Evans v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Attendance) [2026] QIRC 197

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Evans v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Attendance) [2026] QIRC 197 PARTIES: Evans, Jessye (Applicant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: WC/2025/104 PROCEEDING: Application in Existing Proceedings DELIVERED ON: 16 June 2026 HEARING DATE: On the papers MEMBER: HEARD AT: Hartigan DP Brisbane ORDER: The application is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – APPLICATION WITHIN PROCEEDINGS – where the appellant in substantive proceedings made an application within proceedings to attend the hearing of the appeal remotely by videoconference – exercise of Commission's discretion – factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion – where the application, if granted, would render the conduct of the hearing inefficient – application dismissed LEGISLATION: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 47A Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 447, s 451 -- 1 of 15 -- 2 CASES: Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 32A, 552A Marzo v Cittadini [2025] FedCFamC2G 1591 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] The Applicant, Ms Jessye Evans ('Ms Evans'),1 has applied to be excused from attending in person at the hearing of her substantive appeal proceedings ('the appeal proceedings')2 due to her medical condition. [2] Ms Evans requests leave to attend the hearing of her appeal proceedings by way of videoconferencing facilities. [3] Ms Evans also requests leave to be permitted to take regular breaks during her evidence and to have a support person present with her whilst she is giving evidence and, presumably, whilst she is being cross-examined. [4] The Respondent, the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator'), opposes the granting of leave for Ms Evans' requests. [5] This decision will deal with whether leave will be granted to Ms Evan's as the Appellant, to conduct the appeal proceedings remotely. Relevant Background [6] The affidavit of Ms Phoebe Lock ('Ms Lock'), Senior Appeals Officer for the Regulator, provides a useful summary of some of the relevant background of the appeal proceedings, further summarised, as follows: 1. On 3 June 2025, a s 552A conference3 was held before Commissioner McLennan and both parties attended the conference in person and Ms Evans was handed a highlighted hard copy of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Guide by the Commissioner; 2. On 23 July 2025, in response to Ms Evans' query regarding phone attendance for her General Practitioner to give evidence at the hearing, the Industrial Registry responded with extracts of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Guide which refer to 'Attendance at the Commission' and 'Expert Evidence'; 1 Being the Applicant in this proceeding and the Appellant in the substantive proceedings in WC/2025/104. 2 Filed on 14 May 2025. 3 Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld). -- 2 of 15 -- 3 3. On 15 September 2025, a second s 552A conference was held and both parties attended the conference in person; 4. On 27 November 2025, a further s 552A conference was held and both parties attended the conference in person; 5. On 19 January 2026, the parties attended a telephone mention before Deputy President Hartigan to discuss hearing arrangements and secure hearing dates; 6. On 24 February 2026, a mention and an oral hearing, for an Application in Existing Proceedings filed by Ms Evans,4 was held and both parties attended in person; and 7. On 8 April 2026, the Industrial Registry emailed a further copy of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Guide to the parties. [7] It is also relevant to note that Ms Evans was provided the opportunity to attend the conference on 27 November 2025 by telephone, however this offer was declined.5 [8] On 9 March 2026, Ms Evans contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence to advise she has scheduled a Specialist Psychiatric Assessment for 19 March 2026. [9] On 20 March 2026, Ms Evans contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence to advise that she attended her specialist appointment with Dr Khan on 19 March 2026, and Dr Khan issued a diagnosis and proposed an intensive three-month management plan. [10] On 24 March 2026, Ms Brenna Sumner, Ms Evans' partner contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence on behalf of Ms Evans, to advise of Ms Evans current 'medical crisis,' that Ms Evans is not fit to attend the upcoming hearing in person and advised that a medical certificate in support would be provided. [11] On 25 March 2026, Ms Evans contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence advising that she had been admitted to hospital and further advised that Dr Muhammed had reviewed the specialist report from Dr Khan and will provide a medical certificate once the request to participate in the hearing via videoconference is granted by the Commission. [12] A telephone mention was listed for 30 March 2026 for case management and both parties appeared by phone. Ms Evans' request to appear at the hearing by videoconference was 4 Filed 29 January 2026. 5 Email from the Industrial Registry to the Appellant dated 27 November 2025 and Appellant's response dated 27 November 2025. -- 3 of 15 -- 4 not granted on the basis that no medical evidence had been provided to support the request. [13] On 1 April 2026, Ms Evans contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence formally requesting to appear in her appeal proceedings hearing via videoconference ('the Application') and attached a medical certificate in support of her request. [14] A medical certificate was issued by Dr Muhammed, General Practitioner, advising that he had recommended Ms Evans participate in "her upcoming industrial relations matters via video link." [15] The hearing of the appeal proceedings was initially listed to commence on 15 April 2026 for a three (3) day hearing. [16] On 2 April 2026, a Directions Order was issued to the parties seeking Ms Evans to file any further submissions or affidavit material by 8 April 2026, the Regulator to file any submissions or affidavit material in response by 10 April 2026. Due to the proximity of the hearing, the matter was to be determined on the papers. [17] On 8 April 2026, Ms Evans contacted the Industrial Registry by email correspondence raising procedural concerns with respect to witness evidence. [18] On 9 April 2026, a mention was held by telephone during which the hearing listed to commence on 15 April 2026 was vacated due to concerns regarding the calling of witnesses and a Directions Order was issued requiring the Regulator to file its response to the Application by 17 April 2026 and Ms Evans' to file any reply by 22 April 2026. [19] After the Directions Order of 9 April 2026 was issued, but before the determination of this Application, Ms Evans wrote to the Industrial Registry6 advising of her intention to be legally represented in the appeal proceedings. The Industrial Registry subsequently wrote to the parties seeking confirmation from Ms Evans that she would be legally represented7and advised that, should she be represented, 'a further opportunity will be provided for submissions and any affidavit material to be filed by her legal representatives in relation to the remote attendance request, subject to leave being granted for them to appear.'8 Obviously, Ms Evans being legally represented would be a material consideration to this Application. [20] A response from Ms Evans was received by the Industrial Registry on 1 May 2026 confirming her intention to be legally represented and advising she was 'currently in the process of finalizing [sic] legal representation' and that she would 'look forward to my 6 On 16 April 2026 by email correspondence. 7 Requesting a response by 1 May 2026. 8 Email dated 29 April 2026. -- 4 of 15 -- 5 representatives providing further material regarding my remote attendance request once they are formally on the record.' [21] No further correspondence or documentation was provided by Ms Evans in support of her confirmation of being legally represented. Subsequently, on 27 May 2026, the Industrial Registry again sought to confirm that Ms Evans would be legally represented. That same day, Ms Evans wrote to the Industrial Registry to confirm that she would be proceeding as a self-represented litigant in the appeal. [22] Consequently, Ms Evans' request to appear remotely for the whole of the hearing will be considered in the context that she is a self-represented litigant who has instituted an appeal to the Commission on her own behalf. [23] Despite being given the opportunity to be heard orally in respect of the Application, both parties, respectively, were content for the Application to be determined on the papers. Relevant Statutory Provisions and Practice Directions [24] The source of the Commission's power, relevantly, is contained in ss 447(2)(b) and 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'). [25] Section 447 of the IR Act provides for the functions for the Commission as follows: 447 Commission's functions … (2) The commission must perform its functions in a way that— … (b) avoids unnecessary technicalities and facilitates the fair and practical conduct of proceedings under this Act. [26] Section 451 of the IR Act provides for the general powers of the Commission as follows: 451 General powers (1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. (2) Without limiting subsection (1) – the commission in the proceeding may: (a) give directions about the hearing of a matter; or (b) make a decision it considers appropriate, irrespective of the relief sought by a party; or (c) make an order it considers appropriate. [27] Additionally, Practice Direction 8 of 2021 of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('Practice Direction 8 of 2021') confirms, that a decision by a Member of -- 5 of 15 -- 6 the Commission to approve the taking of evidence, by telephone or by video link, is an exercise of discretion. [28] Practice Direction 8 of 2021 is set out in the following terms: The purpose of this Practice Directions is to: • to ensure that all parties are aware of the approach to the taking of evidence by telephone and/or video link in the ordinary case; • to streamline the taking of evidence by these means; • to avoid delay and disruption; and • to maintain the decorum of the proceeding. … General 1 Evidence by telephone will only be taken from expert witnesses and on formal and uncontroversial matters. Telephone evidence will not be taken where credibility is in issue. 2 Evidence by telephone or video link may be given only at the discretion of the Member. … [29] Several authorities in the federal jurisdiction have considered the application of s 47A(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ('FCA Act'). Section 47A(1) of the FCA Act provides that the court may, for the purpose of any proceeding, direct or allow testimony to be given by video link, audio link or other appropriate means. [30] The present Application is unusual in so far as the person seeking to appear by video link is the Applicant herself, not only for the purpose of giving evidence in her appeal, but also to facilitate the conduct of her case at the hearing. A large number of the authorities deal with an application for a third party witness to give evidence remotely. [31] However, Marzo v Cittadini9 is a matter in which the two applicants in a Fair Work Act proceeding sought to attend the hearing by video link as they resided overseas and had been in Australia on a working visa at the time of the alleged contraventions. [32] Her Honour Judge Forbes considered the relevant authorities with respect to exercising the discretion to grant leave for remote attendance at a hearing: Whether or not the court will exercise its discretion in any given case will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of that case. There is no right to appear remotely – indeed in my view there is a presumption against it. Good reasons for the exercise of the court’s discretion must be made out by the party seeking the favourable exercise of that discretion In Southernwood at [44], Murphy J noted that no one set of factors are either exhaustive nor prescriptive of the way in which the court’s discretion should be exercised. The discretion is a broad one in which the determining interest is the interests of justice in the case at hand. There is no presumption nor prima facie case as to the way in which the discretion is to be exercised. Murphy 9 [2025] FedCFamC2G 1591 ('Marzo'). -- 6 of 15 -- 7 J held that the discretion involves a balancing exercise as to what will best serve the administration of justice, doing so consistently with managing justice between the parties. That assessment should be guided by the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)[5], namely, the facilitation of the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. There have been, on the decided cases, differing approaches adopted to the giving of evidence via video link. There is generally a line of cases in favour of the use of audio or visual evidence, and a line of cases which urge a more cautious approach. Several authorities emphasise the benefit that it is possible, with video, to obtain a clearer view of the witness, such that facial expressions, reactions, bodily movements and gestures are easier to discern when evidence is given remotely, as opposed to when the witness is positioned some distance from the bench in a courtroom. By contrast, other authorities raise concerns of a lack of solemnity about giving evidence remotely, as well as difficulty in appreciating and assessing non- verbal signals such as minor differences in emphasis or tone. In Southernwood, Murphy J surveyed a number of relevant authorities (including some of those cited by the applicant) which revealed changing attitudes and diverging opinions within the courts regarding the conduct of proceedings and the hearing of evidence across electronic platforms. In terms of the balancing exercise which underpins the discretion to permit testimony by video, the Courts have recognised that there have been substantial advances in the state of technology which can lead to savings in time and cost. The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic and the widespread adoption of video technology which became necessary to ensure that courts continued to function during periods of lockdown, have seen many judges enthusiastically embrace technology under the rubric of the overarching purpose – efficiency and avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality. Yet there are many Courts and judges who remain steadfastly of the view that there are inherent deficiencies, inefficiencies and complications when evidence is taken by video link. There is no one size fits all answer. Some judges have expressed the view that where evidence is relatively uncontroversial, the cross- examination is not likely to be lengthy, or no real issue of credit is involved, the taking of video evidence can be beneficial to the administration of justice and consistent with justice between the parties. It can be a manner of ensuring a smooth trial by receiving evidence in an efficient, cost- effective and timely way. I completely agree. That said, when doing justice between the parties, there can be a real and material difference between viva voce evidence and evidence given from a remote location via video. Concerns regarding the effectiveness of cross-examination, the importance of certain witnesses and their credit to the determination of factual disputes, in-trial document management, reliability of technology and fairness to the parties loom as just some of the issues when considering applications of the kind made by the applicants. For many judicial officers, particularly trial judges who are required to extract the truth from a thicket of contested narratives, the task can be made all the more difficult when court participants are separated by distance, time-zone and technology.10 [33] What is clear from the authorities is the determination of whether the exercise of my discretion to grant leave for the Applicant to appear at the hearing and conduct her case remotely, involves a balancing exercise as to what will best serve the administration of justice in this particular case. 10 Ibid [48] – [55] (Forbes J). -- 7 of 15 -- 8 The evidence filed in support of the Application [34] Ms Evans relies on her affidavit evidence, Dr Muhammed's medical certificate and the report by Dr Khan to contend that a requirement for in person attendance at the appeal proceedings hearing poses a 'serious risk of a significant relapse or acute panic attack.'11 [35] Ms Evans relies on medical evidence that she contends supports her request to appear remotely. [36] Firstly, Ms Evans relies on a medical certificate of Dr Muhammed, general practitioner, dated 1 April 2026. Relevantly, Dr Muhammed states as follows: This is to confirm that Miss Jessye Evans has been advised to partake in her upcoming industrial relation matters via video link. She has complex PTSD and severe depression / anxiety as a result of her workplace events being discussed at the hearing. Discussing the matters in detail may trigger a relapse I panic attack. Hence my recommendation to partake in a video call, so she remains in her "safe space" at home. I would greatly appreciate your understanding in this matter.12 [37] Ms Evans also seeks to rely on the support of Dr Khan, Psychiatrist, dated 19 March 2026. The report of Dr Khan states that the purpose of the report is to provide an independent psychiatric opinion regarding the causal relationship between workplace incidents occurring in 2023 and 2024 and her current psychiatric conditions. Relevantly, Ms Evans seeks to rely on Dr Khan's diagnosis of Ms Evans suffering from Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (C-PTSD), severe major depressive disorder and severe Generalised Anxiety Disorder in support of her Application. [38] In her affidavit, Ms Evans deposes to a dramatic decline in her mental health following the psychiatric assessment conducted by Dr Khan. She states the assessment process served as a source of significant re-traumatisation and that she is currently largely housebound and socially isolated. Should the Commission exercise its discretion to permit Ms Evans to attend the hearing and give evidence by video link? [39] Ms Evans contends she should be granted leave to appear at the hearing remotely, which would have the effect of permitting her to conduct her case, including cross-examining witnesses, and giving her own evidence by video link. [40] Curiously Ms Evans submits that she will be the sole witness providing oral evidence.13 That is not consistent with the witness lists provided by both parties. Relevantly, Ms 11 Affidavit of Jessye Evans filed 7 April 2026. 12 Medical certificate dated 1 April 2026. 13 Affidavit of Jessye Evans filed 7 April 2026. -- 8 of 15 -- 9 Evans has previously indicated that she will give evidence together with Dr Khan. The Regulator has indicated that it will call the following witnesses: 1. Ms Kamila Wolyniec 2. Ms Rosie Hamilton 3. Ms Kylie Mills 4. Dr Provan [41] Ms Evans provides, in summary, the following basis in support of the exercise of the discretion: 1. that her symptoms are directly related to the workplace event which she alleges to have been the cause of her workplace injury, which is the subject of the appeal proceedings; 2. that her mental health significantly declined after attending on Dr Khan for a Specialist Psychiatric Assessment, and the re-traumatisation of this assessment has left her largely housebound and socially isolated; 3. that 'an in-person environment'14 would be overwhelming and hinder her ability to provide 'clear and focused evidence'; and 4. that participating via videoconference would allow her to remain in her 'safe space' at home and to manage her symptoms, including access to prescribed medication and sensory grounding tools, to ensure her psychological safety. [42] Ms Evans further seeks leave to permit frequent breaks during her evidence and to have a support person present to mitigate the risk of re-traumatisation. [43] The Regulator opposes the Application for remote attendance on the following summarised basis: 1. Ms Evans commenced the appeal on the basis that she would be conducting her own case; 2. Ms Evans has participated in a number of pre-hearing conferences before the Commission, during which she has been apprised of the relevant procedural requirements, including her obligations in relation to giving evidence and the cross-examination of witnesses; 3. In the course of those pre-hearing processes, Ms Evans has already been required to recount the workplace events said to be traumatic; 14 Ibid, 3. -- 9 of 15 -- 10 4. The Regulator submits that the contention that further recounting would precipitate a relapse should be treated with 'much skepticism' [sic] as Ms Evans has, without direction, undertaken the preparation of a substantial body of additional material, much of which addresses the same workplace events; and 5. In any event, the workplace events will need to be examined in detail at the hearing, whether Ms Evans attends in person or remotely. [44] The Regulator also opposes Ms Evans' request for frequent breaks during her oral evidence to confer with her support person. The Regulator submits that permitting such discussions would undermine the established procedures governing the giving of evidence and the conduct of cross-examination. The Regulator further contends that, to the extent that breaks or consultation with her support person during oral evidence become necessary, these matters could be more effectively supervised in the context of an in-person hearing. [45] The Regulator finally contends that self-represented litigants are not uncommon in these types of proceedings and as a model litigant, the Regulator will allow a full and fair opportunity for self-represented litigants to reasonably present their case. [46] In reply, Ms Evans contends that: 1. the Regulator's representatives are not medical professionals and it is not open to them to 'edit' or 'reinterpret' medical information to suit a legal narrative; 2. that participation at a conciliation conference, which was directed by the Commission, is not analogous with a court room environment, and notes that the conciliation conferences were repeatedly suspended due the impact on her; 3. that the physical environment is a primary trigger for her medical condition and being required to appear in-person with representatives of her employer who 'failed to protect her' is a 'hostile sensory experience' that can trigger an immediate dissociative episode. She contrasts this environment with her 'safe place' which she says would allow her to regulate her nervous system to provide the necessary evidence that the 'interests of justice' require; 4. that she is prepared to satisfy any procedural safeguards to ensure the sanctity of evidence, including: i. 360-Degree Room Tour: To be conducted via camera at the start of testimony and after every break. ii. Fixed Camera Angle: Ensuring the Appellant's hands, face, and immediate surroundings remain visible at all times. -- 10 of 15 -- 11 iii. Digital Document Management: The Appellant will serve clear, digital copies of all relevant documents to all parties, ensuring a higher level of clarity and efficiency than a standard in-person hearing.15 5. that remote attendance would not hinder the effectiveness of cross-examination as 'truth is not dependent on proximity'. She further submits that a remote setting would ensure that her reactions are a result of the questions asked rather than a physiological reaction of the environment; and 6. that allowing an in-person hearing would unfairly disadvantage her because she is vulnerable and unrepresented, while the Regulator has experienced legal counsel and requiring physical confrontation would create an imbalance and undermine a fair hearing. [47] Ms Evans further seeks to rely on s 31 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to support her position that the Commission has a duty to ensure a fair hearing. [48] This matter can be distinguished from Marzo in so far as the factual circumstances for the seeking of leave is on the basis of a medical condition and not locality. Consideration [49] A large number of authorities referred to above, contemplate whether leave should be granted to a witness to appear to give their evidence remotely, primarily because, that witness was located in a separate location to the hearing. [50] The decision of Marzo, also referred to above, contemplated an application for the relevant applicants to appear and conduct the hearing remotely because they lived outside of Australia. On that occasion, the Court determined not to exercise its discretion to permit the hearing to be conducted in the physical absence of the applicants. [51] Relevantly, in Marzo, the Court noted16 that there is no right to appear remotely and, indeed, there is a presumption against it. [52] It is my view that such a presumption also exists before the Commission. As much can be established by the requirements set out in Practice Direction Number 8 of 2021, 'Taking Evidence by Telephone or Videolink' and the expectations of parties preparing for an appearing at hearings of appeals in workers' compensation proceedings in 'Workers' Compensation Appeal Guide', QIRC, 'Part 7 Hearings'. 15 Submissions of the Appellant in reply filed 22 April 2026. 16 [2025] FedCFamC2G 1591, [48] (Forbes J). -- 11 of 15 -- 12 [53] It is not in dispute that Ms Evans has been on notice that she would be required to attend the hearing in person as she has had the benefit of the provision of information to her during case management conferences and hearings including by being provided with a copy of the 'Workers' Compensation Appeals Guide.' [54] Further, and consistent with the presumption referred to above, Ms Evans has previously appeared in person before the Commission during the course of the proceedings in conferences and mentions. [55] It is within this context that Ms Evans now seeks to have her appearance in person excused with respect to the conduct of her own hearing. Not only will Ms Evans be required, as the Appellant, to give evidence as the principal witness in her appeal proceedings but, as a self-represented litigant, she will also be required to conduct the hearing from beginning to end. [56] A number of practical and substantive obstacles flow from Ms Evans' request. [57] Firstly, Dr Muhammed's medical certificate suggests that discussing the matter in detail may 'trigger a relapse/ panic attack'. Whether Ms Evans appears remotely or in person does not eliminate the requirement for Ms Evans to discharge the onus placed on her, as the Appellant in the proceedings, to establish that she suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the WCR Act. This will necessarily require Ms Evans to discuss the matter in detail, not just as a witness who will presumably be cross-examined about the matter, but also as a self-represented litigant who will adduce other evidence including by leading evidence-in-chief from her expert witnesses, cross-examining witnesses called by the Regulator and making opening and closing submissions to the Commission. [58] Consequently, I do not consider that, even if Ms Evans was to conduct the proceedings remotely, the trigger Dr Muhammed refers to would be eliminated, as her requirement to discuss the matter in detail will be front and centre of the hearing from the beginning to end. Further, Dr Muhammed provides no factual or other foundation to support his recommendation that if Ms Evans were to participate by video from her 'safe space' at home it would reduce or eliminate 'the trigger'. [59] That is to say, whether Ms Evans appears remotely or in person, she will still be required to discuss the matters in detail. [60] I do not consider that the medical certificate issued by Dr Muhammed establishes that, if Ms Evans was to appear at the hearing remotely, that 'the trigger' as described by Dr Muhammed would be eliminated. [61] Dr Khan's medical report pre-dates Ms Evans' Application and does not express an opinion with respect to Ms Evans' medical capacity and the impact, if any, on Ms Evans conducting the hearing in person or remotely. -- 12 of 15 -- 13 [62] With respect to Ms Evans requests for breaks during her evidence, I consider that if Ms Evans appeared before the Commission in person that the Commission would be in a position to observe Ms Evans and to determine case management issues as they arise in the hearing with both parties present. If it is the case, for instance, that the Commission determines during the hearing of the matter that breaks are required in the interests of justice, then such case management decisions will be determined at the relevant time taking into account the circumstances present when they arise. Such decisions are often assisted by the Commission observing the parties appearing in person before them. [63] Further, if breaks are to occur, the Commission is better placed to manage such breaks when both parties are present in person before the Commission. This includes practical matters of ensuring that breaks are managed efficiently when both parties remain in the precinct of the Commission's hearing room and not needing to be reliant on technological reliability to rejoin parties to the hearing room remotely. [64] I am not satisfied that the matters Ms Evans raises in support of the Application are matters that weigh in favour of the exercise of my discretion. Further, I consider that there are a number of matters that weigh against the exercise of my discretion. [65] Firstly, and as noted above, Ms Evans commenced the appeal proceedings and is the principal party to the appeal. In doing so, Ms Evans has invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission in which there is a presumption that Ms Evans will appear in person to attend the hearing of the appeal and in doing so will conduct it from beginning to end in person. [66] Secondly, there are matters of factual dispute between the parties and Ms Evans' evidence will be critical to the Commission's resolution of the factual dispute and, to the determination of the appeal. Given that there is a factual contest of the events, it is likely that cross-examination will be wide-ranging and lengthy and the credit of witnesses, including Ms Evans, will be put in issue. I consider that the traditional forensic benefit of witnesses appearing in person should not be dismissed lightly, that is even more the case when the relevant witness is the Appellant in the proceedings. [67] Consequently, in these circumstances, the Commission will benefit from Ms Evans giving her evidence in person. [68] Thirdly, a number of practical issues arise in this Application, given Ms Evans seeks to be excused from appearing in person for the whole of the hearing. These issues go beyond the practical issues that arise when an application is being sought for a witness to be excused from appearing in person. That is because the practical issues that include, for instance, managing the provision of relevant documents and reliability of the technology used including the electronic provision of documents to witnesses and the reliability of Ms Evans' videolink, are ordinarily only required for a window of time in a hearing, -- 13 of 15 -- 14 whilst the relevant witness gives evidence remotely rather than, as Ms Evans seeks, for the whole of the hearing. Further, there are other practical hurdles in the form of, for instance, the Regulator showing Ms Evans a copy of a document before putting it to a witness which will be impeded and made less effective if Ms Evans is not present in the court room. I consider that these practical issues would result in the hearing being conducted less efficiently if Ms Evans appeared at the hearing remotely. [69] Accordingly, after undertaking the balancing exercise as to what will best serve the administration of justice in this particular case, I have decided against exercising my discretion to allow Ms Evans to appear remotely and conduct the proceedings remotely by videolink. [70] It follows that the Application for Ms Evans to appear as a witness and to conduct her appeal hearing remotely is dismissed. Further matters raised on the material [71] The Commission is concerned about matters referred to in Ms Evans' submissions, that while not supporting the exercise of the discretion as referred to above, do raise questions regarding Ms Evans' fitness and capacity to give evidence and or to conduct her hearing as a self-represented litigant at this point in time. [72] In this regard, Ms Evans submitted, in her submissions in reply, that '[a]s established by Dr Khan, the Appellant is at high risk of a dissociative episode in a physical courtroom. A witness who is in a state of acute psychiatric collapse cannot be 'effectively' cross- examined. Remote attendance ensures the Appellant remains 'present' and able to provide the very evidence that Respondents claim they wish to test.'17 [73] The report of Dr Khan does not expressly state the matters submitted by Ms Evans. Dr Khan's report does not address any risks associated with Ms Evans' giving her evidence at all, let alone with respect to her giving in person or remote evidence. [74] Ms Evans also refers to being 're-traumatised' following the medical assessment conducted by Dr Khan. The issues raised by these submissions will need to be considered further by the Commission, after hearing from the parties. [75] The Commission will issue a direction that the proceedings be listed for a telephone mention in order for this matter to be further discussed with the parties with, and, if necessary, for further directions to be issued. 17 Submissions of the Appellant in reply filed 22 April 2026, 3, 4. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 Order [76] For the above reasons, it is ordered that: -- 15 of 15 --