Burns v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 140

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Burns v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2026] QIRC 140 PARTIES: Burns, Christopher (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2025/177 PROCEEDING: Public Sector Appeal – Fair treatment decision DELIVERED ON: 22 April 2026 MEMBER: McLennan IC HEARD AT: On the papers ORDERS: The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appeal against a fair treatment decision – where the appellant was unsuccessful for an Expression of Interest opportunity – where there was an internal review decision – where the appeal was filed out of time – whether the appeal should be extended – consideration of explanation for delay – consideration of prejudice – consideration of prospects of success LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) Directive 04/23 Appeals -- 1 of 17 -- 2 Directive 11/20: Individual Employee Grievances CASES: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd (1995) 149 QGIG 777 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland [2010] ICQ 35 Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Susan Lloyd v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) [2015] QIRC 138 Megan Reimers v Aramaki Company (Australia) t/a Camira Child Care Centre [2002] 170 QGIG 1010 Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232 Tonia Shelley v McRoberts Agency [2009] 190 QGIG 189 Reasons for Decision [1] Mr Christopher Burns (the Appellant) is employed as a HP3 Radiographer with Queensland Health (the Respondent) in the Medical Imaging unit at Nambour General Hospital. [2] On 2 September 2025, the Appellant filed an appeal against "the recruitment outcome of the HP4 Expression of Interest (EOI) process conducted in December 2024 within the Nambour Medical Imaging Department".1 [3] On 5 September 2025, through the Industrial Registry, I emailed the parties noting that the Appeal Notice appeared to relate to the Internal Review Decision (IRD) dated 21 July 2025, rather than a "promotion decision" as originally indicated by the Appellant. 1 Appeal Notice filed in the Industrial Registry on 2 September 2025, Attachment 1. -- 2 of 17 -- 3 [4] Subsequently, I called a Mention on 16 September 2025 for the purposes of clarifying the particular decision that the Appellant sought to appeal.2 The Appellant was asked to consider whether his appeal was against the IRD and if so, he was invited to refile his Appeal Notice accordingly. I also drew the Appellant's attention to the fact that any appeal against the IRD was filed more than 21 days after the decision was given (out of time). In such circumstances, both parties would be given an opportunity to first make submissions on whether I ought to exercise my discretion to hear an appeal against the decision outside the prescribed 21-day timeframe.3 [5] At the Mention, I explained to the Appellant that he could not appeal against "a promotion decision" to make a temporary appointment on 5 December 2024. That is not permitted under Directive 04/23 Appeals (Appeals Directive), cl 10.4. Even if it were, the Appellant would be approximately nine months out of time to appeal such decision. [6] In light of that explanation, the Appellant confirmed his intention to appeal against the IRD. [7] On 17 September 2025, the Appellant then filed an Amended Appeal Notice noting that he appeals against "a fair treatment decision". The Amended Appeal Notice included the date the Appellant was given the decision, which was 21 July 2025. That means that the original Appeal Notice filed on 2 September 2025 was 22 days out of time. [8] A Directions Order was issued on 18 September 2025 directing the parties to make written submissions as to why the Appeal should be heard out of time. The usual factors informing Commission decisions as to whether to extend the time limit for an appeal were included, to focus those submissions to the relevant matters. [9] Before the question of 'whether or not the internal review decision of Mr Warren Campbell, Director Workforce Advisory, Sunshine Coast Hospital and Health Service, was fair and reasonable' may be answered, I am first required to address the superseding (and in this case determinative) jurisdictional issue of the Appeal being filed out of time. [10] For the reasons that follow, I find that: (a) The Appellant has filed this Appeal out of time; (b) The Appellant has not provided sufficient reasons to warrant an extension of time; (c) The circumstances do not support granting an extension of time to hear the Appeal. 2 Mention Transcript, 16 September 2025. 3 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act'), s 564. -- 3 of 17 -- 4 Jurisdiction Timeframe to appeal [11] Section 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (IR Act) requires that an appeal be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given. That is the relevant inquiry with respect to timeframes. [12] I am empowered by the IR Act to extend the time for giving an appeal notice.4 How long ‘out of time’ was the Appeal filed? [13] The Appellant seeks to appeal against a "fair treatment decision", being the IRD. [14] The IRD was given to the Appellant on 21 July 2025. [15] The deadline for the Appellant to file an Appeal was therefore 11 August 2025. [16] The Appellant attempted to file his Appeal Notice by email on 26 August 2025, at 10:01 pm. However, the Industrial Registry was unable to accept it because it exceeded the prescribed page limit for electronic filing and so a hard copy was required. That meant that the Appeal Notice was filed with the Industrial Registry on 2 September 2025 which was 22 days out of time.5 [17] The Appellant's submissions refer to 26 August 2025 as the date the Appeal Notice was filed, therefore asserting that the Appeal Notice was only 15 days out of time.6 Even if the date the Appellant attempted filing could be taken as the "the date" for the purposes of establishing the length of delay, given the time the email was sent to the Industrial Registry, it would have been 27 August 2025. The most generous view of the timeframes is that the Appellant first attempted to file the Appeal Notice 16 days out of time. To be clear though, the date the Appeal Notice was filed is 2 September 2025. Should time for filing be extended? [18] The IR Act does not provide any criteria against which I am to determine whether or not to extend time. The question of whether to extend the time for filing an appeal is fundamentally an exercise of discretion. Such an exercise must be undertaken judicially and according to the rules of reason and justice, not arbitrarily or capriciously or according to private opinion.7 4 Ibid, s 564(2). 5 Appeal Notice (n 1). 6 Appellant's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 24 September 2026, [1]. 7 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, [2]. -- 4 of 17 -- 5 [19] The Appellant bears the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of an extension of time to file the Appeal Notice.8 In that regard, I note the reasoning of McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor:9 A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature's judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period, notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated. Against this background, I do not see any warrant for treating provisions that provide for an extension of time for commencing an action as having a standing equal to or greater than those provisions that enact limitation periods. A limitation provision is the general rule; an extension provision is the exception to it. [20] In Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd,10 Hall P set out the following considerations: (a) the length of the delay; (b) the explanation for the delay; (c) the prejudice to the Appellant if the extension of time is not granted; (d) the prejudice to the Respondent if the extension of time is granted; and (e) any relevant conduct of the Respondent. [21] Some additional considerations were provided by Linnane VP in Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited.11 These considerations were usefully summarised by Thompson IC in Lloyd v Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services12 and are paraphrased below: (a) the 21-day time limit must be respected and should not easily be dispensed with; and (b) the appellant's prospects of success at a substantive hearing are always a relevant matter where it appears an appellant has no, or very limited, prospects of success. In that instance, the Commission would not normally grant an extension of time. [22] Those cases were considering s 74(2)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). However, they were answering substantively the same question as in this case, that is, what should inform the exercise of my discretion in extending the time to bring proceedings? As such, I find their assessment of the relevant factors to be highly persuasive in informing the exercise of my discretion. 8 Megan Reimers v Aramaki Company (Australia) t/a Camira Child Care Centre [2002] 170 QGIG 1010; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 547. 9 (1996) 186 CLR 541, 553. 10 (1995) 149 QGIG 777. 11 (1999) 163 QGIG 20; Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232. 12 [2013] QIRC 129. -- 5 of 17 -- 6 [23] Additionally, my discretion is informed by the purpose of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (PS Act), including promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of government entities.13 In that regard, I am guided by the commentary of French CJ in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University: 14 Also to be considered is the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a court is seen to accede to applications (seeking the exercise of a discretion) made without adequate explanation or justification. [24] I will now consider the circumstances in this matter, against the abovementioned factors, to determine whether I should exercise my discretion to hear this Appeal out of time. Length of delay [25] As detailed in paragraph [16], the Appellant attempted to file the Appeal Notice (and attachments, exceeding the 30-page limit for electronic filing) via email to the Industrial Registry on 26 August 2025, at 10:01 pm. If the Appellant were able to file the Appeal Notice electronically in such circumstances, it would not have been stamped as filed until the following day, 27 August 2025. Even if it were possible to take the most generous view of the length of delay, the Appellant was still 16 days out of time. [26] The Appellant then proceeded to file a hard copy of the Appeal Notice and attachments, as instructed by the Industrial Registry. I consider the Appeal Notice was then officially ‘filed’ on 2 September 2025, 22 days out of time. [27] Finally, the Amended Appeal Notice, which was complete, and included the required information, was filed 37 days out of time. [28] The 21-day timeframe has been determined by the legislature to be the appropriate period for a person to commence an appeal. That is clearly stated in both the IR Act15 and Directive 04/23 Appeals (Appeals Directive), cl 15.1. [29] The character of the delay, be it excessive, reasonable or otherwise, takes its colour from the surrounding circumstances.16 It is true that in some cases delays of several weeks have been considered to be not excessive.17 However, in such cases the delay is usually accompanied by a substantial explanation such as natural disasters, extraordinary personal circumstances such as a major health issue, or the like. That was not the case here. 13 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act'), s 3. 14 (2009) 239 CLR 175, [30]. 15 IR Act (n 3), s 564. 16 Tonia Shelley v McRoberts Agency [2009] 190 QGIG 189. 17 See, eg, Susan Lloyd v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services) [2015] QIRC 138. -- 6 of 17 -- 7 [30] In conjunction with the reasons that follow, I find that a delay of 22 days for the appeal to be filed is significant and unreasonable in these circumstances. Explanation for the delay [31] The Appellant's explanation was that the Appeal Notice was filed out of time due to ongoing internal processes and circumstances, including that: (a) He was "actively seeking clarification and resolution internally during this period. After Mr Campbell's initial response, I continued to engage with him until his final correspondence on 12 August. It was reasonable for me to await that outcome before escalating the matter externally".18 (b) He "was working full-time shift work…with only a single day off in that period."19 (c) He had no "internal support available to me …This left me with no option but to rely on my own efforts, assisted only by occasional calls to the Industrial Registry for procedural guidance".20 (d) The "short delay was unavoidable and arose from a good faith attempt to both exhaust internal processes and carefully prepare my application".21 [32] The Appellant went on to say in his submissions that: …My conduct has at all times been diligent and reasonable. I did not sit idly by after the decision of 21 July. Instead, I actively sought clarification and pressed Mr Campbell to give further consideration to my concerns, consistent with my obligation to exhaust internal grievance procedures. It became clear on 12 August that no further investigation or due diligence would be undertaken. At that point, I prepared my appeal without delay. Far from seeking to prolong matters, I acted in good faith to ensure that all reasonable internal avenues had been pursued before escalating to the Commission… [33] The Appellant then provided the same reasoning as to why he submitted the appeal out of time in his submissions filed in reply:22 … The delay in lodging my appeal arose directly from my continued efforts to obtain clarification from Mr Warren Campbell following his Stage 2 grievance response. His decision of 21 July 2025 did not address my key concerns regarding procedural fairness or potential bias, and appeared to rely solely on assurances from the panel members without conducting any substantive investigation. My subsequent correspondence on 28 July and 5 August sought to confirm whether he had properly reviewed the process or merely accepted the panel’s version of events. When his final response of 12 August confirmed that no further inquiry would be undertaken, I promptly prepared and lodged my Form 89 on 26 August. 18 Appellant's submissions (n 6), [2]. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Appellant's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 7 October 2025. -- 7 of 17 -- 8 The short delay therefore did not result from inaction or neglect, but from my good-faith efforts to ensure the internal grievance process had been properly exhausted before escalating to the Commission. This, I believe, is consistent with the intent of the Public Sector Commission’s employee complaints framework, which encourages internal resolution prior to external appeal. My conduct throughout has been diligent and reasonable. I am a full-time clinical radiographer working shift rotations, and during this period I had limited non-working days. Without legal representation, I took reasonable steps to understand the appropriate procedures and relied on advice from both Queensland Health and the Commission. … [34] The Appellant's submissions essentially explain the delay arose from: his good faith attempts to first exhaust internal processes; time needed to carefully prepare his appeal application; full-time shift work; and lack of support given he was "without legal representation", and "relied on advice from both Queensland Health and the Commission" on "appropriate procedures" via the Industrial Registry.23 [35] With respect to the Appellant’s lack of support and need to rely on his own efforts in filing the appeal, I am not persuaded by that argument. The Commission is a lay tribunal. Self-represented parties appear regularly at the Commission and in fact, for public sector appeals, privately engaged lawyers are expressly not permitted.24 An employee may be assisted by a registered organisation,25 though that is entirely a matter for them. There is the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission Public Sector Appeal Guide (QIRC Appeal guide) that is publicly available on the QIRC website to provide procedural guidance to public sector employees, regarding their rights and obligations with respect to filing such appeals. A link to the QIRC Appeal guide was embedded in the Individual Employee Grievances Directive (IEG), cl 9.3(c), as attached to the IRD given on 21 July 2025. Further, the Appellant has referred to contact with the Industrial Registry for procedural information. Thus, I cannot accept the argument that the Appellant’s delay in filing the appeal was a result of a lack of support. [36] With respect to the Appellant’s full-time employment, including work on shift rotations, those are not unique or unusual circumstances that persuade me to dispense with the legislative time limits to appeal. Any number of public sector employees including nurses, paramedics, police, health practitioners, and the like, may face similar rostering conditions. The legislature has not determined that different time limits for appeal apply to employees who are either full time, shift workers, or both. [37] With respect to the delay being due to the Appellant’s need to carefully prepare the appeal notice, I have earlier noted that there were problems with the completion of the Appeal Notice filed in hard copy on 2 September 2025. As earlier outlined, I held a Mention to explain some problems to the Appellant and provide an opportunity to file an Amended Appeal Notice. I note that the Appellant elected to attach a three-page submission to the Appeal Notice, explaining the background to the matter, grounds of appeal, and outcome 23 Ibid. 24 IR Act (n 3), s 530A. 25 Ibid, s 530A(4). -- 8 of 17 -- 9 sought. It was the Appellant’s choice to provide that level of detail at time of filing the Appeal Notice, but he need not have done so. It was open to the Appellant to provide further details after directions were issued to hear the parties on the appeal once filed. The process for hearing public sector appeals is explained in the QIRC Appeal guide link, embedded in Attachment 1 to the IRD. [38] With respect to the Appellant’s good faith attempts to first exhaust internal processes, that was achieved at the point Mr Campbell issued the Stage 2, Internal Review Decision. Mr Campbell was clear that the IRD comprised ‘the decision’ on the matter, as he wrote:26 Decision I support the decision made by Mr Edmond’s in relation to the stage 1 grievance outcome and determine the decision-making process as fair and reasonable in the circumstances… … [39] Further, Mr Campbell went on to outline that the Appellant had other avenues for external appeal if he remained dissatisfied with the IRD (emphasis added):27 External appeal If you are dissatisfied with my decision, you may, if eligible, refer your grievance to an appropriate external body for review / appeal. Which appropriate external body will depend on the nature of your grievance, however could include the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, Queensland Ombudsman or Queensland Human Rights Commission. I have attached section 9.3 of the Directive for further detail. If you are considering referring your grievance to an external body, you should contact the relevant external body for specific information about their processes and any timeframes that may apply. [40] For those reasons, it ought to have been clear to the Appellant that the decision had been made by Mr Campbell, the Stage 2 internal review was concluded, and so any further entreaties at that level would be futile. [41] With respect to the delay in filing being characterised as a "short delay", I have earlier noted that the time between the legislative deadline for filing and the date the Appeal Notice was filed by the Industrial Registry was 22 days. Even if the most generous view of the matter could be taken, the Appellant attempted to file the Appeal Notice via email late on 26 August 2025. That means it would not have been stamped as filed until the following day, 27 August 2025, such that the Appellant would still be 16 days out of time. Neither 22 days, or indeed 16 days, out of time can be reasonably considered to be a "short delay" in the particular circumstances of this case, as earlier explained at [29]. 26 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 2. 27 Ibid, pg 3. -- 9 of 17 -- 10 [42] On the Appellant’s own submission, he was engaged in attempts to persuade Mr Campbell to revise his view and resolve the matter internally, before filing his appeal. The Appellant submitted that Mr Campbell’s "…final response of 12 August confirmed that no further inquiry would be undertaken…". As the Appellant first attempted to file the appeal late on 26 August 2025, that means a period of two weeks elapsed between realising Mr Campbell’s decision was final and filing the Appeal Notice. In my view, that is not a reasonable explanation for the significant delay. [43] For those reasons, the Appellant’s explanation for the delay is most unpersuasive. Prejudice to the Appellant [44] The Appellant will suffer some prejudice should the Appeal be dismissed for filing out of time. The obvious prejudice is that he would lose the opportunity for an independent review of the IRD. [45] I have concluded that the Appellant has limited prospects of success and therefore while I accept there is some prejudice to the Appellant, I do not consider that to be significant. Prejudice to the Respondent [46] It is important to note that delay itself is considered to give rise to a general presumption of prejudice to the Respondent. [47] A delay in filing an appeal is a delay in the overall process. This prejudice is compounded by my conclusion that the Appeal has low prospects of success. [48] For those reasons, I find that the Respondent would suffer prejudice should I decide to exercise my discretion to hear the Appeal out of time. Though similarly to the prejudice to the Appellant above, I do not consider that to be significant. Conduct of the Respondent [49] The IEG Directive, cl 9.2(h)(iv) mandates that the written IRD (emphasis added) "must…outline any avenues of external review that may be available to the employee, including any relevant timeframes." In my view, the IRD did not satisfy that requirement. [50] Firstly, attached to the IRD was cl 9.3 Stage 3 – External review, IEG Directive. That provision begins: (a) If the employee who made the original individual employee grievance is dissatisfied with a decision made following internal review, the employee may seek an external review. Depending on the issues raised in the grievance, the avenues for external review may include: … -- 10 of 17 -- 11 [51] Clause 9.3 proceeds to list seven possible avenues for external review, including complaint or appeal to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. [52] On the face of it, that would appear to comply with the IEG Directive requirement, however it does not. The problem with simply attaching cl 9.3 to the IRD is that it has clearly been some time since the IEG Directive was reviewed, with an effective date of 25 September 2020. The sections of the PS Act cited at cl 9.3(a)(i) are outdated references to an earlier iteration of the PS Act. It does not inform an employee where information regarding a fair treatment decision can be located in the current legislation. It does not assist an employee to adequately understand the avenues for external review. [53] Secondly, cl 9.3 concludes that: (c) Employees seeking more information about the procedures to be followed when making a public service appeal should refer to the QIRC appeals guide. [54] That extract included an embedded link to the QIRC Appeal guide. At page 14 of the guide, the 21-day timeframe for filing an appeal may be discovered. [55] Importantly then, neither the IRD or attached cl 9.3 contain information about the required timeframes. Further, cl 9.3 is of limited value to inform an employee of avenues of external review, given the outdated references contained therein. [56] For those reasons, the Respondent did not satisfy the mandatory requirement to advise the Appellant of the "relevant timeframes" for the various external review avenues, pursuant to the IEG Directive, cl 9.2(h)(iv). [57] I find that the Respondent contributed to the Appellant’s delay in filing the appeal. Prospects of success [58] An Appellant's prospects of success at a substantive hearing is a relevant consideration.28 I note the guidance on this factor provided by President Hall in Bruce Anthony Piggott v State of Queensland (emphasis added, citations removed): 29 In addition to these factors, the prospects of an application succeeding at a substantive hearing are also relevant, so that where it appears that an applicant has no, or very limited, prospects of success, the Commission should not grant an extension of time. However, the occasions for rejecting an application for an extension of time on the ground that the applicant has poor prospects of success will be few, and generally, the merits of an application are part of the general consideration of all relevant factors. In assessing the prospects of the substantive application succeeding, in the context of deciding an application to extend time, the merits or lack thereof of the substantive application must be clear cut, and will usually flow from formation of a view that there is an obstacle that no amount of evidence can overcome. Cases where a view may be formed so adverse to the applicant as to justify the refusal to extend time on that ground, will be rare. 28 Geoffrey John Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG 20; Roger Carter Paterson v Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited (1998) 159 QGIG 232. 29 [2010] ICQ 35, [6]. -- 11 of 17 -- 12 [59] Section 562B of the IR Act provides that "The commission must decide the appeal by reviewing the decision appealed against" to determine "whether the decision…was fair and reasonable". For an appeal of this type (a "fair treatment appeal"), the commission decides the appeal "having regard to the evidence available to the decision maker when the decision was made." [60] The Respondent submitted that the Appellant has limited prospects of success because:30 The EOI process was conducted in accordance with the HR Policy B1 Recruitment and selection, which incorporates safeguards against bias, including the requirement for an external party to be on the selection panel. This measure is specifically intended to provide impartiality and mitigate any concerns regarding conflict of interest, which is the primary basis of the Appellant’s concerns. The Respondent confirms that both the Stage 1 and Stage 2 Grievance processes were conducted in accordance with HR Policy E12 Individual employee grievances and the Grievance Directive. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any further review would produce a materially different outcome. [61] The Appellant submitted he has "reasonable prospects of success" because: 31 …the Stage 2 grievance outcome…was not fair or reasonable. My grievance raised specific and detailed concerns about bias and conflicts of interest in the HP4 recruitment process. However, rather than conducting a proper investigation into those concerns, Mr Campbell appears to have limited his inquiry to asking the panel members whether they believed bias had occurred. … …A fair and reasonable investigation requires…testing those concerns against objective evidence, including documented procedures, comparative candidate experience, scoring practices, and potential conflicts of interest… … …By failing to investigate properly, Mr Campbell denied me a genuine opportunity to have my concerns heard and resolved… [62] With respect to the Appellant’s prospects of success on the substantive matter of 'whether or not the internal review decision of Mr Campbell was fair and reasonable', several elements require consideration. Is this type of complaint able to be addressed under the IEG Directive? [63] The IRD noted that the Appellant had "raised concerns in relation to the fairness of a recent EOI process conducted for an HP4 backfill opportunity…"32 Similarly, in the Appeal Notice, the Appellant stated that he seeks to "appeal the recruitment outcome of 30 Respondent’s submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 1 October 2025, [19]-[20]. 31 Appellant’s submissions (n 6), [6]. 32 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 1. -- 12 of 17 -- 13 the HP4 Expression of Interest (EOI) process conducted in December 2024 within the Nambour Medical Imaging Department."33 [64] The Respondent submitted that: 34 In December 2024, the Health Service conducted an Expression of Interest (EOI) process for a temporary appointment to a Senior Radiographer (HP4) position, in accordance with HR Policy B1 Recruitment and selection. The Appellant was unsuccessful in this process and lodged a Stage 1 Grievance pursuant to Directive 11/20 Individual Employee Grievances…challenging the fairness and transparency of the EOI process. [65] Relevantly, the IEG Directive, cl 6 sets out matters that cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance. Clause 6.1(c) provides that: The following decisions, conduct or behaviour cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance under this directive: ... a decision relating to the recruitment or selection of a public service employee … [66] Out of an abundance of fairness and caution, it appears to me that the Respondent has nonetheless entertained the Appellant’s complaint and proceeded to address it under the IEG Directive. However, as the decision in question pertained to the recruitment or selection of a public service employee, I do not believe it was required to do so. Is the IRD able to be appealed as a fair treatment decision? [67] Section 129 of the PS Act defines a fair treatment decision to mean "a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable." A person’s right of appeal against some decisions, and not others, is set out at sections 130 to 132 of the PS Act. [68] Section 132(4)(e) of the PS Act says an employee can file a fair treatment appeal regarding a decision about the outcome of a grievance. However, as I have explained above, I do not believe the Appellant had standing to pursue a grievance under the IEG Directive, even though the Respondent entertained it as such. [69] Most relevantly though, s 132(4)(c) of the PS Act further provides that: A person can not appeal against a fair treatment decision – … 33 Appeal Notice (n 1), Attachment 1. 34 Respondent’s submissions (n 30), [3]. -- 13 of 17 -- 14 relating to the recruitment or selection of a public sector employee… … [70] That exclusion is also restated in the Appeals Directive at cl 9.6. [71] As I have considered at [63]-[66] above, the nature of the Appellant’s complaint centred on matters "relating to the recruitment or selection of a public sector employee."35 In my view, the Appellant is then prevented from bringing this matter as a fair treatment appeal. Compliance with Directive and Policy [72] The relevant provisions are set out in IEG Directive and the HR Policy E12 Individual Grievances (QH-POL-140). [73] The IRD is compliant with the IEG Directive requirements in the following areas: (a) The IRD noted the 14-day timeframe36 for making the decision was extended by mutual agreement,37 given the response fell within a period of the Appellant’s planned leave. (b) The IRD is the "written decision"38 that is required to be provided to the Appellant. (c) The IRD sets out the "action taken to review the decision made through local action".39 That is, Mr Campbell considered "all the information available to me" in conducting a "review on the papers."40 That included Mr Campbell’s review of the: Appellant’s Stage 1 – Grievance; Stage 1 - Local action outcome; Appellant’s request for an internal review; HR Policy E12 IEG; IEG Directive; HP4 backfill EOI advertisement; a witness account obtained from the external panel member.41 (d) The IRD explained the reasons why Mr Campbell decided to confirm the Stage 1 – Local action outcome.42 That was because he considered that: the decision- making process was fair and reasonable; it addressed each of the Appellant’s four expressed concerns (perception of bias and retaliation; inconsistent use of selection criteria; influence of senior staff on panel; impact on workplace culture and morale) with the EOI process for HP4 backfill opportunity; and "provided contextual firsthand information to assist understanding in how the process was undertaken."43 35 PS Act (n 13), s 132(4)(c). 36 Directive 11/20 Individual Employee Grievances ('IEG Directive'), cl 9.2(f). 37 Ibid, cl 9.2(f)(i). 38 Ibid, cl 9.2(h). 39 Ibid, cl 9.2(h)(i). 40 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 1, 2. 41 Ibid, pg 2. 42 IEG Directive (n 36), cl 9.2(h)(ii). 43 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 2. -- 14 of 17 -- 15 (e) Mr Campbell went on to explain that he himself had verified "the accuracy of firsthand information provided within the stage 1 grievance outcome" with the external panel member and that:44 Their account validated [the Decision-Maker’s] comments in the stage 1 outcome letter; discounted the presence of retaliation or influence by Mr Patrick Eastgate; and confirmed the objectivity of the selection criteria and overall EOI process.45 (f) The IRD did state that Mr Campbell would take no further action,46 in light of his conclusion to support the Stage 1 – Local action outcome "that the Health Service has acted in accordance with our HR policies and industrial obligations."47 [74] The IRD is compliant with HR Policy E12 Individual Grievances (QH-POL-140) because the additional matter at cl 5 Treatment of employees who make grievances provides that: "Employees should be supported during the grievance process, including…[being] provided with the name and contact information of a contact person to assist with answering any questions or concerns" and "offered access to the relevant Employee Assistance Program". I can see those requirements are fulfilled at page 3 of the correspondence.48 [75] As earlier explained, I have found that the IRD is not compliant with the IEG Directive requirements with respect to: (a) failure to outline "any avenues of external review…including any relevant timeframes";49 and (b) the exclusion of certain types of complaints, including "a decision relating to the recruitment or selection of a public service employee".50 [76] The Respondent has complied with the requirements of both the Directive and Policy, with the rather significant exceptions of failure to pay proper attention to outlining the avenues of external review and relevant timeframes; and accepting the complaint under the IEG Directive in the first place.51 44 IEG Directive (n 36), cl 9.2(h)(ii). 45 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 2. 46 IEG Directive (n 36), cl 9.2(h). 47 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 2. 48 Ibid, pg 3. 49 IEG Directive (n 36), cl 9.2(h)(iv). 50 Ibid, 6.1(c). 51 Ibid, cl 9.2(h)(iv), cl 6.1(c). -- 15 of 17 -- 16 Re-investigation of concerns raised [77] The main thrust of the Appellant’s submission appears that Mr Campbell did not conduct "a proper investigation into those concerns".52 [78] As I held in Davey,53 the Internal Review task is "to 'review the decision' as 'an internal review of a process and decision', and not 're-investigate' his complaint in entirety".54 In my view, the Respondent in Davey well expressed the purpose of an internal review is: …not to conduct a new complaint process but rather to assess whether the original complaint process was conducted in a fair and reasonable manner. Further, an internal review should identify any areas of deficiency in the original complaint process and recommend remedial action to resolve those deficiencies if appropriate.55 [79] Further, as Mr Campbell explained in this case: …The purpose of an internal review is to determine whether the decision made through local action was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. An internal review is not conducted by way of re- hearing but is a review "on the papers". This involves a review of the decision, arrived at by the delegate, and the associated decision-making process.56 [80] I agree those are the accepted parameters of the conduct of such Internal Review. I appreciate the Appellant wants a fresh investigation into his various concerns with the HP4 EOI process undertaken, though that will not happen. Remedies sought [81] The other relevant matter is the outcome sought by the Appellant in filing this appeal. The Appellant asks that the Commission set aside the appointment arising from the December 2024 HP4 EOI process; order a fresh selection process for the HP4 role; subject the future recruitment process to independent oversight and safeguards, including training and compliance mechanisms; recognise systemic risk and recommend reforms to support "the principles of merit, transparency and fairness in public sector employment."57 The Appellant did subsequently file an Amended Appeal Notice indicating that the appeal was against a fair treatment decision (IRD) dated 21 July 2025, though that did not update the outcome sought. In the Mention held on 16 September 2025, I explained to the Appellant that "none of those remedies and relief are possible"58 (for an appeal against the IRD) and "the only question the Commission would answer is whether or not the Delegate’s decision was fair and reasonable",59 so if "what an appellant 52 Appellant’s submissions (n 6), [6]. 53 Davey v State of Queensland (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) [2025] QIRC 168. 54 Ibid, 190. 55 Ibid, 46. 56 Correspondence from Mr Warren Campbell to Mr Christopher Burns dated 21 July 2025 (IRD), pg 1. 57 Appeal Notice (n 1), Attachment 1, pg 3. 58 Mention Transcript, 16 September 2025, T 1-4, line 24. 59 Ibid, T 1-4, lines 31-32. -- 16 of 17 -- 17 is hoping to get by virtue of filing the appeal is not available to them through that pathway, then it may be considered a fruitless exercise…"60 [82] For those reasons, I find that the Appellant has limited prospects of success if I were to exercise discretion to extend the time for filing, in order to hear the appeal. Conclusion [83] The Appellant filed his Appeal Notice 22 days out of time and seeks that I exercise my discretion to extend the time for filing that appeal.61 [84] There is a suite of relevant considerations in exercising such a discretion. Foremost, I should be satisfied that the Appellant had a reasonable ground for extending the time. [85] The Appellant has not provided an adequate explanation for the delay. While that is certainly unfortunate, the delay did not result from the combination of factors beyond his control. There is no acceptable reason to depart from the legislatively prescribed timeframe of 21 days in this case. [86] The Appellant will suffer some prejudice resulting from my decision to decline to hear the Appeal out of time. He will not receive an independent review of the decision on this occasion. However, I do not consider that prejudice to be overwhelming, especially as the various outcomes he seeks are not available to him. [87] If I proceeded to hear the Appeal out of time, the prejudice to be suffered by the Respondent is also relevant, though not substantial. [88] While I have found that the conduct of the Respondent contributed to the delay, I have weighed that against the Appellant’s very limited prospects of success. [89] For the reasons above, I find that the Appeal was filed out of time, and there is no reasonable ground to extend the time for filing. [90] I order accordingly: The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 60 Ibid, T 1-5, lines 1-3. 61 IR Act (n 3), s 564(2). -- 17 of 17 --