Ellul v State of Queensland (Department of Local Government, Water and Volunteers) [2026] QIRC 147

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Ellul v State of Queensland (Department of Local Government, Water and Volunteers) [2026] QIRC 147 PARTIES: Ellul, Jay (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Local Government, Water and Volunteers) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2025/295 PROCEEDING: Public Sector Appeal - Application in existing proceedings DELIVERED ON: 29 April 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: O'Neill IC On the papers ORDER: 1. The Appellant's application for an extension of time to file his appeal is dismissed. 2. The appeal in matter PSA/2025/295 is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – where appeal filed out of time – whether discretion to extend time should be exercised – length of delay – explanations for delay– prejudice to the appellant and respondent – whether the Commission should exercise discretion to grant extension – prospects of success – extension of time not granted – appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction. -- 1 of 29 -- 2 LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) Directive 11/20 - Individual employee grievances CASES: A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 1 Breust v Qantas Airways Limited [1995] QGIG 777 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland [2010] ICQ 35 Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172 Collins v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 086 Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258 Douglas v Allen and Ors [1984] FCA 77 Forsyth-Stewart v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 395 Gibson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health [2024] QIRC 090 Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) Gray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 258 -- 2 of 29 -- 3 Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 293 Herwin v Flexihire Pty Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 709 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Johnson v Discovery Bay Developments Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apt) (1996) 151 QGIG 1010 Kazuva v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 147 Kelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 018 Lockhart v Queensland Health [2014] QIRC 012 Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252 Tucker v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 145 Wilson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2021] QIRC 245 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] Mr Jay Ellul ('the Appellant') is an AO8 Regional Manager employed by the Department of Local Government, Water and Volunteers ('the Respondent'). [2] On 24 November 2023 the Appellant submitted a complaint in relation to alleged conduct of Ms Jo Stephenson, Regional Director, Northern Region, and Mr Jeff Jimmieson, Acting Regional Director, Northern Region. The allegations were that the subject officers misused their authority to cause detriment to the Appellant. -- 3 of 29 -- 4 [3] The Appellant's complaint gave rise to an external investigation conducted by McCullough Robertson Lawyers. The external investigation report was provided to the delegate and by a decision letter dated 13 October 2025, Mr Jordan Watts Acting Executive Director provided the investigation outcome to the Appellant. [4] The decision letter from Mr Watts has been treated as the Local Action Decision ('LAD') for the purposes of an Individual Employee Grievance pursuant to the terms of Directive 11/20 - Individual employee grievances. The decision letter informed the Appellant of his right to seek an internal review. [5] On 27 October 2025 the Appellant sought an internal review decision of the LAD. The Appellant was provided with an internal review decision dated 10 November by Mr Jarrod Cowley-Grimmond, Deputy Director-General. That decision informed the Appellant of his ability to seek an external review with the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('the Commission') ('QIRC'). It also informed the Appellant of the 21-day limitation period. [6] The Appellant ultimately filed a compliant Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry on 23 December 2025. The substantive appeal is a fair treatment appeal in relation to the internal review decision. [7] In accordance with s 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') an appeal must be lodged in the Commission 21 days after the decision is received. [8] Mr Ellul's Appeal Notice was filed in the Registry on 23 December 2025, 43 days after the decision was received and 21 days beyond the statutory requirement. [9] This decision will address the preliminary jurisdictional issue of the Appellant's out of time filing of the Appeal Notice and whether the Appellant should receive an extension of time for the filing of the Appeal. Background [10] As outlined above, the Appellant received the Internal Review decision on 10 November 2025. [11] On Sunday, 23 November 2025 Mr Ellul, via email to the Industrial Registry, sent a Form 89 – Appeal Notice and a number of attachments which totalled over 200 pages. [12] In accordance with Practice Direction Number 3 of 2021, the Registry advised the Appellant on 25 November 2025 that his appeal was not being accepted for filing as it exceeded 30 pages in length and therefore needed to be filed in a hard copy. -- 4 of 29 -- 5 [13] That same day, the Appellant advised the Registry that he was not in his usual place of residence and therefore could not access a printer or post office. Within this correspondence, the Appellant also queried if an extension of time to file the appeal could be accommodated. [14] Between 25 November 2025 and 23 December 2025, the Appellant made a number of further attempts to file his appeal however these were also not accepted for various reasons including the length of the material, or the wrong decision being attached. [15] A compliant appeal notice was accepted by the Registry on 23 December 2025. [16] I called the matter on for mention on 14 January 2026 during which the Respondent confirmed that they would be pressing a jurisdictional objection on the basis that the appeal was filed out of time. [17] I issued a Directions Order following the mention directing the parties to file submissions in relation to whether I should exercise my discretion to extend time. [18] Upon receiving and reviewing those submissions it became clear that email exchanges that are outlined above in paragraphs [11]-[14] were not provided to me, nor to the Respondent. [19] Therefore, I requested from the Registry a complete history of email correspondence between the Appellant and the Registry. I then provided this to the parties and invited further submissions to be made on the basis of the new information. [20] The issue for determination is whether the Appellant should be granted an extension of time until 23 December 2025 to file a compliant Appeal Notice. [21] I have determined: (a) That the Appellant has failed to discharge the onus placed on him to establish that the justice of this case supports the exercise of a discretion to grant an extension of time. (b) To not exercise my discretion to extend time to the Appellant within which to lodge his Appeal Notice. (c) The appeal should be dismissed. [22] My reasons follow. Relevant Legislation -- 5 of 29 -- 6 [23] Section 564 of the IR Act relevantly provides: (1) An appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal must be started, as required under the rules, within the appeal period. (2) However, on an application made during or after the appeal period, the industrial tribunal may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period. (3) In this section— "appeal period", for an appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal, means the period within 21 days after— (a) if the decision is given at a hearing—the announcement of the decision at the hearing; or (b) if the decision is given through the registrar—the release of the decision; or (c) if the decision is a promotion decision—the decision is publicly notified under the Public Sector Act 2022; or (d) if, under another Act, the decision is given in another way – the decision is given in the other way. (Emphasis added) Submissions Appellant Submissions [24] The Appellant filed submissions on 3 February, 26 February and 12 March 2026. I intend to summarise all three submissions together below. [25] Mr Ellul contends that the time for filing the appeal should be extended based on the following grounds: 1. The Appellant made a timely initial attempt to comply within the statutory period; 2. Delay arose from a procedural misunderstanding concerning what needed to be filed at the outset; 3. There were practical barriers to accessing required systems and information; 4. Mitigating personal circumstances contributed to the filing error; and 5. Granting the extension will not cause prejudice to the Respondent and will permit the matter being considered on its merits. -- 6 of 29 -- 7 [26] The Appellant submits that his initial attempt to file the appeal was in the required timeframe however, he misunderstood the requirements and erroneously believed that all documents related to the complaint must be included. He contends this filing demonstrates the intention to comply with statutory requirements. [27] The Appellant further explains that he was provided conflicting information regarding the appropriate agency to file the appeal with. This arose because the QIRC Registry advised the Appellant his appeal should be lodged with the Office of Information Commissioner due to him attaching a decision relating to his Right to Information application. [28] The Appellant contends he did not have access to his emails between 15 December 2025 and 22 December 2025. He further submits that he was experiencing significant stress and anxiety as a result of the alleged bullying at work. [29] In relation to actions taken by the Respondent, the Appellant contends that they refused to consent to an extension of time for him to file the appeal and delayed in providing him responses to queries about how to file the appeal. [30] The Appellant submits that his substantive matter requires an impartial viewing because "the Respondent is conflicted and does not want to admit they took no action to protect the Appellant who raised safety concerns in July 2019". [31] The Appellant in his submissions attempts to cite a number of Commission cases1 to support his application however, I have been unable to locate the decisions he cites. In fact, the citations included by the Appellant belong to Commission cases of different names and facts.2 Therefore, it appears that the Appellant may have utilised Artificial Intelligence ('AI') in the preparation of his submissions which has caused him to provide incorrect and irrelevant case authorities. [32] There is in fact a decision of Keegan v Sussan Corporation (Aust.) Pty Ltd3 which is a decision of Henry J in the Supreme Court of Queensland which involved a negligence claim for damages arising from a psychiatric injury. This decision has no relevance to the issue of whether the Appellant should be entitled to an extension of time to pursue a public sector appeal in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. [33] The second case cited by the Appellant appears to in fact be Robinson v State of Queensland,4 once again a decision of His Honour Henry J in the Supreme Court at Cairns. That case also involved an action for negligence where the plaintiff claimed 1 The following incorrect citations were provided by the Appellant: 'Keegan v Sussan Corporation (Aust.) Pty Ltd [2014] QIRC 193; Robinson v State of Queensland [2015] QIRC 165'. 2 Morton v State of Queensland [2014] QIRC 193; Hegarty v Townsville City Council [2015] QIRC 165. 3 [2014] QSC 64 (Henry J). 4 [2017] QSC 165 (Henry J). -- 7 of 29 -- 8 damages for a psychiatric injury which was said to have arisen from cumulative breaches of the plaintiff's employer's duty of care. Once again, this case has limited to no relevance to the issue to be determined by the Commission which involves whether the Appellant has established that it is appropriate for him to be granted an extension of time. [34] The Appellant states that due to a belief that the Commission alone determined extension requests, he waited until a complete set of documents were available before filing the appeal. He further submits that had he known that the Respondent was involved in extension-of-time considerations, arrangements would have been made to provide the available documents immediately. In relation to this submission, it is the QIRC that determines extension of time applications. Other than providing submissions either opposing or supporting such an application, the Respondent is not involved in determining the application. [35] The Appellant contends that the interests of justice favour granting the extension of time. Respondent submissions [36] The Respondent submits that the internal review decision provided to Mr Ellul on 10 November 2025 clearly outlined his appeal rights. Further, it made reference to, and linked, the Public Sector Appeals Guide ('the Appeals Guide') which can be found on the QIRC website. Within the Appeals Guide, the Respondent contends that page 16 specifically states "Do not attach supporting documents to the Form 89, other than the relevant decision…" meaning that the Appellant was on notice of the requirements to file the appeal. [37] The Respondent acknowledges that the Appellant contacted the Department on multiple occasions with queries regarding how to file the appeal and contends that prompt responses were provided to Mr Ellul. [38] The Respondent submits that the Appellant was acutely aware of his appeal rights and the statutory timeframe. In response to the contentions that the Appellant had a procedural misunderstanding of the process, the Respondent contends that Mr Ellul was simply requested to file a hard copy of his appeal and no procedural misunderstanding was present. [39] The Respondent submits that the Appellant had everything he needed to file a compliant appeal, being the internal review decision letter. They note that in response to queries from the Appellant, the Department quoted the Appeals Guide to which Mr Ellul responded, "please do not quote any further documents that do nothing to support my right to appeal". -- 8 of 29 -- 9 [40] The Respondent contends that following advice from the QIRC Registry that documents exceeding 30 pages would need to be filed as a hard copy; the Appellant did not make any attempts to post the Appeal Notice. [41] The Respondent cites, and relies upon, the decision of Industrial Commissioner McLennan in Tucker v State of Queensland (Department of Health).5 [42] The Respondent contends that the Appellant failed to comply with instructions contained in the internal review decision, Appeals Guide and directly provided to him by the QIRC Registry and Department. The Respondent cites the decision of Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon in Gray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)6 ('Gray'). This decision will be further considered below. [43] The Respondent submits that no reasonable explanation has been provided by the Appellant to justify the filing of the Appeal 21 days beyond the statutory timeframe. [44] In relation to the Appellant's prospects of success in the substantive appeal, the Respondent submits that the Appellant was provided advice regarding the outcome of his complaint and appeal rights. The Appellant requested an internal review which found that the delegate's decision regarding Mr Ellul's complaints was fair and reasonable in the circumstances and the actions taken in respect to the matters that were substantiated were within the range of appropriate actions. [45] The Respondent concludes its submissions by submitting that the appeal should be dismissed. The Respondent contends that no compelling evidence has been provided as to why the appeal should be heard out of time, and there is no evidence to suggest a gross miscarriage of justice in how the Appellant's complaints have been dealt with. Consideration [46] In the preparation of these reasons for decision, I have carefully considered all of the submissions and attached evidence provided by both parties. All relevant material has been considered although it may not be referred to in these reasons for decision. Commission's discretion to grant an extension [47] It is for the Appellant to persuade the Commission to allow an extension of time to file an application.7 5 [2021] QIRC 145, [23], [26] – [27] (McLennan IC). 6 [2023] QIRC 258 (Pidgeon IC). 7 Collins v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 086, [22]; Lockhart v Queensland Health [2014] QIRC 012, [14]; Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258, [35]; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 554. -- 9 of 29 -- 10 [48] The Commission is empowered with a discretion to extend time by s 564(2) of the IR Act. [49] In Kelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)8 in the context of an application for an extension of time in a public sector appeal I observed: Section 564(2) of the IR Act is silent as to the factors to be considered by the Commission when considering whether to exercise a discretion to extend time, as a consequence, the question of whether to extend the time for filing an appeal is fundamentally an exercise of discretion. Such an exercise must be undertaken judicially and according to the rules of reason and justice, not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.9 [50] In A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations)10, President Martin J stated: On an application to extend time, the approach of this Court was described by President Hall in the Neophytos Foundadjis v Collin Bailey in the following way: "This Court has traditionally adhered to the view that s. 346 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 represents a legislative assessment that in the ordinary category of cases, justice will best be served by adhering to a 21 day limitation period, though on occasion the limitation may defeat a perfectly good case and that the discretion to extend time should be exercised only where the applicant for an extension of time discharges a positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of a further period." I note that s 346 of the 1999 Act is reproduced at s 564 in the current Act. In applying those principles, this Court will not grant leave unless it is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so. I will consider the merits of the appeal before finally determining the application for extension. As was said in Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172: “In determining whether it is proper to grant the extension, it is appropriate to consider the merits of the substantive application … An extension of time will not be granted if the court considers the appeal to be plainly hopeless.” … [51] Chief Industrial Commissioner Hall (as His Honour then was) confirmed in Breust v Qantas Airways Limited11 that the following factors are relevant when considering whether to grant an extension of time: a. The length of the delay; b. The Appellant's explanation of the delay; c. The prejudice to the parties should the extension be allowed or not allowed; d. The conduct of the Respondent; and e. The Appellant's prospects of success (in the substantive matter). 8 [2026] QIRC 018. 9 Ibid [69] citing House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, [2]. 10 [2019] ICQ 16, [2]. 11 [1995] QGIG 777. -- 10 of 29 -- 11 [52] I will adopt those factors in determining whether it is appropriate for an extension of time to be granted in this matter. [53] I further note that the importance of the application of statutory time limits was outlined by McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor12, where His Honour stated: A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature's judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period, notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated. Against this background, I do not see any warrant for treating provisions that provide for an extension of time for commencing an action as having a standing equal to or greater than those provisions that enact limitation periods. A limitation provision is the general rule; an extension provision is the exception to it.13 The length of the delay [54] In the present case the appeal was required to be filed on or before 2 December 2025 and was not filed until 23 December 2025. This means that the delay was a period of 21 days. [55] The Commission in other cases has determined that a delay involving a far lesser period of time to be a significant delay. In Forsyth-Stewart v State of Queensland (Department of Education),14 a delay of 10 days was held by his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, to be 'significant.'15 In Gibson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),16 Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon found a delay of 5 days to be 'significant.'17 In Kazuva v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),18 Industrial Commissioner Power accepted a submission that a delay of 6 days was 'significant.'19 [56] In the context of a 21-day limitation period a delay which effectively doubles the limitation period is in my view a significant delay. [57] This is a factor which militates against the granting of an extension of time. Explanation for the delay [58] As noted in paragraph [25] above, the Appellant relies on a number of matters to explain his delay in lodging a compliant Appeal Notice. I will separately address each ground that the Appellant relies upon. The Appellant made a timely initial attempt to comply within the statutory period 12 (1996) 186 CLR 541. 13 Ibid 553 per McHugh J, with whom Dawson J agreed. 14 [2021] QIRC 395. 15 Ibid [26]–[27]. 16 [2024] QIRC 090. 17 Ibid [47]–[48]. 18 [2022] QIRC 147. 19 Ibid [13], [21]-[24]. -- 11 of 29 -- 12 [59] The internal review decision received by the Appellant on 10 November 2025 provided the following information to the Appellant about his appeal rights: Appeal In accordance with the Individual Employment Grievances Directive (11/20), if you are dissatisfied with my decision in relation to your complaint, you may seek an external review within 21 days of receiving the decision. The directive provides the avenue for the external reviews that may be undertaken. Please refer to the Directive and Part 10 of the Public Sector Act 2022 s129 to s133 for further information. The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission Industrial Registry can provide further information about public sector appeal procedures. Visit www.qirc.qld.gov.au, or telephone 1300 592 987 or (07) 3227 8060. For further information please refer to the QIRC appeals guide.20 (Emphasis added). [60] I am therefore satisfied that the decision letter places the Appellant on notice that he had 21 days from the date of receipt of the decision to file his appeal. Further, the decision letter informs the Appellant of his ability to contact the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission and provides him with the necessary contact details to facilitate him doing so. Finally, although it is not apparent on the section of the decision letter excerpted above, the decision letter also provides a hyperlink to the appeals guide. [61] The Appeals Guide details on page 16: Section 5 of the form requires you to attach a copy of the Respondent's decision that you are appealing against. That might be a letter or a more formal document which provides reasons to you. The copy of the decision must be attached for your Form 89 to be processed by the Registry. … Do not attach supporting documents to the Form 89, other than the relevant decision or copy of the relevant gazette. Supporting documents will not be accepted for filing with the Form 89. If the Member requires more information, then it will be requested later, usually via a Directions Order. [62] I am therefore satisfied that had the Appellant taken appropriate heed of the advice provided in the Appeals Guide he would have been aware that to have a compliant Appeal Notice it was only necessary to file with the Appeal Notice, the decision which he was seeking to appeal. Further, the Appellant was also placed on notice that he should not attach other supporting documents to his Form 89. [63] I further note that the Form 89 Appeal notice on the front page includes an information box which relevantly provides: • Use this form to make a public sector appeal to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. 20 Respondent's submissions filed 25 February 2026, Attachment 1. -- 12 of 29 -- 13 • Please read this form carefully and complete all relevant sections. • For information on completing the application, please see the Public Sector Appeal Guide located on the website www.qirc.qld.gov.au. • Documents which are longer than 30 pages in length must be provided to the Industrial Registry in hard copy before it will be accepted for filing. For further information please contact the Industrial Registry on 1300 592 987 or via email at [email protected]. (Emphasis added.) [64] In the information contained on the Form 89, the Appellant is again provided with a reminder about the Public Sector Appeals Guide. He is further reminded that any documents of greater than 30 pages would be required to be provided to the Industrial Registry in hard copy before it would be accepted for filing. [65] As noted in the Appellant's submissions, he initially submitted an appeal by email on Sunday, 23 November 2025, within the prescribed 21-day timeframe. The Appellant attached to the Appeal Notice a number of other documents such that the length of the document bundle the Appellant was trying to file was well over 200 pages. [66] The difficulty with the material provided by the Appellant is that he did not identify in the Form 89 (in Question 5) the decision he was seeking to have externally reviewed or the date of that decision. [67] The Industrial Registry emailed the Appellant on Tuesday, 25 November 2025 at 10:30 am informing him that the appeal had not been accepted for filing because it was over 30 pages in length and was required to be filed in hard copy format. That email informed the Appellant about PD 3 of 2021 – Electronic filing and hard copies of documents and provided him with a hyperlink to that document. [68] The Appellant responds to the Industrial Registry on Tuesday, 25 November 2025 at 11:40 am noting: Thank you for that information regarding the hard copy requirements. I am not in my usual place of residence this week and cannot access a printer or post office – Will it be okay to send the hard copies next week via registered post? [69] The Appellant has not provided any further explanation as to where he was during this period, or why he could not access a printer or post-office (noting that he was able to access a computer on Sunday, 23 November 2025). Further, the Appellant has not sought to rely on this alleged unavailability as an explanation for his failure to lodge the appeal within time. [70] At this time on Tuesday 25 November 2025, the Appellant still had seven (7) days within which to file a compliant Appeal Notice. -- 13 of 29 -- 14 [71] The Appellant then called the Industrial Registry and following that call sent an email to the Industrial Registry on 25 November 2025 at 11:59 am which stated: … I called the Registry Office to get clarification on the requirements and was advised to submit an extension of time stating the reasons that I need extra time to get the documents submitted by. As stated in my previous email, I am not in my usual place of residence this week and cannot access a printer or post office for the rest of this week. I can print the documents over the weekend and send them on Monday 01 December 2025 via registered post. Alternatively, is there a QIRC office in Townsville, QLD I can deliver the documents to? (Emphasis added.) [72] The Industrial Registry responded to that email at 2:08 pm on 25 November 2025 noting that the Industrial Registry does not have the authority to grant an extension of time, and that if the Appellant sought an extension of time, he must include the request and the supporting reasons at the time of lodging the Form 89 Appeal Notice. The email also confirmed that there was only one Registry location and provided the Appellant with its address and the mailing address. [73] The Appellant responded to that email from the Industrial Registry at 3:44 pm on 25 November 2025. In that email the Appellant stated: In my appeal Form 89, I have listed an extension of time request due to waiting for a Right to Information document request. I submitted both of these documents in my initial submission. I have attached again for your ease of reference. Please advise what is required now you have Form 89 and the supporting document for the need for an extension of time which is entirely out of my control. [74] The Appellant attached to that email the Form 89 Appeal Notice he had originally lodged on Sunday, 23 November 2025 together with correspondence dated 20 November 2025 from Ms Emily Fanning, Senior Right to Information Officer which addressed the Appellant's Right to Information request. That correspondence sought the Appellant's consent to an extension of time to process his RTI application. It also informed the Appellant of his right to seek an external review of the decision with the Office of the Information Commissioner. [75] Once again, the Appeal Notice the Appellant attached to that email failed to identify the internal review decision that he was seeking to have externally reviewed, or the date of that decision. It was a reasonable inference open to be drawn, that the decision the -- 14 of 29 -- 15 Appellant was referring to, was the decision he attached from Ms Fanning. [76] This was the inference drawn by a Registry Officer from the Industrial Registry who replied to the Appellant on Wednesday, 26 November 2025 at midday. The email notes as follows: On review of your appeal, it is not clear whether the decision you have been issued is one which is appealable within the requirements of the Public Sector Act 2022. Furthermore, the decision letter states that you may seek an external review of the Office of Information Commissioner. If you are seeking to have the decision externally reviewed, you should contact the Office of the Information Commissioner … Your appeal has not yet been accepted by us for filing. The Industrial Registry is unable to provide you with advise (sic) specific to the content of your appeal, however you may wish to review the Public Sector Appeal Guide and associated information on the website (www.qirc.qld.gov.au) to determine what is an appealable decision, and seek further advice or assistance prior to filing your appeal. The FAQs page on our website lists some places where you might be able to obtain further advice. If you believe your appeal should be accepted for filing, please advise us accordingly. [77] Once again in that email, the Appellant was provided with hyperlinks to the Appeal Guide and to the Commission's website. [78] To the extent that there was any confusion about the nature of the Appellant's appeal, the decision being appealed, the timeframe within which the appeal was to be lodged, I find that the Appellant was the author of that confusion by: • his failure to complete section 5 of the Appeal Notice; • his failure to identify the internal review decision dated 10 November 2025; and • by attaching the RTI decision letter to his email sent at 3:44 pm on 25 November 2025. [79] The Appellant then replied to that email at 3:35 pm on Wednesday, 26 November 2025 as follows: The advice contained from the internal review (attached, bottom of page 5, top of page 6) of the Department of Local Government, Water and Volunteers is as follows: [The Appellant set out the information excerpted in paragraph [59] above.] I am requesting to appeal based on the lack of fair treatment in relation to the investigation outcome that I am to continue to report to Jo Stephenson. I explicitly stated in my initial complaint as an outcome was to never report to Jo Stephenson again. -- 15 of 29 -- 16 … I believe my appeal should be accepted for filing noting the extension of time request to provide the documents as the RTI office has not provided me the full investigation report. I will then send all relevant documents in hardcopy to the GPO address. [80] On 26 November 2025 at 3:24 pm, the Appellant emailed the Respondent seeking clarification and advice as to whether he should notify the Respondent or the QIRC if he wanted to request an external review. He further noted that the QIRC had not recognised his request for an external review, stating to contact the Office of the Information Commissioner.21 [81] The Industrial Registry replied at 4:06 pm on Wednesday, 26 November 2025 as follows: Thank you for your email and for providing that further clarification. It appears that we have received multiple emails from you with regards to your appeal, so it was unclear that the information had already been provided. Please be advised that your appeal and associated documents will be assessed now for filing once the hardcopy has been received. As previously advised, an appeal and associated material which is over 30 pages in length cannot be accepted for filing until a hard copy is received. Information previously provided by email is not taken into consideration. To avoid any ongoing confusion, please provide the hard copy of all your materials as soon as possible. Please do not provide your material in multiple emails. You have 21 days from the date that you received the decision you appealed against to file the material. As previously advised, the request for an extension of time cannot be considered by the Industrial Registry. That request would be considered by the Member allocated your file once all material is received and accepted for filing. (Emphasis added by underlining, bolded words already present in the original.) [82] I am satisfied that following receipt of that email correspondence from the Industrial Registry, the Appellant was left in no doubt as to the following matters: • His appeal had not been accepted for filing because it was over 30 pages in length. • Because the appeal and attachments were over 30 pages in length, he was required to file a hardcopy of those documents in the Industrial Registry. • That hard copy material should be provided as soon as possible. • The Appellant had 21 days from the date that he received the decision to file the material in the Industrial Registry. 21 Respondent's submissions (n 20), Attachment 2 – email from the Appellant dated 26 November 2025. -- 16 of 29 -- 17 • That a compliant appeal had to be filed on or before 2 December 2025. [83] On Friday, 28 November 2025 at 10:48 am, Ms Alison Lake, Senior HR Consultant responded to the Appellant and confirmed that as detailed in the internal review outcome letter, and in line with the Individual Employee Grievance Directive, if the Appellant was dissatisfied with the internal review decision, he was to lodge an appeal with the QIRC for an external review. The email went on to conclude: … Attached is the Individual Employee Grievance Directive (11/20), for your reference, which details the process and provides a link to the QIRC appeal webpage, which was also included in your Internal Review Outcome Letter. I am unable to comment on the advice you received from the QIRC and can only recommend that you contact them to seek clarity on the reason they directed to you (sic) Officer (sic) of the Information Commissioner. Please know that QIRC is an independent tribunal and if you are unable to submit a request for an external review within that timeframe, that will need to be communicated directly with the QIRC.22 [84] On 1 December 2025 the Appellant made the same enquiry of the Respondent as detailed in paragraph [80] by an email sent at 9:08 am.23 [85] By an email sent on 1 December 2025 at 2:24 pm, Ms Lake confirmed the accuracy of the information provided in the Grievance Directive and noted that if the Appellant was unable to submit his request for an external review to the QIRC within the 21-day period, he would need to address that directly with the QIRC.24 [86] The Appellant on multiple occasions was directed to the sources of information that would have confirmed exactly what information he was required to lodge with the Industrial Registry to have a compliant Appeal Notice and how to do so. [87] The Appellant was provided with hyperlinks to the Public Sector Appeals Guide and the QIRC website on more than one occasion. The Appellant was also provided with the contact details for the Industrial Registry. The Appellant was also informed on multiple occasions that an appeal had to be filed within 21 days of his receipt of the internal review decision. Finally, the Appellant was also informed on multiple occasions by the Industrial Registry, that if the material filed was in excess of 30 pages, the Appellant was required to file a hardcopy of the material with the Industrial Registry. [88] From my review of the contemporaneous communications, I am satisfied that the Appellant understood each of the matters set out in paragraph [87]. 22 Respondent's submissions (n 20), Attachment 3 23 Ibid, Attachment 4. 24 Ibid, Attachment 5. -- 17 of 29 -- 18 [89] It is a relevant consideration in my view that the Appellant is a senior public sector employee, being employed in the role of an AO8 Regional Manager. It is not in my view, an unfair or unrealistic expectation, that an experienced AO8 Manager such as the Appellant would be able to utilise the guidance provided to him to ensure that he filed a compliant appeal notice within the 21-day limitation period. [90] The Respondent relies upon the decision of Industrial Commission Pidgeon in Gray25, where the Commission provided the following observations when considering an appeal that was filed outside of the 21-day statutory timeframe: [64] Dr Gray has not provided satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing his appeal. Dr Gray has made some deliberate choices about the course of action he chose to address his concerns. Further, I am not satisfied that Dr Gray had to wait until the RTI process had concluded in order file an appeal against the decisions… … [73] I find that Dr Gray has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal such that I would be persuaded to depart from the 21-day statutory timeframe. … I further find that any prejudice to Dr Gray is not such that it serves to displace the statutory timeframe. I am also of the view that Dr Gray’s appeal, should time be extended for filing, has limited prospects of success and is unlikely to deliver him the relief he seeks…26 [91] Similarly in this matter, it was not necessary for the Appellant to wait until the outcome of his RTI request to lodge his appeal. All that was required for the Appellant to lodge a compliant Appeal Notice was for Mr Ellul to complete the Form 89 and to attach the internal review decision. This could have been done by email. [92] Had the Appellant taken care to fully read the Appeal Guide and the Form 89 he would have been aware of this. Further, the Appellant received advice from both the Industrial Registry and from the Respondent regarding how to lodge his appeal and the timeframe for doing so. [93] I find that what has caused the late lodgement of the appeal notice is the failure by the Appellant to follow the advice provided. Further, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has provided a reasonable or adequate explanation for his inability to file the Appeal Notice within time. [94] The Appellant has provided no explanation as to why he was unable to mail a hard copy of the material to the Industrial Registry before close of business on 2 December 2025. [95] In Harry v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)27 Industrial Commissioner Knight dealt with an out of time issue involving a public sector appeal. In that matter Ms Harry filed her appeal in the Industrial Registry on 28 April 2022, six days out of time. Ms Harry had in fact attempted to lodge her appeal within time on Friday, 21 April 2022, 25 Gray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 258 (Pidgeon IC). 26 Ibid [64] and [73]. 27 [2022] QIRC 293. -- 18 of 29 -- 19 however, due to the appeal notice being incomplete it was rejected by the Industrial Registry. [96] The Industrial Registry contacted Ms Harry by email on Monday, 24 April 2022 seeking clarification and for her to resubmit a completed form, however, Ms Harry did not respond to the email. A compliant Appeal Notice was not filed until 28 April 2022. Commissioner Knight in refusing an extension of time noted as follows: [31] While I accept Ms Harry made some attempts to commence her appeal within time, I consider it is incumbent on parties to ensure they file material correctly and within the timeframes prescribed by either legislation or this Commission. I would have been somewhat more sympathetic to Ms Harry's position had she responded to the Industrial Registry or taken steps to correct her omission in a timely manner. Instead, it was not until the Industrial Registry persisted in trying to assist Ms Harry that she filed the completed form. [32] I also note the onus is on Ms Harry to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay. She has not done so. Instead, it has been left to the Commission to glean some understanding of the circumstances from correspondence which was not raised by her.28 [97] I agree with Industrial Commissioner Knight that it is incumbent upon parties to ensure that they file material correctly and within time. This is particularly the case where the decision letter provides explicit advice both about where the appeal has to be filed and the time limits for doing so. [98] I am not satisfied that the Appellant has provided an adequate explanation for his failure to lodge the appeal within the 21-day period. I remain uninformed as to why it was not possible for the Appellant to lodge a hardcopy of the materials by post by close of business on 2 December 2025. [99] What then followed after 2 December 2025, were further unexplained failures by the Appellant to act with some haste to address his failure to lodge the appeal within time. [100] On Wednesday, 3 December 2025 there are again multiple email exchanges between the Appellant and the Industrial Registry that appear to go over the same matters that had been addressed in the preceding week. The Industrial Registry again confirm on 3 December 2025 at 2:22 pm that a request for an extension of time cannot be considered by the Industrial Registry. That such a request could only be considered by the Member allocated the file once the material was received and accepted for filing. [101] The email from the Registry again confirmed that the appeal could only be accepted for filing when the appeal received was complete and if it was over 30 pages, it was filed in hard copy form. 28 Ibid, [31]-[32] per Knight IC. -- 19 of 29 -- 20 [102] The Appellant then engaged in further email communications with the Respondent. On Friday, 12 December 2025 at 1:03 pm, Ms Lake emails the Appellant as follows: You mentioned in your email below that you are seeking additional documentations to be able to submit your appeal, but I would like to note that you have been provided all information to complete the submission. In accordance with the Industrial Relations Act 2016, section 5628, the requirement of the commission is that: (2) The commission must decide the appeal by reviewing the decision appealed against. (3) The purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. This is supported by the Public Sector Appeal Guide (attached and available on the QIRC, website), which states in section 3.5 that: Public sector appeals are conducted as a review of the decision which is the subject of the appeal. The Member of the Commission who decides your appeal will be deciding whether the decision made was fair and reasonable. Therefore, the purpose of an appeal through the QIRC is not to re-prosecute the original grievance but instead to review the decision made by the delegate to ensure that it was fair and reasonable. Also, the Public Sector Appeal Guide states that no supporting documents to Form 89, other than the relevant decision, will be accepted as part of the filling. If additional information is required by the Member that can and will request it at a later stage. [103] In a further email sent to the Appellant on Monday, 15 December 2025 at 4:29 pm, Ms Lake states: It is important to note that you have not been denied your appeal rights. You were provided information 13 October 2025 on your appeal rights, both internally and externally. The fact that you have exercised your right to internal review demonstrates that your appeal rights have not been impeded. As previously advised, you have been provided outcome correspondence, which is the only document you need to submit an external appeal through QIRC. I again refer to the Public Sector Appeal Guide authored by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, specifically page 16: Do not attach supporting documents to the Form 89, other than the relevant decision or copy of the relevant gazette. Supporting documents will not be accepted for filing with the Form 89. If the Member requires more information, then it will be requested later, usually via a Directions Order. [104] I am not satisfied that the Appellant has provided a valid explanation for the delay in filing his appeal between 2 December 2025 and 23 December 2025 under this ground. [105] The Appellant is again provided with advice both from the Respondent and the Industrial Registry as to what he must do but apparently sits on his hands and fails to act on it and delays for a further period of three weeks. -- 20 of 29 -- 21 Delay arose from a procedural misunderstanding concerning what needed to be filed at the outset [106] In his initial submissions, the Appellant notes that he misunderstood the requirements for filing and erroneously believed that all documents related to the complaint and investigation were necessary to support the appeal. He further contends that this misunderstanding was compounded by the silence of the outcome letter on numerous allegations raised by the Appellant, leading to uncertainty about how to properly address matters. [107] The Appellant further acknowledges an error in overlooking page 16 of the Appeals Guide. [108] For the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that the Appellant's misunderstanding arose from his failure to properly read the Appeal Guide and the Form 89 and to properly prepare his Appeal Notice. [109] In his further written submissions filed on 12 March 2026, the Appellant states that on 26 November 2025, the Appellant was advised by the Industrial Registry that the Appellant: … may seek an external review of the Office of the Information Commissioner … [110] All of the relevant contemporaneous email correspondence has been considered in the preceding section. [111] For the reasons I have set out above, and in particular noting paragraphs [81] and [82], I am satisfied that following receipt of the email from the Industrial Registry on Wednesday, 26 November 2025 sent at 4:06 pm, the Appellant could not have been left in any doubt as to what he was required to do to lodge his appeal within the 21 day limitation period. [112] I am not satisfied that any alleged confusion on the part of the Appellant provides a reasonable or valid explanation for his delay in lodging the Appeal Notice. [113] To the extent that there has been any miscommunication between the Industrial Registry staff and the Appellant, I am satisfied that this was clarified by the email from the Registry at 4:06 pm on 26 November 2025. At this time the Appellant still had six days within which he could have mailed a hard copy of the material to the Industrial Registry or simply filed the Form 89 and a copy of the internal review decision by email. He failed to do either of these things, and then further delayed for another three weeks before ultimately filing a compliant Appeal Notice. -- 21 of 29 -- 22 [114] In Wilson v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General)29, Commissioner McLennan dealt with an out-of-time public sector appeal which had been filed two days late. [115] The Appellant in that matter contacted the Registry in late December 2020 to enquire about lodging an appeal. The Appellant was advised that the timeframe to appeal would fall within the Christmas holidays and so she should file an extension to lodge an appeal as soon as possible after 4 January 2021. Commissioner McLennan noted: [24] Ms Wilson's explanation does evidence a degree of tardiness in both taking the initiative to properly educate herself on the appeal process and also in filing the appeal. Ms Wilson had substantial time from 11 December 2020 until the commencement of the Christmas break to file an appeal or an application for an extension to file an appeal. It appears that the delay largely stems from Ms Wilson's misbelief that she would be prejudiced if she was not given the opportunity to obtain legal representation before filing the appeal. That is incorrect for the reasons submitted by the Department. [25] The QIRC Registry does not provide legal advice and Ms Wilson should have taken the initiative to better understand the process upon which she was embarking. Ms Wilson stated she remained confused following the procedural guidance provided. However, that in itself is not a persuasive argument for extending time to appeal in the usual course.30 (emphasis added) [116] In my view the observations of Industrial Commissioner McLennan apply with equal force to the actions of the Appellant in this matter. I am therefore not satisfied that the Appellant has provided an explanation for the delay in filing the Appeal Notice on this ground. There were practical barriers to accessing required systems and information [117] The Appellant does not develop this ground in his initial submissions filed on 3 February 2026. It appears that what the Appellant is referring to is his allegation that he had restricted email/laptop access from 16 October 2025 onwards. [118] The Appellant has provided an email dated 16 October 202531 sent to Mr Jordan Watts, Acting Executive Director, Strategy and Service Delivery (the LAD decision-maker) which notes that his email is half back on-line, noting that he can send emails but not receive them. The balance of the correspondence deals with him requesting an extension of time to lodge an internal review of the decision. [119] I note that the email address that the Appellant was using to submit the Appeal Notices and to communicate with the Industrial Registry was a private Gmail email address. The lack of access to his work email therefore would not have prevented the Appellant (and 29 [2021] QIRC 245. 30 Ibid, [24]-[25] per McLennan IC. 31 Appellant's submissions filed on 3 February 2026, Attachment E. -- 22 of 29 -- 23 in fact did not prevent the Appellant) from lodging a compliant Appeal Notice. [120] The Appellant also provided two emails dated 10 December 2025 between the Appellant and Ms Alison Lake, Senior HR Consultant relating to his request to access his laptop. [121] In his reply submissions filed on 26 February 2026, the Appellant submits that hard copies would have been provided if all evidence could have been provided. [122] I am not satisfied that this provides an explanation for the Appellant's failure to lodge the appeal within time. [123] For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the Appellant was placed on notice that: • To have a compliant Appeal Notice, all that he was required to do was to file a complete Form 89 and attach the internal review decision; • There was a 21-day limitation period within which he had to file his Appeal Notice; • It was not necessary to attach further documentation to his Appeal Notice; • He would have the opportunity at a later time to provide additional documentation to the Commission; and • If he intended to file a document in the Industrial Registry of greater than 30 pages, it was necessary for him to file hard copies of the document in the Industrial Registry. [124] The Appellant was able to email an Appeal Notice with significant attachments to the Industrial Registry on 23 November 2025. He was apparently not prevented by the lack of access to his laptop or his email difficulties in doing so. Further, those matters would not have prevented the Appellant from filing the same bundle of documents in hard copy or simply filing a copy of the Form 89 and the internal review decision electronically. [125] As a consequence, I find that the Appellant has not provided a valid explanation for the delay in reliance on this ground. Mitigating personal circumstances contributed to the filing error [126] In support of this ground, the Appellant submits that he has been subjected to a prolonged period of bullying and harassment since February 2019, with the Respondent being aware of the matters since July 2019. The Appellant further contends that the investigation into these matters has been ongoing for over two years, contributing to significant stress and -- 23 of 29 -- 24 anxiety for the Appellant. [127] The Appellant then notes that he has been receiving psychological support since November 2019 due to the adverse effects of this environment. He contends that the Respondent's actions and decisions have exacerbated feelings of isolation and anxiety, which have impacted his ability to process and act on procedural requirements effectively. [128] The Appellant contends that he became overwhelmed upon receiving the outcome requiring reporting to the same person involved in the allegations, further impairing the Appellant's ability to fully comprehend the details of the QIRC appeal submissions requirement. [129] The Appellant has not provided any recent medical evidence to support or corroborate these submissions. What has been provided is correspondence from Jackie Coetzee, Registered Psychologist from PsylutionsGroup dated 18 May 2022. In that correspondence Ms Coetzee confirms that she has been consulting with the Appellant for two years and that he presented (at that time) with anxiety (situational) which was directly attributable to his workplace situation. [130] The correspondence further alleges that the Appellant has been experiencing unhealthy work dynamics, including frustrations due to lack of effective communications from his direct manager as well as other toxic behaviours in the workplace. Ms Coetzee opines that this has been causing (at that time) severe anxiety and random panic attacks. [131] I note the correspondence from Ms Coetzee, but even that correspondence from approximately four years ago does not suggest that the Appellant's psychological condition gave rise to an incapacity, or an inability on his behalf to comply with requirements to lodge an appeal within time. [132] The added difficulty for the Appellant is that there is no more recent medical evidence provided by him which: • Confirms that his psychological condition is ongoing and current; and • Confirms that the condition impacts his ability to comprehend and understand instructions or would inhibit his ability to lodge an appeal within time. [133] An additional difficulty for the Appellant is that there is evidence before the Commission establishing his ability to prepare detailed complaint documentation and to initially provide that material to the Industrial Registry on 23 November 2025. I find that this is inconsistent with the Appellant being impacted by his psychological condition in the manner that he suggests. -- 24 of 29 -- 25 [134] I am also not satisfied that the Appellant has provided a reasonable explanation for the delay based on this ground. Conclusion – Explanation for the delay [135] I accept the Respondent's submission that the Appellant has not provided any compelling evidence or justification for his delay in filing the Appeal Notice. I further accept the Respondent's submission that the Appellant's failure to comply with the statutory timeframe was not due to circumstances beyond his control, but rather due to a lack of due diligence in pursuing his appeal rights. [136] For all of the reasons set out above, I am not persuaded that the Appellant has provided an acceptable explanation for his delay in filing the appeal with the Industrial Registry. [137] This is a factor which strongly mitigates against the Appellant being granted an extension of time within which to file the appeal. Prejudice to the Parties [138] The Appellant submits that granting an extension of time will not cause undue prejudice to the Respondent because the Respondent has been aware of the Appellant's intention to appeal since his initial attempt on 23 November 2025. [139] There will clearly be some prejudice sustained by the Applicant if an extension is not granted, as he will be unable to proceed to have his external review application heard and determined. [140] The Respondent does not raise any issue of prejudice that it would suffer if an extension was granted to the Applicant. I note however, that the absence of prejudice to the Respondent, is not of itself, a factor which justifies an extension of time.32 [141] The prejudice that the Respondent will suffer if an extension of time is granted is having to respond to an appeal which is currently time barred. [142] This factor provides some support for an extension of time being granted, however, I afford it less weight than the factors relating to the length of the delay and the explanation for the delay. 32 Douglas v Allen and Ors [1984] FCA 77. -- 25 of 29 -- 26 Conduct of the Respondent [143] What is relevant for this factor is conduct by the Respondent that contributes to the Appellant's delay in filing his appeal. [144] In his submissions the Appellant is critical of the length of the investigation following him lodging his complaints. As noted above, the Respondent appointed an external investigator to conduct the investigation into the Appellant's complaints. [145] I am not satisfied that the length of the investigation played any role in the Appellant filing the Appeal Notice late. [146] The other conduct of the Respondent relied upon by the Appellant is the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide the Appellant with a copy of the investigation report. In the email correspondence from Ms Lake to the Appellant dated 12 December 2025,33 Ms Lake informed the Appellant that distributing an investigation report was not a standard practice given the confidential information included. Ms Lake further noted that they would need to sight the Delegate's approval of the Appellant's request before the investigation report could be provided. [147] In that same email, the Respondent also provided information to the Appellant confirming that all he had to file with the Appeal Notice was the internal review decision. [148] I am not satisfied that any alleged conduct of the Respondent has contributed to the Appellant's failure to lodge the appeal within time. [149] This factor also militates against the Appellant being granted an extension of time. Merits of the Application [150] Section 562B(2) and (3) of the IR Act provides that the appeal is decided by reviewing the decision appealed against "to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable". [151] The appeal is not conducted by way of re-hearing,34 but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker and the associated decision-making process.35 [152] The Appellant's prospects of success in the substantive appeal are a relevant consideration.36 33 Respondent's submissions (n 20), Attachment 10. 34 Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 567(1). 35 Ibid; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 562B(2). 36 Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172, [3]. -- 26 of 29 -- 27 [153] Guidance on this factor was provided by President Hall in Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland37 (emphasis added and citations removed): In addition to these factors, the prospects of an application succeeding at a substantive hearing are also relevant, so that where it appears that an applicant has no, or very limited, prospects of success, the Commission should not grant an extension of time. However, the occasions for rejecting an application for an extension of time on the ground that the applicant has poor prospects of success will be few, and generally, the merits of an application are part of the general consideration of all relevant factors. In assessing the prospects of the substantive application succeeding, in the context of deciding an application to extend time, the merits or lack thereof of the substantive application must be clear cut, and will usually flow from formation of a view that there is an obstacle that no amount of evidence can overcome. Cases where a view may be formed so adverse to the applicant as to justify the refusal to extend time on that ground, will be rare. [154] Some authorities have cautioned against any close examination of the merits of the case at a preliminary stage.38 [155] The Respondent in its submissions notes that the Appellant was provided advice regarding the outcome of his complaint and appeal rights. The Appellant requested an internal review which found that the delegate's decision, with respect to the complaints, was fair and reasonable in the circumstances and further that the actions taken in respect to the matters that were substantiated were within the range of appropriate actions. [156] The only information available to me for assessing the merits of the substantive appeal are the Form 89 – Appeal Notice, the Appellant's submissions attached to the Appeal Notice, and then the jurisdictional submissions provided by the respective parties. [157] Neither party has addressed the issue of the Appellant's prospects of success in the substantive appeal in any detail in their respective jurisdictional submissions. I simply do not have sufficient information available to me to reach a conclusion on these matters with the required certainty that is required as indicated by President Hall in Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland.39 [158] Not being able to form a view as to the appeal's prospects, I consider the merits to be a neutral consideration. Other Matters [159] In his reply submissions the Appellant contends that the Respondent's submission should be considered to be invalid because of various alleged failures to comply with the legal 37 Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland [2010] ICQ 35, [6]. 38 Herwin v Flexihire Pty Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 709, per McKenzie P; Johnson v Discovery Bay Developments Pty Ltd (rec and mgr apt) (1996) 151 QGIG 1010, per Chief Industrial Commissioner Hall (as His Honour then was). 39 Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland [2010] ICQ 35, [6]. -- 27 of 29 -- 28 requirements in the Australian and Queensland Government's Style Manual. [160] I am not satisfied that any purported non-compliance with the Style Manual provides a basis for the Respondent's submission to be rejected. Conclusion [161] For the reasons set out above I have concluded that filing the appeal 21 days out of time in the context of a 21-day limitation period is a significant and unreasonable period of delay. [162] I am not satisfied that the Appellant has provided an adequate explanation for the delay in circumstances where both the 21-day limitation period for filing the appeal, and the process for filing the appeal in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission was specifically addressed in the internal review letter. [163] Further, the Appellant was informed of, and provided hyperlinks to the Public Sector Appeals Guide and the QIRC website where further information was available to the Appellant to guide him in preparing and filing his Appeal Notice. In addition, the Appellant received appropriate information from both the Industrial Registry and the Respondent about the appeal process and the time period within which the appeal was to be filed. [164] The Appellant has failed to provide a cogent or adequate explanation for the delay in filing his Appeal Notice. [165] I have determined that there was no conduct by the Respondent which caused or contributed to Appellant filing the appeal late. To the contrary, I am satisfied that the Respondent has made every effort to ensure that the Appellant was provided with all necessary information to enable him to successfully challenge the internal review decision. The Appellant has either chosen not to read this information, or to not heed the information provided to him. [166] More significant prejudice will be suffered by the Appellant if an extension of time is not granted, and this provides some support for an extension of time being granted. [167] The Appellant has not established that he has a meritorious appeal, although I have found in the circumstances that this is a neutral consideration. [168] Having considered the matters referred to above, I have determined to not exercise my discretion to extend the period for the filing of the appeal. -- 28 of 29 -- 29 Order [169] I make the following orders: 1. The Appellant's application for an extension of time to file his appeal is dismissed. 2. The appeal in matter PSA/2025/295 is dismissed. -- 29 of 29 --