Choi v The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place (No 2) [2026] QCATA 105

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Choi v The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place CTS 10897 (no2) [2026] QCATA 105 PARTIES: YUK SUM CHOI (appellant) v THE BODY CORPORATE OF MACQUARIE PLACE CTS 10897 (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: APL161-25 MATTER TYPE: Appeals DELIVERED ON: 18 June 2026 HEARING DATE: 18 June 2026 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Roney KC ORDERS: 1. The application for miscellaneous matters filed 24 March 2026 and the further application for miscellaneous matters filed 9 June 2026 are adjourned to 9:30am on 5 August 2026 to permit Yuk Sum Choi to engage legal representation for the hearing before Member Roney KC. 2. Order 3 of the Appeal Tribunal Order’s made 19 December 2025 is stayed until 9:30am on 5 August 2026 or early order. 3. The parties are granted leave to be legally represented at further hearings. 4. Both parties are granted liberty to apply in respect of these orders including for the discharge or variation of these orders. The Appeal Tribunal directs that: 1. Yuk Sum Choi must file and serve all and any material she relies upon on the hearing of those applications, by 4:00pm on 2 July 2026. 2. The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place CTS 10897 must file and serve all and any material it relies upon on the hearing of those applications, by 4:00pm on 16 July 2026. -- 1 of 7 -- 2 CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – STAY OF ACCESS ORDERS PENDING FURTHER APPEAL PRINCIPLES – whether to temporarily stay orders that a lot owner allow access to a lot by expert witnesses for the Body Corporate Body Corporate Community Management Act 1997 (Qld), s 271 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 152 Choi v The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place CTS 10897 [2025] QCATA 128 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Appellant: Self-represented, assisted by H Chan Respondent: Self-represented by its agent A West Body Corporate Secretary REASONS FOR DECISION Background [1] The appellant is the owner of Lot 20 in the scheme that is Macquarie Place CTS 10897. Macquarie Place is a scheme comprising 21 lots and common property, regulated by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) and Standard Module. Macquarie Place was built in around 1981. [2] In reasons handed down on 19 December 2025 in Choi v The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place CTS 10897 [2025] QCATA 128 I set aside orders made by an Adjudicator and remitted the matter to the Commissioner for further adjudication and consideration in relation to the following: (a) Whether section 177 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) applied because the exclusive area affected by the smoke lock was utility infrastructure, having regard to the submissions the parties have since made on that issue, and any relevant evidence which bears upon that issue. This is the issue I have identified in the section of these reasons headed “the failure to seek submissions on the utility infrastructure point-denial of procedural fairness”. (b) Whether in all the circumstances, it is reasonable that the Body Corporate insist on reinstatement of the smoke lock having regard to its own conduct and any other relevant considerations. This is the issue I have identified in the section of these reasons headed “Reasonableness and enforcement of the By-law” and “Duty to act reasonably”. -- 2 of 7 -- 3 (c) What is to the proper construction of by-law 5 and as to whether it applied to the relevant works of and associated with removing the airlock, notwithstanding the approval by the body, corporate of those works. (d) What are the implications for a Body Corporate in sanctioning work which arguably contravenes by-law 5.? (e) Does it constitute a waiver of any by-law contravention or is the Body Corporate estopped from asserting that the works must be removed because of by-law 5? (f) Must the Body Corporate enforce by-law 5 contravention if it has in practical effect sanctioned and approved the works allegedly contravening it? (g) Is it feasible, possible and appropriate from a proper building and engineering perspective to reinstate the smoke lock and what other modifications would be necessary to be made to the appellant’s lot in order for that to occur? As an associated issue, what methods are appropriate to reinstate the smoke lock and make the other modifications and what costs would be associated with that work? (h) Having regard to the answer and outcomes from these issues, who should bear the cost of doing that reinstatement and/or any other associated rectification work having regard to what is just inequitable and reasonable in the circumstances? [2] The Tribunal’s powers included to set aside the decision and return the matter to the tribunal or other entity who made the decision for reconsideration with or without the hearing of additional evidence as directed by the appeal tribunal, and with the other directions the appeal tribunal considers appropriate or make any other order it considers appropriate, whether or not in combination with other orders. [3] I made a direction that the parties act reasonably in all relevant respects in seeking to provide such information, submissions and expert opinion to the Adjudicator as may be necessary in order for the adjudication to determine those issues. [4] I directed in what I shall refer in these reasons to the access orders, that the appellant provides such access to the lot as may reasonably be requested and or required by the respondent on reasonable notice from time to time, and permit its representatives, agents, consultants any expert to conduct a proper examination of the features of the lot in order to assist the Adjudicator to arrive at a just and equitable outcome. I made the access orders to overcome the conundrum which was presented as the result of the fact that the appellant had refused access in an appropriate way to the Body Corporate’s representatives, agents, consultants and experts at times in the past in circumstances where the appellant contended that there are oppressive or significant financial consequences for her in reinstating the smoke lock. [5] I directed that if the appellant proposes to contend in the further adjudication process that there are oppressive or significant financial consequences for her in reinstating the smoke lock, that she files with the Commissioner’s office evidence as to the cost of reinstating the smoke lock within 90 days of the making of these orders or such further time, as the Adjudicator may permit. [6] I granted the parties liberty to apply in respect of any other consequential or other orders which might be required to be made. -- 3 of 7 -- 4 [7] The appellant has appealed the making of the access orders on various bases, which it is not necessary to describe for the purposes of the present application to adjourn and consider whether to grant a temporary stay but essentially are that the orders were beyond power and the applicant was not given an opportunity to make submissions on the issue of access, although they actually did address those issues in the adjudication and before this Tribunal. [3] In the reasons I recorded the following; [178] I should not leave this matter without recording how unsatisfactory the conduct of this matter has been both before the Adjudicator and before me. In particular, the appellant’s conduct of the matter, mainly because of the conduct of her husband who has had a large role in the presentation of the appellant’s case both here and below, has been unnecessarily confrontational and adversarial. There are references to some of that conduct in the Adjudicator’s reasons, and it includes the refusal by the appellant to allow access to the affected area by experts for the respondent. That raises concerns that she does not actually want there to be an informed and just outcome to this dispute but is acting solely to protect her interests. There has been a considerable amount of ill will demonstrated by the appellant’s side, with material which has been filed in which there are numerous personal attacks on the integrity of members of the body corporate, its committee, its expert advisers and the Adjudicator as well. When I invited submissions from the parties on specific issues after the hearing, the appellant’s response in part was to misstate things I had said in the context of inviting submissions, as if I had made some kind of tentative finding in her favour on some issues, when I had not. [4] For all intents and purposes, the applicant was successful in the appeal before me. I regarded it as appropriate that if the matter were to be referred back to the Commissioner for consideration to be given to the issues identified, that the Body Corporate’s experts have access to the site. Were such access not permitted it is likely or potentially so that a different outcome would have resulted, because it would mean that the adjudicator and the respondent are unlikely to be able to be properly informed of the matters required to be considered and therefore the justification for returning it for further consideration diminished or lost. [5] On 18 June 2026 I made orders adjourning two applications for miscellaneous matters which were before the Tribunal, to a hearing before me on 5 august 2026 on the applicant’s application to adjourn in order for her to obtain legal representation and specifically to retain counsel to appear on the hearing of those applications. The application for the adjournment was opposed by the respondent, who was represented by the secretary of the Body Corporate. I also ordered a temporary stay of the access orders. [6] Principally the respondent opposed the adjournment and a temporary stay of the access orders. [7] On the hearing of this application for an adjournment there was a concession by the appellant principally , through the agency of her husband, that they had since 26 November 2024 refused access and were likely to continue to refuse access to the experts to the Lot or specifically the laundry area of their Lot which had previously been the airlock area, which was the subject of the appeal to this Tribunal in the context of a past adjudication and an ongoing adjudication. -- 4 of 7 -- 5 [8] Suffice it to say that the Court of Appeal is due to hear their application for leave to appeal fairly soon, on the 17 July 2026. [9] The appellant chose to bring her application for a stay of the access order in this Tribunal rather than bring it in the Court of Appeal because she has advice to the effect that no such order could be made there until the hearing of the application for leave to appeal. [10] The two applications which have been adjourned involve first an application to stay the access order, pending the appeal or the determination of it. [11] The second application filed 9 June 2026 sought that the hearing listed on 18 June be vacated or alternatively, the stay application be relisted before another member or alternatively that the hearing be adjourned pending determination of that application. [12] The grounds in support of that suggest that the applicant objects to my hearing the ultimate stay application because she suggests that adverse views were recorded in the reasons concerning the conduct of the applicant's husband and those included a refusal to allow access to the affected areas by experts for the respondent and that these observations raised a question of apprehended bias on my part. [13] The grounds upon which the stay was sought were said to be that if inspections of the applicant's unit were carried out pursuant to the order “in advance of the determination of the Court of Appeal Proceeding, the utility of that part of' the proceeding would become otiose (if successful)”.And as stated in oral submissions the grounds are that representatives of the respondent have indicated an intention to carry out inspections pursuant to the access order, despite the commencement of the Court of Appeal proceeding. [14] The applicant initially sought to bring the stay application in reliance upon an order that I made giving the party's liberty to apply. The Registry determined that those orders did not authorise such an application. So instead, the applicant brought the application pursuant to section 152 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), (QCAT Act) which in its terms permits the Tribunal to order a stay but vests jurisdiction in the tribunal, as originally constituted, and which prima facie suggests that I have that power but other members of the Tribunal generally do not. The applicant seeks to contend that the proper construction of section 152 means that someone else on the tribunal could hear the application for a stay. [15] Whatever merits of that are, essentially the applicant seeks an opportunity to get legal representation to argue all of these points and be given a stay of the access order until the hearing of this matter, which will now occur on 5 August, after the hearing of the leave Application before the Court of Appeal. [16] The applicant , both herself and through her husband who at times represented her on the hearing before, me put on record that they had been requested in letters from the Body Corporate on 14 January 2026 and 12 March 2026, both of which are in evidence before, me requesting that she permit access on a specified date to identified expert witnesses who included a professional certifier, a fire consultant and others .Those letters did not suggest that access would be permitted to anyone other than those experts, for example to any other person within the body corporate committee. [17] The second letter of 12 March 2026 noted that access had been refused and that there has been a continued reiteration that access would be opposed, and a request was again -- 5 of 7 -- 6 made for access by those same experts forc1 April 2026.They continued to refuse access. [18] The applicant herself and through her husband put on record that the reason that access was opposed and there was prejudice to them in permitting such access was that the Body Corporate wanted to try to get into the unit to engage in some kind of fishing expedition to benefit the Court of Appeal hearing and to fish for evidence for some other, unidentified litigation because it had been trying to get into the unit for a couple of years. [19] That opposition to allowing access does not depend on any evidence of any particular prejudice or disadvantaged to them in allowing that to occur and indeed, the appellant conceded that they have previously permitted access to the body corporate when it was asked for but that stopped after 26 November 2024. [20] There is no evidence that the body corporate has previously misused permitted access, and there is nothing in the correspondence or any dealings between the body corporate and the applicant and her husband which would support the proposition that it was seeking to obtain access for some ulterior or collateral purpose other than to enable an orderly adjudication to proceed since the matter has been sent back to an adjudicator for further consideration. Be that as it as it may, the applicant and her husband contend that the prejudice to them in permitting access is that the body corporate will be able to produce new evidence as a result of what its experts see and that this will be used for some ulterior purpose and it will be irreversible once permitted. [21] In response, the body corporate put on record that it was not seeking to go fishing for any evidence or any such, its appropriate outcome and that it is only seeking access to the smoke lock area, which is the subject matter of dispute. [22] The applicant and her husband put on record at the hearing on 18 June 2026 that prior to and when the hearing was conducted before me on 5 November 2025 it was obviously a live issue as between her and the body corporate that access had been refused and was being asked for and that was an issue which arose as part of the issues to be determined on that hearing. That would suggest that any submissions relating to prejudice or the like were open to be made at any time, both at the oral hearing and in later written submissions, which the parties delivered. [23] Attention was also drawn to the fact that the adjudicator had powers as part of the investigative powers in section 271 of the Body Corporate Community Management Act 1997 to enter and inspect a lot but only with the consent of an owner. [24] The applicant also points to what she contends, is a protected human right to refuse access to her home which was “their castle”. [25] I also made orders directing the filing of any further material to be relied upon having regard to the fact that, despite orders made on 19 May 2026 that required the applicant to file submissions in respect of applications filed by 12 June 2026, she did not do. Nor did she serve them on the respondent, but produced copies from the Bar table at the hearing on 18 June 2026 which no one had seen. They explained this failure by suggesting that there was no need to file those written submissions because there was to be an oral hearing on that date. [26] It seems to me that even without considering at all the merits of the appeal and/ or the prospects of succeeding in getting a stay for a longer period in respect of the access -- 6 of 7 -- 7 order, it is appropriate to grant a temporary stay until the hearing can occur on 5 August. [27] The respondent could point to no specific prejudice to it in permitting such a stay. It should not be assumed that the absence of prejudice would continue after 5 August having regard to the fact that the matter generally, concerns important issues concerning the extent of fire safety in the building. In my earlier reasons I observed that the critical findings of the Adjudicator included that the previously constructed smoke lock (airlock) that formed part of the building's fire safety system has now been removed and that area now forms part of the lot 20 laundry room and it cannot now be considered to be a sanitary compartment, airlock or the like. The adjudicator was in agreement with both of the expert reports who concluded that this modification affects the building's fire safety system in a manner that is not considered minor and contravenes the provisions of National Construction Code (NCC) 2022 Volume One, "Building Code of Australia (BCA) Class 2 to Class 9 Buildings". [28] Although the material before me concerning the basis for the refusal of access and any prejudice to the applicants is scant end prima facie based upon unfounded speculation as to what ulterior purposes the body corporate might have for wishing to have access, in my view, in the exercise of my discretion, it is appropriate to grant the stay sought. [29] I therefore order that the application for miscellaneous matters filed 24 March 2026 and the further application for miscellaneous matters filed 9 June 2026 are adjourned to 9:30am on 5 August 2026 to permit Yuk Sum Choi to engage legal representation for the hearing before me. [30] Order 3 of the Appeal Tribunal Order’s made 19 December 2025 is stayed until 9:30am on 5 August 2026 or early order. [31] The parties are granted leave to be legally represented at further hearings. [32] Both parties are granted liberty to apply in respect of these orders including for the discharge or variation of these orders. [33] The Appeal Tribunal directs that Yuk Sum Choi must file and serve all and any material she relies upon on the hearing of those applications, by 4:00pm on 2 July 2026.The Body Corporate of Macquarie Place CTS 10897 must file and serve all and any material it relies upon on the hearing of those applications, by 4:00pm on 16 July 2026. -- 7 of 7 --