Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 8) [2026] QIRC 88

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 8) [2026] QIRC 088 PARTIES: Chen, Victor (Applicant) v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (Respondent) CASE NO: GP/2020/27 & TD/2021/20 PROCEEDING: Application in existing proceedings DELIVERED ON: 26 March 2026 HEARD AT: On the papers DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: Respondent's submissions (13 March 2026) Applicant's submissions in reply (19 March 2026) MEMBER: Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon HEARD AT: On the papers ORDER: 1. Dr Chen's application for my recusal is dismissed. 2. The question of costs arising from this application is reserved until the determination of GP/2020/27 and TD/2021/20. CATCHWORDS: COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS – INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONERS – DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS – where the Applicant files an application for recusal – where the Applicant claims allegations of actual bias – where the respondent -- 1 of 13 -- 2 objects to the application – where the allegations of actual bias cannot be made out – where the grounds for recusal cannot be made out – where the application is dismissed – where the question of costs is reserved until the determination of GP/2020/27 and TD/2021/20 LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 424, 531(3), 545(2)(a)(ii) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 90, 94, sch 4 CASES: Antoun v The Queen (2006) 224 ALR 61 Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278 Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 6) [2026] QIRC 45 Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 7) [2026] QIRC 46 Chen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 249 Dunstan v Orr [2022] FCA 1006 Gilbert v Metro North [2021] QIRC 255 Jia v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 87 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 -- 2 of 13 -- 3 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] On 20 February 2026 I released Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 6) [2026] QIRC 45 ('Chen No. 6') in which I dealt with Dr Chen's application to amend his General Protections application. [2] On 4 March 2026, Dr Chen filed a Form 4 – Application in Existing Proceedings ('the Recusal Application') seeking that I recuse myself from hearing his substantive matters on the basis that I have demonstrated 'actual material bias'. [3] Dr Chen's claim of actual bias relates specifically to two aspects of Chen No. 6. [4] The Respondent filed submissions in reply to Dr Chen's Recusal Application on 13 March 2026. Dr Chen filed a reply to those submissions on 19 March 2026. Neither party sought an oral hearing. Relevant Legislation and Legal Principles [5] Section 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') confers broad powers on the Commission to make orders it considers appropriate. Actual Bias [6] A determination of actual bias in the form of prejudgment requires an assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question, ordinarily on the basis of what the judge had said and done.1 The party asserting actual bias bears the onus of demonstrating its existence and it is a heavy onus.2 [7] In Dunstan v Orr,3 his Honour Wigney J set out the principles concerning actual bias in the following terms: 63 Actual bias "exists where the decision-maker has prejudged the case against the applicant, or acted with such partisanship or hostility as to show that the decision-maker had a mind made up against the applicant and was not open to persuasion in favour of the applicant". The question is not whether a decision- maker's mind is blank, or whether there is an "absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion"; rather, the "state of mind described as bias in the form of prejudgment is one so committed to a 1 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427. 2 Jia v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 87, 106 (French J). 3 [2022] FCA 1006 ('Dunstan'). -- 3 of 13 -- 4 conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented". 64 Actual bias is usually difficult to prove. It is also an allegation that "is not to be made lightly". It requires a subjective assessment of the state of mind of the judge in question. A "finding of bias is a grave matter, different in kind from a finding of mere error, or even wrong-headedness, whether in law, logic, or approach". Courts have rarely found actual bias to exist, principally because "a reasonable apprehension of bias suffices to disqualify a judicial officer" and where "actual bias exists, reasonable apprehension of bias will also exist and, consequently, courts concerned with supervising the application of the requirements of natural justice have not had to go so far as to find actual bias".4 First ground - the disciplinary finding against Dr Chen Dr Chen's submissions5 [8] The first matter Dr Chen raises relates to paragraph [45] of Chen No. 6 which says: Dr Chen was clearly aware of the disciplinary matter at all relevant times, as he was the subject of it. Dr Chen appealed the disciplinary decision and while he was partially successful, there remains a disciplinary finding against him. Dr Chen's reliance on the decision of Industrial Commissioner Knight to support an argument that the disciplinary process was doomed to fail is misguided and, in fact, a misrepresentation of that decision's findings. [9] Dr Chen appears to be of the understanding that the 'substantiation of a disciplinary finding is not finality'.6 As no disciplinary penalty has been decided, Dr Chen submits that in Chen No. 6 I did not have jurisdiction to say 'there remains a disciplinary finding against him'. Dr Chen submits that I have 'pre-judged prior to necessary due processes involving steps to find whether allegations substantiated ('disciplinary finding') and whether a lawful penalty can be decided ('disciplinary action')'. [10] Dr Chen says that at [47] of Chen No. 6, I 'erroneously recorded' that the 'fresh show cause process Industrial Commissioner Knight ordered was only with regard to the disciplinary penalty to be applied to Dr Chen. It was not with regard to undertaking further investigations regarding the allegations'. [11] Dr Chen notes that the Commission has previously found that where a disciplinary investigation is undertaken in good faith and for a proper purpose, it does not constitute employer adverse action.7 On that basis, and considering the costs provision of the 4 Ibid [63]–[64] (citations omitted). 5 When I refer to Dr Chen's submissions, I am referring to: the Schedule to Dr Chen's Form 4 – Application in Existing Proceedings filed in the Industrial Registry on 4 March 2026 and the Applicant's Outline of Reply Submissions As To Actual Bias filed in the Industrial Registry on 19 March 2026. 6 Schedule to Dr Chen's Form 4 – Application in Existing Proceedings filed in the Industrial Registry on 4 March 2026 [4]. 7 Gilbert v Metro North [2021] QIRC 255. -- 4 of 13 -- 5 IR Act,8 Dr Chen says that the only 'tenable application filing' with 'reasonable prospects of success' is to allege that GCHHS's disciplinary actions were taken in 'bad faith' and 'sham'. Dr Chen says it remains inexplicable to him that his previous lawyers did not make 'the only reasonably arguable filing with any finite reasonable prospects of success' and file an application alleging the disciplinary action was taken in bad faith and was a sham. In his footnotes on this point, Dr Chen again refers to Barrister Y. For reasons given in Chen No. 6 and Chen No. 7,9 I will not address that matter. [12] Dr Chen says that he has filed an Outline of Submissions in the substantive matter in which he argues that the disciplinary action was taken in 'bad faith' and sham. In Chen No. 6, I struck out a number of Dr Chen's amendments to his Application and Further Yet Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions. This included his amendment alleging that the disciplinary action was an adverse action taken against him. To that extent, some of the matters Dr Chen addresses in his submissions may not be relevant to the matters to be determined by the Commission at hearing. That is a matter for the substantive hearing, and I will consider any arguments the parties have to make on the relevance of various submissions at that point. [13] Dr Chen says:10 Where the honourable Commissioner has manifested bias – decided unlawfully at this interlocutory stage to have decided upon this material aspect of the Applicant's matter – unlawfully, not impartially, and adverse to the interests of the Applicant – whether that failure was deliberate or not – the appropriate and reasonable application is now filed that the honourable Commissioner must recuse where there is cogent conclusive proof of real and material actual bias recording unlawful pre-judgment "there remains a disciplinary finding against him" and also the other decisions recorded by the honourable Commissioner in the Decision at paras 45 to 48. Respondent's submissions [14] The Respondent sets out its understanding of Dr Chen's position that my summary of Knight IC's decision amounts to a pre-judgment of his conduct insofar as it relates to the interaction with the nurse, which I could not make because there could be no 'disciplinary finding' against him absent a determination of a 'lawful penalty'.11 [15] In response to Dr Chen's submissions on this point, the Respondent submits that I did not pre-judge anything. Relevantly, the Respondent says:12 … the Commissioner set out an entirely apt summary of Knight IC' s findings in that decision (which were not appealed by Dr Chen). Further, under the PS Act a 'disciplinary ground' meant 'a ground for disciplining a public service officer under section 187' and a 'disciplinary finding' was defined 8 s 545(2)(a)(ii) of the IR Act. 9 Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 7) [2026] QIRC 46 ('Chen No. 7'). 10 Dr Chen's Application in Existing Proceedings filed in the Industrial Registry on 4 March 2026 [7]. 11 Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 13 March 2026 [14]. 12 Ibid [15]. -- 5 of 13 -- 6 as 'a finding that a disciplinary ground exists'.13 In turn, the definition of ‘disciplinary action' referred to s 188,14 which set out the various categories of action that could be taken under the PS Act to discipline a public service employee once a chief executive was reasonably satisfied that a disciplinary ground had been made out. A demarcation between 'disciplinary ground' and 'disciplinary finding' on the one hand, and a determination as to what, if any, disciplinary action ought to be taken on the other was present in respect of other categories of employees (see s 186B(4); 187A(2)-(4); and 188A(3)-(4)). A similar demarcation appears in the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld).15 [16] The Respondent says it is 'factually correct that there remains a disciplinary finding against Dr Chen even if no subsequent disciplinary action was taken in respect of that finding'. The Respondent submits that 'there is nothing improper in Pidgeon IC's summary of Knight IC's decision in this regard'.16 [17] The Respondent submits that 'the proceeding does not raise for determination, as a fact in issue, whether and to what extent Dr Chen had, improperly engaged with the nurse as a matter of objective fact'.17 [18] The Respondent submits that even if it becomes necessary for me to form my own views about what happened between Dr Chen and the nurse, it cannot be said that my recitation of findings made by Knight IC mean that my mind is 'closed to persuasion' on that matter, or any other.18 [19] The Respondent submits that Dr Chen's allegation does not sensibly engage the test for apprehended bias.19 Consideration [20] It was necessary for me to address the 2020 disciplinary process as Dr Chen had sought to include the disciplinary process as an additional count of unlawful adverse action in his amended application to which the Respondent objected. The Respondent had submitted that any suggestion by Dr Chen that the disciplinary process was 'doomed to fail' could not be sustained when considering the findings of Knight IC in the public service appeal which arose out of the disciplinary process. [21] I understand that Dr Chen believes there is no disciplinary finding against him because there was no decision on disciplinary action. This belief is misguided. There remains a disciplinary finding against Dr Chen. This is not something I have decided or 'pre- judged'. Rather, I am aware of this fact because I have read the decision of Knight IC. 13 PS Act, Schedule 4. 14 Ibid. 15 See ss 90 and 92 of the PS Act. 16 Respondent's submissions (n 11) [16]. 17 Ibid [17]. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. -- 6 of 13 -- 7 [22] In his submissions, Dr Chen notes that I have referred to allegations plural and says this adverts awareness to two allegations. That is correct. There were two substantiated allegations discussed in that decision. [23] Knight IC had some reservations regarding the substantiation of Allegation One, but said, '[i]f Dr Chen wished to appeal the substantiation of Allegation One, he was required to bring an appeal in respect of that decision…'. The substantiation of that Allegation remained unchanged following Knight IC's decision. In her orders, it was noted that in undertaking a fresh show cause process only on disciplinary penalty, '[t]he decision-maker must have regard to the earlier substantiation of Allegation One and the findings set out in this decision'.20 [24] Regarding Allegation Two, Knight IC substituted the GCHHS finding of misconduct with a finding that Dr Chen contravened the Code of Conduct. Relevantly:21 [80] Although I consider Dr Chen's actions were entirely unacceptable, I'm not persuaded he intentionally set out to harm Ms Bawden in the moment, nor does it appear on the materials that he was indifferent to his actions. [81] Instead, I consider it possible he became caught up in the procedure and the safety of the patient, to such an extent that he briefly lost sight of his environment and the people around him. In those circumstances, I consider his actions fall short of the threshold for misconduct. [82] As it was on the basis that Dr Chen had engaged in misconduct that Ms Bloch considered the disciplinary penalty, and I am not convinced he met that threshold, I consider her decision to discipline Dr Chen pursuant to s 187(1)(b) was not fair and reasonable. [83] Instead, this is a matter where the grounds of discipline are more amenable to the circumstances described at s 187(1)(f)(ii) in that Dr Chen has contravened, without reasonable excuse, the Code of Conduct in that he has failed to demonstrate a high standard of workplace behaviour and personal conduct. [84] To be clear, I do not consider Dr Chen's concerns about patient safety to be a sufficient excuse for his failure to comply with cl 1.5 of the Code of Conduct. Dr Chen's actions in pushing Ms Bawden aside were unacceptable. As observed by Ms Bloch, there were other ways in which he could have equally addressed his concerns about patient safety. [85] Given the circumstances regarding Dr Chen's employment and noting that GCHHS may make a disciplinary finding, or take or continue disciplinary action against Dr Chen, even in circumstances where his employment with the public service has ceased, I consider that the best course of action here is to return the decision to Ms Bloch to undertake a fresh show cause process in relation to the disciplinary penalty. [25] Dr Chen believes I am mistaken in my understanding that Knight IC ordered a fresh show cause process with regard to the disciplinary penalty and not with regard to the 20 Chen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 249 [86]. 21 Ibid. -- 7 of 13 -- 8 substantiation of the allegations. I draw my understanding from Knight IC's decision where Order 4 states: 4. The matter is returned to the decision‑maker to undertake a fresh show cause process only in relation to the disciplinary penalty… [26] Dr Chen may disagree with my decision to strike out his amendments regarding the disciplinary process, and he may be concerned about his 'reasonable prospects of success' in the substantive matter in the absence of the amendments regarding the disciplinary process being unlawful adverse action. Dr Chen may also believe it was wrong for me to summarise and quote the Commission decision which establishes that there remains a disciplinary finding against him. Should Dr Chen feel aggrieved by this and consider that I was wrong in striking out those amendments, it is a matter for him to appeal that decision. [27] Dr Chen argues that I did not have 'lawful jurisdiction' and that it was an error of law to record that there remains a disciplinary finding against him. Dr Chen is concerned about 'legal and professional implications seriously adverse to the interests of the Applicant'. If Dr Chen believes I have made an error of law, again, it is open to him to appeal that decision. [28] I do not expect that the substantive hearing will require me to go back and consider the allegations or the findings made by Knight IC. But if for some reason, in hearing the matters which form a part of the substantive applications, noting that a number of Dr Chen's amendments were struck out, I am required to consider them, I will hear from the parties and turn my mind to any question that is before me. [29] I do not accept Dr Chen's submission that I have pre-judged the matter of the existing disciplinary finding against him or that I have demonstrated actual bias with regard to this matter. Second ground – the application of cl 7.1(b) of the Award Dr Chen's submissions [30] Dr Chen sought to amend his general protections application to include that he had been denied the benefit of cl 7.1(b) of the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Award – State 2015 ('the Award'). That clause invokes the 'status quo' in circumstances where the dispute resolution provisions of the Award are engaged. -- 8 of 13 -- 9 [31] Dr Chen argues that I have pre-judged this matter.22 Dr Chen says that in pre-judging this matter before the substantive hearing, there has been a 'serious material breach of procedural fairness'.23 [32] Dr Chen says:24 Where the honourable Commissioner stated in clear and unmistakeable language the ''Award Clause 7.1 (b) has no application to Dr Chen's matters" - the honourable Commissioner has manifestly unequivocally materially prejudged matters in the Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions filed since 21 February 2022 -where the Applicant filed that he was employed as a Senior Medical Officer with terms of employment governed by the Medical Officers' (Queensland Health) Award- State 2015 ('Award 2015') -where relevant provision is at cl 7.1(6) "while the dispute procedure is being followed normal work is to continue except in the case of a genuine safety issue. The status quo existing before the emergence of a dispute is to continue whilst the procedure is being followed. No party shall be prejudiced as to the final settlement by the continuation of work." Respondent's submissions [33] The Respondent says that in the decision, I 'made the straightforward points that there was no evidence' before me to the effect that Dr Chen had sought to invoke clause 7.1 of the Award and that in any event, neither an unfair dismissal application or a general protections claim are matters to which cl 7.1 applies.25 [34] The Respondent points out that I expressly stated that '[w]hether Dr Chen was an SMO or a VMO is a matter for consideration at the hearing of the substantive matter'. [35] The Respondent submits:26 Dr Chen asserts that this aspect of the Judgment demonstrated actual bias because it cut across his generalised assertion that the Award governed the terms and conditions of his employment. The obvious difficulty is that the Commissioner did not say that Dr Chen was not entitled to raise a dispute under clause 7.1 (which is not a fact in issue in any event), or that the terms of employment were not set the Award (sic). Like ground one, this ground is misconceived. Consideration [36] It appears that Dr Chen's concern is that I have somehow pre-judged or pre-determined that the Award does not apply to his employment. Dr Chen lists a number of matters which are covered by the Award, including cl 7.1(b).27 I did not address any other Award clauses in Chen No. 6. 22 On this point, Dr Chen cites Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 [36]. 23 Dr Chen references Groves, Matthew, 'Clarity and Complexity in the Bias Rule' (2020) 44(2) Melbourne University Law Review, 565. 24 Dr Chen's Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed in the Industrial Registry on 4 March 2026 [9]. 25 Respondent's submissions (n 11) [20]. 26 Ibid [21]. 27 Dr Chen's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 19 March 2026 [9]. -- 9 of 13 -- 10 [37] In Chen No. 6, I simply observed that cl 7.1(b) of the Award is not enlivened in the circumstances of Dr Chen's substantive General Protections and Unfair Dismissal applications. [38] The matter of whether Dr Chen is a person to whom the Award applies is a matter to be determined at the hearing. I said as much in the decision at paragraph [103] of Chen (No. 6). In his submissions, Dr Chen addresses material from his 'yet to be filed' Court Book where he says that there were various discussions about whether he was a Senior Medical Officer ('SMO') or a Visiting Medical Officer ('VMO'). The material will be appropriately addressed at the hearing and through witnesses, including Dr Chen himself.28 [39] If Dr Chen believes I am wrong in my assessment of the applicability of cl 7.1(b) of the Award and that this somehow has a bearing on the substantive matter to the effect that I erred in my determination that particular amendments be struck out, it is a matter for him to appeal Chen (No. 6). [40] Dr Chen refers to the Respondent's denial of the existence of a dispute following on from Award provisions.29 I understood the Respondent's submissions to be to the effect that there was no dispute for the purposes of cl 7.1(b) of the Award. It is very clear that there is a disagreement between the parties as to whether the Award itself applied to Dr Chen and whether he was employed as a VMO or an SMO. That is not a matter I decided in Chen No. 6. [41] I do not consider that I have pre-judged the matter of the applicability of the Award to Dr Chen's employment. I am open to persuasion on that matter and will determine it with an open mind based on the evidence and arguments to be presented.30 Conclusion [42] Dr Chen has not alleged apprehended bias in this application. The allegation Dr Chen makes is that I have displayed actual bias. While the Respondent has made submissions regarding apprehended bias out of an abundance of caution, Dr Chen's application does not allege apprehended bias and I will not address that matter except to note that Dr Chen appears to state at [34] of his submissions, that he strongly doubts that the key authority addressing apprehended bias, Ebner has application in this matter.31 28 At footnote 19 of Dr Chen's submissions, he lists some of the material contained in his yet to be filed Court Book. 29 Dr Chen's submissions (n 27) [13]. 30 At paragraph 11 of his submissions, Dr Chen includes a series of italicised phrases. I take these phrases to be a reference to Dunstan v Orr or other cases cited throughout Dr Chen's footnotes. 31 Dr Chen's submissions (n 27) [34] citing Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 ('Ebner'). -- 10 of 13 -- 11 [43] With reference to the principles set out in the passage of Dunstan v Orr above at [7], Dr Chen says he accepts that this application claiming actual bias on my part addresses 'a grave matter' but says that the 'evidence here is "cogent" and actual material bias "clearly proven". Dr Chen refers to 'clear and unmistakable language within the decision' which he says I have a 'consciously described state of mind', have 'pre-judged the issues' and I am 'so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented'. Dr Chen says that on the basis of the matters he has raised, I have 'stated pre-judged conclusions' and that I am not 'open to persuasion' and will not be 'giving the matter fresh consideration in light of whatever may be the facts and arguments relevant to the particular case'. [44] Dr Chen says that he recognises that Commission members are human but that 'actual bias and pre-judgement in Chen No. 6 is 'intolerable to the right interests of the Applicant's (sic) in regards natural justice due processes…'. Dr Chen says that:32 … recusal is a positive step accepting that we can all sometimes be fallible sometimes (sic) but there is overall consideration to support the integrity of the QIRC and ICQ as institutions rather than only reflect negatively on rarely the IC's error – recusal will reinforce the responsibility of the QIRC and ICQ as an institution to uphold objective standards of impartiality [45] It has been difficult to know how best to approach this application. It seems to me that the sections of the decision Dr Chen says demonstrate actual bias simply involve referring to a published decision of the Commission (the disciplinary finding matter) and making a finding that the Award clause specifically relating to maintenance of the status quo was not enlivened and so has no application in this matter. [46] I have considered Dr Chen's allegations of actual bias with regard to each matter above from [8]–[29] ('Disciplinary findings') and [30]–[41] ('Clause 7.1(b) of the Award'). [47] I do not expect that I will be required to undertake a reconsideration of the disciplinary allegations or findings when determining the substantive matters. If I am required to, I will hear from the parties and make decisions about whatever matters need to be resolved. I did not determine anything at all about the disciplinary findings. I simply summarised existing findings made by Knight IC. [48] To the extent that Dr Chen questions the decision to not allow his amendments alleging the disciplinary process was taken in bad faith and was a sham, the appropriate avenue is for him to appeal that decision. [49] With regard to the dispute between the parties as to whether Dr Chen was employed as a SMO or a VMO, I have expressly stated in Chen No. 6 that this is a matter which will be 32 Ibid [33] citing Australian Law Reform Commission, Without Fear or Favour: Judicial Impartiality and the Law on Bias (Summary Report No 138, December 2021), Response to terms of reference, p7 [13]. -- 11 of 13 -- 12 considered at the hearing. I do not accept any suggestion that I have pre-judged that matter or that I am not open to persuasion on that question. [50] Making a finding on the basis of the material before me that Dr Chen had not invoked the dispute resolution procedure under the Award and that in any case, cl 7.1(b) of the Award had no relevance to his unfair dismissal or adverse action matters does not in any way suggest that he was not employed under the Award or should not be afforded the rights contained therein. [51] Whether Dr Chen was employed as a VMO or an SMO will ultimately be a finding of fact to be made based on the evidence before the Commission. [52] As the Respondent submits, an assessment of actual bias requires an interrogation of the state of mind of the relevant trier of fact.33 In his submissions, Dr Chen appears to take issue with me striking out some of his amendments where I found they had limited prospects of success and says '…the IC should nonetheless have been aware of obligated sworn commissioned duties to be open to persuasion and listen to even apparently weak arguments with an independent, impartial and open mind'.34 [53] The matter before me in Chen No. 6 was an application in existing proceedings to amend an application and associated statement of facts and contentions. In deciding the Respondent's objection to the application to amend, I was, as required by s 531(3) of the IR Act, guided by 'equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case…'. I was also guided by the relevant considerations set out in Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278.35 [54] The decision did not require me to make final determinations on matters, rather I was to determine whether to allow a range of additional matters to be added to Dr Chen's application. The matter was of an interlocutory nature and time was of the essence in circumstances where hearing dates which had been set some time earlier were approaching. I had the benefit of written and oral submissions of the parties. I decided the matter in accordance with relevant principles. [55] An allegation of actual bias is very serious. Dr Chen carries the heavy onus of demonstrating actual bias in the form of prejudgment by me of the matters before me. Dr Chen has specifically identified two grounds which he says are demonstrative of my actual bias. I have considered those matters, and the submissions Dr Chen has made. I am not persuaded that Dr Chen has demonstrated that I have prejudged the case against him, 33 Michael Wilson & Partners [2011] HCA 48; (2011) 244 CLR 427 [33]. 34 Antoun v The Queen (2006) 224 ALR 61, 77-8 [85]–[87]. 35 Chen v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service (No. 6) [2026] QIRC 45 [6]. -- 12 of 13 -- 13 or that I have acted with partisanship or hostility such that I have my mind made up against him and am not open to persuasion in his favour.36 My mind is not closed regarding the matters which remain to be determined by the Commission in the substantive proceeding. Dr Chen has not shown any actual bias on my part resulting from Chen No. 6. [56] It seems to me that Dr Chen disagrees with my decision in Chen No. 6 and believes I have made a series of errors of law. If Dr Chen disagrees with my decision and believes it contains errors, it is a matter for him to appeal that decision. [57] Even if I were not the decision-maker in Dr Chen's substantive matters, in circumstances where Dr Chen has not appealed Chen No. 6, the decision remains and the amendments which were struck out remain so. [58] Dr Chen has not provided any cogent evidence to demonstrate actual material bias. [59] Dr Chen's application for my recusal is dismissed. Orders [60] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: 1. Dr Chen's application for my recusal is dismissed. 2. The question of costs arising from this application is reserved until the determination of GP/2020/27 and TD/2021/20. 36 Dunstan [63]. -- 13 of 13 --