Dunne v State of Queensland (Department of Customer Services, Open Data and Small and Family Business) [2026] QIRC 53

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION PARTIES: Dunne v State of Queensland (Department of Customer Services, Open Data and Small and Family Business) [2026] QIRC 053 Dunne, Julie-Anne (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Customer Services, Open Data and Small and Family Business) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2025/297 PROCEEDING: Public Service Appeal – Appeal against a fair treatment decision DELIVERED ON: 27 February 2026 DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: Appeal Notice (24 December 2025) Respondent's submissions (21 January 2026) Appellant's submissions in reply (3 February 2026) Respondent's submissions in reply (10 February 2026) MEMBER: Pidgeon IC HEARD AT: On the papers ORDERS: Pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Appeal will not be heard because the Appellant has not, prior to lodging the appeal, used the individual grievance policy and procedure in relation to the decision appealed against. CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appeal against a fair treatment decision – where the Respondent raises a jurisdictional objection – where the appeal -- 1 of 8 -- 2 will not be heard pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – where the individual employee grievance process is to be followed LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: Directive 04/23: Appeals cls 7.4, 9 Directive 06/24: Voluntary Medical Retirement (VMR) Scheme cls 6.1, 11.3, 12.1 Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievance cl 8.5(b) Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562A(3)(b)(iii) Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 129 CASES: White v State of Queensland (Department of Education [2021] QIRC 259 Reasons for Decision Background [1] Ms Julie-Anne Dunne ('the Appellant') is employed as a Customer Services Advisor with the State of Queensland (Department of Customer Services, Open Data and Small and Family Businesses ('CDSB' or 'the Respondent'). Ms Dunne emailed a representative from the Department of Transport and Main Roads ('DTMR') to formally apply for a Voluntary Medical Retirement ('VMR') on 3 June 2025. [2] On 16 June 2025, Ms Dunne was advised by a representative from DTMR that her application for a VMR was to be made prior to 1 July 2025 because of Machinery of Government ('MoG') changes which would take effect from this date. Among these changes was that Ms Dunne's employment was moved from DTMR to CDSB. [3] Ms Dunne sent a further email to the DTMR representative on 23 June 2025 advising that the soonest that she could attend a specialist neurology appointment was October 2025. The following day, Ms Dunne was advised that she should provide a proof of appointment and that the delegate would consider whether her application could be considered 'dependant on the length of time till the specialist appointment'.1 1 Appeal Notice filed in the Industrial Registry on 24 December 2025. -- 2 of 8 -- 3 [4] Ms Dunne attended the appointment in October 2025 and was advised by CDSB (following the MoG transition period) on 12 December 2025 that her VMR application would not be considered 'as 'an issue has been identified with [her] eligibility'.2 [5] Ms Dunne submits that CDSB ' must have considered [her] VMR application as the application was (sic) made whilst [she] was employed by DTMR, with an implied agreement that the specialist report could be provided in support of the VMR application after the 1st of July 2025. It is submitted that given there was no correspondence rendering what the decision of the delegate was as to whether the VMR application would be considered, it was unreasonable for the second agency to not consider [her] VMR application'.3 The decision [6] On 12 December 2025, Ms Dunne received correspondence from Ms Vos, Acting Chief Human Resources Officer, Corporate Services regarding her VMR application dated 17 June 2025. [7] The correspondence acknowledges that while CDSB is not a participating entity in the VMR scheme, the Directive 06/24: Voluntary Medical Retirement (VMR) Scheme ('the VMR Directive') provides that where an employee moves from a participating entity to a non-participating entity due to MoG changes, an application must be decided under the directive regardless of the second entity being a participating entity or not. [8] Ms Vos goes on to say that Ms Dunne's application has been reviewed against the requirements of the VMR Directive. Specifically, the decision states: …the Directive provides a public sector employee may apply for a VMR package where they have medical evidence that: • they have an injury or illness that prevents (or is reasonably likely to prevent) them from continuing in or returning to their substantive role or other roles for which they are reasonably qualified, and • addresses the matters in clause 11.2 and that this evidence is to include on specialist medical opinion. [9] Clause 11.3 of the VMR Directive states: 11.3 The employee must provide medical evidence which the chief executive considers sufficient to consider the employee's VMR application and is to include one specialist medical opinion. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. -- 3 of 8 -- 4 [10] The correspondence goes on to state: The medical evidence you had submitted to support your VMR application on 17 June 2025 was from Dr Shirley Butler, General Practitioner, dated 12 June 2025. Your application did not however include one specialist medical opinion, as required by the Directive. Accordingly, your application was not a valid application as you did not meet the requirements of the Directive for you to be able to apply for a VMR package. As such, CDSB is unable to decide your VMR application under the provisions of clause 9.3 of the Directive. I note you subsequently provided a specialist medical opinion from Dr Rita Starling, Neurologist, dated 14 October 2025, which provided your neurological deficits significantly impact your ability to perform your current role and that return to your previous role is unfeasible. CDSB is unable to use this medical documentation to decide your VMR application, having regard to the Directive requirements. If you were provided any advice in TMR to the effect that your application would be able to be decided by CDSB if you submitted your application by 30 June 2025 and provided specialist medical advice at a later date, this advice was incorrect. … Ms Dunne's reasons for appeal [11] Ms Dunne's reasons for appeal provide a background to the matter as set out above from paragraphs [1]–[5] of these reasons. [12] In essence, Ms Dunne's argument is that she made the application while she worked at DTMR with 'an implied agreement that the specialist report could be provided in support of the VMR application after the 1st of July 2025'. [13] Ms Dunne says that 'given there was no correspondence rendering what the decision of the delegate was as to whether the VMR application would be considered, it was unreasonable for the second agency not to consider [her] VMR application. Jurisdictional Issue Respondent submissions [14] The Respondent submits that the decision appealed against is not appealable as a fair treatment decision under s 129 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (the 'PS Act'). The Respondent submits this in circumstances where the correspondence was 'not a decision in relation to their VMR application, but rather it was advice regarding the validity of the Appellant's VMR application'.4 [15] Further, the Respondent submits that the ability to decide an application for VMR has not been subdelegated and sits only with the Director-General of the Respondent. 4 Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 21 January 2026 [5]. -- 4 of 8 -- 5 Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the A/Chief Human Resources Officer, the author of the correspondence is not authorised to decide Ms Dunne's VMR application.5 [16] In the alternative, the Respondent submits that Ms Dunne is entitled to make a fair treatment appeal on the basis that the advice of the A/Chief Human Resources Officer not to progress her VMR application to be considered by the Director-General of the Respondent is an administrative decision. However, the Respondent submits that pursuant to cl 9 of the Directive 04/23: Appeals ('the Appeals Directive') Ms Dunne is required to comply with the individual employee grievance process prior to appealing to the Commission.6 [17] In support of this proposition, the Respondent cites the decision of his Honour, Deputy President Merrell in White wherein, his Honour states:7 In my opinion, where the chief executive of the public service commission has made directives relevant to appeals about a decision not involving disciplinary finding grounds which an employee believes is not fair and reasonable, then the employee should comply with the procedures set out in those directives. Appellant's submissions [18] Ms Dunne's union concedes that cl 9.4 of the Appeals Directive requires her to comply with the Respondent's Individual Employee Grievance process, however, submits that this would 'be unreasonable and impractical' in circumstances where she was expected to do so prior to appealing the 12 December 2025 decision.8 Further, Ms Dunne submits that the 'salient purpose of the VMR scheme is to apply for a package which involves [her] acquiring medical evidence which renders an inability to conduct the inherent requirements of [her] role'.9 Ms Dunne submits that these inherent requirements extend to engaging in workplace processes when necessary and capable. [19] In summary, Ms Dunne submits that '… it would be unreasonable to expect of the Appellant that they must engage in an Internal Grievance Procedure where medical incapacity has been expressly rendered to the Employer on multiple occasions'.10 [20] Ms Dunne submits that the Chief Human Resources Officer must have had delegation of the Chief Executive in determining her VMR application pursuant to cl 12.1 of the VMR Directive.11 5 Ibid [6]. 6 Ibid [10]. 7 Ibid [11] citing White v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 259 ('White'). 8 Appellant's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 3 February 2026 [15]. 9 Ibid [16]. 10 Ibid [17]. 11 Ibid [19]. -- 5 of 8 -- 6 [21] Ms Dunne seeks that I exercise my discretion under s 562A(1) of the IR Act to hear her Appeal on the basis that she is not medically fit to participate in the internal workplace process.12 [22] Should I decide not to exercise my discretion to hear the Appeal as a fair treatment appeal, Ms Dunne requests that her Appeal is dealt with as a directive decision under s 129 of the PS Act.13 Respondent in reply [23] In reply to Ms Dunne's submissions regarding her compliance with the Respondent's individual employee grievance process, the Respondent submits that it is reasonable for her to comply with the process, particularly in circumstances where pursuant to cl 8.5(b) of Directive 11/20: individual employee grievance allows for an employee to be represented by a union representative.14 Consideration re: jurisdictional objection [24] I understand that Ms Dunne is in possession of medical evidence stating that her neurological deficits are significantly impacting her ability to perform her current role and that a return to her previous role is not feasible. I also understand that Ms Dunne's desire is for the VMR application to be considered positively by the Chief Executive or their delegate. [25] I am cognisant of requirements for employees to follow processes set out in Directives and any available individual employee grievance procedures as a precursor to lodging a Fair Treatment Appeal. In the circumstances, I am of the view that it is reasonable to require Ms Dunne to first comply with the procedure set out in the Directive. [26] I understand the argument made by Ms Dunne's union that if the matter cannot be heard as a fair treatment appeal due to the Applicant's failure to engage the individual employee grievance process, I should hear the matter as an appeal against a directive decision. In my view, the decision Ms Dunne appeals is best understood as a preliminary administrative decision undertaken before the matter is considered under a directive. In any case, the Appeals Directive states that before appealing a directive decision, an employee must first comply with procedures under the directive relating to individual employee grievances.15 [27] Here, there has been no decision made on Ms Dunne's application because she has been taken to have not made a valid application in the first place. I understand that Ms Vos 12 Ibid [20]. 13 Ibid [21]. 14 Respondent's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 10 February 2026 [7]. 15 Directive 04/23: Appeals cl 7.4. -- 6 of 8 -- 7 came to that conclusion having read the requirements of the VMR Directive. I particularly note cl 6.1 of the VMR Directive which states 'the requirements set out in these directions are binding and must be followed'. [28] On the face of it, the assessment undertaken by Ms Vos would appear to be correct. However, I am of the view that it would be fair to Ms Dunne for someone to undertake a further assessment or investigation to ascertain how or why she was provided with advice from TMR that it may be possible and appropriate for her application to be considered on the basis of providing confirmation an appointment had been made and then to later provide the report of the doctor. [29] There is no way for Ms Dunne to know why it has been assessed that the information she was provided at the time she was enquiring about making an application was 'incorrect'. It may be that the Chief Executive or someone with delegation decided to enable that process to occur prior to the MoG changes. It may also be that the advice was given by someone with no authority to provide it. There is no way of knowing based on Ms Vos' letter. [30] Having said that, upon reading the advice originally provided to Ms Dunne, there was no guarantee given that any application she made would be favourably considered. In fact, it appears that what she was told was to go ahead and make the application with the provision of the appointment date and that an assessment would be undertaken as to whether her application would be considered. [31] No such assessment was undertaken in the terms Ms Dunne was informed of by the previous agency. On that basis, she undertook and paid for the specialist appointment and provided the material, all on the basis that she would be able to make a valid VMR application. Ms Dunne acted in the absence of a decision that, for example, her medical appointment was too remote to the 30 June 2025 MoG deadline for applications and would not be considered. [32] I think that at the very least, any outcome of an Individual Employee Grievance process should inform Ms Dunne as to how the 'incorrect' advice came about and/or why or how the delegate in the new agency has decided the advice was incorrect and Ms Dunne's application will not be considered. [33] The task in a fair treatment appeal is to determine whether a decision is fair and reasonable. At this point, I am not satisfied a 'decision' has been made at the appropriate level of delegation to be reviewed as a public sector appeal. Even if I were deciding the matter in this appeal, the decision would be about whether it was fair and reasonable to determine Ms Dunne's VMR application was not valid, as opposed to a decision not to offer Ms Dunne a VMR. [34] The decision of Ms Vos does not address how the earlier advice Ms Dunne relied upon came about, other than to say it was 'incorrect' and in that case, there would not be -- 7 of 8 -- 8 sufficient information available for me to determine whether that decision was fair and reasonable. In such a case, even if I were hearing the appeal, I would be returning the decision to the Respondent for reconsideration. [35] The outcome would be the same whether the matter was reconsidered through the IEG process or returned for further consideration following a public sector appeal. In either scenario, Ms Dunne will at some point be issued with a decision about the validity of her VMR application. If she remains of the view that decision is not fair and reasonable, she will have an avenue of appeal against that decision through an external review. [36] For the reasons I have given, the appeal will not be heard. If Ms Dunne wishes to pursue this matter, it is open to her to follow the IEG process. I understand that Ms Dunne is unwell, however, she has demonstrated a capacity to lodge this appeal, and she is able to seek the support and advice of her union.16 [37] I further note that the Individual Employee Grievance Directive provides for decisions to be made in a timely way and contains associated timeframes for decision making. All parties will benefit from timely decision-making relating to this matter in circumstances where Ms Dunne is unwell and the Respondent is committed to supporting her and working with her in relation to her ongoing employment arrangements. Order [38] Accordingly, I make the following order: 1. Pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Appeal will not be heard because the Appellant has not, prior to lodging the appeal, used the individual grievance policy and procedure in relation to the decision appealed against. 16 Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievance cl 8.5(b). -- 8 of 8 --