Dale v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCATA 44

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Dale v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2026] QCATA 44 PARTIES: WILLIAM JOHN DALE (appellant) v QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE – WEAPONS LICENSING (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: APL213-23 ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S: GAR222-19 MATTER TYPE: Appeals DELIVERED ON: 10 February 2026 HEARING DATE: 9 April 2025 SUBMISSIONS FILED: 28 May 2025 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member M Lember Member D Brown ORDERS: The appeal is allowed. The decision to strike out made in GAR222-19 on 19 June 2023 is set aside. The application for miscellaneous matters (strike out) filed 21 March 2022 is dismissed. The application to review a decision filed 20 June 2019 is returned to the Tribunal below to be listed for a directions hearing at the earliest date. CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – where appeal from a discretionary decision – where currency of revoked weapons license expired before review decision made – where application for review dismissed as lacking utility due to the expiry- whether the Tribunal in summarily dismissing acted on a wrong principle or arrived at the incorrect outcome – where appeal allowed – whether application to strike out should be dismissed Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) s 13, s 31, s 48, s 58 -- 1 of 13 -- 2 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 3, s 4, s 17, s 20, s 24, s 47, s 142, s 146 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) s 10, s 20, s 29, s 49A, s 142 Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) s 231, s 304P Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226 Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 Fuimaono v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 415 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 HA v. Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia (No 2) [2021] QCAT 327 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 502 McEwan v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2024] QCAT 64 Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing v Fowkes [2017] QCATA 37 Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 State of Queensland v Mizner [2022] QCATA 149 Steven Moore (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30 SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 Webber v. Moreton Bay Regional Council (No 2) [2011] QCAT 475 William John Dale v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 216 Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: Mr A Hoare, KC, instructed by Wonderley & Hall Solicitors. Respondent: Ms S Donkin, instructed by the Respondent. REASONS FOR DECISION What is the application about? [1] On 30 May 2019, Mr Dale’s weapons licenses were revoked by the Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing (QPS). He sought a review of the revocation decision by an application filed in the Tribunal on 20 June 2019 (the review application). But -- 2 of 13 -- 3 for the revocation decision, the term of his firearms licence would have expired on 28 July 2019 and of his concealable license on 28 July 2020. [2] A final hearing of the review application was scheduled for 24 April 2020, but was adjourned due to COVID-19 arrangements and had not been relisted when the QPS brought an application for miscellaneous matters seeking summary dismissal of the review application on 21 March 2022. [3] On 19 June 2023 the review application was dismissed pursuant to s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (the QCAT Act) on the basis that, because Mr Dale’s licences had since expired: … the application is now futile. If Mr Dale’s application for review were to proceed and be successful, he will not achieve the relief he, ultimately, is seeking being the reinstatement of his licence.1 [4] Mr Dale appeals the dismissal,2 and the appeal is determined as follows. The first instance decision [5] Section 10 of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (Weapons Act) provides the conditions under which a licence will be issued to a person and includes a requirement that the person must be considered a fit and proper person to hold a licence. Holding a licence authorises a licensee to possess and use a weapon or category of weapon endorsed on the licence for any lawful purpose.3 [6] Relevantly, the Weapons Act provides as follows: 20 Term of licence (1) A licence, other than a replacement licence, remains in force for the term stated on the licence which must not be more than— (a) if the licence is for a category A or B weapon—10 years; or (b) if the licence is for a weapon other than a category A or B weapon— 5 years. … (6) Also, a licence, including a replacement licence, stops being in force if— (a) it is suspended, cancelled, revoked or surrendered;… 29 Revocation of licence by giving revocation notice (1) An authorised officer may, by a revocation notice given to a licensee, revoke the licensee’s licence if the authorised officer is satisfied of any of the following things— … (d) the licensee is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence;... 1 William John Dale v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 216 at [24]. 2 Application for leave to appeal or appeal filed 10 July 2023; Queensland Civil and Administrative Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) ss 142, 146. 3 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) (Weapons Act), s 49A. -- 3 of 13 -- 4 [7] QPS argued on the application for dismissal4 that that there is no utility in proceeding with a review when licences have expired and submitted that Mr Dale should instead file a fresh application for the relevant licences, given the passage of time that had elapsed since the reviewable decision was made. [8] They also argued that a successful application for a new licence would render the review unnecessary, whereas a successful review would still require Mr Dale to apply for new licenses because the expired licenses would be out of time to be renewed. [9] In response, counsel for Mr Dale argued: (a) As the licences were revoked the previous expiration dates of the licences is of no further relevance. (b) The licences have been revoked and that is the reason they cannot be renewed, not because they have expired. (c) There is no reason for the Mr Dale to have any comfort or confidence that a licence would be granted on a fresh application, particularly with revocations on his record. (d) If Mr Dale makes a fresh application and it is refused a review would be on the same basis, therefore, the costs of the initial review application would be wasted. (e) Although Mr Dale would still have to apply for a fresh licence even if successful in the review application, he would be armed with and benefit from the findings of the Tribunal. (f) A review decision has effect from when the reviewable decision takes or took effect, namely, a point in time decision would be made restoring Mr Dale’s licenses as at, should the review application proceed. [10] After considering the submissions, the learned Member allowed the strike out and dismissed the review application, reasoning that: [19] It is clear from the legislation that a licence to use a weapon is a privilege and not a right. A licence stops being in force when it is revoked. The period a licence remains in force is finite and time can only be extended in the circumstances allowed for in the legislation, none of which applies in the instant case. [20] I do not accept that the expiration date for a licence is no longer relevant when the licence is revoked. Should the review have been successful, and the licence had not expired the licensee would still be required to renew it before it expired. [21] Obviously, when revoked the licence could not be renewed unless the review application was successful, or it was reinstated by the authorised officer. [22] I agree that it would be surprising if Mr Dale was successful on a fresh application until the matters which led to his revocation were addressed. It is unlikely that the authorised officer would change his/her opinion without further or fresh evidence. 4 Appeal Book pages 23-30. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 [23] Mr Dale argues that costs would be thrown away if the application to review is struck out and that there is utility in hearing the review as QPS would have the benefit of the Tribunal’s findings when considering a fresh application, assuming Mr Dale was successful. The anthesis of that argument is that if Mr Dale’s review application is heard by the Tribunal and he loses. He still could apply afresh for a licence. If that is refused and he seeks a review of that application, there is also a duplication of costs. As the same issues that would arise in a fresh application are likely to be identical to the issues in the present review application, the costs thrown away then, in my opinion, would be minimal. [24] In my opinion the application is now futile. If Mr Dale’s application for review were to proceed and be successful, he will not achieve the relief he, ultimately, is seeking being the reinstatement of his licence.5 [11] The merits of the review, namely, whether Mr Dale was a fit and proper person to hold a licence, were not considered. QPS argued that, in fact, there is no requirement for a Tribunal, in considering an application to dismiss a proceeding under section 47 of the QCAT Act, to conduct a summary merits assessment of the matter. In this case, they say, the subject for review (the license) has expired and, therefore, there is no requirement to perform a summary merits assessment on an expired licence. The grounds of appeal [12] Although not expressly articulated as such in the application for appeal or submissions, Mr Dale submits that the learned Member erred in dismissing the review application because: (a) The discretion to dismiss under section 47 was not enlivened, because the requirements of section 47(1) were not met (in other words, the outcome was incorrect), or alternatively, (b) The discretion to dismiss the review application under section 47 miscarried because the wrong principle was applied (namely, the discretion miscarried). Strike outs in the review jurisdiction [13] The Tribunal is mandated to deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick,6 and must also: (a) encourage the early and economical resolution of disputes before the Tribunal;7 and (b) ensure proceedings are conducted in an informal way that minimises costs to the parties and is as quick as is consistent with achieving justice.8 [14] The Tribunal must be mindful that their resources serve the public, not just the parties to the proceedings, per the oft-cited decision of Justice Alan Wilson, then President in Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226 at [13]: The statutory regime under which QCAT operates places obligations upon parties themselves to take care in their dealings with Tribunal matters, and to 5 William John Dale v Queensland Police Service - Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 216, at [19]-[24]. 6 QCAT Act, s 3(b). 7 Ibid, s 4(b). 8 Ibid, s 4(c). -- 5 of 13 -- 6 act in their own best interests. QCAT’s resources for the resolution of disputes are in high demand and serve, as the High Court has recently observed in relation to court resources, “… the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings”.9 Finality in litigation is highly desirable, because any further action beyond the hearing can be costly and unnecessarily burdensome on the parties.10 [15] By section 17(1) of the QCAT Act, the Tribunals review jurisdiction is the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by an enabling Act to review a decision made, or taken to have been made, by another entity under that Act. [16] The Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review a decision of the QPS revoking a weapons license is enlivened by section 142 of the Weapons Act which, by section 142(2) permits a person “aggrieved by the decision” to apply, as provided under the QCAT Act, to QCAT for a review of the decision. [17] In exercising its review jurisdiction, section 19 of the QCAT Act requires the Tribunal to decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the enabling Act, performing all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed. [18] Section 20(1) of the QCAT Act provides that the purpose of a review proceeding is to, “produce the correct and preferable decision”, which is done “by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.”11 [19] On review, section 24(1) limits the power of the Tribunal to: (a) confirming or amending the decision; or (b) setting the decision aside and substituting its own decision; or (c) setting the decision aside and returning the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration, with the directions the tribunal considers appropriate. [20] Importantly, the reviewable decision is the empowering instrument of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This was discussed by former Deputy President of QCAT, Horneman- Wren J in JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 502 who observed that, at [37]: Where, in contrast, the Tribunal is exercising review jurisdiction, the only matter, the only jurisdictional fact, of which the Tribunal need satisfy itself is the existence of a decision of a kind the Tribunal has power to review. Whether there is such a decision which falls within the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction is governed by the relevant statutes which confer the review jurisdiction on the Tribunal. It is a construction of those statutes which determines whether it is necessary that there be a valid decision made in a lawful exercise of the decision making power in order for the decision to be reviewable. (emphasis added) [21] The application to dismiss Mr Dale’s review application was grounded upon and decided pursuant to section 47 of the QCAT Act the words of which follow: 47 Dismissing, striking out or deciding if unjustified proceeding or part 9 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 217. 10 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Gummow JJ. 11 QCAT Act, s 20(2). -- 6 of 13 -- 7 (1) This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding or a part of a proceeding is— (a) frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or (b) lacking in substance; or (c) otherwise an abuse of process. (2) The tribunal may— (a) if the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal is the applicant for the proceeding, order the proceeding or part be dismissed or struck out; or (b) for a part of a proceeding brought before the tribunal by a party other than the applicant for the proceeding— (i) make its final decision in the proceeding in the applicant’s favour; or (ii) order that the party who brought the part before the tribunal be removed from the proceeding; or (c) make a costs order against the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal to compensate another party for any reasonable costs, expenses, loss, inconvenience and embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or part. Note— See section 108 for the tribunal’s power to order that the costs be paid before it continues with the proceeding. (3) The tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party to the proceeding or on the tribunal’s own initiative. (4) The tribunal’s power to act under subsection (2) is exercisable only by— (a) the tribunal as constituted for the proceeding; or (b) if the tribunal has not been constituted for the proceeding—a legally qualified member or an adjudicator. [22] As observed by Senior Member Brown in State of Queensland v Mizner [2022] QCATA 149, at [21]: The power conferred upon the Tribunal by s 47 of the QCAT Act is in the nature of a summary judgment power. The Tribunal will hasten slowly to deprive a party of their opportunity to argue their case at a final hearing. Only in the clearest of cases will a proceeding by an applicant be summarily dismissed. [23] It has also been said that: (a) The power to strike out ought only to be exercised “sparingly” and “when a claim is groundless or futile”.12 12 Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261, [5]-[7] citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 (b) The evidence should be weighed to reach a conclusion about whether the applicant has an arguable case. A lack of any cause of action must be very clear.13 (c) The Tribunal ought to be satisfied to a “high degree of certainty about the outcome” to strike the proceeding out.14 (d) Summary dismissal should not be granted simply because it appears an applicant is unlikely to succeed on an issue of fact, in circumstances where there are factual issues in dispute and capable of dispute.15 [24] In Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing v Fowkes [2017] QCATA 37 (Fowkes), at [27], the then Senior Member Stilgoe OAM considered several section 47 authorities, particularly Webber v. Moreton Bay Regional Council (No 2) [2011] QCAT 475 (Webber) that involved an application for review of a decision to declare a dog dangerous (emphasis added): 27. At paragraph 9, the Tribunal in Webber said: Section 47 has a valid role to play in ensuring that cases objectively lacking substance do not place a respondent in the position of having to devote time and resources to making a case that has little or no chance of succeeding. When bringing an early end to a case, QCAT should be satisfied that the factors in favour of a person having the opportunity to continue to seek review of an administrative decision have been clearly outweighed by factors involving the proper use of QCAT’s resources and factors involving fairness to a respondent. [25] These considerations take on greater significance in light of the application of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (the HR Act) in administrative review proceedings. Pursuant to section 48 of the HR Act, the Tribunal must interpret statutory provisions in a way that is compatible with human rights, and in doing so is required to conduct itself in accordance with section 58 of the HR Act. Section 31 of the HR Act protects a party’s right to have a civil proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. To the extent that a decision limits human rights, the limitations must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13 of the HR Act. Consideration [26] The decision to strike out was an exercise of discretion by the Tribunal as discussed below. There is a strong presumption in favour of an exercise of discretion and it is not enough that, on appeal, the Appeal Tribunal considers that it would have decided the matter differently. [27] In Steven Moore (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia considered whether the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, in hearing an interlocutory appeal concerning a trial judge's refusal to exclude evidence, was required to apply the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 13 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125. 14 Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261, [5]-[7] citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62, at [6]. 15 Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 499 (House v R) applicable to the review of discretionary decisions or, alternatively, the "correctness" standard referred to in SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541.16. [28] The Court determined that the ‘correctness standard’ applied and at [14] their Honours explained (emphasis added): Under the correctness standard, the appellate court determines for itself the correct outcome while making due allowance for such "advantages" as may have been enjoyed by the judge who conducted the trial or hearing.17 With House v The King, appellate intervention is limited to circumstances where the trial judge: acted upon a wrong principle, or allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to affect the decision; mistook the facts; failed to take into account some material consideration; or made a decision that was unreasonable or plainly unjust. These grounds for intervention contemplate the appellate court accepting that intervention is not warranted even though the members of the appellate court may have decided the matter differently to the judge at first instance. [29] We find, respectfully, that, on applying either the ‘correct outcome’ test or the decision in House v R, namely finding that that a decision was made on a wrong principle, the Tribunal below made an error of law in making the decision to dismiss. [30] Firstly, it is not controversial that the review application was not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process.18 Given this, the Tribunal could only dismiss under section 47 if it considered the review application to be misconceived or lacking in substance. [31] We observe that the QPS’ submissions on the application to strike out specifically noted that “it remain[ed] to be considered whether the application for review is either misconceived or lacking in substance”.19 [32] It cannot be controversial that the application for review was not misconceived because Mr Dale’s application seeks to review a decision that is expressly reviewable under section 142 of the Weapons Act. [33] Therefore, for the decision to have been made correctly, but, also, for the Tribunal below to have acted on the correct principle, it must be the case that the application to review was objectively lacking in substance. [34] Specifically, that Mr Dale’s application to review the decision to revoke his weapons license was, after it was filed, rendered futile by the passing of what would have been – but for the revocation – the expiry date of his weapon’s licence. [35] This is where we respectfully depart from earlier Tribunal decisions on similar, but clearly distinguishable, dismissals of review applications that were impacted by the occurrence of intervening events. Those decisions, relied upon by the QPS in their appeal submissions include: (a) Fowkes, which concerned an application to review a decision by the QPS that conditionally exempted Mr Fowkes from certain requirements of the Weapons Act to permit the display of weapons at an event on Anzac Day 2016. The 16 At 559-560 [41], 560-561 [43], 562-563 [46], 563 [48]-[49]. 17 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 at 552; see also Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 125-126 [23]. 18 QPS Submissions on strike-out dated 21 March 2022: Appeal Book pages 31-34, at page 33, para 16. 19 QPS submissions on strike-out dated 21 March 2022; Appeal Book pages 31-34, at page 33, para 16. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 exemption was for specific date and event that had passed. There was no utility on proceeding with the review application in circumstances where the reviewable decision pertained to a specific date and event that had since passed. (b) Webber, in which Mr Webber had successfully negotiated a withdrawal of the decision to which he had objected, and the reviewable decision had been withdrawn. Again, there was no utility in proceeding with the review application in those circumstances as the reviewable decision had ceased to exist. (c) HA v. Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia (No 2) [2021] QCAT 327, where Deputy President Judge Allen QC, considered an application under section 47(2)(a) of the QCAT Act to dismiss an application as misconceived or lacking in substance. Conditions had been imposed on HA’s registration as a registered nurse that required them to undertake and complete a re-entry to practice program and to be supervised by another registered nurse when practicing. After applying to review the decision, HA failed to renew their registration. As the Tribunal standing in the shoes of the respondent could only make a decision about a person who holds registration, the review proceedings were rendered moot and the Tribunal could no longer, as a matter of jurisdiction, make the decision under review. The cessation of HA’s registration meant that conditions could no longer form part of the register kept by the Board. (d) Fuimaono v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 415, in which the QPS decided to suspend and later to revoke Mr Fuimaono’s firearms licence. The application to review the suspension decision was dismissed for lack of substance pursuant to section 47 because even if Mr Fuimaono was successful in having the suspension overturned, the subsequent revocation decision, for the same reasons as the suspension, rendered the review of the suspension decision as lacking in substance. The same decision was made for the same reasons in McEwan v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2024] QCAT 64, however, the Tribunal noted that the revocation decision was reviewable and a separate application for review could be pursued. [36] In these proceedings, the decisions available to the Tribunal on review, following a fresh hearing on the merits as to whether Mr Dale is a fit and proper person to hold his licences are to: (a) confirm or amend the revocation decision; or (b) set aside the revocation decision and, (i) substitute its own decision; or (ii) return the matter to the decision-maker for reconsideration, with the directions. [37] Revocation of the licences stopped them from being in force by operation of section 20(6)(a) of the Weapons Act. They no longer existed to expire and, therefore, there was no subsequent event of the expiry of the licences. [38] If the final decision on review is to set aside the revocation decision, with the effect that the revoked licences are reinstated on their previous terms, and those licences then, by the passage of time are found to have expired, those are matters for the applicant and the decision maker to resolve, according to current licencing processes. This is not a consideration that impacts the decision itself, but rather what the -- 10 of 13 -- 11 applicant can do with it and, in our view, is not, relevant to whether the application for review lacks substance, where the underlying consideration is whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a licence. The authorities set out in paragraph [35] are distinguished because the Tribunal below is not prevented from making the decision on review, as a matter of jurisdiction. The decision has not ceased to become reviewable by the passage of time or an intervening event, the decision has not been superseded by another reviewable decision, and the decision under review is not specific to a particular time or event that has passed. [39] Therefore, we find that the want of merit or substance required to summarily dismiss Mr Dale’s application for review must go to the question as to whether he is a fit and proper person to hold a licence, which directly goes to the substance of whether the revocation decision should be confirmed or set aside, rather than with respect to what he can practically do with the decision, once made, should his application succeed. This is, in our view, the only approach that appropriately balances an applicant’s statutory right to review against the perils of misusing the Tribunal’s limited resources. [40] Extending this consideration to other administration review lists concerning fixed- term licenses, we note that, not dissimilar to the weapons licensing list, the working with children regime permits Blue Card Services to cancel a person’s working with children authority, and, in that case, to issue a negative notice. Upon such a decision being made (which is, in some cases, reviewable) the blue card holder must return the card.20 Under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), working with children authorities, or blue cards, are issued for a fixed term and must be renewed by the card holder: 231 Term of clearance (1) Unless cancelled earlier under part 5A, the term of a working with children clearance issued to a person is— (a) if the chief executive decides the term of the clearance under subsection (2)—the term decided by the chief executive; or (b) otherwise—3 years. [41] In our opinion, summarily dismissing an application for review of a decision to revoke or cancel a fixed term licence on the grounds that the term of the licence would have since expired is flawed for several reasons. [42] Firstly, the licence has not, as a matter of fact, expired: the term of and any authority conveyed by the licence ceases to exist upon its revocation or cancellation. The review right is triggered at that time, and if the decision is set aside on review, at that point in time the revocation or cancellation is set aside. That the term of the licence would subsequently, at some point, have expired is a given for all fixed-term licences, however this is irrelevant because the term ended prematurely upon revocation. No licence remained to expire by an effluxion of time. [43] Through no fault of their own, parties to review applications are subject to significant delays to final hearing in the Tribunal. For example, in mid-2025, according to the QCAT website, the current average time to finalise three-quarters of all applications for review was as set out in the table below, where the remaining one-quarter of 20 Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) s 304P. -- 11 of 13 -- 12 matters will take longer and some of them will take considerably longer depending on the circumstances, including the complexity and size of the matter. Jurisdiction Number of weeks that most applications were finalised within Review of government agency decisions – QBCC 92 weeks Review of government agency decisions – Weapons licensing 62 weeks Children and young people – Blue Card 109 weeks [44] The reality of hearing delays is such that, if the expiry of what would have been the remaining term of an otherwise revoked or cancelled licence rendered a review application futile, an application for review could not or should not be brought unless the time remaining on the cancelled or revoked weapons licence exceeds fourteen months or, alternatively, two years for a blue card. Effectively, this would render a decision to revoke a blue card that is not made within the first year of the card issuing unreviewable, as it would every decision to revoke a weapons license with less than one year remaining on its term. [45] If this was intended by the legislature, it would have been specified - it is not for the Tribunal exercise its section 47 discretion to arbitrarily impose a time-bar to these types of applications that does not otherwise exist in the enabling Act governing the review. [46] Further, a decision of this nature would, in our view, unreasonably limit an applicant’s human rights with respect to a fair hearing of their application for review in circumstances where there is no demonstrable justification for doing so, particularly where the merits of the application to review have not been considered. [47] For the reasons given, we find the Tribunal below erred in dismissing the application for review because it misapplied the test of whether an application lacks substance set out in section 47 and in doing so arrived at the incorrect outcome. Our decision is therefore to allow the appeal and to set aside the decision to strike out. Appeal [48] In deciding the appeal on a question of law, the Appeal Tribunal can:21 (a) return the matter to the Tribunal below to determine; or (b) set aside the decision and substitute its own decision.22 [49] The evidence before us is more than sufficient to conclude that there are insufficient grounds to strike the application for review out under section 47 of the QCAT Act. If the application for strike out is returned to the Tribunal below, the only decision available to the Tribunal will be to dismiss the application. Consistent with the objects of the QCAT Act which include to have the Tribunal deal with matters in a way that 21 QCAT Act, s 146(c). 22 Provided that in doing so, the substituted decision can resolve the matter and does not entail any rehearing of the evidence: see Ericson v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCA 391 at [25]. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal, and quick,23 in the interests of expediency, we elect to substitute the decision to strike out with one refusing the application to strike out. Orders [50] The decision of the Appeal Tribunal is therefore that: (a) The appeal is allowed. (b) The decision to strike out made in GAR222-19 on 19 June 2023 is set aside. (c) The application for miscellaneous matters (strike out) filed 21 March 2022 is dismissed. [51] The application to review a decision filed 20 June 2019 is returned to the Tribunal below to be listed for a directions hearing at the earliest date. 23 QCAT Act, s 3. -- 13 of 13 --