Browne v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2026] QIRC 220

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: PARTIES: Browne v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2026] QIRC 220 Browne, Lucas Alexander (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2026/94 PROCEEDING: Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a disciplinary decision DELIVERED ON: 7 July 2026 DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: Notice of Appeal (17 April 2026) Respondent's submissions (30 April 2026) Appellant's submissions in reply (18 May 2026) Respondent's further submissions (26 May 2026) HEARD AT: On the papers MEMBER: Pidgeon IC ORDERS: 1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – where the Appellant appeals the disciplinary action decision – where the seriousness of the disciplinary findings is considered – consideration of procedural fairness – consideration of proportionality – where the disciplinary action is fair and reasonable – where the decision appealed against is confirmed – where the appeal is dismissed -- 1 of 20 -- 2 LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: Directive 05/23: Discipline cls 9.5, 11 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 562B 562C(1)(a) Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] Mr Lucas Alexander Browne ('the Appellant') appeals the decision of Mr Chris Draper, Assistant Commissioner, Metro South Region, Queensland Ambulance Service ('QAS') ('the Respondent') dated 30 March 2026 which imposed the taking of disciplinary action against Officer Browne. The proposed actions outlined in the decision appealed against were:1 (a) forfeiture of two remuneration increments from Advanced Care Paramedic (ACP) on Pay Code AP22/7 ($104,383 per annum) to ACP on Pay Code AP22/5 ($99,818 per annum); (b) forfeiture of Officer Browne's status as a 'Senior' within the classification level until he again progresses to Pay Code AP22/6 as set out below; (c) subject to satisfactory work performance and conduct, following 12 months at Pay Code AP22/5, Officer Browne will progress to Pay Code AP22/6 base per annum; and (d) subject to satisfactory work performance and conduct, following a further 12 months at Pay Code AP22/6, Officer Browne will progress to Pay Code AP22/7 base per annum (Decision). [2] The Respondent has provided a brief outline of the background to this matter which I have canvassed in these reasons:2 4. Officer Browne has been employed by QAS since 2009. He is currently employed as a Senior ACP, stationed at Ipswich Ambulance Station. 5. On 29 July 2022, Mr Peter Warrener, Assistant Commissioner, Metro South Region, QAS, provided Officer Browne with an opportunity to respond to concerns that on 13 March 2022 and 20 March 2022, Officer Browne had falsely withheld information regarding his whereabouts whilst on a shift (Attachment A). 6. On 12 August 2022, Officer Browne provided a response to Assistant Commissioner Warrener's queries (Attachment B) 7. By letter dated 3 December 2024, Matthew Salter, then A/Assistant Commissioner, Metro South Region, QAS, invited Officer Browne to show cause why disciplinary findings should not be made against him in relation to the following five allegations (FSCN) (Attachment C) 1 Decision letter. 2 Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 30 April 2026. -- 2 of 20 -- 3 a. Allegation 1: On 13 March 2022, you failed to update the Operations Centre of your unit status whilst on shift; b. Allegation 2: On 13 March 2022, you failed to appropriately notify your supervisor of your absence and intention to terminate shift; c. Allegation 3: On 20 March 2022, you failed to update the Operations Centre of your unit status while on shift and located at the Ipswich General Hospital; d. Allegation 4: On 20 March 2022, you failed to update the Operations Centre of your unit status whilst on shift after you had departed Ipswich General Hospital; and e. Allegation 5: On 5 November 2022, you failed to follow a lawful direction provided in correspondence from Drew Hebbron Director West Moreton District dated 6 April 2022 relating to your supervised practice. 8. By email dated 22 January 2025, Officer Browne provided his response dated 21 January 2025 to the FSCN (Attachment D). 9. On 10 September 2025, Ms Theresa Hodges, Executive Director, Workforce, QAS, undertook a periodic review of the disciplinary process and determined the process was compliant with the Public Sector Commission Discipline Directive 05/23 (Directive), in that procedural fairness had been appropriately provided to Officer Browne (Attachment E). 10. By letter dated 11 December 2025, the Decision-maker: a. found all five allegations substantiated on the balance of probabilities; b. found Officer Browne contravened cl 3.1 of the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service (Code of Conduct) in respect of Allegations 1, 3 and 4 and clause 4.1 of the Code of Conduct in respect of Allegation 5; c. determined not to make a disciplinary finding against Officer Browne in respect of Allegation 2, on the basis his conduct was not sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action; and d. invited Officer Browne to show cause why the following proposed disciplinary action proposed [sic] should not be taken, namely: i. forfeiture of two remuneration increments from ACP on Pay Code AP22/7 ($104,383 per annum) to ACP on Pay Code AP22/5 ($99,818 per annum); ii. forfeiture of Officer Browne's status as a 'Senior' within the classification level until he again progresses to Pay Code AP 22/6 as set out below; iii. subject to satisfactory work performance and conduct, following 12 months at Pay Code AP 22/5, Officer Browne will progress to Pay Code AP22/6 base per annum; iv. subject to satisfactory work performance and conduct, following a further 12 months at Pay Code AP22/6, Officer Browne will progress to Pay Code AP 22/7 base per annum; and -- 3 of 20 -- 4 v. a direction to complete the QAS Code of Conduct and Public Sector Ethics Training Course and review QAS's relevant policies and procedures, and to comply with his obligations under the Code of Conduct and policies and procedures in the court of his duties with QAS… 11. By email dated 17 December 2025, Officer Browne provided his response dated 11 December 2025 to the SSCN… 12. By letter dated 30 March 2026, the Decision-maker determined to impose the Decision… [3] The Respondent submits that the decision appealed was 'made in the context of the relevant considerations under the Directive'.3 [4] The Respondent submits that the decision to impose disciplinary action was fair and reasonably open to the decision-maker and that in those circumstances, that I should confirm the decision pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act').4 [5] I must decide whether the disciplinary action decision dated 30 March 2026 was fair and reasonable.5 For the reasons which follow, I have decided the decision was fair and reasonable and, on that basis, the decision is confirmed.6 Notice of Appeal [6] Within Officer Browne's Notice of Appeal, he says that the decision to impose disciplinary action was not fair and reasonable in line with s 562C(1)(a) of the IR Act in circumstances where:7 The appeal is made on the basis that the disciplinary decision is unreasonable and disproportionate, and that the process did not comply with the requirements of procedural fairness or the Public Sector Commissioner (sic) Directive 05/23 – Discipline. The conduct in question relates to an administrative delay in marking availability and does not involve clinical decision-making or directly involve patient safety. Notwithstanding this, significant penalties were imposed, including prolonged supervised practice of more than four years, reduction in pay point, and removal of senior status. The alleged incident occurred on 13 March 2022. On 6 April 2022, I was placed on supervised practice. However, the reasons for this action were not provided until 29 July 2022, at which time I was first afforded an opportunity to respond. I did not receive any communication from QAS in relation to my response until 11 December 2025, during which time I remained on supervised practice. The final disciplinary decision was issued on 30 March 2026. This sequence represents a substantial delay between the imposition of restrictions and the provision 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid [3]. 5 s 562B(3) of the IR Act. 6 Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the IR Act. 7 Appeal Notice filed in the Industrial Registry on 17 April 2026. -- 4 of 20 -- 5 of reasons, response opportunity, and outcome, contrary to the requirements of procedural fairness. Further, the supervised practice arrangement has been applied without clearly defined objectives, review points, or a reasonable timeframe, resulting in an ongoing punitive effect disproportionate to the nature of the conduct. In addition, there appears to be a significant inconsistency in disciplinary outcomes arising from the same incident, with another employee receiving a materially less severe outcome. [7] Having reviewed Officer Browne's notice of appeal, I have identified the following grounds upon which Officer Browne says the decision was not fair and reasonable: the disciplinary action is disproportionate; Officer Brown was not afforded procedural fairness; prolonged supervised practice; the supervised practice arrangements are not reasonable; the disciplinary outcome is inconsistent with that imposed on an employee for similar conduct. Preliminary matters Officer Browne's complaint about the period of supervised practice [8] The Respondent notes Officer Browne's complaint that he was placed on supervised practice for four years. The Respondent says that the decision to place Officer Browne on supervised practice in April 2022 was a 'separate decision of the QAS'. The Respondent says that supervised practice arrangements are an administrative decision put in place to ensure that QAS can appropriately manage operations where allegations of inappropriate conduct have arisen. The Respondent says that Officer Browne was not financially disadvantaged while on supervised practice.8 [9] The Respondent says that the relevance of the supervised practice arrangements to this Appeal matter is limited to the decision-maker's finding in Allegation 5, that Officer Browne failed to follow a lawful direction relating to his supervised practice.9 The Respondent notes that Officer Browne did not appeal the disciplinary findings. Accordingly, submissions addressing the supervised practice arrangements themselves are not relevant to this appeal.10 [10] Officer Browne submits that the 'supervised practice arrangement is central context to why the overall process was unfair and punitive'. Officer Browne submits:11 • Being on supervised practice required him to tell each partner he worked with that he was on supervised practice and required monitoring. 8 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [15]. 9 Ibid [16]. 10 Ibid. 11 Appellant's submissions filed 18 May 2026, page one [2]. -- 5 of 20 -- 6 • He was prohibited from explaining why he had been placed on supervised practice. • The original supervised practice letter did not explain the actual allegations or why supervised practice was necessary. • Being placed on supervised practice without being told why and having his requests for clarification refused, created severe and unnecessary stress. • At the time he was placed on supervised practice he had no way of knowing whether QAS believed he had 'caused serious clinical harm, killed someone, or exposed himself to allegations of criminal negligence'. • Supervised practice was 'not a neutral administrative inconvenience' and had a 'real professional, psychological, and reputational impact'. [11] Officer Browne's position is that 'QAS treated a speculative risk of delayed communication as more serious than the real operational consequences of removing a qualified ACP from availability for years'.12 That is not a matter which I am required to consider in this appeal. [12] The decision to place Officer Browne on supervised practice is not the subject of this appeal. I accept that being on supervised practice for a prolonged period has been difficult and I understand why Officer Browne says that supervised practice caused him stress and concern and why he believes supervised practice is not a neutral administrative inconvenience. However, I will not be making any orders regarding the period of supervised practice. [13] Where Officer Browne argues that the disciplinary action imposed does not take into account the impact of the supervised practice, I will consider those submissions. [14] I will also consider the submissions of the Respondent as to the seriousness of Officer Browne's substantiated conduct subject of Allegation 5, related to his supervised practice. Officer Browne's submissions regarding the disciplinary findings/substantiated allegations [15] Officer Browne has provided detailed submissions as to why the disciplinary findings were not fair and reasonable.13 Officer Browne argues the findings were made without proper evidence. 12 Ibid, page three [4]. 13 For example Ibid unnumbered paragraphs 3-5 on page 1, page 2, page 3, page 4, page 5, page 6, page 8. -- 6 of 20 -- 7 [16] In its reply submissions, the Respondent notes that Officer Browne's submissions filed on 18 May 2026 'related substantially to the Decision-maker's decision on disciplinary findings dated 11 December 2025'. The Respondent says that the disciplinary findings decision is not the decision under appeal and notes that Officer Browne was informed of his entitlement to lodge an appeal against that decision but elected not to do so.14 [17] The Respondent says that Officer Browne's submissions about the validity of the disciplinary findings decision are irrelevant to the consideration of whether the 30 March 2026 decision to impose disciplinary action of a temporary forfeiture of two remuneration increments was 'fair and reasonable'. [18] I accept the Respondent's position on this point. Officer Browne did not appeal the December 2025 disciplinary findings decision. The Appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against.15 On that basis, the matter for my consideration is whether, based on the substantiated allegations and associated disciplinary findings, the discipline action imposed on Officer Browne is fair and reasonable. [19] While I have read all material in this Appeal and have considered Officer Browne's submissions about the seriousness (or otherwise) of the conduct upon which the disciplinary action decision has been taken, I will not otherwise consider whether it was fair and reasonable to substantiate the allegations. Was the disciplinary action decision fair and reasonable? [20] The Respondent says that the decision-maker had regard to the relevant considerations under the Directive 05/23: Discipline ('the Directive') and specifically cl 9.5(d) which outlines the relevant considerations in proposing appropriate and proportionate disciplinary action.16 It is convenient for me to consider the submissions of both the Respondent and Officer Browne as they relate to each of these matters. Relevant considerations under the Directive 05/23: Discipline Seriousness of disciplinary findings cl 9.5(d)(i) of the Directive [21] The effect of Officer Browne's submissions is that the disciplinary findings were not as serious as contended by the Respondent as they did not relate to clinical matters but rather administrative matters. [22] For completeness, while Officer Browne has repeatedly referred to the unfairness of QAS's findings of misconduct against him, this was not the characterisation adopted by 14 Respondent's reply submissions filed on 26 May 2026 [2]. 15 s 562B(2) of the IR Act. 16 Ibid [17]. -- 7 of 20 -- 8 the decision-maker. The letter referred to the December 2025 discipline findings decision and stated the following: On the basis of my findings in relation to the allegations, I determined that: • In respect to Allegations 1, 3 and 4, pursuant to section 91(1)(h) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (the PS Act), you have contravened, without reasonable excuse a relevant standard of conduct, namely, clause 3.1 of the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service (Code of Conduct), in such a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. • In respect of Allegation 5, pursuant to section 91(1)(h) of the PS Act you have contravened, without reasonable excuse a relevant standard of conduct, namely, clause 4.1 of the Code of Conduct, in such a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. • In respect of Allegation 2, despite finding you engaged in the conduct, no disciplinary finding was made because your conduct in relation to this allegation was not sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. [23] The Respondent says that Officer Browne's conduct was serious in that he did not adhere to QAS procedure, namely the QAS Standard Operating Procedure 02.18 – Dispatch – Radio Procedure, or that he failed to comply with a reasonable and lawful direction.17 The Respondent provides the following summary of Officer Browne's conduct:18 a. On 13 March 2022, Officer Browne was required to update the Operations Centre of his unit status by methods including radio communication, including to advise of any genuine operational reason for why his unit was unavailable, between 17:50 and 18:46, however did not do so (Allegation 1); b. On 20 March 2022, Officer Browne was required to update the Operations Centre of his unit status by methods including radio communication, including to advise of any genuine operational reason )for why his unit was unavailable, between 16:26 and 16:56, however did not do so (Allegation 3); c. On 20 March 2022, Officer Browne was required to update the Operations Centre of his unit status by methods including radio communication, including to advise of any genuine operational reason his unit was unavailable, between 17:50 and 18:46, however did not do so (Allegation 4); d. On 5 November 2022, Officer Browne was required to comply with the direction not to work with another officer who is on supervised practice, however Officer Browne logged onto a unit with a colleague whom he knew was also on supervised practice (Allegation 5). [24] The disciplinary findings are not under appeal. This includes the finding that the conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. I am satisfied that the decision- maker considered the seriousness of the disciplinary finding when making the decision. This is evidenced on page 4 of the letter where the decision-maker specifically gives 17 Ibid [4]. 18 Ibid. -- 8 of 20 -- 9 reasons regarding the seriousness of the conduct and responds to Officer Browne's submissions. Employee's classification level and/or expected level of awareness about their performance or conduct obligations cl 9.5(d)(ii) of the Directive [25] The Respondent submits that Officer Browne was a Senior ACP, in a senior role. The Respondent says that Officer Browne has been employed on a Level 2, Band 2 Increment Level 7 since 9 September 2020 and that according to the QAS Certified Agreement it is expected that:19 employees at these increments will be actively contributing to developing and improving the quality-of-service delivery in their work group/area, provide leadership and support to peers. Employees at these increments are expected to act professionally at all times, operate within the boundaries of organisational process and operate as an effective representative of the work area in forums. [26] The Respondent says that Officer Browne was or ought to have been familiar with the QAS operational procedures and the potential consequences of his conduct on the basis of his 17-years of service.20 [27] Officer Browne does not dispute the expectations of him but does dispute the Respondent's conclusion that his conduct was inconsistent with them. Officer Browne makes submissions in support of his position.21 I again note that this is not an appeal against the disciplinary finding and so I am not reviewing the finding that the conduct departed from expectations. [28] I accept that Officer Browne has been employed by QAS for a significant period and that his seniority was such that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to be satisfied that he had a thorough awareness of his performance and conduct obligations. Whether extenuating or mitigating circumstances applied to the employee's actions cl 9.5(d)(iii) of the Directive [29] Officer Browne says that he now knows he was suffering from work-induced PTSD. Officer Browne says that medical and tribunal material records that his injury arose from his long career in QAS and cumulative occupational exposure rather than an isolated event. Officer Browne says that the Respondent did not properly consider the broader occupational context.22 19 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [18]. 20 Ibid [23]. 21 Appellant's submissions (n 11) unnumbered paragraphs 3 and 4. 22 Ibid page 5. -- 9 of 20 -- 10 [30] The Respondent says that while Officer Browne says that the QAS's consideration of his medical condition did not properly consider the broader occupational context clinically documented by psychiatrists, Officer Browne has not supplied any medical evidence to support the existence of his medical condition as a relevant extenuating circumstance to his actions and decisions on 13 March 2022, 20 March 2022 and 5 November 2022.23 [31] There is no evidence before me regarding Officer Browne's reported medical condition and what impact it may have had on the substantiated conduct. In circumstances where Officer Browne did not provide any medical evidence as a part of his show cause response addressing mitigation, I find it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to state that:24 Noting you have not provided any medical evidence to support the submission that you were suffering a diagnosed psychological injury at the time of the allegations (between 13 March 2022 and 5 November 2022), I do not consider your submissions in relation to this matter give rise to any relevant mitigating circumstance. The employee's overall work record including previous management interventions and/or disciplinary proceedings cl 9.5(d)(iv) of the Directive [32] Officer Browne says that the management action QAS relies upon involved a patient complaint that 'needs context'. Officer Browne says that the complaint was not about him personally and that the clinical management was appropriate. Officer Browne submits that this is relevant because QAS has 'used prior material to support a picture of risk or poor judgment, but the prior issue does not fairly support that conclusion'. Officer Browne says that the previous management intervention should 'not have been used to magnify the present allegations'.25 [33] The Respondent says it was open to the decision-maker to consider previous management intervention in relation to a clinical complaint regarding patient assessment and care. However, the Respondent says that as evident at page 5 of the decision, the previous management intervention did not have a significant effect on the disciplinary action to impose. The Respondent says that it was relevantly raised to prompt Officer Browne's genuine insight into his ongoing capacity to adhere to QAS procedures.26 [34] The Respondent says that Officer Browne's 17 years of service with QAS was appropriately acknowledged, however in the context of Officer Browne's seniority and the potential impact of his behaviour on patient safety, this factor did not outweigh the severity of his conduct.27 23 Respondent's reply submissions (n 14) [9]. 24 Decision letter page 5. 25 Appellant's submissions (n 11) page 5. 26 Respondent's reply submissions (n 14) [10]. 27 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [23]. -- 10 of 20 -- 11 [35] I am satisfied that the decision-maker adequately considered Officer Browne's length of service and lack of prior disciplinary history. I understand Officer Browne's submission that the more recent management intervention needs to be considered in context. It seems to me that the decision-maker was well aware of the context in which the management intervention occurred and this is evidenced at page 5 of the decision. I accept the Respondent's submission that this matter did not have a significant effect on the disciplinary action to be imposed. [36] The Directive lists 'previous management intervention' as a matter which should be considered by a decision-maker when determining what discipline action to impose. It follows that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to provide a detailed description of the management intervention of 23 May 2022. The employee's explanation (if any) cl 9.5(d)(v) of the Directive [37] Officer Browne submits that he was involved in 'standard operational management of a ramped patient' and that 'not responding immediately to pager message while ramped at hospital is not, in itself, clinically unsafe or improper'.28 [38] Officer Browne says that there are a number of reasons why there might be a 'period of apparent inactivity in an ambulance' and says that he now knows he was suffering from work-induced PTSD. [39] Officer Browne submits that 'Operationally, patient care and immediate on-ground management take priority over administrative updates'.29 Officer Browne says that 'a delayed update does not create the type of risk QAS now asserts'.30 [40] The Respondent submits that Officer Browne's responses to date provide no specific or compelling reason for why he did not follow the required procedure.31 The Respondent says that Officer Browne instead appears to suggest he should be exempt from QAS procedure and expected standard of conduct.32 [41] I have dealt with the matter of Officer Browne's submissions regarding his medical condition elsewhere in these reasons. Some of Officer Browne's submissions relating to this point are matters which would have been better addressed in an appeal against the disciplinary findings. [42] I am satisfied that the decision-maker considered Officer Browne's explanation. Throughout the disciplinary process, the Respondent has made clear to Officer Browne 28 Appellant's submissions (n 11) page one para 3 and 4. 29 Ibid page 2 unnumbered para 6. 30 Ibid page 3 para 1. 31 Respondent's reply submissions (n 14) [5]. 32 Ibid. -- 11 of 20 -- 12 what its expectations are and why it believes he has departed from those expectations. Officer Browne's responses continue to assert that his conduct caused no risk to patient safety. The decision-maker has provided detailed reasons as to why the Respondent does not accept Officer Browne's explanation and why it maintains that his conduct represented a departure from procedure. There is nothing in the material before me that demonstrates that this consideration was not fair and reasonable. The degree of risk to the health and safety of employees, customers and members of the public cl 9.5(d)(vi) of the Directive [43] The Respondent notes Officer Browne's submission that because no patients were impacted by his conduct, any proposed disciplinary action was unnecessarily punitive. The Respondent also notes Officer Browne's continuing submission that his delay to update the Operations Centre of his unit's status 'relates to an administrative delay in marking availability and does not involve clinical decision-making or directly involve patient safety'. The Respondent says that the decision-maker comprehensively outlined how Officer Browne's conduct was a serious departure from the standard of conduct expected of a Senior ACP.33 [44] The Respondent says that the decision-maker discussed how Officer Browne's failure to update his unit status could have resulted in delays in dispatching other units and risks to patient safety. The Respondent notes that the decision-maker explained that it was irrelevant if patients were or were not impacted by Officer Browne's conduct and that he could not have known or predicted if urgent cases would arise during periods of his inaccurate status. The Respondent says that as a Senior ACP on duty, Officer Browne was expected to be available for urgent call outs.34 [45] The Respondent says that the allegations pertaining to Office Browne's disregard to the health and safety of patients supports the imposition of serious disciplinary action.35 [46] Officer Browne maintains that his conduct did not impact upon any patients. This may be the case; however his submissions do not serve to negate the potential impact on patient safety arising from his departure from procedure. It seems to me that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to conclude that the conduct was of a serious nature as it posed a potential risk. As the decision-maker stated: 'You could not have reasonably predicted that no urgent cases would arise during the periods in which you did not update your unit status'. 33 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [20]. 34 Ibid. 35 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [26]. -- 12 of 20 -- 13 The impact on the employee's ability to perform the duties of their position cl 9.5(d)(vii) of the Directive [47] There are no specific submissions regarding this matter, though I note that a significant portion of Officer Browne's submissions addresses the impact that being placed on supervised practice has had on his ability to perform a senior role and that effectively, it means his resource as a senior officer has not been available to the Respondent. While the imposition of supervised practice is not a matter I need to consider in this decision, I am satisfied that the decision-maker addressed Officer Browne's submissions on this point.36 The employee's potential for modified behaviour in the work unit or elsewhere cl 9.5(d)(viii) of the Directive [48] The Respondent says that it relies upon paramedics adhering to established systems and processes to ensure the timely allocation of paramedic services to patients. The Respondent says that not only did Officer Browne fail to comply with correct procedure and direction, but he has also repeatedly failed to acknowledge or accept that he did not follow the correct procedure or comply with a lawful and reasonable direction.37 [49] The Respondent says that Officer Browne's submissions in the appeal before me show a lack of insight into the purpose of his role, which is to provide emergency clinical response services to the public. The Respondent says that Officer Browne has failed and continues to fail to show any acknowledgement of the impact of his behaviour. The Respondent says Officer Browne holds a concerning disregard for the safety and wellbeing of the general public and shows a lack of capacity to modify his behaviour.38 [50] In response, Officer Browne submits that 'I do not lack insight because I disagree with QAS's interpretation. Disagreement with an unfair or exaggerated allegation is not a lack of insight'. Officer Browne goes on to make submissions as to why his conduct was appropriate and supported patient safety. Accordingly, he submits:39 My insight led me to conclude that the matter was escalated through assumption, selective enforcement, and misuse of authority. I recognise that QAS may not like that conclusion. But that does not mean I lack insight. It means I reject a version of events that is not supported by direct evidence and ignores operational reality. [51] Officer Browne says that QAS 'should consider its own institutional blind spot' and that it is unwilling to accept that a supervisor may have acted unfairly or abused power. 36 Decision letter page 6. 37 Respondent's reply submissions (n 14) [6]. 38 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [22]. 39 Appellant's submissions (n 11) page 4. -- 13 of 20 -- 14 Officer Browne goes on to declare that 'the lack of insight lies in QAS's refusal to properly examine whether its own supervisory and disciplinary process was misused'.40 [52] Officer Browne's submissions on this point demonstrate the depth of his grievance with the Respondent's position. Given Officer Browne maintains that he has done nothing wrong, that his conduct was appropriate and that the fault lies with the Respondent, I find it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to 'hold serious concerns' that Officer Browne lacks the capacity to modify his behaviour.41 The impact a financial penalty may have on the employee cl 9.5(d)(ix) and The cumulative impact that a reduction in classification and/or pay point may have on the employee cl 9.5 (d)(x) of the Directive [53] The Respondent submits that the decision-maker considered the monetary impact of a temporary reduction in remuneration. The Respondent notes that the reduction is $175 per fortnight. The Respondent says it was open to the decision-maker to determine that the impact on Officer Browne from the temporary reduction did not outweigh the severity of the conduct. The Respondent says it goes without saying that a temporary reduction in classification is significantly less than termination of employment. [54] Officer Browne has not made specific submissions on this point, and it does not appear that his show cause response specifically addressed this matter. I do note that Officer Browne's submissions are more generally to the effect that the decision is 'wildly disproportionate'. [55] I am satisfied that the decision-maker considered these aspects of the Directive in the written decision.42 The likely impact the disciplinary action will have on public and customer confidence in the unit/entity and its proportionality to the gravity of the disciplinary finding cl 9.5(d)(xi) of the Directive [56] The Respondent says that it has an obligation to protect its reputation and the public interest by addressing Mr Bowne's breaches of the relevant standard of conduct through disciplinary action.43 [57] The Respondent says the decision-maker considered disciplinary action necessary to preserve public and customer confidence in the QAS.44 40 Ibid page 5. 41 Decision page 6. 42 Decision page 6. 43 Ibid [7]. 44 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [26]. -- 14 of 20 -- 15 [58] Officer Browne's submissions as canvassed throughout this decision are to the effect that his conduct related to administrative rather than clinical matters and that there was no impact on patients as a result. For the reasons given above, I accept that it was open to the decision-maker to consider not only whether there was a demonstrated impact on a patient, but also the potential for impact. [59] Officer Browne's submissions make clear that he thinks the disciplinary action is 'wildly disproportionate' to the gravity of the findings. He also provides submissions addressing the personal and professional impact the disciplinary process has had on him. I am satisfied that the decision-maker considered the matter of proportionality and the impact of the process when determining the disciplinary action to impose. This consideration is found on page 6 of the decision letter where the decision-maker says: • Consequently, to reflect the seriousness with which I view your conduct, I consider it is necessary to reduce your classification by two increments from AP22/7 to AP22/5, which carries a corresponding forfeiture of your status as a 'Senior Paramedic' for a minimum 12-month period, until you progress to AP22/6. In my view it is appropriate and proportionate to the substantiated conduct to impose serious disciplinary action against you. I also consider this necessary to preserve public and customer confidence in the QAS. … • Though I acknowledge the personal impact this process has had on you, I reiterate that the QAS is obliged to investigate allegations of inappropriate conduct to ensure they are appropriately addressed. There is significant public interest in ensuring that QAS employees adhere to the relevant procedures and policies when engaged in clinical roles, particularly as they are in place to safeguard the public. [60] I understand Officer Browne's submissions about the personal and professional impact on him arising from the protracted length of the process. However, having reviewed all the submissions, I do not think that the length of time the process has taken, noting it was paused for a year while Officer Browne was on leave, was of such significance that it makes the outcome not fair and reasonable or warrants setting aside the decision. I find it likely that the same disciplinary action would have been imposed had the process concluded earlier. During the time Officer Browne has been going through the process and has been working under supervised practice, his income has not been impacted. I will further address Officer Browne's submissions regarding the delay and its impact on procedural fairness below. Appeal Ground – Procedural Fairness (including the delay in finalising the discipline process) [61] Officer Browne complains about the delay between the initial events in March 2022 and his opportunity to respond in August 2022. Officer Browne complains that the delay was prejudicial as it 'affects memory, access to evidence, witness availability, and the ability to respond meaningfully to ordinary operational events'.45 These matters would have 45 Appellant's submissions (n 11) page 7. -- 15 of 20 -- 16 been better directed at the decision to substantiate the allegations rather than the final decision on disciplinary action. [62] Beyond his submission regarding the length of time taken to finalise the matter, I note that Officer Browne complains that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the conduct until five months after the events. He says that this made it difficult to 'recall a routine period between jobs with precision'. [63] Officer Browne says that procedural fairness is not satisfied 'merely by receiving submissions if the substance of those submissions is then dismissed, mischaracterised, or treated as evidence of a "lack of insight"'.46 [64] Officer Browne argues that the process has affected his ability to practise, his professional standing, career progression and personal life from March 2022 until May 2026, a period of more than four years. Officer Browne says that QAS 'now seeks to extend that impact further through a demotion and loss of senior status lasting up to another two years'. Officer Browne says that the result is six years of career impact for conduct he denies.47 [65] Officer Browne says that the delay 'is central to why the final decision is not fair and reasonable' as 'the delay itself has become part of the punishment' and has 'prolonged uncertainty, restricted [his] professional development, limited promotional and acting opportunities, damaged [his] reputation, and left [him] operating under the stigma of unresolved allegations for years before any final decision was made'.48 [66] The Respondent submits that the decision-maker initially addressed Officer Browne's concerns regarding procedural fairness and the delay in finalising the process in the second show cause notice. While acknowledging the delay, the decision-maker said that the disciplinary process was held in abeyance due to Officer Browne's extended leave between 19 November 2022 and 19 November 2023. The Respondent says that this was to ensure that Officer Browne was medically fit to work and to ensure that he was afforded procedural fairness. The Respondent says that the length of time taken to finalise the disciplinary process is not because of any inaction by QAS.49 [67] The Respondent says that it is unclear what affect the delay in finalising the process had on 'access to evidence' or 'witness availability'. In any event, it must also be noted that Officer Browne received all relevant evidence at the commencement of the process, provided a fulsome response to the allegations and did not, at any point, make a request for additional witness interviews. 46 Ibid page 6. 47 Ibid page 7. 48 Ibid. 49 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [29]. -- 16 of 20 -- 17 [68] The Respondent says that Officer Browne was: given an initial opportunity to respond shortly after concerns were identified; was provided with all relevant material relied upon by the decision-maker; was given opportunities to makes submissions, including the granting of extensions of time. The Respondent also says the process was reviewed by an independent decision-maker who was satisfied Officer Browne was afforded procedural fairness. Further, Officer Browne was advised of his appeal rights in the second show cause notice and the decision letter.50 [69] Further, the Respondent says that the decision-maker carefully considered all of the material before him prior to deciding the discipline action to take and that the decision-maker gave detailed reasons for the decision to implement serious disciplinary action against Officer Browne.51 [70] I have reviewed the submissions regarding the steps taken in the process. The process has complied with the requirements set out in the Directive. Officer Browne was given the opportunity to respond to the proposed disciplinary action. [71] It does appear that this matter has gone on for a very long time. However, I note that 12 months of that time was due to a pause in the process while Officer Browne was on a period of leave. I also note that it appears there was a change in decision-maker at some point. Further to that, as per the requirement under cl 11 of the Discipline Directive, an independent decision-maker undertook a periodic review of the discipline process. I note that cl 11.6 states that the discipline process must not continue until the review is completed. This may also account for some of the delay in the process. [72] Elsewhere in this decision, I have considered Officer Browne's submission that the length of time taken to complete the process has had an impact on him and should be taken into consideration when considering whether the discipline action to be imposed is fair and reasonable. However, I cannot identify any procedural unfairness to Officer Browne resulting from the delay. In fact, in relation to the part of the process I am considering as part of this appeal, the process has been conducted in a timely manner. [73] I understand that Officer Browne is aggrieved that the decision-maker did not agree with his submissions and determined that he had shown a lack of insight into the seriousness of his conduct. That Officer Browne is unhappy that his submissions were not accepted, does not demonstrate procedural unfairness. I have reviewed the decision of Assistant Commissioner Draper dated 30 March 2026 and I am satisfied that Officer Browne's submissions were considered and that detailed reasons for the decision have been provided to Officer Browne. That Officer Browne disagrees with the outcome does not, on its own, serve to make the decision not fair and reasonable. 50 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [30]. 51 Ibid. -- 17 of 20 -- 18 Appeal Ground – Matters relating to supervised practice [74] I have dealt with this matter above. The decision to place Officer Browne on 'supervised practice' is a separate decision and is not a disciplinary action taken as a part of the decision under appeal. [75] The Respondent submits that Officer Browne was advised the direction would remain in place until the completion of the disciplinary process and that Allegation 5 relates to Officer Browne's failure to follow a lawful direction about his supervised practice. The Respondent submits that Officer Browne was aware that his peer, who he worked with contrary to the direction, was also on supervised practice. The Respondent says that the decision-maker confirmed the direction was a reasonable and necessary decision made in the public interest and that Officer Browne's conduct, being working with a peer who was also on supervised practice, was highly inappropriate.52 [76] I note Officer Browne's submission that he did not know the other Officer was also on supervised practice. However, I also note the Respondent's submission that Officer Browne did not raise this matter in his first and second show cause notices. As this matter is not an appeal against the disciplinary findings, I will not consider submissions on that point. [77] Officer Browne makes submissions regarding the implementation of the supervised practice restrictions, effectively that they were mishandled and that he did not receive procedural fairness regarding the decision to impose the restrictions.53 These are not matters to be addressed in this appeal. Appeal Ground – proportionality and parity compared to other similar people [78] Officer Browne submits that the disciplinary action 'was wildly disproportionate for conduct that had ordinary operational explanations and could have been resolved at the time by a supervisor simply speaking to us'.54 Officer Browne again provides background and arguments which would be more appropriately directed at the first show cause process regarding the allegations. [79] Officer Browne says that the proportionality issue is not limited to the pay reduction. He says that the process has 'affected [his] professional standing, ability to act in supervisory roles, ability to progress, and reputation'. Officer Browne again refers to being placed on supervised practice. Officer Browne says that these responses are not proportionate to a disputed operational communication issue.55 52 Ibid [12], [13]. 53 Appellant's submissions (n 11) page 6. 54 Ibid page 5. 55 Ibid page 6. -- 18 of 20 -- 19 [80] Officer Browne says that he and his colleague were both involved in the same operational context. He says that after months of silence, his colleague was approved to work in acting supervisory roles and that this would not normally occur if he were subject to supervised practice restrictions. Officer Browne says that on the day the two worked together, they had been rostered together by QAS and on that basis, they reasonably believed the matter had been resolved or dropped. Officer Browne says that the two worked together uneventfully and treated patients normally as they had for years. These submissions appear to be better directed at the initial show cause process regarding the allegations. [81] The Respondent submits that the principle of parity is based on the concept that like cases should be treated alike and different cases differently. The Respondent says that all circumstances in the respective cases must be taken into account.56 [82] The Respondent says it is not in dispute that another QAS employee was involved in the conduct the subject of the substantiated allegations against Officer Browne. The Respondent says that Officer Browne's responses have demonstrated a noticeable limited capacity to modify his behaviour and that it was ultimately open to the decision- maker, when balancing the matters in cl 9.5 to consider the decision was appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances.57 [83] There is no information before me regarding any disciplinary action taken against Officer Browne's colleague. While the principle of parity can be an important consideration in determining whether a disciplinary action decision is fair and reasonable, each case turns on its own facts. [84] There is no doubt that Officer Browne's response to the second show cause notice and submissions in this matter demonstrate that he steadfastly maintains his position that his conduct was not a departure from accepted standards or expectations and that he was acting reasonably regarding the conduct subject of each allegation. Officer Browne has maintained a position that it is not he who lacks insight but the Respondent. On that basis, it seems to me that it would be open to the Respondent to take Officer Browne's specific individual responses and submissions into account and that it would be fair and reasonable for it to impose different disciplinary action upon him when compared to a colleague who responded differently throughout the process. Any lack of parity in disciplinary outcomes specific to this case does not make the decision not fair and reasonable. 56 Respondent's submissions (n 2) [31]. 57 Ibid [32]. -- 19 of 20 -- 20 Conclusion [85] I have set out my consideration of Officer Browne's grounds of appeal throughout this decision. As I have stated above, many of Officer Browne's submissions really go to whether the disciplinary findings decision was fair and reasonable. That decision was not appealed and is not before me. I also note that many of Officer Browne's submissions address his dissatisfaction with the supervised practice arrangements. Again, that is not a decision which is before me. I confirm that I have considered Officer Browne's submissions regarding the conduct and allegations where they address matters such as mitigation or explanation for the conduct. I have considered the submissions regarding supervised practice as they relate to the conduct subject of Allegation 5 and also the impact the disciplinary process has had on Officer Browne. [86] Officer Browne did not submit that the decision-maker failed to consider the matters set out in the Directive. However, the Respondent addressed this in its submissions and compliance with the relevant Directive is a consideration when determining if a decision was fair and reasonable. I have considered the submissions of the parties as they relate to the matters set out in cl 9.5 of the Directive from [20]–[60]. I am satisfied that the decision-maker appropriately considered the matters set out in the cl 9.5 of the Directive when determining the proposed disciplinary action. My specific consideration of each aspect of cl 9.5 can be found in paragraphs [24], [28], [31], [35]–[36], [41]–[42], [46]–[47], [52], [55], [60] and [61]. [87] I have addressed Officer Browne's ground of appeal regarding procedural fairness and delay from [61]–[73]. [88] I have addressed Officer Browne's submissions regarding the unreasonableness of the supervised practice arrangements placed upon him from [8]–[14] and [74]–[77]. [89] I have addressed Officer Browne's submissions regarding the proportionality of the disciplinary action and parity compared to his colleague above at [78]–[84] and from [56]–[60]. [90] For the reasons given above I find that the decision was fair and reasonable. On that basis, the decision is confirmed. Order [91] I make the following order: 1. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. -- 20 of 20 --