Aniko Property Management Pty Ltd v Beal [2026] QCATA 118

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Aniko Property Management Pty Ltd v Beal [2026] QCATA 118 PARTIES: ANIKO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (applicant/appellant) v JOHN DOUGLAS BEAL (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: APL167-25 ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S: Q12302-24 MATTER TYPE: Appeals DELIVERED ON: 17 July 2026 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Gaffney ORDERS: Leave to appeal is granted. The appeal is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – ERROR OF LAW – RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES LEGISLATION – OBLIGATIONS, PROHIBITED MATTERS AND PROTECTION FOR LESSEES – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant was and is the agent for a lessor under two successive residential tenancy agreements – where the respondent was a tenant under the agreements – where the agent sought rectification of the second agreement arising from a clerical error in nominating the amount of rent – where the agent relied on s 429 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) – where the application was dismissed by the Tribunal below – where the applicant alleges various errors were made by the Tribunal – whether s 429 was misapplied – whether an order for rectification is within the scope of orders which could be made under s 429 – whether it is appropriate to order rectification in the circumstances Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32CA(1) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 13(1), s 142(3)(a)(i), s 147 -- 1 of 11 -- 2 Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2009 (Qld), s 5(2)(b), s 71, s 173, s 206(1), s 429 Ascend Holdings Pty Ltd ATF Ascend Family Trust v Hellings [2012] QCATA 19 Harrison v Meehan [2016] QCATA 197 Khromeenkova v PRD Robina Nationwide [2021] QCATA 35 Li v Morgan Jade Heading ATF the JE Trust (No 2) [2021] QCATA 107 Ovseev v Pristine Management Pty Ltd [2023] QCATA 168 Prendergast v West Murray Irrigation [2014] NSWCATAP 69 R v PL [2009] NSWCA 256 Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2016) 260 CLR 85 Stone v Grundy [2018] QCATA 68 Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (2023) 278 CLR 208 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) REASONS FOR DECISION Background [1] The Applicant (‘Aniko’) is the agent for the letting of a residential apartment at Hope Island.1 The Respondent, Mr Beal, was, at the time of the filing of this appeal, a tenant of the apartment.2 The parties executed a residential tenancy agreement in December 2023 for the period 12 January 2024 to 30 January 2025. The rent payable was $1,500 per week. The parties executed a subsequent tenancy agreement (‘the lease’), for the period 12 January 2025 to 30 January 2026, at a rental of $1,250 per week. [2] Aniko says that the decrease in rent resulted from a ‘clerical error’ on its part.3 The minor civil dispute proceeding [3] Aniko filed an Application for minor civil dispute - residential tenancy dispute on 2 December 2024 seeking the following orders, in reliance on s 429 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) (‘RTRAA’): (a) that the Tribunal set aside the lease; (b) that the Tribunal ‘reinstate’ the rent increase to the ‘intended’ $1,550 per week effective from 31 January 2025; and 1 General tenancy agreement Form 18a commencing 12 January 2025. 2 Ibid. 3 Application for leave to appeal or appeal, 28 April 2025, Part C. -- 2 of 11 -- 3 (c) that the Tribunal order that the rent be brought up to date at the increased amount.4 [4] The application was dismissed by an Adjudicator of the Tribunal. The application for leave to appeal and appeal [5] Aniko filed an application for leave to appeal and appeal on 29 April 2025 seeking that leave to appeal be granted, the Adjudicator’s decision be set aside, the lease be corrected to reflect the intended weekly rent of $1,550, effective from 31 January 2025.5 The grounds of appeal [6] The grounds of appeal are summarised as follows:6 The Tribunal’s decision to dismiss the application failed to properly consider critical evidence demonstrating a clerical error in the renewed tenancy agreement for [the apartment]. Specifically, the agreement recorded a weekly rent of $1,250 instead of the intended $1,550. This figure was entered in error during lease renewal processing and was not the result of any mutual agreement between the parties. No supporting documentation - such as a rent decrease form or signed variation – was provided to validate a lawful rent reduction, as required under section 71 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld). The tenant had consistently paid $1,500 per week in the prior term, and there was no indication of financial hardship or objection to the intended modest increase to $1,550. Evidence submitted included system-generated logs and timelines verifying the original rent proposal and identifying the point at which the clerical error occurred. By overlooking this substantive and procedural discrepancy, the [Tribunal’s] dismissal resulted in an unjust outcome that does not reflect the true intent of the parties and causes financial detriment to the lessor. Leave is respectfully sought to appeal this outcome and request rectification of the lease. [7] In its submissions filed with the application for leave to appeal and appeal, Aniko submits that: 7 (a) the Tribunal dismissed the application without rectifying the agreement or providing reasoning that addressed the procedural error at the heart of the dispute; (b) the decision may have failed to consider relevant mandatory statutory requirements, for example, s 71 of the RTRAA requiring formal documentation for a rent decrease; (c) the determination did not adequately address Aniko’s evidence, which demonstrates a clear clerical error, not a genuine agreement to reduce rent; and (d) the outcome creates unintended financial disadvantage to the lessor due to a procedural misstep not supported by mutual consent or law. 4 Applicant’s submissions in Q12302-24. 5 Application for leave to appeal or appeal, 28 April 2025, Part D. 6 Ibid Part C. 7 Applicant’s submissions filed on 29 April 2025. -- 3 of 11 -- 4 The Respondent’s submissions [8] Mr Beal submits that:8 (a) the Form 18d is not required for a rent decrease, as it only relates to COVID-19; (b) the initiating application was not valid under s 417 of the Act as it was supposed to be made by the lessor and not the agent – he had seen no evidence or authorisation of the agent to bring the application via separate letter or in the tenancy agreement; and (c) the lease was fully signed and returned to him on 8 November 2024, and it was his understanding that the Tribunal could not rule on issues older than 6 months. Leave to appeal [9] Aniko is entitled to appeal against the Adjudicator’s decision to the Appeal Tribunal,9 however, as the appeal is from a decision in a minor civil dispute, Aniko must first obtain leave to appeal from the Appeal Tribunal.10 [10] In Ascend Holdings Pty Ltd ATF Ascend Family Trust v Hellings,11 Deputy President Kingham DCJ stated in relation to the matters to be satisfied before leave to appeal may be granted: [3] Leave to appeal will ordinarily only be granted where there is some question of general importance upon which further argument, and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal, would be to the public advantage; or, there is a reasonably arguable case of error in the primary decision and a reasonable prospect that the applicant would obtain further substantive relief. Another question sometimes asked is: is leave necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant, caused by some error? [11] I consider it would be to the public advantage for the Appeal Tribunal to consider the scope of s 429 in the circumstances of this case. Leave to appeal is granted. The alleged errors by the Adjudicator [12] I consider Aniko’s material to raise for consideration whether the learned Adjudicator erred in that: (a) the Adjudicator’s decision was not reasonably open and was against the weight of evidence;12 (b) the Adjudicator failed to apply s 71 of the RTRAA; (c) the Adjudicator failed to apply s 173 of the RTRAA; (d) the Adjudicator failed to find that a Form 18d was required to effect a decrease in rent; (e) the Adjudicator failed to give adequate reasons for decision; and 8 Respondent’s submissions filed on 30 June 2025. 9 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 142(1). 10 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 142(3)(a)(i). 11 [2012] QCATA 19 [3]. 12 Li v Morgan Jade Heading ATF the JE Trust (No 2) [2021] QCATA 107, [25]. -- 4 of 11 -- 5 (f) the Adjudicator misapplied s 429 by dismissing the application without rectifying the agreement. [13] As the error referred to in (f) above is a question of mixed law and fact,13 the appeal must proceed by way of rehearing under s 147 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). The Adjudicator’s reasons [14] I turn now to the Adjudicator’s reasons. [15] Contrary to Aniko’s assertion, the learned Adjudicator accepted that an error was made in specifying the amount of rent in the subsequent lease.14 However, the Adjudicator found that Mr Beal was not aware of the error, and had no reason to know that an error had been committed,15 particularly as the amount of the bond was also reduced to reflect the reduced rental amount.16 The Adjudicator found that there were no pre-contractual negotiations which would indicate that an error been made,17 and accepted Mr Beal’s evidence that he assumed the reduction in rent was a reflection of the current market and that he had been a good tenant.18 Further, that the error was not an obvious one.19 [16] The Adjudicator stated:20 Whilst I believe I would have the power to potentially order that the contract be amended to rectify a mistake, I have to assess all of that information and the parties’ conduct during the negotiation and at the time of the agreement and then rectify if I felt that was necessary in the circumstances. I’m certainly not – there is nothing to suggest that Mr Beal should’ve been aware that this was an error nor would that allow me or give me the power or convince me that I should rectify and remedy the unilateral mistake – an administrative mistake that was made by the agent. I certainly don’t think that I have anything before me that would warrant such a rectification and remedy being applied. So I am dismissing the application today. [17] The Adjudicator also found that the Form 18d was a COVID form and not relevant,21 that s 71 did not apply,22 and s 173 also did not apply.23 Has an error been demonstrated? [18] I turn now to consider each of the alleged errors. (a) Whether the finding of unilateral mistake was open on the evidence [19] I consider the Adjudicator’s finding that there had been a unilateral mistake on the part of Aniko, as an agent, was open on the evidence, relevantly: 13 R v PL [2009] NSWCA 256 [26]. 14 Transcript T1-8 ln 30. 15 Transcript T1-8 ln 29. 16 Transcript T1-8 ln 39-43. 17 Transcript T1-8 ln 18-19. 18 Transcript T1-8 ln 36-37. 19 Transcript T1-9 ln 5-9. 20 Transcript T1-9 ln 11-19. 21 Transcript T1-8 ln 13. 22 Transcript T1-8 ln 21-22. 23 Transcript T1-8 ln 25-27. -- 5 of 11 -- 6 (a) the Adjudicator accepted Aniko’s evidence of the error being made, which is reflected in email correspondence between Aniko and the lessor;24 (b) there was no evidence of any pre-contractual negotiations between the parties; (c) there was evidence of Mr Beal’s assumption about the reduced rent in an email summary of a discussions with the agent occurring on 11 November 2024, soon after his execution of the lease, which stated: I had assumed the more realistic amount of $1,250 was offered after the owners visit mid-year. I hoped they were pleased with the manner in which I kept the property, and only having 1 tenant to minimize (sic) wear & tear.’25 (d) the decreased rent was not ‘significantly less or more’ so as to be ‘grossly undervalued or ludicrous in the circumstances and very clearly an error’. [20] There was no evidence to suggest that the ‘true intention’ of Mr Beal, in addition to that of the lessor, was for the rent to be increased, or that there was a ‘mutual agreement’ for the rent to be increased. The evidence supported a finding of error on the part of the agent alone. No error on the part of the learned Adjudicator is established. (b) Section 71 RTRAA [21] Section 71 of the RTRAA provides, relevantly: 71 Tenant may apply to tribunal about significant change in subsequent agreement (1) This section applies if— (a) an agreement (the existing agreement) between a lessor and tenant creates a residential tenancy for premises; and (b) the lessor of the premises enters into a new agreement with the tenant (the new agreement) for the premises that starts after the end of the existing agreement; and (c) the new agreement contains 1 or more significant changes to the terms of the existing agreement; and (d) at least 1 of the tenants mentioned in the existing agreement is a tenant for the new agreement. (2) Also, this section applies whether or not the lessor for the existing agreement and the lessor for the new agreement are the same person. (3) If the tenant considers the significant change is unreasonable, the tenant may apply to a tribunal for an order under this section. (4) The application must be made within 30 days after the tenant enters into the new agreement. 24 Email dated 28 October 2024 from Jeanette Bladin to Laleh Kalsi, email dated 20 October 2024 from Laleh Kalsi to Jeanette Bladin, email dated 10 November 2024 from Laleh Kalsi to Jeanette Bladin. 25 Email dated 11 November 2025 from the Respondent to the Applicant. -- 6 of 11 -- 7 (5) If the significant change relates to an increase in rent, the tribunal may reduce the rent payable under the agreement. … [22] It can be seen that s 71 has no application to the present case: it does not require that a tenant seek the Tribunal’s approval for a rental decrease, it merely allows the tenant to apply for a decrease if the tenant considers the rent under a new agreement to be unreasonable. That was not the case here. The learned Adjudicator did not err in finding that s 71 had no application.26 (c) Section 173 [23] Section 173 provides: 173 Certain terms about penalties and other payments void (1) A term of an agreement is void to the extent it provides that, if the tenant breaches the agreement or this or another Act, the tenant is liable to pay— (a) all or a part of the rent remaining payable under the agreement; or (b) increased rent; or (c) an amount as a penalty; or (d) an amount as liquidated damages. (2) However, subsection (1) does not apply to a term of an agreement requiring the tenant to pay the costs incurred by the lessor in reletting the premises if the term complies with section 357A. (3) A lessor or lessor’s agent must not require a tenant to enter into an agreement containing a term that is void under subsection (1). Maximum penalty for subsection (3)—20 penalty units. [24] This section has no application to the present case. No error on this basis has been established. (d) Form 18d [25] The Form 18d is a ‘General tenancy COVID-19 variation agreement’. There is no applicable legislative provision having the effect that this form was required to effect a decrease in rent in a successive lease. It has no application to the present case. No error has been established. (e) Failure to give adequate reasons [26] As was noted by Judicial Member Rinaudo AM in Ovseev v Pristine Management Pty Ltd,27 the purpose of requiring reasons is to ‘inform the public and parties with an immediate interest in the outcome of the proceedings of the manner in which the Tribunal’s conclusions were arrived at’. [27] The Adjudicator adequately explained how she arrived at her decision: she accepted the error was made, but not that Mr Beal was or ought to have been aware of it, and 26 Transcript T1-8 ln 21 – 22. 27 [2023] QCATA 168, [33], citing Commonwealth of Australia v Pharmacy Guild of Australia [1989] FCA 797; 91 ALR 65, [42]. -- 7 of 11 -- 8 that rectification was not ‘necessary’ in the circumstances. The learned Adjudicator did not fail to give adequate reasons. [28] However, the conclusion reached is problematic because of the wording of s 429, which I discuss below. Error in applying s 429 of the RTRAA [29] Aniko’s claim was based on s 429 of the RTRAA. It provides: 429 General disputes between lessors and tenants or providers and residents (1) If there is a dispute between the lessor and tenant, or provider and resident, about an agreement, either party may apply to a tribunal for an order, and the tribunal may make any order it considers appropriate, to resolve the dispute. (2) An application under subsection (1) may be made by a cotenant. [30] The question to be asked by the Tribunal is not whether an order is ‘necessary’, it is whether an order is ‘appropriate’. They are different concepts. [31] ‘Appropriate’ is not defined in the RTRAA. The Macquarie Dictionary28 defines ‘appropriate’ to mean ‘suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, person, occasion etc.’ I consider that the meaning of ‘appropriate’ for the purpose of s 429 is ‘suitable or fitting to the circumstances of the dispute about an agreement.’ [32] By contrast, the Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘necessary’ as ‘that cannot be dispensed with’.29 [33] It follows that the Adjudicator erred in asking the wrong question.30 Determination of the appeal on rehearing [34] In Harrison v Meehan,31 the Appeal Tribunal stated: [20] …Appeals by way of rehearing involve a new determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties, rather than a mere correction of the errors in the determination of the Tribunal below. [21] An appeal by way of rehearing under s 147 of the QCAT Act is not a rehearing de novo. The Appeal Tribunal must make its own determination on the material before the Tribunal below (supplemented, if necessary by additional evidence if permitted under s 147(2)) with due respect for the findings of fact of the primary Tribunal, and due consideration of the advantages enjoyed by it. (footnotes omitted) 28 Macquarie Dictionary, 9 th ed, 2003, ‘appropriate’. 29 Ibid, ‘necessary’. 30 Prendergast v West Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69, [13(2)], citing Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 179; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, [82]. 31 [2016] QCATA 197. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 [35] I consider whether an order for rectification of the lease in the way proposed by the Applicant32 would be an ‘appropriate’ order under s 429. [36] As Member Gordon noted in Stone v Grundy (‘Stone v Grundy’),33 it is unclear exactly what s 429 empowers the Tribunal to do. The use of the word ‘may’ in s 429 indicates that any order under s 429 is discretionary.34 The obvious purpose of the section as appears from the wording is to resolve a dispute about a residential tenancy agreement.35 Member Gordon held that s 429 would give the Tribunal jurisdiction to decide the terms and parties to the agreement and to construe the agreement.36 I respectfully agree with this proposition, if that is what is required to resolve the dispute. [37] In Khromeenkova v PRD Robina Nationwide,37 Member Howe held that section 429 is a ‘general catch-all’ provision. It is not intended to override special provisions that the RTRAA has addressed with detail and particularity. [38] I consider s 429 would allow the Tribunal to exercise a discretion to rectify a residential tenancy agreement in an appropriate case, that is, a case in which rectification would be suitable or fitting to resolve the dispute. An order for rectification would amount to the Tribunal deciding the terms of the agreement, by a means which has not been specifically provided for elsewhere in the RTRAA. One of the objects of the RTRAA is to provide for the resolution of disputes about residential tenancy agreements.38 Allowing rectification to occur within the scheme of the RTRAA would further that object. [39] Two more questions arise: (a) what order is appropriate in this case, and also ‘fair and equitable to the parties’, as required by s13(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld); and (b) to that end, to what extent, if any, should I consider whether the equitable remedy of rectification would be available to Aniko? [40] As to the second question, in Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (‘Simic’);39 Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ set out the circumstances in which the equitable remedy of rectification is available:40 [103] Rectification is an equitable remedy, the purpose of which is to make a written instrument “conform to the true agreement of the parties where the writing by common mistake fails to express that agreement accurately”. For relief by rectification, it must be demonstrated that, at the time of the execution of the written instrument sought to be rectified, there was an “agreement” between the parties in the sense that the parties had a “common intention”, and that the written instrument was to 32 Which is the effect of their requested orders that the Tribunal ‘set aside the incorrect lease’ and ‘reinstate the rent increase’. 33 [2018] QCATA 68, [45]. 34 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 32CA(1). 35 See Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) s 429; Stone v Grundy, [50]. 36 Ibid [46]. 37 [2021] QCATA 35, [43]. 38 Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld), s 5(2)(b). 39 [2016] HCA 47; (2016) 260 CLR 85, [103]. 40 French CJ agreeing. -- 9 of 11 -- 10 conform to that agreement. Critically, it must also be demonstrated that the written instrument does not reflect the “agreement” because of a common mistake. Unless those elements are established, the “hypothesis arising from execution of the written instrument, namely, that it is the true agreement of the parties” cannot be displaced. (footnotes omitted) [41] In the circumstances found by the Adjudicator, which I consider open on the evidence, the equitable remedy of rectification would not have been available, as the evidence does not establish a common intention on the part of the parties that the rent would be increased. [42] As to whether I should simply apply principles stated in Simic, I am guided by the High Court’s decision in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (‘Young’).41 In that case the majority considered that statutory compensation was ‘likely more accessible’ than the availability of damages at common law.42 While s 429 does not specifically contemplate an award of compensation, as is the case with s 420 of the RTRAA, the High Court has in Young emphasised the primacy which is to be given to the statute. [43] So, there may be cases where it might be appropriate for rectification of the lease to be ordered in circumstances where rectification would not be available in equity. However, this is not one of those cases. To make the order sought would put Mr Beal in the position where he would pay to the lessor additional monies without his consent. He will have lost the opportunity to negotiate the rent or find another tenancy. In those circumstances it would not be appropriate, nor fair and equitable, for the order to be made. [44] Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. Other matters Mr Beal’s submissions [45] For completeness, I address Mr Beal’s submissions to the extent not already dealt with: (a) the initiating application was validly brought by the agent by virtue of cl 43 and item 3.1 of the lease, and s 206(1) of the RTRAA – the ‘written notice’ for s 206(1) is that contained in the lease; and (b) whilst there are specific limitation periods in the RTAA, an application under s 429 is not expressly subject to a limitation period, although unreasonable delay in lodging a dispute resolution request or applying to the Tribunal might be a factor against exercising the discretion. In this case, Aniko acted promptly. Evidence of comparable property [46] There was some discussion at the hearing of the application about the evidence filed by Mr Beal, consisting of advertisements for a property which he said was comparable to the leased property, advertised at $1,100 per week.43 The advertisements are not dated although Mr Beal submits they were published on 27 January 2025 and 14 41 [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208. 42 Ibid, [23]. 43 Refer to the Respondent’s letter to the Tribunal and advertisements filed on 18 February 2025, Transcript T1-4 ln 1-44 – T1-6 ln 1-32. -- 10 of 11 -- 11 February 2025.44 In any event the evidence is not relevant as it does not affect the question of what Mr Beal’s intention was at the time he signed the lease. 44 Respondent’s letter to the Tribunal filed on 18 February 2025. -- 11 of 11 --