Buckley v Sussex [2026] QCAT 21

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Buckley v Sussex [2026] QCAT 21 PARTIES: JENNIFER BUCKLEY (applicant) v JASMINE SUSSEX (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: ADL041-24 MATTER TYPE: Anti-discrimination matters DELIVERED ON: 13 January 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Bridgman ORDERS: The application for directions under s 62 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) is dismissed. The matter is adjourned for directions on a date to be fixed. Costs reserved. CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS – PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – where an application for directions as to the production of documents was made – whether the documents are relevant to the substantive proceeding – whether the documents are required to be produced Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 124A Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 47, s 62, s 237 Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103 Elks v Aitken Whyte Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] QCAT 123 Gill v Roberts [2011] QCAT 515 Pinnacle Sales & Management Pty Ltd & Ors v Lisa Douglas [2019] QCATA 52 SGB Facility Services Pty Ltd & Anor v Zoo Agency Pty Ltd [2021] QCATA 77 Stella v Griffith University & Ors [2025] QCAT 115 -- 1 of 10 -- 2 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Jasmine Sussex is the Respondent in a complaint brought by Jennifer Buckley under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (“AD Act”) alleging that Ms Sussex vilified Ms Buckley contrary to s 124A of that Act. [2] Ms Sussex applies for production of a document, thing or information under s 62 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”). This decision is solely about that application. For consistency, Ms Sussex is called the Respondent and Ms Buckley the Applicant, or in context, Complainant. [3] While this decision is about the interlocutory application, its determination requires some reflection on the substantive matter. [4] The substantive matter is contentious and has been the subject of public commentary, some of it sensationalised. It is not, however, a factually complicated matter; the facts presently before the Tribunal are straightforward. [5] Both parties were legally represented by leave including by senior counsel. Background [6] Ms Buckley is a transgender woman who complains that Ms Sussex, contrary to s 124A of the AD Act, vilified her and transgender women as a group. The alleged vilification is in comments by the Respondent about the Applicant’s stimulation of lactation and feeding her child, and similar acts by transgender women in general. [7] Section 124A provides relevantly as follows: 124A Vilification on grounds of race, religion, sexuality, sex characteristics or gender identity unlawful (1) A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race, religion, sexuality, sex characteristics or gender identity of the person or members of the group. (2) Subsection (1) does not make unlawful— (a) the publication of a fair report of a public act mentioned in subsection (1); or (b) the publication of material in circumstances in which the publication would be subject to a defence of absolute privilege in proceedings for defamation; or (c) a public act, done reasonably and in good faith, for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes or for other purposes in the public interest, including public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter. … -- 2 of 10 -- 3 [8] The public acts complained of were mostly social media posts and online news reports by, or quoting, the Respondent and identifying or referring to the Applicant, the Applicant’s attributes, her workplace and family members, and transgender women more broadly. [9] Preliminary steps included filing the initiating complaint, mediation between the parties, and filing additional materials including contentions and replies, designed to inform the Respondent (and the Tribunal) of the substance of the impugned acts.1 [10] Contentions were filed and served by the Applicant, contentions in response by the Respondent, and a reply by the Applicant. An amended statement of contentions is on file. It is unclear if this document is the final filed statement of contentions; the Respondent says leave to amend is not yet given. Both parties appear to proceed on the basis of that document. For this application, it makes no difference which version is used. [11] The Applicant replied to 12 paragraphs of the Respondent’s Statement of contentions in response with the following: “the Complainant induced lactation under the supervision and with the knowledge of medical professionals.” That statement was in paragraph [5] of the Applicant’s reply. [12] That statement echoed a statement accompanying the initiating complaint, that lactation was induced under medical supervision.2 [13] Ms Sussex served a notice on Ms Buckley requiring further and better particulars about paragraph [5] (“Notice”). Such notices are common in pleadings jurisdictions but not applications under the QCAT Act.3 Nonetheless, the Applicant’s solicitors responded, seemingly accepting the process and progressing the matter. [14] A formal application for directions under s 62(3) was filed by Ms Sussex with the Notice attached. Section 62 [15] By s 62 of the QCAT Act the Tribunal may give directions: 62 Directions (1) The tribunal may give a direction at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. (2) The tribunal may hold a directions hearing for giving the direction before any other hearing is held for the proceeding. (3) Without limiting subsection (1), the tribunal may give a direction under this section requiring a party to the proceeding to produce a document or another thing, or provide information to— (a) the tribunal; or 1 Gill v Roberts [2011] QCAT 515. 2 Complaint Form, page 5 of 8. 3 “The Tribunal does not have pleadings”: Pedersen v Bradshaw & Anor [2021] QCATA 102. See also, for example, SGB Facility Services Pty Ltd & Anor v Zoo Agency Pty Ltd [2021] QCATA 77; Greg Black Constructions Pty Ltd v Brodie and Anor [2011] QCAT 671. Section 160 of the QCAT Act empowers the Tribunal to require further and better particulars of an administrative decision maker in its review jurisdiction but that is not relevant here. -- 3 of 10 -- 4 (b) another party to the proceeding. (4) A party must comply with a direction given under this section within— (a) the period stated in the direction; or (b) if the tribunal has extended the period within which the direction must be complied with—the extended period. (5) However, subsection (4) does not apply to a document or thing, a part of a document or thing, or information for which there is a valid claim to privilege from disclosure. (6) The tribunal may act under this section on the application of a party to a proceeding or on the tribunal’s own initiative. (7) The tribunal’s power to act under this section is exercisable only by— (a) the tribunal as constituted for the proceeding; or (b) a legally qualified member, an adjudicator or the principal registrar. [16] The information sought was for all documents as follows, verbatim: 1. Full and complete particulars of each procedure or step undertaken by or in respect of the Complainant which is relied upon as having “induced” lactation. 2. Particulars as to whether: (a) it is alleged the bodily fluid so generated was or comprised milk; and (b) (if so) full and complete particulars of all facts, matters or circumstances relied upon as supporting that conclusion. 3. Full and complete particulars of the chemical, biological and metabolic nature and composition of the bodily fluid so generated, specifying: (a) the pH balance thereof; (b) the colour thereof; and (c) whether it included the following components, and (if so) the nature and concentration of each; namely– (i) caseins or nutrients, such as calcium or protein; (ii) sugars or carbohydrates; (iii) minerals, such as phosphate, magnesium, sodium, potassium, citrate, chloride, or other cations, anions or milk salts; (iv) vitamins, such as Vitamins A, B1, B2, B5, B6, B7, B12, and D; (v) lactose; (vi) saturated fats; (vii) the enzyme lactase; (viii) immune factors or immune-modulating components; and (ix) antibodies. -- 4 of 10 -- 5 4. Full and complete particulars of all facts, matters and circumstances by reason whereof it is alleged that the generation of bodily fluid by the Complainant constituted “lactation”, including: (a) whether the bodily fluid so generated was secreted from a mammary gland, and (if not) identification of the body part or anatomical feature from which the bodily fluid was secreted; and (b) whether the process by which such bodily fluid was generated involved hormonal stimulation by the presence or absence of each of the following hormones, and (if so) the source thereof or the process by which the level thereof was increased or decreased (as the case may be); namely: (i) progesterone; (ii) estrogen; (iii) prolactin human placental lactogen (HPL); (iv) follicle stimulating hormone (FSH); (v) luteinizing hormone (LH); (vi) human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG); (vii) growth hormone (GH); (viii) adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH); (ix) glucocorticoids such as cortisol; (x) thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH); (xi) thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH); and (xii) oxytocin. 5. Full and complete particulars of each “medical professional” who allegedly provided “supervision” in respect of lactation or the inducement thereof, including: (a) the identity of the medical professional; (b) the qualifications of the medical professional; and (c) the nature and timing of the supervision allegedly supplied by the medical professional. 6. Full and complete particulars of each “medical professional” who allegedly had “knowledge” of lactation or the inducement thereof, including: (a) the identity of the medical professional; (b) the qualifications of the medical professional; and (c) the source, timing and extent of the medical professional’s alleged knowledge. [17] For convenience, the application, while it refers to documents, is taken to require provision of information as well as production of documents. Several of the items are unlikely to be documents in the Applicant’s hands. To the extent necessary I waive procedural requirements to encompass information as well as documents. -- 5 of 10 -- 6 [18] Solicitors for Ms Buckley rejected most of the requested information as not proper and misconceived, citing irrelevancy or lack of utility in the substantive proceedings. [19] Ms Buckley’s solicitors declined to provide full details of treating practitioners citing concerns for their safety. A list of specialities of medical providers was given. [20] In Elks v Aitken Whyte Lawyers Pty Ltd it was held as follows:4 [10] Materials sought pursuant to an application under s 62(3) will only be directed to be produced where they are described with particularity and have demonstrated direct relevance to the issues in the dispute. The application must not be used to engage in a “fishing expedition”. [11] The exercise of the power to order disclosure must occur in the context of what is necessary for a speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding in question. … [14] The question arising in this application concerns the relevance of the requested materials, if any, to the issues in the substantive proceeding. It is therefore necessary to identify any pertinent issues in the substantive proceeding. (footnotes omitted) Elements of vilification [21] Section 124A sets out the elements that, if proven, would amount to vilification. For convenience subsection (1) is again reproduced here: (1) A person must not, by a public act, incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons on the ground of the race, religion, sexuality, sex characteristics or gender identity of the person or members of the group. [22] In the present case the contentions etc state these elements as follows: (a) a person – the Respondent, Ms Sussex; (b) by a public act – the alleged tweets, media reports etc; (c) incite hatred etc – the fear and other matters set forth in contentions affecting Ms Buckley, her family members and other transgender women; (d) attribute – sex characteristics or gender identity. Are the items in the Notice relevant to issues in dispute? [23] I do not by this list imply any finding, merely noting the matters as stated in contentions. Proof is still required by way of admissions or evidence, with the onus lying on the Applicant. [24] The elements of s 124A(1) discussed above are the matters that can be in dispute for the purposes of this application. The following list states my conclusions about the 4 [2024] QCAT 123 (Mellifont J, President and Member Berry). Applied by Senior Member Traves in Stella v Griffith University & Ors [2025] QCAT 115. -- 6 of 10 -- 7 Notice items’ relevance to issues in dispute, using the numbering of the Notice ([16] above) with headings as a guide only. (1) Procedures said to induce lactation The nature of the procedures (or whether procedures were followed or not) has no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. (2) Composition of bodily fluids and means of their analysis These details, including whether there were relevant bodily fluids or not, and whether they were analysed or not, have no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. (3) Details of bodily fluids by various characteristics and composition in detail These details, including whether they were obtained or not, have no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. (4) Whether generation of bodily fluids constituted lactation This request seems more properly the subject of expert testimony and is not necessarily information or documentation held by the Applicant or information she possesses. Further, whether the medical procedures result in lactation by transgender women has no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. (5) Particulars of treating medical professionals The personal and professional qualifications of Ms Buckley’s treating team and details of any treatment have no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. (6) Particulars of medical professionals’ knowledge of lactation etc This request has no bearing on whether the Respondent, by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute. [25] In relation to (5) and (6) above, any challenge to the expertise of medical professionals is a matter for cross-examination and not for further and better particulars. There is presently nothing before me indicating the Applicant intends to call those professionals and for the following reasons it is hard to see why such evidence would be called or permitted. [26] Whether or not Ms Buckley received the medical treatment, the nature and effects of the treatment, the composition of various bodily fluids and the qualifications and experience of those working with her are not elements of the alleged vilification. It is Ms Sussex’s acts that are tested, not those of Ms Buckley. [27] The Applicant’s contention about medical supervision and knowledge5 is not relevant to the impugned conduct of the Respondent. It makes no difference to the substantive question whether or not Ms Buckley took or acted on medical advice; whether or not 5 See paras [11] and [12] above. -- 7 of 10 -- 8 fluids were produced or used; whether or not fluids were analysed or their composition; and who provided professional assistance. [28] Vilification lies in the public acts of the Respondent, the impact of those acts, and the attributes of the Applicant.6 [29] The Applicant’s recent medical treatment is simply not relevant to the matter. Exculpation [30] Section 124A(2) sets out some matters that are not unlawful despite s 124A(1): (a) publication of a fair report of the public act; (b) absolute privilege; (c) a public act done reasonably and in good faith: (i) for academic, artistic, scientific or research purposes; or (ii) for public interest purposes, including public discussion or debate about, and expositions of, any act or matter. [31] These exculpatory elements operate as defences. The burden of proving fair report; privilege; or a good faith act for academic etc purposes or in the public interest lies on the Respondent, who must (absent admission by the Applicant or judicial notice) adduce evidence to satisfy the Tribunal, to the relevant standard, that the exception applies.7 [32] It is up to the Respondent to raise and prove exculpatory arguments. Filing contentions in reply or demanding particulars does not reverse the onus. [33] The Applicant is of course able to challenge or pre-empt exculpatory arguments: is the report “fair”; is asserted privilege of the requisite character and correctly claimed; was the public act for the stated purposes and done in good faith? There may be evidence of these matters adduced and tested at hearing by either party. Conclusion on relevance [34] I find the requested information is not relevant to issues in dispute and on that basis the application for directions under s 62 is dismissed. Section 47 [35] Section 47 of the QCAT Act empowers the Tribunal to dismiss etc a proceeding or part of a proceeding if the Tribunal considers it to be frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; lacking in substance; or otherwise an abuse of process. [36] Given the conclusion on relevance, it is unnecessary for me to make a determination under s 47. However, if my conclusion were different, I would have asked the parties for submissions or directed a hearing about an order dismissing the application under s 47. 6 There is no contest as to Ms Buckley’s relevant attributes. 7 Eatock v Bolt [2011] FCA 1103, [336]–[339]. Relating to s 18D Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), a cognate provision. -- 8 of 10 -- 9 [37] For completeness, the Respondent has a right to vigorously defend herself; her legal advisors are entitled to raise every legitimate argument. [38] The Respondent’s documents, including the Notice, contain much colourful language, and extensive use of code words and quotation marks flagging dissent. One document8 refers to an American activist who reportedly advocates violence against transgender people and their medical providers.9 [39] Whether these matters are oppressive and an abuse of process in this interlocutory application would demand more information, incur further delay and provide a further forum for stating entrenched views rather than enhancing the speed and fairness of the proceeding. [40] Further, good faith is an element of exculpation in s 124A(2)(c) of the AD Act. A finding of an abuse of process at this stage may reflect negatively on the Respondent in the substantive matter, and should rightly be the subject of fulsome consideration and submissions. [41] If it had been necessary, I would have also sought submissions or heard the parties about dismissing the application under s 47 as oppressive and designed to cause embarrassment to the Applicant. In the context of highly contentious proceedings with entrenched positions, there is a risk of further vilificatory public acts, protected by the litigation process.10 Further, there are perverse incentives to cause delay in these proceedings, especially for the Respondent. As Member Dr Forbes said in a different context:11 [21] In lawyers’ experience it is not unknown for alleged debtors to fend off the evil day with ingenuous demands for further particulars, and further and better particulars. If further particulars were really needed, an interim application would have required SBG to specify the desired information with precision, and to satisfy the Tribunal that it was essential for defence of Zoo’s claim. In a Tribunal directed by the legislature to proceed with expedition and freedom from technicality, demands for further particulars in a relatively uncomplicated case call for close scrutiny. Discretion [42] Directions under s 62 of the QCAT Act are discretionary and may be issued to do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding.12 [43] I would exercise my discretion against the application for directions under s 62 on the following grounds: (a) the information sought is unnecessarily intimate and would amount to a serious infringement of the rights of privacy of the Applicant; (b) the details sought are oppressive; 8 Respondent’s Statement of Contentions in response to Complainant’s amended Statement of Contentions [10](b)(i) about the statement of 27 May 2023 referring to “dangerous fetish”. 9 Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘Matt Walsh’ (Web Page). <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/matt-walsh/>. 10 QCAT Act s 237. 11 SGB Facility Services Pty Ltd & Anor v Zoo Agency Pty Ltd [2021] QCATA 77. 12 QCAT Act s 62(1); Pinnacle Sales & Management Pty Ltd & Ors v Lisa Douglas [2019] QCATA 52. -- 9 of 10 -- 10 (c) production of the documents and other information would take time and incur costs on the Applicant for little or no purpose; (d) there are serious concerns about the safety of medical professionals; (e) the directions sought would have the effect of delaying speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding; (f) production of the documents and information would not narrow the issues in dispute and has no other discernible advantages; (g) the directions sought are not in the interests of justice. [44] On those grounds, I dismiss the application for directions under s 62. Adequacy of reasons [45] The reason the information was sought was inadequately particularised, merely being that it related to a statement made in the Applicant’s filed materials about medical supervision. [46] I was unable to glean the relevance of the reply to the 12 paragraphs discussed above at [11] to [13] to the substantive matter, although I understand the fact of medical supervision may be personally important to Ms Buckley, especially given her profession. [47] I find that whether, how and by whom procedures were medically supervised is not relevant to the substantive application. [48] The stated reasons are not relevant to whether the Respondent by public act, incited hatred etc of the Applicant or a class of persons with an attribute and are not in the interests of justice. [49] I dismiss the application also on that basis. Further directions [50] Given the observations in [41] and [43] above and potential for further delay in proceedings by more interlocutory applications or notices inter partes, the substantive matter should adjourned to an early date to be fixed for directions to efficiently manage the case to hearing or determination on the papers. Costs [51] No application has been made for costs in this interlocutory step. It is a matter for the Tribunal in the substantive matter whether costs orders are made and if so, how disposition of this application is dealt with. Costs are reserved. Orders The application for directions under s 62 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) is dismissed. The matter is adjourned for directions on a date to be fixed. Costs reserved. -- 10 of 10 --