Crime and Corruption Commission v Acting Detective Superintendent Christopher Hansel [2026] QCAT 50

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Crime and Corruption Commission v Acting Detective Superintendent Christopher Hansel [2026] QCAT 50 PARTIES: CRIME AND CORRUPTION COMMISSION (applicant) v ACTING DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT CHRISTOPHER HANSEL (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: OCR112-25 MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters DELIVERED ON: 2 February 2026 HEARD AT: On the papers DECISION OF: Member Auld ORDERS: The decision of Acting Detective Superintendent Christopher Hansel dated 17 April 2025 is set aside. The Tribunal directs that the matter return to the Commissioner of Police and further directs that: (a) The Former Officer be given a written notice under section 7A.3(1)(a) of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) (“PSA Act”); and (b) A disciplinary hearing be held under section 7A.3(1)(b) of the PSA Act. CATCHWORDS: POLICE – INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION – DISCIPLINE FOR MISCONDUCT – where the former officer was charged with domestic violence related offences, where the former office was dismissed on medical grounds – where the Respondent decided not to commence a disciplinary declaration process – where the Crime and Corruption Commission applied for a review of the decision. Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 219BA, s 219FA, s 219H, s 219JA Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 7A.1, s 7A.2, s 7A.3, s 8.3(4) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 9(1), s 17, s 19 Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115 -- 1 of 7 -- 2 REASONS FOR DECISION Background [1] The Applicant, being the Crime and Corruption Commission, has applied for a review of a decision of the Respondent of 17 April 2025 not to commence disciplinary proceedings against a now former Police Officer (“the Decision”) (“the Former Officer”).1 [2] The Application is made under section 219JA of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) (“the CC Act”). The Applicant seeks that the Tribunal set aside the Respondent’s decision of 17 April 2025 not to commence a disciplinary declaration against the Former Officer, as well as further ancillary orders. [3] Pursuant to section 219FA(6) of the CC Act, the parties to a proceeding are to be the Crime and Corruption Commission (the Applicant in this case), the person who made the reviewable decision (being the Respondent in this case), and if the Former Officer to whom the reviewable decision relates elects to become a party to the proceeding, the former officer. [4] It is noted that the Former Officer was removed as a respondent in these proceedings by order of the Tribunal on 26 August 2025 as a result of the Former Officer declining to notify the parties in accordance with section 219FA(7) of the CC Act. Legislative framework [5] The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“the QCAT Act”) provides that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to deal with matters that it is empowered to deal with under the QCAT Act, or an enabling Act.2 [6] The Applicant seeks a review under section 219FA of the CC Act, being an enabling act for a review of a “reviewable decision” as defined in section 219BA(1)(c) of the CC Act. [7] The Respondent’s decision is a “reviewable decision” as it was a decision under section 219BA(1)(c) of the CC Act. [8] That section provides that a decision under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) (“the PSA Act”), part 7A to do neither of the following, amounts to a reviewable decision: (a) Give the former officer a written notice under section 7A.3(1)(a) of the PSA Act; (b) Hold a disciplinary hearing under section 7A.3(1)(b) of that Act.3 1 On 9 September 2025, the Tribunal made an order under section 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) that the identity of the former officer, subject of the Respondent’s decision under review not be identified. The former officer will be referred to as the Former Officer in this decision. 2 QCAT Act s 9(1). 3 CC Act s 219BA(1)(c). -- 2 of 7 -- 3 [9] It follows that section 7A.3 of the PSA Act sets out the procedure that commences the process of determining if a disciplinary declaration will be made. [10] A disciplinary declaration is a declaration of: (a) A disciplinary finding against the former officer; and (b) The disciplinary action that would have been taken against the former officer under Part 7 if the former officer’s employment had not ended.4 [11] Section 7A.2(3) of the PSA Act provides that the Commissioner may only make a disciplinary declaration if the disciplinary action that would have been taken against the former officer if their employment had not ended would have been: (a) Dismissal; or (b) Suspension from duty without pay for at least three months; or (c) Probation; or (d) Demotion, whether permanently or for a stated period. Review Jurisdiction [12] Section 17 of the QCAT Act provides that the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction is conferred by an enabling Act, which in this case is the CC Act. The exercise of which must be made in accordance with section 19 of the QCAT Act. [13] As the Respondent’s Decision is a reviewable decision pursuant to section 219BA(1)(c) of the CC Act, the Tribunal must conduct a review of that reviewable decision in accordance with section 219H of the CC Act, being that it is to be by way of rehearing on the evidence (“original evidence”) given in the proceeding before the original decision maker (“original proceeding”). [14] The Queensland Court of Appeal in Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115 (“Willmott”) concluded at paragraph [43] that “the Tribunal’s review power under s 219Q(1) of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) is predicated on there being first shown legal, factual or discretionary error in the decision below.” [15] The Applicant in this matter submits that section 219H of the CC Act is expressed in identical terms as that of 219Q. I accept the Applicant’s submission that on that basis, the Tribunal’s review power under section 219H(1) meets the conclusion drawn in Willmott. [16] The Tribunal is required to return the matter to the Commissioner of Police if after reviewing the Decision, the Tribunal decides to set it aside under section 219BA(1)(c). Circumstances giving rise to the Application [17] The conduct that was subject to the Respondent’s decision, and now this application, involves five allegations of misconduct committed by the Former Officer between 30 June 2022 and 13 October 2022. Four of which, have resulted in criminal charges. [18] The most serious allegations involve acts of physical domestic violence towards the Former Officer’s pregnant partner, as well as interference with the course of justice. 4 PSA Act s 7A.2(5). -- 3 of 7 -- 4 [19] The below chronology takes into account the non-publication order made by this Tribunal on 9 September 2025. [20] By way of chronology: (a) The allegations are said to have occurred between 30 June 2022 to 13 October 2022. (b) On 1 July 2022, as a result of the allegations set out above, the Former Officer was stood down. (c) On 28 October 2022, the Former Officer was suspended with pay. (d) On 1 May 2023, the Former Officer was dismissed from employment with the Queensland Police Service pursuant to section 8.3(4) of the PSA Act on grounds of medical incapacity. [21] Upon termination of the Former Officer’s employment, section 7A.1 of the PSA Act was enlivened. This section provides a discretionary power for the Commissioner or their delegate to conduct a disciplinary investigation against the Former Officer where their employment came to an end for any reason after a ground for disciplinary action arises. [22] On 17 April 2025, the Respondent decided not to commence an investigation to determine whether the Former Officer was liable for a disciplinary action. [23] That decision is what the Applicant says was affected by error and seeks to be set aside by way of this Application. The Respondent’s Material [24] The Respondent has filed material in accordance with section 21(2) of the QCAT Act. [25] That material includes the material that would have been before the Respondent at the time that he considered the Decision. [26] The material is substantial in it’s volume. [27] I have reviewed the material and considered it when making this decision. The Applicant’s submissions [28] The Applicant submits four grounds where it says the Respondent erred in coming to the decision of 17 April 2025: (a) Firstly, that the Respondent’s decision was influenced by incorrect findings in relation to the nature and purpose of the disciplinary declarations under Part 7A of the PSA Act, being an error of law5 (“Ground 1”). (b) Secondly, that the Respondent’s findings that the Former Officer was unlikely to seek further employment within the government was not supported by the evidence before the Respondent at the time of making the decision. This being a factual error6 (“Ground 2”). 5 Applicant’s submissions para 31a. 6 Ibid para 31b. -- 4 of 7 -- 5 (c) Thirdly, that the Respondent gave insufficient weight to the seriousness of the grounds for disciplinary action. This being a discretionary error7 (“Ground 3”). (d) Finally, that the Respondent’s finding that there was no ‘tangible benefit’ to the Queensland Police Service in conducting a disciplinary investigation was contrary to law. This being an error of law, and error of fact8 (“Ground 4”). Consideration of each ground Ground 1 [29] As to Ground 1, the Respondent, by way of his Decision, noted that: the Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and Order Legislation Amendment Bill 2019 introduced 7A provisions to prevent police officers from avoiding disciplinary sanctions by resigning and obtaining work in other government departments. Such incidents had reduced public confidence in the police discipline system. The current matter is not such a case. The SM (Former Officer) was dismissed as being medically unfit to continue service in May 2023.9 [30] By way of this statement, the Respondent has attempted to draw a distinction between a police officer who voluntarily resigns from their employment, and a police officer whose employment ends by some other means. [31] I find that this is misconceived. Quite clearly, section 7A.1(1) provides that the section applies if a ground for a disciplinary action arises in relation to a police officer, and that after the ground arises, the employment of the former officer ends for any reason. There can be no exception as to whether the employment ended for any particular reasons, but simply that the employment ended (for any reason). [32] In this case, the employment ended on the basis of grounds of mental incapacity and falls within section 7A.1(1) of the PSA Act. [33] As to Ground 1, I find that the Respondent erred in law. Ground 2 [34] As to Ground 2, the Decision provides no evidence that the Former Officer was unlikely to seek further employment within the government. [35] I accept the Applicant’s submission that the Respondent erred in finding that the Former Officer was unlikely to seek further government employment. This view was not open to the Respondent to reach on the material before the Tribunal. [36] The Former Officer’s employment status, on the evidence before the Tribunal in this matter, was listed as ‘unknown’. Regardless of this, the outcome of those enquires would not support a position that the Former Officer would not ever seek employment within the government. 7 Ibid para 31c. 8 Ibid para 31d. 9 Decision 17 April 2025 p 5. -- 5 of 7 -- 6 [37] The Former Officer is 38 years of age and has a large portion of working life ahead. Further, the inference that the Former Officer has not returned to Queensland since his dismissal is not indicative of a conclusion that he will never return. Ground 3 [38] The PSA Act requires the seriousness of the grounds for disciplinary action to be considered when having regard to whether to start a disciplinary declaration process.10 [39] The Respondent’s analysis of the conduct of the Former Officer is clearly insufficient. The Respondent has not undertaken any critical analysis of the conduct and has rather taken a broad approach to its consideration. [40] I find that the Respondent has failed to give sufficient weight and consideration to the conduct, summarised in the Applicant’s submissions that:11 (a) The allegations occurred over a protracted period of approximately three and a half months. (b) The allegations include multiple acts of physical violence upon the Former Officer’s heavily pregnant ex-partner, posing a serious risk to not only her but also her unborn child. (c) The allegations involved repeated violations of the law and ongoing disobedience to lawful authority. (d) The allegations included threats to kill and cause harm. (e) The Former Officer’s interference in the course of justice was premeditation and involved a significant degree of coercion. This conduct ultimately resulted in conditions under a Temporary Protection Orde being relaxed and place the aggrieved at risk. [41] That conduct clearly amounts to a level of seriousness that should have resulted in the Respondent taking the view that a disciplinary declaration process should have been started. [42] I find that the Respondent erred in his decision by failing to properly consider the seriousness of the grounds for disciplinary action. Ground 4 [43] In the Decision, the Respondent concluded that there was “no tangible benefit in having these matters investigated where the matters are still continuing through the Court’s process.”12 The Respondent also commented that the Former Officer would likely already face a significant barrier to returning to employment within the QPS as a result of the Former Officer’s employment ending on medical grounds.13 [44] I find this conclusion to be misconceived and not supported by the evidence before the Respondent at the time of making the Decision, and before me on this review. [45] Regardless of the outcome of the Court process, the benefit to the QPS would be that the Former Officer’s conduct would be properly assessed internally within the QPS 10 PSA Act s 7A.1(3A). 11 Applicant’s submissions para 45(a)–(e). 12 Decision p 4. 13 Ibid. -- 6 of 7 -- 7 and if found liable for disciplinary action, a disciplinary declaration would have been made. [46] The Respondent’s decision means that the Former Officer would escape that process. Instead, it would have been open to the QPS (through the Commissioner) to record a formal disciplinary declaration which would have been disclosable to future employers. [47] The Applicant also submits that the disciplinary investigation would have also conveyed a broader benefit by the QPS maintaining public confidence in its handling of serious disciplinary allegations of this nature. [48] I find that the Respondent’s conclusion that there was no benefit to the QPS in commencing a disciplinary investigation to be an error, and not supported by the evidence before the Respondent at the time of making the Decision, or before the Tribunal during this review. Consideration of Review [49] Having reviewed the evidence that was before the Respondent at the time of making the Decision, I find that the Respondent erred in his Decision. I find that there was a sufficient basis, at law, and factually, for the Respondent to have commenced a disciplinary declaration process. [50] In forming this view and considering each ground above, I have placed significant weight on the Former Officer’s conduct, which as stated, involved domestic violence offending, with elements of physical violence, as well as coercion and interference with the justice process. There was quite clearly sufficient evidence before me on this review to support that conclusion, which would also have been before the Respondent at the time he made the Decision. [51] Due to the serious nature of the allegations and conduct of the Former Officer, a disciplinary investigation would be required to maintain public confidence and uphold the ethical standards within the QPS. [52] Taking all of that into account, I find that the Respondent erred in his Decision not to commence a disciplinary declaration process, and that it was open to him to commence that process on the evidence before him. Orders [53] For the reasons set out above, I order that: (a) The decision of Acting Detective Superintendent Christopher Hansel dated 17 April 2025 is set aside. (b) I direct that the matter return to the Commissioner of Police, and further direct that: (i) The Former Officer be given a written notice under section 7A.3(1)(a) of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) (“PSA Act”); and (ii) A disciplinary heading be held under section 7A.3(1)(b) of the PSA Act. -- 7 of 7 --