Christensen v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 188

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Christensen v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 188 PARTIES: Christensen, Jane (Applicant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: B/2025/89 PROCEEDING: General Application DELIVERED ON: 4 June 2026 MEMBER: Hartigan DP HEARD AT: On the papers ORDER: Pursuant to r 41(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, the parties in WC/2024/141 are directed to confer with one another and lodge in the Industrial Registry a draft Further Directions Order on or before 4pm on 16 June 2026. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS – DORMANT PROCEEDINGS – STEP IN PROCEEDINGS – whether the proceedings lapsed pursuant to r 230 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 - whether serving an expert report on the regulator constitutes action taken – where serving the expert report is determined to be action taken to progress the proceedings. LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) rr 9, 41, 230 -- 1 of 8 -- 2 CASES: Sharples v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] ICQ 20 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 010 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] The Applicant in this application is the Appellant ('the Applicant') in an appeal of a review decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator') in proceedings WC/2025/141 ('the appeal proceedings'). [2] On 23 October 2025, the Applicant's legal representatives were advised by the Industrial Registry that the appeal proceedings had lapsed on 26 September 2025. [3] The issues to be determined on this application are as follows: (a) Did the Applicant's appeal lapse because of the application of r 230(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('the Rules'). Specifically, did the Applicant fail to take action in the proceedings by the relevant date; and, if so, (b) Should an order be made allowing the Applicant to take further action with respect to her appeal proceedings due to r 230(2) of the Rules. [4] Relevant to the determination of these issues is a chronology of the matter which is set out in the following terms: (a) On 19 July 2024, the Applicant lodged her appeal with the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, and a timetable was issued by the Industrial Registry on that same day (“Initial Timetable”). (b) At the crux of the Applicant’s Appeal is the issue of whether the injury suffered by the Applicant in the course of her employment was caused by the taking of reasonable management action and, if so, whether such action was taken in a reasonable way. (c) After exchange of Lists of Documents between the parties on 19 August 2024, the Respondent consented to a request by the Applicant to have the appeal placed in abeyance until the Applicant had obtained expert evidence relevant to the appeal. (d) On 26 September 2024, the Applicant’s solicitors emailed the Industrial Registry making the relevant request, which was confirmed by the Registry via the issuance of a further Directions Order on 1 October 2024, vacating the Initial Timetable. -- 2 of 8 -- 3 (e) The Applicant was required to take action in relation to the proceedings by 26 September 2025 (i.e. 1 year from the date of the above action) (“Relevant Date”). (f) On 27 November 2024, the Applicant was assessed by expert consultant psychiatrist, Dr Trevor Lotz, who produced a report dated 2 December 2024. (g) On 6 August 2025, the report was ultimately served on the Respondent with agreement sought for the Applicant’s solicitors to request for the reinstatement of the Initial Timetable (albeit with additional orders for the parties to exchange updated Lists of Documents). It was (and remains) the belief of the Applicant’s solicitor that the service of the expert report was action in the proceeding as contemplated by rule 230(1). (h) On 19 August 2025, the Respondent agreed to the proposed way forward. (i) On 22 October 2025, the Applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Commission seeking the re- instatement of the prior Directions Order. Whilst it was the intention of the Applicant’s solicitors to submit the request at an earlier time, an administrative oversight resulted in the request being lodged on 22 October.1 Relevant legislation [5] Rule 9 of the Rules provides that an applicant has carriage of proceedings as follows: 9 Who has carriage of proceeding (1) An applicant has carriage of a proceeding unless— (a) the court, commission or registrar orders another person to have the carriage; or (b) the court or commission orders the registrar to have the carriage. (2) The person who has carriage of a proceeding must take all necessary steps in the proceeding until the proceeding is— (a) discontinued by leave of the court, commission or registrar; or (b) finally determined by the court, commission or registrar. [6] Rule 230 provides for the lapse of proceedings after at least one year's delay as follows: 230 Lapse of proceeding after at least 1 year’s delay (1) This rule applies if— (a) an application starting a proceeding has been filed; and (b) no action has been taken by the applicant in relation to the application for at least 1 year since the last action was taken by the applicant in the application. (2) A party may only take further action on the application with an order of the court, commission or registrar. (3) An application for an order under subrule (2) must be in the approved form and state the following— 1 The Applicant, 'Applicant’s written submissions in support of the application filed on 30 October 2025' Submission filed in Christensen v Workers’ Compensation Regulator, B/2025/89, filed 19 November 2025, [1.2] (citations omitted). -- 3 of 8 -- 4 (a) the steps taken in the proceeding; (b) an explanation for the circumstances of the delay; (c) the steps (including a timetable) proposed to be taken to progress the proceeding; (d) any prejudice suffered or likely to be suffered by another party to the proceeding if the application starting the proceeding is not struck out; (e) the merits of the proceeding; (f) why the court, commission or registrar should make the order despite the delay. [7] In order for r 230 of the Rules to apply, the following facts must be established: (a) an application starting a proceeding has been filed;2 and (b) no action has been taken by the Applicant in relation to the application for at least one year since the last action was taken by the Applicant.3 [8] The Commission is satisfied that an application starting a proceeding for the purpose of r 230(1)(a) of the Rules has been filed. What was the last action taken by the Applicant in the appeal proceedings? [9] The Applicant submits that the relevant last action to be taken by her was the disclosure of an expert report by the Applicant on the Regulator. [10] The Applicant's submissions in this regard are set out as follows: 6.4 It is relevant to the determination of the principal issue to understand the Applicant’s ongoing obligation of disclosure in the appeal. 6.5 The Applicant submits she was under an ongoing duty of disclosure pursuant to rule 46 of the Rules, which applies to appeals under the WCRA (of which her appeal is one) as confirmed by section 553 of the WCRA. 6.6 The Applicant was ordered to attend to disclosure under the Initial Timetable by way of provision of a List of Documents to the Respondent;13 the List was provided on 19 August 2024. 6.7 Notwithstanding the later vacating of the Initial Timetable, the Applicant submits the rule 46 duty was maintained, and she was required to comply with it. 6.8 Given the ongoing duty of disclosure, the Applicant was required to disclose the expert report of Dr Lotz pursuant to rule 46(2) of the Rules. The service of the report upon the Respondent was therefore an action taken in compliance with her ongoing duty of disclosure in the appeal.4 2 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 230(1)(a). 3 Ibid r 230(1)(b). 4 Ibid (n 1) [6.4] – [6.8] (citations omitted). -- 4 of 8 -- 5 [11] The Industrial Court of Queensland has considered the purpose of the Rules generally, and specifically in respect of r 230 as follows: [28] The purpose of the Rules, as a whole, is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Court at a minimum of expense. Rule 230 only permits a party to take further action on an application by order of the Court where no action has been taken after one year. Clearly, the purpose of this rule is to ensure parties take timely steps for the expeditious determination of applications made to the Court. [29] Having regard to the purpose of r 230, the 'action' contemplated in rr 230(1)(b) and 230(2) of the Rules is, in my view, action taken in moving the matter towards judgment or the relief sought or an act or activity that has the characteristic of carrying the cause or action forward. For these reasons, I conclude that that same meaning should also be attributed to the noun 'steps' in rr 230(3)(a) and (c) of the Rules. Such a construction is strengthened when regard is had to r 230(3)(c) which refers to '... steps (including a timetable) proposed to be taken to progress the proceeding.'5 [12] In support of her position, the Applicant relies on the following passages of State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator:6 [25] In its written submissions in reply, the State submitted that there was no requirement, either in the terms of r 230 of the Rules, or in the equivalent provisions under civil procedure rules, that the conduct (or, relevantly to the present case, the 'action' referred to in r 230(1)(b) and r 230(2) of the Rules), is conduct confined to that done in the Commission or the Industrial Registry. … [30] In my view, the State's submissions are correct in that, at the very least, the State's action in disclosing Dr Varghese's report to the Regulator on 2 December 2022 was action taken by the State in relation to its appeal within the meaning of r 230(1)(b) of the Rules. [31] The consequence of this is that, within at least one year after the conference on 2 February 2022, the State did take action in relation to its appeal, such that its appeal did not lapse.7 [13] In that decision, a similar factual scenario arose, in so far as the Appellant (the State of Queensland) in that proceeding served an expert report on the Regulator on 25 November 2022. The Industrial Registry in that matter advised the Appellant that the appeal had lapsed on 18 April 2023. [14] The Commission concluded8 that the Appellant's action in disclosing the expert report to the Regulator was action taken by the Appellant in relation to its appeal within the meaning of r 230(1)(b) of the Rules. The Commission relied on the following four grounds in support of its conclusion: 5 Sharples v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] ICQ 20 [28]-[29] (citations omitted). 6 [2024] QIRC 010. 7 Ibid [25], [30]-[31]. 8 Ibid [30]. -- 5 of 8 -- 6 [33] First, in Porzuczek v Toowoomba District Health Services, Moynihan J held that the word 'step' in r 389 of the UCPR is to be interpreted in the same way as 'proceedings' in O 90, r 9 of the RSC. [34] Therefore, consistently with the approach taken by the Commission and the Industrial Court of Queensland in other cases concerning the equivalent provisions that have governed them, the principles developed by the courts about the construction of the equivalent rules in the RSC and the UCPR are of assistance in construing r 230 of the Rules. [35] An action, therefore, within the meaning of r 230(1)(b) of the Rules, need not be a step taken or act done in the Commission or the Industrial Registry. Further, it does not need to be something required by the Rules. In Artahs Pty Ltd v Gall Standfield & Smith (A Firm) Margaret McMurdo P relevantly stated in respect of r 389 of the UCPR: [3] The expression "step" is not defined in the UCPR. Its ordinary meaning in this context is: "a move or proceeding, as towards some end or in the general course of action: the first step towards peace". Whether a step has been taken in a particular proceeding will turn on the pertinent circumstances in that case. It is clear from the authorities discussed by Peter Lyons J that, to be a step under r 389 it must, consistent with that word's ordinary meaning, progress the action towards a conclusion. I agree with Peter Lyons J that it is not necessary the step be something required by the UCPR. For example, the filing and service of a reply or a subsequent pleading would usually amount to a step in the action. [36] Secondly, s 553 of the Act provides: 553. Application of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 and Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (1) The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, chapter 7, part 2 and chapter 9, part 4 and the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 apply to an appeal under this division with necessary changes. (2) However, if there is an inconsistency between a provision of the rules mentioned in subsection (1) and a provision of this division, the provision of this division prevails to the extent of the inconsistency. [37] As submitted by the State, ch 7, pt 2 of the UCPR deals with disclosure generally. Rule 211(2) of the UCPR provides that the duty of disclosure continues until the proceeding is decided. Further, r 46 of the Rules provides: 46 Duty of disclosure (1) If a directions order requiring disclosure of documents is made, a party must disclose any document that– (a) is directly relevant to the proceeding or a matter in issue in the proceeding; and (b) is in, or comes into, the possession of the party. (2) A party must act under subrule (1) until the proceeding is concluded or the matter in issue is admitted, withdrawn, struck out or otherwise disposed of. -- 6 of 8 -- 7 (3) Subrule (1) does not apply to a document in relation to which there is a valid claim to privilege from disclosure. [38] On the evidence before me, it is unclear whether the State, in disclosing Dr Varghese's report to the Regulator, was acting under its obligation pursuant to the UCPR or pursuant to an earlier Directions Order issued by the Commission that required disclosure. In any event, there was clearly an obligation on the State to disclose Dr Varghese's report to the Regulator. The State did so on 2 December 2022. [39] Thirdly, there seems to be no dispute, and in my view it is clear and consistent with authority, that the holding of the conference by the Commission on 2 February 2022, pursuant to s 552A of the Act, was action within the meaning of r 230(1)(b) of the Rules. [40] Fourthly, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the disclosure of Dr Varghese's report by the State to the Regulator on 2 December 2022 was, in my view, action taken by the State in relation to its appeal within the meaning of r 230(1)(b) of the Rules. This is consistent with authority. Further, the disclosure of Dr Varghese's report had the characteristic of carrying the State's appeal forward. This is because the material issue between the parties is whether the worker had suffered an injury within the meaning of s 32 of the Act. Dr Varghese's report deals with that issue.9 Consideration [15] The Commission issued directions for the parties to file written submissions in respect of the Applicant's application. [16] The Applicant complied with the directions and filed written submissions and relied on affidavit material. [17] The Regulator did not file written submissions in accordance with the directions order. [18] Instead, it sent correspondence to the Industrial Registry indicating that the Regulator neither consented nor objected to the application. [19] Although not stated by the Regulator, it is assumed that the evidence relied on by the Applicant is uncontested. [20] The Applicant was required to take action in relation to the appeal proceedings by 26 September 2025. [21] The Commission accepts that the Applicant served the expert report of Dr Lotz on the Regulator on 6 August 2025. [22] Having regard to the relevant authorities referred to above, together with the purpose of the disclosure of the expert report of Dr Lotz in the context of the appeal proceedings, the 9 Ibid (n 6) [33] – [40] (citations omitted). -- 7 of 8 -- 8 Commission is satisfied that the service of the expert report is action taken to move the proceedings forward. [23] Accordingly, action was taken by the Applicant so that the appeal proceedings did not lapse on 26 September 2025. [24] Consequently, r 230 of the Rules does not apply to the appeal proceedings as r 230(1)(b) has not been established on the facts of this matter. [25] The Appellant seeks reinstatement of the timetable to progress the appeal proceedings. [26] A direction will be issued for the parties to confer with one another with respect to the timetabling of the progression of the appeal proceedings and to lodge a draft further directions order in the Industrial Registry giving effect to such a timetable. Order [27] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: Pursuant to r 41(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, the parties in WC/2024/141 are directed to confer with one another and lodge in the Industrial Registry a draft Further Directions Order on or before 4pm on 16 June 2026. -- 8 of 8 --