occurred; (f) the relevance of the information to employment, or carrying in a business, that involves or may involve children; (g) anything else relating to the information that the chief executive reasonably believes is relevant to the assessment of the person. -- 6 of 14 -- [20] In considering this application for review, it is important to appreciate the Tribunal’s task. The Tribunal is exercising its review jurisdiction. The Tribunal must decide, the review in accordance with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (the “QCAT Act”) and the WWC Act. The Tribunal “may perform the … functions conferred on the Tribunal by the [QCAT Act] or the [WWC Act]”.1 The Tribunal “has all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed”.2 The task of the Tribunal is “to produce the correct and preferable decision”,3 and the Tribunal “must hear and decide [the] review of [the] reviewable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits”.4 The Tribunal is empowered to confirm or amend the decision, set aside the decision and substitute its own decision, or set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-maker with any direction that the Tribunal considers appropriate.5 [21] In exercising this jurisdiction, the Tribunal is commanded to “act fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case”.6 The Tribunal is also commanded to “observe the rules of natural justice” and is not bound by the rules of evidence.7 [22] The text and scheme of the WWC Act provides a statutory balancing of two completing legislative purposes. First, the need to protect children from risk of harm. Second, the balancing of this purpose against the legislative intent that all citizens have from being adversely restricted in their activities or a diminution of their public standing. The scheme of the WWC Act strikes this balance. The balance is principally reflected in the operation of s 221 which commands the issuance of a Blue Card (note, “must issue …” in sub-s 221(1)) where the decision-maker “is not aware of any relevant information about the person” or “is not required to issue a negative notice”. [23] In respect of the second limb – the “not required to issue a negative notice” limb – this limb of the test that animates the scheme is that the decision-maker must issue a negative notice if the decision-maker “is aware of relevant information about the person” and the decision-maker “is satisfied it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children for the chief executive to issue a working with children clearance to the person”. Put simply, it is an “exceptional case” if the decision-maker is aware of any relevant information and the decision- maker is satisfied that “the best interests of children” is served by a negative notice being issued. It is “exceptional” in the sense that the case is an exception to the starting position that the Blue Card “must” be issued. [24] Working on the assumption that sub-s 228(1)(b)(iv) of the WWC Act is engaged (and it must having regard to the Alleged Conduct), in deciding whether there is an exceptional case, this Tribunal must have regard to the matters set out in sub-s 228(2)(d) to (g) inclusive. 1 QCAT Act s 19(b). 2 Ibid s 19(c). 3 Ibid s 20(1). 4 Ibid s 20(2). 5 Ibid s 24(1). 6 Ibid s 28(2). 7 Ibid s 28(3)(a), (b). -- 7 of 14 -- [25] In summary, as correctly submitted by the Applicant, the starting position is that notwithstanding the existence of any relevant information, the Applicant is entitled to be issued with a working with children clearance unless it is an exceptional case. As Member Taylor in BJM v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney- General8 said: If that starting position stood without exception, then it would be in order for me to set aside the Decision. However, it is that exception which looms large in these sorts of matters. It is that the starting position is subject to the exception that if I am satisfied that it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children for the applicant to be issued with such a clearance, then a negative notice must be issued and so it would be in order for me to confirm the Decision. That is, the exceptional case in this context is one that does not conform to the general rule, the rule being that a working with children clearance must issue thereby allowing the applicant to be issued with a Blue Card. But the [WWC Act] does not define an exceptional case, and it has been held that it is a matter of fact and degree to be decided in each case having regard to the interests of children. As it was expressed in Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian v FGC [2011] QCATA 291 in reference to the predecessor legislation to the [WWC Act]: It is to be accepted that phrases like ‘exceptional case’ must be considered in the context of the legislation which contains them, the intent and purpose of that legislation, and the interests of the persons whom it is here, quite obviously, designed to protect: (sic) children. There is, however, nothing in the Commission Act which gives apparent support to the special meaning or construction suggested in OAA and, in the Queensland Supreme Court, Philippides J has said that: ‘... it would be most unwise to lay down any general rule with regard to what is an exceptional case ... All these matters are matters of discretion’. We accept that the phrase is to be read in the particular context of the legislation in which it occurs, but are not persuaded that the legislature intended to give it a meaning which was special, or unusual. It is a term of common use in everyday language. The proper approach to it is that, with respect, adopted by Philippides J: to consider its application in each particular case, unhampered by any special meaning or interpretation. The Respondent’s Position [26] In its closing submissions, the Respondent submitted that this is an exceptional case (warranting the issuance of a negative notice) because of the following seven reasons. [27] First, the Respondent says that the allegations that constitute the alleged conduct “cannot be dismissed as entirely lacking in merit or substance”. That said, the Respondent qualifies this submission by saying that the Respondent “does not seek that the Tribunal, make findings of fact that the [Alleged Conduct] occurred”. The 8 [2022] QCAT 372. -- 8 of 14 -- Respondent justifies these submissions by observing that the Applicant did work in the School at the relevant time, and some of the Claimant’s descriptions of the boarding house are “very similar”. [28] The Respondent acknowledges that the Claimant “openly admits matters that are adverse to [the Claimant’s] credibility, such as his use of illicit drugs both prior to and after the alleged abuse occurred”. [29] The Respondent points out that the Applicant was served with a contribution notice under s 16(1) of the PIPA on 15 March 2022, which, in the submissions of the Respondent, “may indicate that the school had reasons to believe the allegations, at least to some extent, were capable of substantiation”. [30] Second, the Respondent submits that “the Tribunal may place weight upon the allegations without making findings of fact as to whether the [Alleged Conduct] occurred”. After reciting passages from TNC v Chief Executive Officer, Public Safety Business Agency9 and Volkers v Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian,10 the Respondent submitted that “regardless of whether the allegations are capable substantiation, the risk posed by the allegations is significant”. [31] Third, the Alleged Conduct is highly relevant to engaging in child-related employment, and is a relevant consideration pursuant to s 228(2)(d) of the WWC Act. [32] Fourth, s 228(2)(e) of the WWC Act requires the length of time that has passed since the Alleged Conduct occurred to be considered. Despite some 45 years or so having passed since the time attributed to the Alleged Conduct, the Respondent submitted that “the passage of time is not, in itself, conclusive evidence that the risk of harm to children is reduced particularly given the child-related nature of the allegations”. [33] Fifth, a report prepared by Ms Helen Neighbour, a psychologist, prepared for the Applicant’s case, ought to be given “reduce[d] weight”. [34] Sixth, the evidence given by one of the Applicant’s lay witnesses should be given “reduce[d] weight”. [35] Seventh, “the nature and gravity of the risk raised, gives rise to considerations surrounding community expectations”. Whilst making this obvious point, the Respondent doesn’t appear to explain what the Tribunal is to make of this submission, save for observing that “the community has an expectation that persons who have unfettered and unrestricted access to children are safe individuals who do not have allegations of child sexual abuse made against them, even if those allegations are untested”. [36] Prior to the hearing, the Respondent filed written submissions that included two further submissions; submissions that were expressly withdrawn in the Respondent’s post-hearing submissions. For clarity, here is paragraph 17 of the Respondent’s written submissions, filed on 31 March 2025: 9 [2015] QCAT 489. 10 [2010] QCAT 243. -- 9 of 14 -- 17. Aspects of the allegations are supported or corroborated by the material before the Tribunal. The allegations are neither implausible, fantastical, or fanciful, nor so lacking in merit or substance that the claim was dismissed entirely. Rather, the: a) claimant chose to pursue the claim; b) solicitors chose to accept instructions to pursue the claimant’s claim; c) [the Employing Entity] served a contribution notice on the Applicant; and d) [the Employing Entity] chose to compromise (rather than defend) the claim. [Footnotes omitted] [37] In the Respondent’s post-hearing submissions, at paragraph 25, the Respondent said: 25. The Respondent clarifies that it does not continue to rely upon: (a) the statements at paragraphs [17(b)] or [17(c)] of its submissions as being relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the weight that may be placed on the allegations; and (b) the sentencing remarks in the matter of R v Griffiths at paragraph [20(c)] of the outline of submissions. [Footnotes omitted; original underlying] [38] That is, the Respondent’s two further submissions are that it no longer presses paragraphs 17(b) and 17(c) of the Respondent’s initial written submissions, filed 31 March 2025. [39] The Tribunal needs to make some observations about the Respondent’s submissions regarding paragraphs 17(b), (c) and (d) of the 31 March 2025 submissions. Paragraph 17(b) [40] As just identified, the Respondent, a senior officer of the Queensland Government has, through their delegate, submitted to this Tribunal (which is a court of record11) that the Alleged Conduct ought not be seen as implausible, fantastical or fanciful, nor so lacking in merit or substance because the solicitors acting for an alleged victim of abuse “chose to accept instructions to pursue the Claimant’s claim”. Think about that for a moment. This Tribunal (a court) is asked to conclude that the Alleged Conduct allegations are supported or corroborated by the fact that some lawyer, or lawyers, “chose” to take their client’s instructions, and “pursue” the client’s claim. This submission is so ridiculous, as to be offensive. Such a submission should not be made by legal practitioners. And it most certainly should not be made by a Director-General of a State government department. The fact that a person engages lawyers to advance their interest does not, of itself, constitute probative evidence of the truth of the allegations made by that person. Within an ethical framework, lawyers act on instructions. Their retention by a client is not proof of the honesty of the person’s allegation. 11 QCAT Act s 164(1). -- 10 of 14 -- [41] It was ridiculous for the Respondent to make this submission in the submissions filed on 31 March 2025. Paragraph 17(c) [42] Paragraph 17(c) is no longer pressed. This was a sensible and appropriate concession. The fact that a contribution notice had been issued does not, of itself, assist in the assessment of the truth. There are many reasons why a contribution notice might be issued under s 16 of the PIPA. It would not be appropriate for this Tribunal to attempt to look behind the reasons why a party to a personal injury claim issued a contribution notice. Implicitly, the Applicant’s response to the contribution notice (required under s 17(2)(a) of the PIPA), contained a denial of the Alleged Conduct. It is one thing to have regard to admissions or denials (if made) by the Applicant in the contribution notice process; it is quite another thing to have regard the mental processes of a respondent to a personal injury claim deciding to issue a contribution notice to a third party (under s 16 of the PIPA). There is no probative value in examining the reason(s) why a contribution notice was issued to a person said to be “a contributor”. Paragraph 17(d) [43] Paragraph 17(d) has not been withdrawn. It is not mentioned in paragraph 25 of the Respondent’s post-hearing submissions. The Tribunal must conclude that the Respondent continues to press paragraph 17(d) of the submissions filed on 31 March 2025. [44] The submission contained in paragraph 17(d) is irrational and does not assist this Tribunal. A party may choose to compromise, or settle, a civil claim for a variety of reasons. One reason might be that the party believes that there is factual truth in the substance of the claim. A second reason is that the terms of the proposed compromise are attractive to that party, in the sense that the terms are better than that party thinks it might achieve at the end of a trial. A third reason is that the party thinks that the cost of pressing or defending the claim is, at that point in time, or in the future, going to outweigh the litigation costs associated with pressing or defending that claim – that is, for a commercial reason. The reasoning (for settling) might include one or more of these factors. This Tribunal can never know what the true thinking was behind the decision to compromise a claim. This is even harder when one of the parties is, as the Employing Entity is, a corporate entity that is likely to have a number of internal steps or processes, involved in making a decision to compromise a claim. [45] It is absurd for the Respondent to submit to this Tribunal that the Alleged Conduct can be “supported or corroborated” by the fact that the Employing Entity “chose to compromise (rather than defend) this claim”. [46] The Tribunal raised this submission at the hearing on 2 December 2025, and invited the Respondent to reflect upon these propositions. The fact that other submissions have been abandoned, but paragraph 17(d) has not been abandoned, defies credulity. Surely, the Respondent’s officers know that a decision to settle a civil claim cannot be used as evidence of proof of the claim before a tribunal or court? Consideration [47] This Tribunal has considered the nature of the information (that is, the contents of the Alleged Conduct), including the gravity of the behaviour alleged. Consistent -- 11 of 14 -- with s 228 of the WWC Act, the Tribunal has considered the length of time since the alleged events that constitute the Alleged Conduct are said to have occurred (the early 1980’s). The Tribunal has also considered the relevancy of the Alleged Conduct to the Applicant’s employment as a teacher, or at educational institutions, and his proximity to children. [48] The Tribunal has concluded that this is not an exceptional case as warranting the issuance of a negative notice pursuant to s 221 of the WWC Act. The Tribunal arrives at this assessment because: (a) the allegations against the Applicant which are said to constitute the Alleged Conduct have not been tested in any tribunal or court; (b) the allegations against the Applicant which are said to constitute the Alleged Conduct have not been the subject of any complaint or report to the police; (c) the Applicant played no role in settling the civil claim brought against (not him, but) the Employing Entity; (d) the allegations relate to conduct that was said to have occurred when the Applicant was barely an adult himself; (e) the Applicant presents before this Tribunal as a person with an unblemished professional record, and is not, to the Tribunal’s knowledge, suspected of other allegations of misconduct; and (f) there are aspects of the Claimant’s allegations that are questionable, or, to better express the point, the Claimant’s version of events is open to challenge, and the reliability of the Claimant’s allegations that the Alleged Conduct occurred are the subject of serious challenge. Through the effluxion of time (since the alleged events), and the Claimant’s admitted drug use at the time, the Tribunal cannot conclude that the Claimant’s version of events is reliable enough to warrant a finding that the Applicant is a risk to children. [49] Additionally, and as a separate fact-finding exercise to the findings identified in the paragraph supra, the Tribunal additionally considered the application of the Briginshaw principle12 to the evidence. Having regard to the gravity of the findings that are pressed by the Respondent to be made by the Tribunal, the Tribunal cannot conclude that there is cogent proof that the Applicant has engaged in the Alleged Conduct. The seriousness of the allegations warrants a state of reasonable satisfaction that does not rely upon inexact proof or indefinite testimony. In this case, there has been no testimony at all from the alleged victim; meaning that such a serious finding of fact (that the Applicant engaged in the Alleged Conduct) should not be made. [50] Furthermore, during the hearing, the Applicant advanced a detailed case identifying a variety of facts (or features) which were advanced so as to lead this Tribunal to conclude that the Claimant’s allegations are untrue, or likely to be untrue. As the Tribunal has noted supra, the Claimant did not give evidence in the hearing. It is very difficult for the Tribunal to consider (or properly engage with) the minutiae of the alleged facts advanced by the Applicant in the absence of the Claimant, or the 12 Briginshaw v Briginshaw & Anor (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361–2. -- 12 of 14 -- Respondent being in a position to cavil with the truth or otherwise of the Applicant’s assertions. [51] Ultimately, it is important to note that the question for the Tribunal was whether (consistent with s 221(2)(b) of the WWC Act) the Tribunal “is satisfied it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children for the chief executive to issue a working with children clearance to the person”. That “satisfied”, or state of satisfaction, is an ultimate finding, which must itself be based upon findings of fact. And it is the opinion of the Tribunal that those underlying findings of fact (considering whether there is truth, or likely to be truth, in the allegations relating to the Alleged Conduct) are unable to be proven – meaning that the Tribunal cannot conclude that this is an “exceptional case” warranting the issuance of a negative notice. Form of the Orders Sought [52] The Applicant seeks an order that the Decision of the delegate of the Director- General, Department of Justice, dated 19 October 2023, that the Applicant’s case is “exceptional” within the meaning of section 221(2) of the WWC Act, is set aside and substituted with a decision that the Applicant’s case is not an exceptional case, and that the negative notice issued pursuant to s 221 of the WWC Act be set aside. This Tribunal will make these orders. [53] As the Tribunal has observed at the outset, this is a matter that the Applicant ought to be anonymised in respect of. The Tribunal has a real scepticism as to the likelihood of the Alleged Conduct, and given that the allegations that constitute the Alleged Conduct have not been the subject of a complaint to the police, and have not been satisfactorily tested in any way before this Tribunal (or any other curial body), the Applicant can rightfully ask for his reputation to be protected and for this set of reasons to be anonymised. The Tribunal finds (consistent with s 66(2) of the QCAT Act) that it is in the interests of justice that the Applicant is not identified using his correct name. The Tribunal concludes that it would be contrary to the public interest and not in the interests of justice for the Applicant, the School, or the various witnesses to be identified. Pursuant to s 66 of the QCAT Act there will be an order requiring the use of a pseudonym for the Applicant’s name in the published reasons. There will also be an order to the effect that in respect of the application to review a decision filed on 4 December 2023, the publication of: (a) the contents of a document, or other thing, produced to the Tribunal; and (b) evidence given before the Tribunal; is prohibited to that extent that it could identify or lead to identification of the Applicant, or any third party, save as is necessary for the parties and the Tribunal to engage in, and progress the matter. A final point [54] As can be seen in these reasons, the Tribunal is critical of some of the submissions advanced by the Respondent. The Respondent’s delegate exercised the power to make the Decision. And the Respondent was named in the proceeding as the contradictor to the application. Clearly, whilst the Respondent’s written submissions were signed-off by the Respondent – in the sense that they were signed “per: Director-General, Department of Justice”, the Respondent’s written submissions were clearly authored by another, or others. -- 13 of 14 -- [55] During the hearing Mr Janes appeared for the Respondent. He described his title as “Advocacy Officer”. The Tribunal understood Mr Janes to be a legal practitioner. The Tribunal asked Mr Janes about the contents of paragraphs 17(b), (c), and (d) of the Respondent’s submissions filed 31 March 2025. The Tribunal pressed Mr Janes on whether he was the author of those written submissions. Mr Janes said he was not. Lest it be said that the Tribunal was being critical of Mr Janes; it is not. Mr Janes admirably sought to defend those submissions, and the reference to R v Griffiths in the written submissions. There is no criticism made of Mr Janes. The Tribunal further pressed Mr Janes to identify the author, or authors, of those submissions. Dutifully, and perhaps reluctantly, Mr Janes answered the Tribunal’s question, and identified the two officers who he understood were, or might have been, the authors of those impugned submissions. As those persons were not in attendance at the hearing on 2 December 2025 to explain to the Tribunal why they made those submissions, they will not be identified in these reasons, and no adverse comment is made against them. Orders of the Tribunal [56] The orders of the Tribunal are that: 1. The application filed by the Applicant on 4 December 2024 to review the Decision is allowed. 2. Pursuant to s 24 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the decision of the Respondent, made on 19 October 2023, to issue the Applicant with a negative notice pursuant to s 221 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) is set aside. 3. Pursuant to s 24 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the decision of the Respondent, made on 19 October 2023, to issue the Applicant with a negative notice pursuant to s 221 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) is substituted with a decision that the Applicant is not an “exceptional case” for the purposes of s 221 of that enactment. 4. Pursuant to s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the identity of the Applicant shall be anonymised, and the Applicant will be identified in the reasons for decision by way of a pseudonym. 5. Pursuant to s 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administration Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the publication of: (a) the contents of a document, or other thing, produced to the Tribunal; and (b) evidence given before the Tribunal; is prohibited to that extent that it could identify, or lead to identification of, the Applicant, or any third party, save as is necessary for the parties and the Tribunal to give effect to these orders. -- 14 of 14 --