Barclay v Gold Coast City Council [2026] QCAT 25

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Barclay v Gold Coast City Council [2026] QCAT 25 PARTIES: RONALD BARCLAY (applicant) v GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: GAR443-23 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters DELIVERED ON: 15 January 2026 HEARING DATE: 31 October 2025 HEARD AT: Southport DECISION OF: Member Lumb ORDERS: The decision of the Respondent made on 6 June 2023 confirming the decision to declare the Applicant’s dog named ‘Rexy’ to be a declared dangerous dog is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL – general administrative review – review of decision of respondent confirming decision declaring the applicant’s dog to be a regulated (dangerous) dog pursuant to s 89 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) – where physical interaction between applicant’s dog and a member of the public on a Gold Coast beach left the person with a wound to his right arm which required surgery – whether the interaction satisfied the definition of ‘seriously attack’ within the meaning of s 89 of the Act – whether the Tribunal has a discretion not to make a dangerous dog declaration Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld), s 3, s 4, s 59, s 89, s 90, s 93, s 94, s 97, s 187, s 188, Schedule 2 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 24, s 58, Schedule 1 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24, s 157 Austin BMI Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier [2023] QSC 95 Brain v Townsville City Council [2025] QCAT 24 Brisbane City Council v Roy [2020] QCATA 147 -- 1 of 22 -- 2 Clark v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2024] QCAT 329 Dalgliesh v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 34 Eadie v Groombridge (1992) 16 MVR 263 Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58 Lake Macquarie City Council v Morris (2005) 63 NSWLR 263 Lee v Brisbane City Council [2012] QCA 284 Murdock v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 297 Sarkis v Morrison [2013] NSWCA 281 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: N. Paterson instructed by Tusk Lawyers Respondent: N. Hatcher of Woods Hatcher Solicitors REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction [1] By an Application to review a decision filed on 4 July 2023 (‘the Review Application’), the Applicant (‘Mr Barclay’) has applied to review an internal decision of the Respondent made on 6 June 2023 (‘the Review Decision’). [2] By the Review Decision, the Respondent confirmed its decision made on 16 May 2023 (‘the original decision’) declaring that Mr Barclay’s dog, ‘Rexy’, was a regulated (dangerous) dog (‘the declaration’) pursuant to s 89(2) of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) (‘the AMA’). [3] Rexy is a desexed male, black/tan Rottweiler who was approximately one year and 10 months old at the date of the incident that led to the making of the declaration. [4] The incident occurred on a Gold Coast beach on 28 January 2023. There is no dispute that there was a physical interaction between Rexy and Mr Timothy Wright (‘Mr Wright’) who was walking along the beach at approximately 4:00pm or 4:30pm that day. The interaction left Mr Wright with two wounds and nerve damage to his right lower arm. Mr Wright required surgery to repair the injuries. [5] By the Review Application, Mr Barclay seeks to have the Review Decision set aside. [6] Mr Barclay submits, in summary, that: (a) the incident did not involve an ‘attack’ by Rexy on Mr Wright within the meaning of s 89(2) of the AMA;1 (b) further, or in the alternative, in all the circumstances (including the steps taken by Mr Barclay since the incident), the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to set aside the Review Decision.2 1 Applicant's submissions on application to review a decision dated 26 February 2024 (Exhibit 6), [13]– [30]. 2 Exhibit 6, [32]–[37]. -- 2 of 22 -- 3 The statutory basis for reviewing the Review Decision [7] Section 188 of the AMA provides: A person who is given, or is entitled to be given, a review notice for a decision under part 1 may apply, as provided under the QCAT Act, for an external review of the decision. [8] A ‘decision under part 1’ is a decision made consequent upon an internal review of an original decision pursuant to Chapter 8, Part 1 of the AMA. [9] Mr Barclay was entitled to be given, and was given, a review notice pursuant to s 187 of the AMA, which was given as part of the Review Decision.3 [10] I consider that the review notice complied with s 157 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the QCAT Act’) (noting that, in any event, a failure to comply with s 157 does not affect the validity of the reviewable decision (see s 157(4) of the QCAT Act)). [11] In my view, Mr Barclay is entitled to apply for an external review of the Review Decision under s 188 of the AMA. [12] I consider that the review of the Review Decision is governed by Division 3 of Part 1 of Chapter 2 of the QCAT Act. [13] In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal: (a) must decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the AMA (being the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision was made);4 (b) may perform the functions conferred on the Tribunal by the QCAT Act or the AMA;5 and (c) has all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed.6 [14] The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision.7 [15] The Tribunal must hear and decide a review of the Decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.8 [16] In this proceeding, the Tribunal may:9 (a) confirm or amend the Review Decision; (b) set aside the Review Decision and substitute its own decision; or (c) set aside the Review Decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-maker for the decision, with the directions the Tribunal considers appropriate. 3 Exhibit 8, pp 11–22 esp. 22. 4 QCAT Act s 19(a). 5 Ibid s 19(b). 6 Ibid s 19(c). 7 Ibid s 20(1). 8 Ibid s 20(2). 9 Ibid s 24(1). -- 3 of 22 -- 4 [17] The Tribunal’s decision pursuant to each of s 24(1)(a) and (b) is taken to be a decision of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision except for the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction or an appeal under part 8 of the QCAT Act.10 [18] The Tribunal is not required to identify an error in either the process or the reasoning that led to the decision being made, and there is no presumption that the decision is correct.11 Relevant provisions of the AMA [19] Section 89 of the AMA is in the following terms (as it was at the date of the hearing): (1) Any local government may, by complying with the requirements of this part— (a) declare a particular dog to be a declared dangerous dog (a dangerous dog declaration); or (b) declare a particular dog to be a declared menacing dog (a menacing dog declaration). (2) A dangerous dog declaration may be made for a dog only if the dog— (a) has seriously attacked, or acted in a way that caused fear to, a person or another animal; or (b) may, in the opinion of an authorised person having regard to the way the dog has behaved towards a person or another animal, seriously attack, or act in a way that causes fear to, the person or animal. (3) A menacing dog declaration may be made for a dog only if a ground mentioned in subsection (2) exists for the dog, except that the attack was not serious. (4) The declaration may be made even if the dog is not in the local government’s area. (5) A declaration under this section is a regulated dog declaration. (6) In this section— animal has the meaning given by section 191. seriously attack means— (a) in relation to a person - attack the person in a way that causes the death of, or grievous bodily harm or bodily harm to, the person; or (b) in relation to an animal - attack the animal in a way that causes the death of the animal, or maims or wounds the animal. [20] The above terms of s 89 reflect amendments made to the AMA in 2024 and, consequently, were made after the Review Decision. [21] The parties proceeded on the basis that s 89 as enacted at the date of the hearing is the applicable provision.12 I am satisfied that this is the correct position, having regard to, 10 Ibid s 24(2). 11 Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58, [9]. 12 Transcript T1-14 line 26 – T1-15 line 13. -- 4 of 22 -- 5 first, that the review involves a fresh hearing on the merits and, second, that there is no indication in the AMA (by way of a transitional provision or otherwise) that s 89 as enacted at some earlier time (for example, at the date of the original decision or the Review Decision) should be applied. [22] Section 90 of the AMA provides: (1) If a local government proposes to make a regulated dog declaration it must give any owner of the dog a notice (a proposed declaration notice) stating— (a) the following details for the dog— (i) breed; (ii) colour; (iii) sex; (iv) any other noticeable distinguishing features or marks; and (b) the local government proposes to declare the dog to be a regulated dog; and (c) the type of regulated dog declaration proposed to be made; and (d) the reasons for the proposed declaration; and (e) an owner of the dog may make, within a stated period, written representations to show why the proposed declaration should not be made. (2) The stated period must end at least 14 days after the proposed declaration notice is given. (3) The proposed declaration notice may be accompanied by a written opinion from a veterinary surgeon or other evidence about the dog’s breed. [23] In my view, a ‘regulated dog declaration’ referred to in s 90 is, having regard to s 89(5) of the AMA, either a dangerous dog declaration or a menacing dog declaration pursuant to s 89(1) of the AMA. [24] Section 94 of the AMA provides: (1) The local government must consider any written representations and evidence accompanying them within the period stated in the proposed declaration notice. (2) If, after complying with subsection (1), the local government is satisfied that the relevant ground under section 89 still exists, it must make the regulated dog declaration for the dog. The issues in dispute [25] The Respondent was content to proceed on the basis that the relevant provision of s 89(2) that is an issue is s 89(2)(a) only.13 That provision contains two alternative limbs, first, if a dog has seriously attacked a person or another animal or, second, a 13 T1-53 line 30 - T1-54 line 21. -- 5 of 22 -- 6 dog has acted in a way that caused fear to a person or another animal. Mr Barclay submits that the alternative limb or causing fear requires that there be an ‘attack’.14 [26] As noted, Mr Barclay’s case is that there was no attack by Rexy. [27] However, as I understand Mr Barclay’s case, if the Tribunal were to find that there was an ‘attack’ there is no dispute that the attack caused bodily harm to Mr Wright and, consequently, would satisfy the definition of ‘seriously attack’ in s 89(5) of the AMA. Meaning of ‘attack’ in s 89 [28] The word ‘attack’ is not defined in the AMA. [29] In Lee v Brisbane City Council (‘Lee’), Holmes JA (as her Honour then was) said:15 [10] The applicant contended error in the construction of the word “attack”, which is not defined in the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act. She relied on a decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court, Lake Macquarie City Council v Morris, which concerned a prosecution under s 16 of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), the offence being that the defendant owned two dogs which attacked another animal. As in the Queensland legislation, the word “attack” was not defined. Johnson J noted dictionary definitions and the meaning attributed to the word in other statutory contexts. It was clear, however, he said, from the section creating the offence that it was not necessary to establish an “attack” that physical contact had occurred between the dog and the animal said to have been attacked; it would be sufficient if the dog’s actions involved an act of hostility or aggression of a kind discussed in other cases. [11] That case is not really helpful. It may be accepted that the behaviour of the spaniel in running and barking could, as the appeal tribunal said, be characterised as an attack. But at issue was whether the German Shepherd had seriously attacked the spaniel, as that expression is defined in s 89(7). It will be a question of fact whether what a dog does amounts to an attack for the purposes of the section, and in deciding that question, hostile behaviour by the animal which is the victim may be relevant. There may be a factual issue, for example, as to whether one dog biting another is attacking or simply defending itself (although where there has been no physical contact preceding the bite, defence is a less likely conclusion). But as a matter of law, there is nothing in s 89 which precludes a finding of attack where the behaviour of the dog in question is a response to aggression from its victim. To put it another way, it is not a pre-requisite to a finding of serious attack by one dog on another that there be a finding that the second dog has itself done nothing which could be described as an attack. [12] There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the appeal tribunal’s approach in regarding the proposition that the spaniel might first have attacked as not precluding a finding of serious attack by the German Shepherd. There was evidence to support a finding that the German Shepherd had committed an attack of that kind. 14 T1-54 line 39 – T1-55 line 3. 15 [2012] QCA 284, [10]–[12] (White JA and Applegarth J agreeing). Special leave to the High Court was refused: Lee v Brisbane City Council [2013] HCASL 37. -- 6 of 22 -- 7 (citations omitted) [30] Her Honour’s reasoning does not deal, in terms, with the meaning of the term ‘attack’ in the AMA. What is established by Lee is that: (a) it is a question of fact whether what a dog does amounts to an attack for the purposes of s 89; (b) in the context of an alleged attack on another dog (or animal), relevant factors include: (i) whether the victim animal engaged in hostile behaviour; (ii) whether one dog biting another was done in self-defence; (c) it is not a pre-requisite to a finding of serious attack by one dog on another that there be a finding that the second dog has itself done nothing which could be described as an attack. [31] In the Macquarie Dictionary Online, the definition of the word ‘attack’ includes the following: verb (t) 1. to set upon with force or weapons; begin hostilities against: attack the enemy. … –verb (i) 6. to make an attack; begin hostilities. –noun 7. the act of attacking; onslaught; assault. … 12. the initial (offensive) movement in a contest; onset. … [32] Mr Barclay contends that an attack requires ‘an act of hostility or aggression’ and relies upon the New South Wales Supreme Court decision of Lake Macquarie City Council v Morris.16 In that case, Johnson J considered the meaning of ‘attacks’ in s 16 of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), which provided, relevantly: ‘If a dog rushes at, attacks, bites, harasses or chases any person or animal (other than vermin), whether or not any injury is caused to the person or animal: (a) the owner of the dog, … is guilty of an offence.’ [33] Johnson J said:17 Consideration has been given by courts to the meaning of the word “attack” as it appeared in the repealed Dog Act 1966 and in another provision of the Companion Animals Act. In Eadie v Groombridge (1992) 16 MVR 263, Meagher JA (Handley JA agreeing) accepted that evidence that a dog “came at” a person in the street constituted an “attack” under s 20(1) of the Dog Act. In the same case, Sheller JA concluded that “attacking” is “an act of hostility or aggression”. 16 (2005) 63 NSWLR 263. 17 Ibid 271. -- 7 of 22 -- 8 In Zappia v Allsop (Court of Appeal, 17 March 1994, unreported) at 8, Clarke JA (Handley JA agreeing) accepted that an “attack” may be constituted by a growling and barking dog charging at a person. In Crump v Sharah t/as Sharah Henville & Co [1999] NSWSC 884 at [24], Davies A-J applied the meaning attributed to the word “attack” in Eadie v Groombridge. Davies A-J concluded (at [26]) that an actual contact is not necessary to establish an “attack” and that it was sufficient, on the facts of that case, that two dogs joined in barking at a horse and that one of the dogs at least had nipped at its hocks. In Coleman v Barrat [2004] NSWCA 27, Gzell J (Sheller JA agreeing), in considering the meaning of the word “attacking” in s 25 of the Companion Animals Act, applied reasoning in Eadie v Groombridge and Crump v Sharah. In the circumstances of that case, Gzell J concluded (at [40]), that the actions of a dog running at a horse, at the rider’s stirrup and under the horse, whilst yapping aggressively constituted an “attack”. Although it is necessary to bear in mind that the statutory context in which the word “attack” was considered in these cases is not identical to that in s 16(1) of the Companion Animals Act, I consider that the word in s 16(1) may be accorded a similar meaning. These cases considered civil liability provisions in the repealed Dog Act 1966 and s 25 of the Companion Animals Act. However, I do not think that this affects the meaning to be given to the word “attacks” in s 16(1), a penal provision. To constitute an “attack” within s 16(1), it is clear from the section itself that it is not necessary that injury be caused. Nor, in my view, is it necessary that the prosecution prove that physical contact occurred between the dog and animal which is said to have been attacked. A court may conclude that a dog has attacked a person or animal for the purposes of s 16(1) if the dog’s actions involve an act of hostility or aggression of the type exemplified in the cases referred to above. [34] Johnson J concluded that: (a) it is not necessary that: (i) injury be caused; or (ii) physical contact occur between the dog and animal which is said to have been attacked; (b) an attack may be found if the dog’s actions involve an act of hostility or aggression of the type exemplified in the cases considered. [35] As I read the observations, in context, Johnson J did not say an act of hostility or aggression is a pre-condition to a conclusion that there has been an attack. For example, in one of the cases cited, Eadie v Groombridge (‘Eadie’),18 two of the New South Wales Court of Appeal Justices of Appeal19 concluded that an attack within the meaning of s 20(1) of the Dog Act 1966 (NSW) occurred in circumstances where the dog ‘came at’ a person (in that case, the dog ran parallel with the motorcycle written by the plaintiff for some short distance and then turned right into the plaintiff who 18 (1992) 16 MVR 263. 19 Meagher and Handley JJA. -- 8 of 22 -- 9 tried avoiding it but collided with the dog). The third Justice of Appeal (Sheller JA) was ‘inclined to think that “attacking” is an act of hostility or aggression’.20 [36] In Sarkis v Morrison (‘Sarkis’),21 the plaintiff was riding a motorcycle on a country road when a dog ran out of a driveway and collided with the front wheel of the motorcycle. The plaintiff suffered significant injuries and amnesia, resulting from his fall. The dog ran out onto the road, but did not attack the plaintiff; nor did the plaintiff have any opportunity to avoid the collision. The trial judge found that the owner of the dog was strictly liable, pursuant to s 25 of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), in circumstances where the dog had wounded the plaintiff, although the wounding did not result from any act of aggression on the part of the dog. The New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgement and entered judgement for the dog’s owner. After considering various cases, including Eadie, the Court expressed the following conclusion:22 The expression in s 25(1)(a) of the Companion Animals Act “caused by the dog wounding or attacking that person” should be understood as limited to conduct involving an element of aggression or other deliberate conduct directed towards that person by the dog. As accepted by Moffitt JA in Martignoni (see at [10] above), inaction on the part of the dog will not suffice. Whether “wounding” requires that a distinction should be drawn between over enthusiasm and aggression, as suggested by Sheller JA in addressing “attacking” in Eadie (see at [20] above), need not be decided. However, the section does require that there be conduct directed at the plaintiff. Where a dog causes bodily injury without any aggressive or other deliberate intent on its part, there will be no liability in the owner under s 25. [37] Returning to s 89(6) of the AMA, ‘seriously attack’ is defined mean ‘attack the person in a way that causes the death of, or grievous bodily harm or bodily harm to, the person’. [38] Sections 89 and 94 are contained in Chapter 4 of the AMA. Section 59 sets out the purposes of Chapter 4. Section 59 provides: (1) The purposes of this chapter are to— (a) protect the community from damage or injury, or risk of damage or injury, from regulated dogs; and (b) ensure regulated dogs are— (i) not a risk to community health or safety; and (ii) controlled and kept in a way consistent with community expectations and the rights of individuals. (2) The purposes are to be achieved primarily by the following— (a) providing for local governments to declare dogs to be dangerous dogs or menacing dogs; (b) providing for the compulsory desexing of declared dangerous dogs; 20 At p 265. 21 [2013] NSWCA 281. 22 Ibid [36] (per Basten JA, Macfarlan and Ward JJA agreeing). -- 9 of 22 -- 10 (c) providing for identification of dogs as regulated dogs; (d) imposing conditions on keeping, and requirements for the control of, regulated dogs; (e) allowing authorised persons to seize or destroy dogs in particular circumstances; (f) providing for local governments to administer, and be responsible for, the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e). [39] Given that the purposes include protection of the community from damage or injury, or risk of damage or injury, from regulated dogs, and to ensure regulated dogs are not a risk to community health or safety, I am of the view that an attack does not require an act of hostility or aggression on the part of a dog. However, I consider that, adopting the language in Sarkis, an attack requires conduct involving an element of aggression or other deliberate conduct directed towards that person by the dog. The parties’ material Mr Barclay [40] Mr Barclay’s material comprised: (a) the Review Application (including attachment) filed on 4 July 2023 (Exhibit 1); (b) a statement of Mr Barclay filed on 15 September 2023 (Exhibit 2); (c) a statement of Dr Cam Day filed on 15 September 2023 (Exhibit 3). (d) a USB containing video footage filed on 24 January 2024 (Exhibit 4); (e) a further statement of Mr Barclay filed on 29 January 2024 (Exhibit 5); (f) Applicant’s submissions filed on 26 February 2024 (Exhibit 6); (g) a further statement of Dr Cam Day filed on 30 October 2025 (Exhibit 7). Respondent [41] The Respondent’s material comprised: (a) the Respondent’s material filed pursuant to s 21 of the QCAT Act on 29 November 2023 (Exhibit 8); (b) a further statement of Mr Wright filed on 15 January 2024 (Exhibit 9); (c) the Respondent’s submissions filed on 12 February 2024 (Exhibit 10). [42] At the hearing, the following persons were cross-examined: (a) Mr Barclay; and (b) Mr Wright. [43] The primary issue is whether Rexy did attack Mr Wright. Did Rexy attack Mr Wright? [44] In deciding this issue, it is necessary to first address the evidence of the only persons who were present at the time of the incident, namely Mr Barclay and Mr Wright. -- 10 of 22 -- 11 The circumstances of the incident [45] Mr Barclay’s evidence is, relevantly, that:23 (a) on 28 January 23 at around 4:30pm to 4:45pm, Mr Barclay was on the beach with Rexy in front of his house; (b) he noticed that there was no one within 50 metres of himself and Rexy in either direction and he decided to let Rexy off the leash so he could throw the ball to him to give him some exercise (during which time he stayed in front of his house); (c) there were only a few people still on the beach; (d) at the time of the incident, Rexy was still a puppy and was ‘very obsessed’ with the ball and was usually focused on the ball rather than the people around him; (e) whilst on the beach, Mr Barclay noticed Mr Wright walking on the beach towards ‘us’; (f) Mr Barclay had Rexy at his feet ‘under control’; (g) Mr Wright stopped around four metres away from Mr Barclay; Rexy was sitting between Mr Barclay and Mr Wright and had his back to Mr Wright; (h) when Mr Barclay noticed Mr Wright had stopped and was looking at Rexy and Mr Barclay, Mr Barclay briefly greeted him and they exchanged ‘pleasantries’; (i) as they were speaking, Rexy suddenly left his position at Mr Barclay’s feet and ran towards Mr Wright and jumped up; Rexy did not growl or bark and he did not try to bite Mr Wright; (j) Mr Wright held his arm in between himself and Rexy, as Rexy came down Mr Wright’s arm was coming up and Rexy’s tooth caught the side of his arm; (k) from Mr Barclay’s view, Rexy was not trying to bite Mr Wright as it was only a single tooth which came into contact with Mr Wright’s arm; (l) it is likely that Rexy became overly excited by Mr Wright approaching him and he jumped up ‘playfully’. [46] In examination-in-chief, Mr Barclay gave evidence that: (a) Mr Wright did not approach him ‘fully’; he was about five metres away and stopped;24 (b) in response to a question about whether Mr Wright said something to Mr Barclay: ‘I can’t recall whether I said, “How’re you doing?” first, or “Hello”, or what-have-you, or he said something first. But, yes, he – he did commence to speak to me. He didn’t get much of a chance after that though.’25 23 See [5]–[17]. 24 T1-22 lines 40–42. 25 T1-22 lines 44–47. -- 11 of 22 -- 12 (c) when Mr Wright came up to Mr Barclay, Rexy was sitting directly in front of Mr Barclay at his feet; the ball was between his feet; and Rexy was looking down at it;26 (d) ‘When Mr Wright began to speak, Rexy just immediately jumped up, ran over and – or got up, ran over and jumped up. And it was something that Rexy did do when he got excited, was jump. He jumped a little bit higher than I had previously seen him, but essentially that’s what he was – that’s what he did.’27 (e) in response to a question about what Mr Barclay did in response: ‘I yelled at him and I said, “Come back. Come here. Come.” And he did, straight away and sat right – just to my side.’28 (f) in response to a question about whether Mr Barclay saw Rexy bite Mr Wright: ‘No, because he was – Mr Wright was on the other side of Rexy. I saw Rexy jump and come down. Mr Wright didn’t move – didn’t squat or get pushed over at all. And Rexy was on the ground and that’s when he came back to me.’29 (g) Mr Barclay went over to Mr Wright (with Rexy on the lead behind Mr Barclay) to see how Mr Wright was and ‘apologised profusely’;30 (h) Mr Wright said, ‘Your dog’s injured my arm’ or words to that effect.31 (i) When Rexy was at Mr Barclay’s feet, Mr Barclay did not observe him to be growling, barking or snarling.32 [47] In cross-examination, Mr Barclay gave evidence that: (a) when Mr Wright approached, Rexy was looking at the ball between Mr Barclay’s feet;33 (b) and the next thing, Rexy stood up from that position without notice and bounded off towards Mr Wright;34 (c) as Rexy jumped in front of Mr Wright, Mr Wright put his right arm out;35 (d) Mr Barclay did not see the contact between Rexy’s mouth and Mr Wright’s arm;36 (e) the bounding over and jumping up by Rexy was one continuous motion;37 (f) at the time Rexy jumped up, Mr Wright was in essentially the same spot as when he stopped.38 26 T1-23 lines 1–3. 27 T1-23 lines 5–9. 28 T1-23 lines 11–12. 29 T1-23 lines 17–20. 30 T1-23 lines 22–27. 31 T1-23 lines 29–30. 32 T1-23 lines 32–41. 33 T1-30 lines 14–28. 34 T1-30 lines 30–31. 35 T1-30 line 36 – T1-31 line 28. 36 T1-35 lines 1–3; see also T1-36 line 1. 37 T1-35 line 38 – T1-31 line 28. 38 T1-36 lines 7–20. -- 12 of 22 -- 13 [48] Mr Wright provided two statements: (a) an initial statement dated 8 February 2023 (‘Mr Wright’s first statement’);39 (b) a further statement dated 14 January 2024 (‘Mr Wright’s further statement’).40 [49] In Mr Wright’s first statement he described the incident as follows:41 (a) at approximately 4:00pm on Saturday 28 January 2023, Mr Wright was walking down the sand on the beach to go for a swim; (b) the owner of the dog was throwing a ball to his dog and the dog was not on a lead; (c) Mr Wright saw the dog bring the ball back to the owner who instructed the dog to ‘drop’ the ball and to ‘sit’; (d) the owner bent down to pick up the ball, the owner and Mr Wright exchanged greetings; they were approximately 15 to 20 feet away from each other; (e) when the dog heard Mr Wright’s voice, ‘it launched from its sitting position, ran at me and jumped up to bite my arm’ and Mr Wright’s arm came down with the weight of the dog attached; (f) the owner was yelling at his dog and the dog released Mr Wright and retreated a few feet; (g) the owner positioned himself between Mr Wright and the dog and the dog stayed at bay; (h) the owner and Mr Wright inspected Mr Wright’s arm and ‘it was observed that there was a deep wound and blood was running down my arm’; (i) the owner apologised and offered to ‘patch me up’ at his house but Mr Wright declined stating that the wound was deep and that he was going to the surf club to receive medical attention. [50] In Mr Wright’s further statement he stated, amongst other matters: (a) in response to a statement by Dr Day, that ‘… the dog in question did not conduct a “mouthing in greeting”’, that the dog ‘launched at me snarling and leapt up to bite down on my arm’;42 (b) that he is 6 foot 2 inches tall and is 90 kg;43 (c) ‘The dog leapt up and grabbed my arm with its mouth and with its weight pulled me downwards. It only let go after its owner yelled at it.’44 (d) he has been permanently scarred with permanent nerve damage to his arm;45 39 Exhibit 8, pp 68–71. 40 Exhibit 9. 41 Exhibit 8, p 69. 42 Exhibit 9, [5]. 43 Exhibit 9, [6]. 44 Exhibit 9, [6]. 45 Exhibit 9, [7]. -- 13 of 22 -- 14 (e) ‘When the paramedics dropped me off to the hospital and the emergency doctor inspected the wounds, the first instruction they made was for the arm to be x- rayed for breakages and fractures. The inspection of the wound showed that the bite marks had gone all the way to the bone and the severe bruising of the underside of my arm was characteristic of a broken bone. Both the top and bottom jaw of the dog clamped down hard on my arm. There is no mistaking this.’46 (f) ‘The dog bit my arm and the attack made me fear for my safety and cause me bodily injury as a result of doing so. There were multiple puncture marks are penetrated through the bone and severe bruising of the underside of my arm that clearly demonstrates that the dog’s mouth bit down with both jaws.’47 (g) ‘There were two distinct puncture wounds on my arm. One on the wrist and one on the forearm.’48 [51] In cross-examination, Mr Wright’s evidence included the following: (a) he accepted that he put his right arm up in response to Rexy jumping;49 (b) Mr Wright accepted that in his first statement he did not write anything about the dog snarling (or growling or barking); that when the dog had returned the ball to Mr Barclay’s feet he could not hear a growling or barking or snarling; but Mr Wright maintained ‘… There was a snarl when the – the dog was launching itself towards me.’50 (c) At T1-42 lines 30–39: ‘You gave evidence in this statement that the dog jumped up to bite your arm?---The dog jumped up and bit my arm. Well, your evidence is that – in the statement, you say, that “Rexy ran at me and jumped up to bite my arm”; do you accept that that’s not correct?---Okay. No, I don’t accept that’s not correct. I can tell you that my arm was put up first and then the dog bit second. So, in that case, from what you’re saying to me, if my arm is up in front of my body first, and then the dog bites, second, then I can say that the dog jumped up to bite my arm. But I have no idea what part of my body the dog intended to bite.’ (d) Mr Wright denied that the bruising on the underside of his right forearm shown on a post-operative photo might have been caused by the surgery. 51 Other evidence [52] The Respondent’s material included an ‘OPERATION RECORD’52 (‘the Operation Record’) in relation to the surgery performed on Mr Wright on 30 January 2023. The Operation Record reported the following findings: 46 Exhibit 9, [8]. 47 Exhibit 9, [10]. 48 Exhibit 9, [10]. 49 T1-42 lines 4–12. 50 T1-48 lines 11–34. 51 T1-46 line 1 – T1-47 line 21. 52 Exhibit 8, p 81. -- 14 of 22 -- 15 Debridement [R] Forearm laceration – dog bite + Flap + Duperficial [sic] radial nerve repair: 1. Defect 2.5 cm – stellate - margins contused 2. Superficial radial nerve partially injured with one large fascicle clearly divided. The injury over a distance of 10 mm – Decision – repair fascicular 10-0 Nylon + Epineurial + Cephalic vein wrap (excised a segment of 20 mm and divided and wrapped around. 3. Flap rotation advancement type. 4. Small puncture wound dorsal wrist – debridement + repair. [53] Based on the above findings and having regard to the evidence of Mr Wright (including the photos taken after the incident) I find that, as a result of the interaction, Mr Wright suffered a 2.5cm penetrating wound to his right forearm which caused damage to the radial nerve (requiring surgical repair) together with a small puncture wound on the dorsal wrist which required debridement and repair. I also note that the Operation Record recorded that the forearm laceration was a result of a ‘dog bite’. [54] Mr Barclay’s first statement included two undated letters/reports of Ms Kaity Kenny (‘Ms Kenny’), Director of Toowoomba Canine Academy. Mr Barclay describes Ms Kenny as a ‘canine behaviouralist’. An email dated 24 July 2023 from Ms Kenny was also included in the material. [55] Ms Kenny’s first letter/report referred to her a session with Rexy on 7 February 2023 during which Ms Kenny conducted a behavioural assessment based on a plethora of criteria. [56] The first letter/report includes the following: (a) ‘During my time there I had noticed when Rexy had wanted something, whether it be food/play/affection, he would come up his owner, Shelly, and using his mouth to grab her dress and give it a small tug. This is where I realise that the mouthing behaviour is a form of communication for him. Most dogs learn very young that mouthing humans is both unacceptable and will not get them what they are trying to gain however Rexy had been accidentally taught this technique as a means of communicating and due to it not being corrected, he had no understanding that it wasn’t okay. In circumstances like this, boundaries for the dog become unclear about where they can and can’t use their mouth as it’s natural for dogs to use their mouths for play with each other. So, that means when a big dog jumps up to play with a human out of excitement, it’s very easy for a dogs teeth to connect and break skin, but it doesn’t automatically label it as aggressive behaviour or mean there was an intent by the dog to cause harm. Once explained to Shelly and Ron the premise of this psychology they put a complete stop to allowing that behaviour and since then Rexy has completely stopped the mouthing behaviour.’ (b) ‘I have received a copy of the report from council that included a recap of the events that occurred that day of the incident on the beach and have seen the photos and am still confident in my stance. Rottweilers are in the top 10 dog breeds with the strongest bite force and given his size, if Rexy’s intent was to cause harm to this person/attack them, the damage would have been significantly worse. Dogs are both stronger, and quicker than humans and if he wanted to bite someone, and got close enough to make contact, you could -- 15 of 22 -- 16 guarantee his force would have been exerted and there would be a lot more than 1 puncture wound and a graze from a second tooth. I would expect to see at the very least, puncture wounds on the underside of the wrist/hand to signify the intent to bite as he would close his jaw around the person’s wrist/hand. Consideration of course needs to be made when I work with large dog breeds regarding the unintentional damage they can cause simply due to their size. I have instructed [Mr Barclay] and Shelly that Rexy is to remain on lead so that effect control is maintained at all times until his training is complete and I will outline this more clearly below.’ (c) ‘There is no part of me that is concerned about his behaviour, and I am confident in saying that I would disagree with the decision of Rexy being a dangerous dog. We most recently did some training at a very busy park here in Toowoomba where we had an off-lead dog (in an on-lead park) try and run up to Rexy. Rexy remained calm, stayed seated next to me and looked to me for guidance on how I wanted him to react and it was a non-event, which is the gold standard of behaviour I strive for in these situations with the dogs I work with. My overall assessment of Rexy is that, like all puppies, he was getting overly excited about being able to play with new people/dogs and hadn’t yet learned how to appropriately display his excitement, but we have done a lot of work in the past few weeks to rewire these behaviours and is now displaying the correct behaviours in these situations almost every time.’ [57] The second letter/report includes the following: I have seen the report from the council, I have seen the photos and I have heard the unbiased recap in the report and my stance on the matter has not changed and that is that Rexy had no intention of hurting the man on the beach. Yes, an injury was inflicted, but this should not automatically declare a dog as dangerous as it was simply an unfortunate series of events from a playful puppy that happens to be a large breed. If the intention was to harm, there would have been much more damage, dogs are much faster and quicker than humans and he would have had no problem causing real harm if he had wanted to do, but the simple fact is that he did not want too and had no intention of causing injury, he was simply being a very bouncy, playful puppy, that was excited to say hello to a stranger. When a big dog jumps up at a human and a tooth or nail collides on the way down, injury can result quite easily. [58] With respect to Ms Kenny’s evidence: (a) Ms Kenny identified ‘mouthing behaviour’ on the part of Rexy; (b) there is no evidence that Ms Kenny possesses any medical or veterinarian qualifications to express an opinion that if Rexy wanted to bite someone, ‘you could guarantee his force would have been exerted and there would be a lot more than 1 puncture wound and a graze from a second tooth’ and, further, I consider that Ms Kenny’s reference to one puncture wound and a graze understates the extent and severity of the injury sustained by Mr Wright as described at paragraph [52] above. I make a similar observation in relation to Ms Kenny’s statement that ‘If the intention was to harm, there would have been much more damage, dogs are much faster and quicker than humans …’; (c) the assertion as to Rexy’s lack of intent is, in my respectful view, speculative. [59] Mr Barclay also relied upon two statements of Dr Cam Day, a veterinarian and veterinary behaviour management consultant: -- 16 of 22 -- 17 (a) the first dated 15 December 2023 attaching a Dog Behaviour Assessment report in respect of Rexy dated 2 May 2023 and updated on 11 December 2023 (‘Dr Day’s report’);53 (b) the second dated 23 April 2025 (‘Dr Day’s further statement’).54 [60] The Respondent did not require Dr Day or Ms Kenny for cross-examination and, consequently, did not challenge their evidence. [61] Dr Day conducted a behavioural assessment of Rexy on 28 April 2023 at Mr Barclay’s home. Dr Day administered eight separate tests to gauge Rexy’s overall behavioural parameters which included the propensity for dangerous behaviours. Dr Day stated that during the 90-minute visit, Rexy did not show any behaviours that would normally be exhibited by a dog with a dangerous propensity. Rexy presented as ‘a friendly, serene, non-aggressive pet dog who is very well trained’. Dr Day noted that Rexy’s ‘reason for living’ is ‘his intense interest in balls’. Dr Day posed the question ‘Why did the injury occur?’ and outlined four ‘potential answers’. [62] The first potential answer was one of ‘frustration’, namely that Rexy may have been frustrated that the ball was not being thrown and jumped at the person to effect a change in the person’s behaviour to allow ball playing to continue. Dr Day thought this was unlikely because it would be more common for Rexy to jump up at Mr Barclay to effect a change in Mr Barclay’s behaviour. [63] The second potential answer is ‘Resource-guarding’ of balls. Dr Day stated that while this is possible, it seems unlikely because Rexy showed no indication of guarding balls during the assessment. [64] The third potential answer was protection of Mr Barclay. Dr Day stated that whilst this appears to be a ‘more likely cause’ Dr Day would have expected Rexy to clearly show a similar reaction when he circled Mr Barclay at an unusually close and intrusive fashion and glared at Rexy in one of the tests conducted. Dr Day stated that Rexy had the opportunity to ‘attack’ but certainly did not do so. Dr Day concluded that he thought the protection of Mr Barclay was an unlikely cause. [65] The fourth potential answer was ‘Mouthing in greeting’. Dr Day noted that during one of the tests Rexy sometimes showed some mouthing behaviours when Dr Day touched his lips and teeth. Dr Day also noted a reference to mouthing in Ms Kenny’s report. Dr Day stated that this appears to be the most likely cause of the injury experienced by Mr Wright. [66] In his further statement, Dr Day attached a report referring to a further visit and re- examination of Rexy in the home environment on 16 April 2025. Dr Day conducted a street walk to assess Rexy’s behaviour when reading unfamiliar people and unfamiliar dogs. At that the time, Rexy was than four years and one month old. Dr Day detailed various events that occurred during the walk, including meeting a dog that was off-lead and not attended by its owner. That dog ‘stood his ground’ and stared at Rexy. Rexy was inert and non-reactive and Dr Day noted that Rexy ‘sat’ on request from Mr Barclay when near this dog. Dr Day observed that Rexy continued to exhibit a calm, friendly and fully non-aggressive demeanour and that it is ‘clear and obvious that Rexy is not a dangerous dog’. 53 Exhibit 2. 54 Exhibit 7. -- 17 of 22 -- 18 [67] With respect to Dr Day’s evidence: (a) I accept Dr Day’s evidence that on each occasion on which he examined Rexy, Rexy presented as a friendly, serene and non-aggressive pet dog; (b) Dr Day reported mouthing behaviour on the part of Rexy on the first occasion that he examined Rexy (consistently with Ms Kenny’s report); (c) at paragraph 2 of Dr Day’s report, Dr Day refers to various documents provided to him by Mr Barclay including, it appears, the two statements of Mr Wright. However, in reaching his conclusions, Dr Day does not identify the facts concerning the interaction between Rexy and Mr Wright in respect of which Dr Day has founded his conclusions, save that (at paragraph 4.3) Dr Day notes that Rexy ‘did not growl or bark at the person involved’. This suggests that (assuming Dr Day was provided with a copy of Mr Wright’s further statement) Dr Day did not take into account Mr Wright’s evidence that Rexy snarled at him. (d) Dr Day did not explain how he reconciled the severity of Mr Wright’s injury with the conclusion that the likely cause of the injury was ‘mouthing’ and was an ‘accidental injury’. [68] Notwithstanding Dr Day’s opinion, I consider that the question of whether there was an ‘attack’ within the meaning of s 89 of the AMA primarily turns on the findings of fact as to what occurred at the time of the incident. Did Rexy attack Mr Wright? [69] Despite the submissions made on behalf of Mr Barclay, I accept the evidence of Mr Wright as to the circumstances of the interaction between Rexy and himself. Leaving aside the question of whether Rexy ‘snarled’ for the moment, Mr Wright’s various evidence as to the circumstances of the interaction was consistent; and his evidence was unshaken in cross-examination. I found both Mr Wright and Mr Barclay to be credible witnesses. However, Mr Barclay acknowledged that he did not see the contact between Rexy’s mouth and Mr Wright’s arm, and I conclude that Rexy would have been facing away from Mr Barclay at that time that Rexy made contact with Mr Wright’s arm given that Rexy ran from his position at Mr Barclay’s feet directly towards Mr Wright. I also find that the interaction took place at a distance of approximately five metres from Mr Barclay’s position. [70] I accept Mr Wright’s evidence that: (a) Rexy jumped and bit down on his right arm which he had brought up as Rexy jumped at him; (b) both Rexy’s top and bottom jaw clamped down hard on his arm; (c) Rexy’s weight pulled Mr Wright downwards and Rexy only let go after Mr Barclay yelled at Rexy; (d) when he was bitten by Rexy, the underside of his hand or arm ‘was in a lot of pain’.55 55 T1-47 lines 15–16. -- 18 of 22 -- 19 [71] I also consider that the medical evidence corroborates Mr Wright’s evidence that he was bitten. Mr Wright suffered a deep laceration and a further puncture wound. The Operation Record refers to a ‘dog bite’. I reject the contention that the injury sustained by Mr Wright was an ‘accident’. [72] I find that Rexy’s actions in running at, jumping at, and biting Mr Wright involved deliberate conduct directed towards Mr Wright by Rexy. It follows that these actions constituted an attack within the meaning of s 89 of the AMA. [73] I also accept Mr Wright’s evidence that Rexy snarled when he ‘was launching itself towards me’. Whilst Mr Wright did not mention any snarling in his initial statement to the Respondent, he did mention it in his further statement. In cross-examination, Mr Wright stated that he could not hear any snarling, barking or growling whilst Rexy was at Mr Barclay’s feet but maintained that Rexy snarled at him as identified above. I accept that Mr Wright took an active interest in the outcome of the Respondent’s decision in relation to the dangerous dog declaration having regard to the contact Mr Wright had with the Respondent. However, I do not accept that this evidence is supports a conclusion that Mr Wright had an ‘axe to grind’ as submitted on behalf of Mr Barclay,56 and denied by Mr Wright.57 I accept Mr Wright’s evidence in this regard; I detected no animosity on the part of Mr Wright towards Mr Barclay, either in the written material or during cross-examination. On this basis, I find that Rexy’s conduct did involve an element of aggression (snarling) and provides a further basis for the finding of an ‘attack’, notwithstanding that Rexy was otherwise a friendly, serene and non-aggressive dog. [74] For completeness, I note that even if I had accepted that Rexy’s contact with Mr Wright’s right arm involved ‘mouthing’, I would still have concluded that the behaviour involved an ‘attack’. The ‘mouthing’ was described by Ms Kenny as a form of communication and, in my view, would involve deliberate conduct on the part of Rexy. On this premise, I consider that the conduct of Rexy in running at, jumping up at, and ‘mouthing’ Mr Wright’s forearm with sufficient force to cause the significant injuries sustained by him would constitute an ‘attack’ pursuant to s 89. [75] It follows that I am satisfied that on 28 January 2023, Rexy did, within the meaning of s 89 of the AMA, ‘attack’ Mr Wright. [76] The further question is whether Rexy did ‘seriously attack’ Mr Wright. Was Mr Wright seriously attacked? [77] The question is whether Rexy attacked Mr Wright in a way that caused bodily harm to Mr Wright. [78] Mr Barclay accepts that the interaction caused Mr Wright bodily harm.58 [79] The medical evidence plainly supports that conclusion. Mr Wright was wounded by the attack and required surgery to repair the injuries. [80] I find that s 89(2)(a) of the AMA is satisfied because Rexy ‘seriously attacked’59 Mr Wright on 28 January 2023. 56 T1-52 line 38 – T1-53 line 17. 57 T1-49 lines 18–30. 58 T1-17 lines 29–32. 59 Within the meaning of AMA s 89(6)(b). -- 19 of 22 -- 20 [81] I now turn to the issue of whether the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the decision- maker, has a discretion not to issue a regulated dog declaration even though satisfied that a ground mentioned in s 89(2) exists for Rexy. Is there a residual discretion? [82] Mr Paterson for Mr Barclay submitted that on a proper construction of the AMA, in particular ss 90 and 94, the decision-maker has a residual discretion whether to make a dangerous dog declaration.60 [83] The submission runs headlong into a decision of the Appeal Tribunal in Brisbane City Council v Roy (‘Roy’).61 The Appeal Tribunal rejected the proposition that there was any residual discretion available if the decision-maker is satisfied about the facts out of which the power to make a regulated dog declaration under s 89(2) or s 89(3) arises. The Appeal Tribunal observed that:62 [52] The words of s 89(1) clearly confer upon a local government a capacity to choose between alternative courses of action: a choice that must be made in the exercise of a discretion. A local government may, subject to compliance with the requirements of Part 4, declare a dog to be dangerous, menacing or restricted. The discretion not to make any declaration at all is confirmed by s 90(1) which states ‘If a local government proposes to make a regulated dog declaration …’ (emphasis added) and then outlines the process available to that end starting with a notice of proposed declaration given to the owner. [53] Section 89(2) sets out the considerations the local government is required to take into account in exercising the discretion conferred by s 89(1) to declare a dog to be dangerous. Section 89(3) sets out the considerations the local government is required to take into account in exercising the discretion conferred by s 89(1) to declaring a dog menacing. [54] If the local government is satisfied about the facts out of which the power to make a declaration about a dog arises, the local government must, by s 94(2) of the AM Act, make the declaration. [55] The ‘relevant ground’ in s 94(2) is a reference to the considerations which must be taken into account in exercising the power to make a regulated dog declaration to which we have earlier referred, that is ss 89(2) and (3). [56] Use of the word ‘must’ in s 94 indicates that the power granted is required to be exercised. There is no discretionary element involved save that the decision maker must be satisfied that the relevant ground under s 89 is made out. If it is not, the regulated dog declaration proposed cannot be made. (citations omitted, emphasis added) [84] Roy has been followed in a number of recent first instance decisions of the Tribunal.63 60 T1-55 line 13 – T1-57 line 61 [2020] QCATA 147. 62 At [52]–[56]. 63 See e.g. Dalgliesh v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 34; Brain v Townsville City Council [2025] QCAT 24; Murdock v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 297. -- 20 of 22 -- 21 [85] I consider myself bound to follow the decision in Roy.64 In any event, I respectfully consider that the decision is correct. I make the following additional observations: (a) s 94 of the AMA is in the same terms as it was when the AMA was first enacted; (b) the Explanatory Notes to the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Bill 2008 provided, relevantly:65 Clause 94(2) provides that, if after considering representations or evidence the local government is satisfied that the dog is a regulated dog under clause 89, it must make the declaration about the dog. (c) I consider that this extrinsic material confirms the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of s 94(2) as addressed in Roy.66 Satisfaction that a dog is a regulated dog turns on whether, taking a dangerous dog declaration as an example, the dog has attacked, acted, or behaved in a manner contemplated by s 89. (d) By operation of s 48(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘the HRA’), all statutory provisions must, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights.67 If a statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights, the provision must, to the extent possible that is consistent with its purpose, be interpreted in a way that is most compatible with human rights.68 I consider that the making of a dangerous dog declaration limits Mr Barclay’s property rights under s 24(1) of the HRA. I have noted the purposes of Chapter 4 of the AMA above. In my view, having regard to the plain language of s 94 of the AMA and the purposes of Chapter 4 of the AMA, I consider that the interpretation favoured in Roy is one that is, ‘to the extent possible’ with the purposes of Chapter 4, consistent with Mr Barclay’s property rights under s 24(1) of the HRA. [86] In short, I conclude that the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the decision-maker, does not have the residual discretion contended for by Mr Barclay. [87] In my view, it follows from this conclusion that s 58(1) of the HRA does not apply because the Tribunal, acting as the decision-maker, could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision having regard to the operation of s 94 of the AMA.69 [88] For completeness, I consider that, even if s 58(1) of the HRA did arise for consideration, the limitation of Mr Barclay’s right under s 24(1) of the HRA is reasonable and justifiable pursuant to s 13 of the HRA having regard to the following factors: 64 For the reasons I expressed in Clark v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2024] QCAT 329, [35]-[47]. 65 At page 46. Whilst s 89 then also encompassed a restricted dog declaration, I consider that this does not impact the issue. 66 See s 14B(1)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). 67 See s 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). 68 HRA s 48(2) 69 See HRA s 58(2); Murdock v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 297, [63]. -- 21 of 22 -- 22 (a) whilst the right concerns property rights, they do not concern one of the core property rights identified by Freeburn J in Austin BMI Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier;70 (b) the purposes of Chapter 4 of the AMA as addressed above; (c) the operation of, in particular, sections 89 and 97 achieves those purposes71 by imposing conditions on the keeping of, and requirements for the control of, regulated dogs; (d) in my view, having regard to the above purposes, the limitation is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and serves an important purpose having regard to the protection of the health and safety of the community in general; (e) the making of a dangerous dog declaration and the consequential imposition of the permit conditions achieves a reasonable balance between achieving the purposes of the AMA (including those of Chapter 4) and the limitation on property rights to the extent of the financial impost of complying with the conditions (and a potential monetary penalty in the event of non-compliance); (f) in my view, having found that Rexy ‘seriously attacked’ Mr Wright, there is no less restrictive and reasonably available way to achieve such purposes. Conclusion [89] Having considered the evidence and submissions made in this proceeding, and concluding that the ground in s 89(2)(a) of the AMA is established, the internal review decision of the Respondent made on 6 June 2023 must be confirmed. Order [90] For the above reasons, it is the decision of the Tribunal that: The decision of the Respondent made on 6 June 2023 confirming the decision to declare the Applicant’s dog named ‘Rexy’ to be a declared dangerous dog is confirmed. 70 [2023] QSC 95, [331]. 71 And, more broadly, the purposes, and means for achieving the purposes, identified in s 3(d) and 4(m) of the AMA. -- 22 of 22 --