Duvall v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 68

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Duvall v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2026] QIRC 068 PARTIES: Duvall, Alicia Marie (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: WC/2023/122 PROCEEDING: Interlocutory proceedings DELIVERED ON: 12 March 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Pratt IC On the papers ORDERS: 1. The matter WC/2023/122 is stayed until such time as Ms Duvall either: (a) advises the Commission that she has obtained representation to run the appeal for her; or (b) provides expert medical evidence that satisfies the Commission that Ms Duvall has capacity to run the appeal on her own. 2. The appeal will lapse if neither of the alternatives to order 1 are complied with before 13 March 2027. CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – WORKERS' COMPENSATION – INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS – hearing for stay of proceedings brought on at Commission's -- 1 of 7 -- 2 initiative – consideration of whether to stay a proceeding against the wishes of the appellant – consideration of whether the appellant objectively has capacity to fairly conduct the proceedings given their current mental health – where the Commission has grave concerns for the appellant's mental health – where the Commission directed the appellant to undergo an independent medical examination – where the independent medical examination expressed that the appellant did not have capacity to conduct the appeal proceedings – found appellant is not in any way likely to be able to fairly and accurately present their case – consideration of one-year lapse of matter pursuant to r 230 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 (Qld) – order that matter be stayed LEGISLATION: CASES: Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 230 Bale v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 235 Black & Black v De Waard & De Waard & Anor [2021] QDC 138 Campion v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 332 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Metropolitan Public Abattoir Board and The Queensland Meat Industry Organisation and Marketing Authority [1991] QSCFC 59; [1992] 1 Qd R 592 -- 2 of 7 -- 3 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 10 Talay v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 273 Reasons for Decision [1] Ms Duvall is the Appellant. She is seeking orders to overcome a decision by the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('Regulator') finding that her claim was not one for compensation. A threshold issue has intervened, however. The question that has arisen is whether Ms Duvall objectively has capacity to fairly conduct the proceedings given her current mental health. How did this issue arise? [2] A directions hearing was called on by the Commission on 31 January 2025. At that hearing, in response to inquiries by the Commission about email correspondence from Ms Duvall, the Regulator advised the Commission that Ms Duvall's narrative of events was not a sufficient list of stressors to enable pleading in reply. The Regulator summarised the issue this way: At the present time, the original list of stressors provided by Ms Duvall consisted of some 127 pages. That was refined to the subsequent list pursuant to the order of the Commission into some 13 pages containing 45 stressors. The problem being that the identified stressors have multiple stressors which are specifically said not to be stressors. They also contain, as was pointed out to Ms Duvall in the letter from my instructing officer, an – 11 stressors that occurred after the date of her resignation and five which occurred after the application for compensation. That means that the respondent is not in a position to understand the case being put forward by Ms Duvall. [3] Whilst addressing those concerns, and other concerns about witness evidence that I consider to have been validly raised by the Regulator, I proposed extending the timetable of directions. This was to give Ms Duvall some more time to put on a clearer list of stressors and better present her outlines of witness evidence. Ms Duvall said in response that she would not provide anything more and most concerningly said: …They want to do this to people until they kill themselves. I will end up killing myself if they continue to drag this matter out. All I ever ever asked for was treatment. [4] Later in that discussion at the mention hearing, Ms Duvall said: I’m not doing any of it in relation to a list of stressors and an outline of evidence from each proposed witness; -- 3 of 7 -- 4 … I’ve had a mental breakdown. … My mental health is important. I have been pushed to the limit. I have no more energy. I can’t even string a sentence together at the moment. … You change the date again I may not be here on this Earth. … I don’t have the mental capacity your honour, to do any more. … If I’d had treatment, I would have the mental ability to somewhat represent myself. I don’t even have that because of the nature of the injury. [5] The matter was adjourned and brought back on for mention on 7 February 2025. At that mention I explained to Ms Duvall that I had reflected upon her comments and had considered the transcript of those proceedings. I explained that I was concerned not only as to whether Ms Duvall was able to adequately conduct the litigation but whether it was potentially harmful to her health that she do so. I referred Ms Duvall to the above- mentioned remarks and explained my concern for Ms Duvall's health and rights as a litigant in the process where the Commission had been placed on notice that there may be something about her current state of mental health that means she was not able to engage fairly in the process. [6] I concluded that it was of great concern that I could see there might come a point in time where the matter is dispensed with because Ms Duvall could not comply, or would not comply, with the orders, which may be due to the mental health issues that Ms Duvall cited. I proposed that Ms Duvall undergo a medical examination to determine whether there was a risk of self-harm in continuing with the proceedings and whether Ms Duvall had capacity to run these proceedings. The Regulator consented to that course and to covering the cost of that assessment. I issued those orders after hearing from Ms Duvall, the effect of which was a submission that nothing will change for her until such time as she can receive treatment and that is not in the foreseeable future. [7] Dr John Chalk is a psychiatrist who was commissioned to conduct a medical assessment and provide a report based on his review of available records and an interview and examination of Ms Duvall. I have considered a report dated 25 May 2025 by Dr Chalk, including Dr Chalk's description of Ms Duvall's current symptoms. In summary, Dr Chalk expressed the view that he did not think that Ms Duvall has the capacity to conduct the proceedings in the Commission on her own behalf. Dr Chalk's opinion was that Ms Duvall was not in any way likely to be able to fairly and accurately present her case and -- 4 of 7 -- 5 respond to the matters put before her by the Regulator. Dr Chalk also expressed the view that he did not think that Ms Duvall was capable of the preparation of complex documents and conducting a complex trial of facts and various legal issues. Should the appeal be stayed? [8] On 20 June 2025, I listed the matter for mention. During that mention hearing I confirmed that Ms Duvall had read Dr Chalk's report. After being invited to consider consenting to the matter being stayed, Ms Duvall expressed a desire not to do so. Accordingly, I issued directions orders that day providing each party an opportunity to make submissions as to whether the matter should be stayed. Those orders were varied on 15 August 2025 to provide for an extension of time for those submissions to be filed and served. [9] The Regulator filed submissions, however, Ms Duvall did not. I do not consider Ms Duvall's not having filed submissions to amount to her no longer contesting a stay of her case, which she has previously expressed opposition to. [10] The Regulator points out that Dr Chalk's opinion about capacity is in reference to the word 'capacity' as it is used in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). That is, capacity to conduct proceedings in the Commission on her own behalf and to clearly and accurately present her case as well as a response to the case put against her by the Regulator. The Regulator relies on that relevant part of Dr Chalk's conclusions that I have mentioned above. [11] The Regulator also expresses concerns that should Ms Duvall be permitted to continue with the case without an appropriate representative, she places herself at risk of psychiatric harm in attempting to embark upon a course of action she is not equipped to pursue. It also argues that any listing of the matter that is abandoned before or at a hearing would lead to costs being incurred without a successful hearing of the merits. The Regulator's submission is that the appropriate course is for the appeal to be placed in abeyance until Ms Duvall obtained legal representation or someone to act on her behalf in accordance with Dr Chalk's advice. There is considerable force to these submissions in my opinion. [12] Alternatively, the Regulator submits, if Ms Duvall puts medical evidence before the Commission proving that she has capacity to conduct her own appeal, then the matter might be appropriately lifted out of abeyance. [13] The Regulator also points to the operative effect of r 230 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 ('the Rules'), which relevantly provides that after 12 months of an appellant taking no action to move the matter towards judgement, that matter will lapse. The Regulator submits that it should be made clear to Ms Duvall that if the matter is placed in abeyance, or stayed, and no further steps are taken in the action in 12 months, the matter will lapse pursuant to r 230 of the Rules. -- 5 of 7 -- 6 [14] I accept that it is appropriate in these reasons, and in any orders, to highlight the effect of any decision to place the matter formally into abeyance. That is, as the Regulator has pointed out, that if Ms Duvall fails to take action to move the matter forward towards judgement within a year of the last step being taken, the matter will lapse. That means any rights of appeal that Ms Duvall has will be lost. [15] I acknowledge that Ms Duvall is opposed to a stay of the matter. However, Dr Chalk's unchallenged evidence is compelling, in my opinion. His conclusion is that Ms Duvall does not have capacity to conduct the proceedings in the Commission on her own behalf. Ms Duvall does not have anyone who can represent her either. Until that changes, I accept Dr Chalk's evidence is that Ms Duvall is not capable of the preparation of complex documents and conducting a complex trial of facts and various legal issues. Accordingly, I find that Ms Duvall is not in any way likely to be able to fairly and accurately present her case and respond to the matters put before her by the Regulator in these proceedings in the Commission. It is for those reasons that this matter must be stayed. When should the 1-year lapse period run out? [16] The operative effect of r 230 of the Rules is that the one-year lapse period begins to run from the last action taken by the applicant/appellant. That is an action that has the effect of moving the matter forward towards judgement.1 The question to be resolved in this case is what was the last action, or step taken, by Ms Duvall to move the matter towards judgment and when was that last action or step taken? [17] In Campion v Workers' Compensation Regulator,2 I made the following observations: What constitutes a "step" is something that has the practical effect of carrying the matter forward towards judgment. Consent given by the other side to placing a matter in abeyance has no impact on the effect of r 230.3 Doing work in preparation for running a matter will not always constitute a step which has the effect of carrying the matter forward.4 For instance, a party's solicitor seeking to meet with the other side for the purpose of negotiations, or writing letters about further disclosure of documents, has been deemed to not be conduct that has the effect of carrying the matter forward.5 The act of sending a medical report to the other side, which was prepared for the purposes of the matter, would have the necessary effect of carrying the matter forward towards judgment.6 That is because it is an action that is more than something one party does, of which the other party, or the court/tribunal is not aware, and where no readily discernible impact on the progress of the matter occurs.7 1 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 10 [16]. 2 [2025] QIRC 332 [4]. 3 Citing the example, Bale v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 235 ('Bale'), where consent by the opposing side for a matter going into abeyance was given but not otherwise a feature in any reasoning as to whether the matter could be reopened. 4 Citicorp Australia Ltd v Metropolitan Public Abattoir Board and The Queensland Meat Industry Organisation and Marketing Authority [1991] QSCFC 59; [1992] 1 Qd R 592 ('Citicorp'). 5 Black & Black v De Waard & De Waard & Anor [2021] QDC 138. 6 State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 10 [40]. 7 Citicorp, 593-595 cited and followed in State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2024] QIRC 10 [27]. -- 6 of 7 -- 7 [18] In Talay v Workers' Compensation Regulator,8 O'Neill IC observed that an action, pursuant to r 230(1)(b) of the Rules, does not need to be a step taken in the Commission or the Industrial Registry. Nor does it need to be doing something required by the Rules. [19] In this case, the last step Ms Duvall actively took could perhaps be when she attended the medical examination by Dr Chalk on 22 May 2025. However, it is not entirely clear whether that was the last active step taken by Ms Duvall which had the effect of moving her matter forward towards judgement. No evidence has been adduced as to when and what was the last step taken. [20] Another difficulty I would have with the one-year lapse clock starting to run on 22 May 2025 is the fact that since then, and actually arising from that step, the matter has been the subject of a process and consideration by the Commission as to whether a stay should be imposed on Ms Duvall's appeal. It would be unfair in my opinion to count that as time that Ms Duvall had not taken action to advance the matter towards judgement when she was in fact waiting for the Commission to deliver a decision on whether a stay should be imposed on her appeal. [21] For these reasons, I consider it appropriate to order that the matter will lapse if no step is taken within one year of the date of this decision being delivered. [22] I therefore order as follows: Orders: 1. The matter WC/2023/122 is stayed until such time as Ms Duvall either: (a) advises the Commission that she has obtained representation to run the appeal for her; or (b) provides expert medical evidence that satisfies the Commission that Ms Duvall has capacity to run the appeal on her own. 2. The appeal will lapse if neither of the alternatives to order 1 are complied with before 13 March 2027. 8 [2025] QIRC 273. -- 7 of 7 --