Corney v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 3) [2026] QIRC 50

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Corney v Workers' Compensation Regulator (No. 3) [2026] QIRC 050 PARTIES: Corney, Steven (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: WC/2022/201 PROCEEDING: Appeal against review decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator DELIVERED ON: 25 February 2026 HEARING DATES: 9, 10, 11 and 12 December 2024, 10 April 2025, and 1 August 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Merrell DP Townsville and Brisbane by video link to Townsville ORDERS: The orders contained in paragraph [287] of these reasons for decision. CATCHWORDS: WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – INJURY, DISEASE OR DISABILITY – WHAT CONSTITUTES INJURY – Appellant was employed by the State of Queensland as an Enrolled Nurse in the Townsville Hospital and Health Service working in the Townsville Community Care Unit – Townsville Community Care Unit is a community resident unit for non- acute mental health patients – Appellant accessed the relevant information technology system to view the medical records of two patients – Appellant undertook such access because of his concern that the patients' physical location in the Townsville Community Care Unit contravened the Mental Health Act 2016 – Appellant told he should only access such records of patients for which he has direct clinical -- 1 of 62 -- 2 care and was given a warning about that conduct – Appellant commenced a grievance against the warning – the grievance was determined adversely to the Appellant – the Appellant unsuccessfully challenged the grievance decision and process – Appellant then decompensated with an adjustment disorder and applied for workers' compensation – the application for workers' compensation was rejected by WorkCover Queensland – the Appellant's application to review the decision of WorkCover Queensland was rejected by the Respondent – the Appellant appealed against the review decision of the Respondent – whether the Appellant's personal injury arose out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with the Appellant's employment – the Appellant's personal injury did arise out of or in the course of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with the Appellant's employment – the review decision of Respondent is confirmed – the parties are to be heard about costs LEGISLATION: Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, s 139, 142 s 145 and s 161C Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, r 97 Mental Health Act 2016, sch 3 Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32 and s 558 CASES: Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461 Fellows v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Office of Industrial Relations and Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor) [2025] QIRC 107 Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010 Townsend v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2022] QIRC 105 -- 2 of 62 -- 3 APPEARANCES: The Appellant in person. Ms L. Willson of Counsel directly instructed by Ms C-L. Godfrey of the Respondent. Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] Mr Steven Corney was employed by the State of Queensland through Queensland Health as an Advanced Skills Enrolled Nurse. Mr Corney worked in the Townsville Community Care Unit ('TCCU') which is part of the Mental Health Service Group operated by the Townsville Hospital and Health Service ('the Health Service'). For convenience, for the purposes of these reasons for decision, I will refer to the Health Service as Mr Corney's employer. [2] The following matters are not in dispute: • the TCCU is a community residential mental health unit which provides a rehabilitation service;1 • as from 1 July 2021, the TCCU was de-gazetted as an Authorised Mental Health Service under the Mental Health Act 2016 which meant no patient could be detained in the TCCU;2 • in July 2021: - as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, another public health service provided in the same location as the TCCU was the Predischarge Discharge Satellite Unit ('PDSU') which consisted of four beds;3 - the governance of the PDSU was with the Adult Acute Mental Health Inpatient Unit ('AAMHIU') while the TCCU had a separate governance;4 and - at the end of a shift, the practice was that PDSU nurses going off duty would provide a verbal and written handover to TCCU nurses in respect of the patients in the PDSU;5 and • the Mental Health Service Group used an information technology system called the Consumer Integrated Mental Health and Addiction application ('CIMHA').6 1 T 3-14, l 43. 2 T 1-21, l 45 to T 1-22, l 5 and T 3-17, 23-25. 3 T 3-14, ll 43-44. 4 T 3-14, ll 43-44 and T 3-39, ll 4-9. 5 T 4-19, ll 30-36. 6 Exhibit 5 and T 1-15, ll 34-43. -- 3 of 62 -- 4 [3] On 24 and 26 July 2021, when Mr Corney was working as an Enrolled Nurse in the TCCU, he accessed CIMHA to obtain information about two patients in the PDSU ('the two PDSU patients').7 [4] Mr Corney accessed that information about the two PDSU patients because, in his view, as he explained in an email to senior Health Service managers he sent on 24 July 2021: • doctors of the AAMHIU sent the two patients to the PDSU at the TCCU;8 • for an acute mental health patient to be in the PDSU at the TCCU, such a patient had to be in receipt of limited community treatment ('LCT') to support the patient being on leave to the PDSU at the TCCU;9 • the two PDSU patients were not in receipt of LCT; and • as the TCCU, from 1 July 2021, was degazetted as an authorised mental health unit, the doctors of the AAMHIU were acting in breach of the Mental Health Act 2016 by sending the two patients to the PDSU at the TCCU.10 [5] By letter dated 17 August 2021, the Health Service asked Mr Corney for information about his access to that information. Ultimately, by letter dated 29 October 2021, the Health Service advised Mr Corney that his access to the information about the two PDSU patients was unauthorised because he did not have direct clinical care of those two patients. Mr Corney was warned that he must only access records of patients who were within his direct clinical care. Mr Corney was further advised to escalate any future similar concerns (about the care of PDSU patients) to his immediate supervisors. [6] Mr Corney subsequently commenced a grievance against these actions, claiming, amongst other matters, that he was the subject of intimidation and bullying. [7] Ultimately, Mr Corney's grievance was dismissed. Thereafter followed further correspondence between certain management representatives of the Health Service and Mr Corney because of his dissatisfaction with the outcomes of his grievance. [8] On 16 June 2022, Mr Corney decompensated with a diagnosed adjustment disorder. [9] On 20 June 2022, Mr Corney made an application, pursuant to the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 ('the Act'), for workers' compensation in respect of his adjustment disorder. WorkCover Queensland subsequently rejected Mr Corney's application. [10] Mr Corney then applied for a review of the WorkCover decision by the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator'). By review decision of 18 November 2022, 7 Exhibit 5. 8 Exhibit 2, page 4. 9 In July 2021, the Dictionary to the Mental Health Act 2016 exhaustively defined 'limited community treatment', namely: limited community treatment means treatment and care of a person in the community, including in the grounds and buildings (other than an inpatient unit) of an authorised mental health service, for a period of not more than 7 consecutive days, that is authorised under this Act. 10 Exhibit 2, pages 4 and 5. -- 4 of 62 -- 5 contained in a letter with reasons for decision dated 21 November 2022, the Regulator confirmed the WorkCover decision ('the review decision'). [11] By notice of appeal filed on 14 December 2022, Mr Corney appeals to this Commission against the review decision. [12] The central issue for my determination is whether Mr Corney's adjustment disorder is removed from being a compensable injury as a consequence of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act. [13] For the reasons that follow, I find that Mr Corney's adjustment disorder arose out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the Health Service in connection with his employment within the meaning of s 32(5)(a) of the Act, such that Mr Corney's adjustment disorder is not an injury within the meaning of the Act. [14] As a consequence, the review decision will be confirmed. The legal framework [15] An appeal of this type is a hearing de novo11 of the issue determined by the review decision,12 namely, whether Mr Corney has suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act. [16] The legal onus of proof is on Mr Corney to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act. [17] The appeal concerns the application of s 32(5) of the Act. That section relevantly provides: (5) Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances – (a) reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment; (b) the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker. The parties' contentions [18] In very broad summary, Mr Corney contends that the following unreasonable management action had a causal connection with his adjustment disorder: • the false accusation made against him of a serious ethical breach by accessing the confidential information of the two PDSU patients; • the subsequent: 11 Church v Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) [2015] ICQ 031; (2015) 252 IR 461, [24]-[27] (Martin J, President). 12 Ibid [37]-[39]. -- 5 of 62 -- 6 - denial to him of procedural fairness and natural justice; and - victimisation of him; and • consequently, the potential for him to face future disciplinary action based on false allegations made in a biased system.13 [19] The Regulator conceded that Mr Corney suffered a personal injury, and that injury arose out of, or in the course of, his employment and in circumstances where his employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury.14 [20] However, the Regulator contends: • Mr Corney was not falsely accused of a serious ethical breach; • there was not a failure of any system by the Health Service and Mr Corney was afforded natural justice throughout all processes; and • any potential disciplinary action was as a result of reasonable management action conducted in a reasonable way. 15 [21] For these reasons, the Regulator, contrary to the unreasonable management action alleged by Mr Corney, contends that Mr Corney's personal injury: • arose out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with his employment; or, in the alternative • arose out of, or in the course of, his expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against him.16 The witnesses called to give evidence [22] Ten witnesses gave evidence. Mr Corney gave evidence on his own behalf. The remaining nine witnesses were all called by Mr Corney. They were: • Professor Kieran Keyes, the Chief Executive of the Health Service ('Professor Keyes'); • Ms Rachelle Floriani who was, at the material time, the Mental Health Act Advisor of the Health Service ('Ms Floriani'); • Ms Jane Watson, Senior Health Administration Manager of the Health Service ('Ms Watson'); 13 Mr Corney's statement of facts and contentions filed on 24 August 2023 ('Mr Corney's contentions'), page 3, last paragraph. 14 T 2-2, l 37 to T 2-3, l 16. 15 The amended statement of facts and contentions of the Workers' Compensation Regulator, filed on 11 June 2024 ('the Regulator's contentions'), paras. 48 a), b) and c). 16 The Regulator's contentions, paras. 49 d) and e). -- 6 of 62 -- 7 • Mr John Baird who was, at the material time, the Nursing Director/Program Manager, Rehabilitation Services, Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service ('Mr Baird'); • Ms Pamela Anderson, Registered Nurse, TCCU ('Ms Anderson'); • Ms Anne Marie Mallett who was, at the material time, the Service Group Director of the Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service ('Ms Mallett'), ; • Mr Stephen Eaton, Chief Operating Officer of the Health Service ('Mr Eaton'); • Ms Amanda Beckinsale who was, at the material time, the Nurse Unit Manager of the TCCU ('Ms Beckinsale'); and • Ms Toni Clayton, Registered Nurse, TCCU ('Ms Clayton'). Events and matters not in dispute [23] I do not understand the following events and matters to be in dispute. Most of the following events are in fact the correspondence between Mr Corney and various management representatives of the Health Service. [24] It will assist in the understanding of why I have found that Mr Corney did not suffer a compensable injury, by virtue of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act, for certain parts of that correspondence to be reproduced in these reasons. Mr Corney's accessing of the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients [25] In July 2021, Mr Corney was employed to work in the TCCU as an Advanced Skills Enrolled Nurse. [26] On 24 and 26 July 2021, Mr Corney, through CIMHA, accessed the medical records of the two PDSU patients.17 Mr Corney's email alleging breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 [27] By email sent on 24 July 2021 to Mr Jason Lee, Medical Director, Mental Health Service Group and to Ms Floriani, Mr Corney informed them that breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 had occurred in respect of the two PDSU patients. Mr Corney wrote: I would like to make you aware of continued breaches of the Mental Health Act by the Doctors of the AAMHIU in sending patients to the PDSU unit at TCCU that are on TA inpatient category with no LCT to support the patient being placed on leave to PDSU at TCCU. As you would be aware the facility of TCCU is no long [sic] able to be used as and [sic] Authorised Mental Health Unit. This was clearly published in the Queensland Government Gazette Vol 387 No.52 Thursday 1 July 2021 17 Exhibit 5. -- 7 of 62 -- 8 There has been no published Gazette notice identifying the 4 beds of villa 1 at TCCU as an Authorised Mental Health Unit. [Name deleted] Arrived at PDSU [date deleted] TA inpatient category. Has an LCT with only On Grounds – Escorted Up to 1 hour with QH staff and IMHW and On Grounds – Unescorted 6 x 15 minute leave breaks [Name deleted] Arrived at PDSU [date deleted]18 TA inpatient category. Has no current LCT19 ('Mr Corney's MHA allegations') Mr Baird's letter dated 17 August 2021 [28] By letter dated 17 August 2021, Mr Baird stated to Mr Corney: Dear Stephen I refer to your employment as an Enrolled Nurse with the Townsville Community Care Unit (TCCU), Mental Health Service Group and information I have received concerning conduct in your role. The incident relates to you accessing the electronic medical records of two consumers, CID 175503 and 26983, between 24 and 26 July 2021 without apparent legitimate reason to do so. Opportunity to provide information I would like to provide you with an opportunity to provide information regarding the incident, so that I may better understand the circumstances before making a decision as to how to proceed. Copies of the CIMHA audits are attached for your information. Any response you wish to provide should be provided to me within fourteen (14) calendar days of the date you receive this letter. If you are a member of a union, you may wish to seek assistance from your union in preparing your response. If you do not respond within 14 calendar days of receipt of this letter I will make a decision based on the information currently available to me. I reiterate I am only considering the matter at this stage. No decision has been made, as to what, if any further action will be taken. If, after considering your response I determine further action is required, you will be informed of same.20 ('Mr Baird's 17 August letter'). [29] Mr Corney provided a response to Mr Baird's letter on 30 August 2021 ('Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird's 17 August letter'). Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird's letter is not in evidence, but a summary of it is given in Ms Mallett's letter to Mr Corney dated 29 October 2021 referred to in paragraph [34] below. 18 Pursuant to r 97(3) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011, I have deleted this identifying information of the two patients. 19 Exhibit 2, pages 4 and 5. 20 Exhibit 5. -- 8 of 62 -- 9 Mr Corney's email to Mr Baird sent on 18 August 2021 and Mr Baird's response sent on 20 August 2021 [30] By email sent on 18 August 2021 to Mr Baird, Mr Corney asked the following question of Mr Baird: Dear John I would like to know the origins of the compliant [sic] that I have accessed the identified consumers charts without authority. The Provided CIMHA reports are very specific and appear to be requested by someone. I would like to know who requested the audit of my CIMHA access for these specific consumers.21 [31] By email in response sent on 20 August 2021, Mr Baird stated: Hi Steve I am able to confirm that it was myself who requested the audit. As program manager I am responsible to ensure that any concerns raised re CIMHA accesses relating to the Rehabilitation stream are considered and followed up appropriately.22 The meeting on 8 September 2021 [32] On 8 September 2021, Mr Corney was requested to attend a meeting with Mr Baird and Ms Beckinsale regarding Mr Baird's 17 August letter and Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird's 17 August letter ('the 8 September meeting'). [33] A file note of the 8 September meeting was prepared by Mr Baird23 and was signed by Mr Baird and by Ms Beckinsale, and a copy provided to Mr Corney. Mr Corney provided a written response on his receipt of the file note.24 Ms Mallett's letter dated 29 October 2021 [34] By letter dated 29 October 2021, Ms Mallett wrote to Mr Corney, in respect of Mr Baird's 17 August letter and Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird's 17 August letter. In that letter, Ms Mallett relevantly stated: Outcome I have now carefully considered all of the information available to me including copies of the CIMHA audits and your response, and I would like to provide you with [sic] following outcomes. Your response states that as part of the agreement between the Adult Acute Mental Health Inpatient Unit (AAMHIU) and TCCU that TCCU staff receive a clinical handover of Pre-Discharge Satellite Unit (PDSU) consumers every shift and as part of this handover, TCCU staff need to be aware of any clinical issues, risk profile and current Mental Health Act status associated with the consumer. Your response further states that following the degazetting of TCCU on 1 July 2021, you became aware that some consumers' Mental Health Act status did not meet the requirements to be cared for in an unauthorised residential community unit. 21 Exhibit 20. 22 Exhibit 20. 23 Exhibit 10. 24 Exhibit 10. -- 9 of 62 -- 10 You acknowledge in your response that you accessed the CIMHA notes of the patients. You assert that that [sic] the patients didn't meet the requirements as per the Mental Health Act 2016, that you raised this with the PDSU nurse who you claim did not escalate further, and that you accessed these notes again to show the Shift Coordinator and other PDSU nurses on subsequent shifts. In consideration of the above responses, I acknowledge that your reasoning for accessing the consumers' CIMHA files appear to be for work related purposes. To clarify, all PDSU are beds governed by the AAMHIU. The current MHSG "Adult Acute Health Inpatient Unit (AAMHIU) Pre-discharge Satellite Unit (PDSU) use during the COVID-19 Pandemic" procedure (Attachment A) provides clear dialogue that operational and nursing management and medical clinical management remains with the AAMHIU for admitted consumers at PDSU and that the role of TCCU clinicians is to provide support to the AAMHIU team when required. … Regarding the use of CIMHA, I refer to THHS (THHSSUP140794v3) MHSG Monitored Access – CIMHA Procedure which states "you should only access a consumer's record in CIMHA when it is part of your duties, if it is a legal requirement, or when specific consent is given" and "consumer information must not be made available to any person or authority other than those staff responsible for the health care of the consumer, unless authorised through existing policy, legislation and standards". The CIMHA team provide regular reminders via email to all MHSG employees regarding appropriate use and access for consumer records in CIMHA, an example is included for reference. THHS (THHSCOR161077v1) Privacy and Confidentiality Policy also outlines principles relating to privacy and confidentiality for employees, In review of the information, I have determined that the allocated AAMHIU (PDSU) nurse had direct clinical care of the two consumers, and you did not have direct clinical care over these consumers, therefore I consider your access to both consumers' records was unauthorised. I acknowledge your original email addressed to Dr Jason Lee, Medical Director on 24 July 2021 and that your concerns regarding potential breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 of two consumers has since been resolved. I understand that Amanda Beckinsale, Nurse Unit Manager and John Baird met with you on 18 August 2021 and 8 September 2021 to communicate MHSG's escalation pathways for any similar, future matters regarding risk or safety. While I acknowledge that you felt you had genuine reasons for accessing the consumers' records, as per THHS policies previously outlined, you must only access records of consumers who are within your direct clinical care. I expect that if you identify any concerns regarding care of PDSU consumers, you escalate these concerns to your Shift Coordinator or Clinical Nurse Consultant in the first instance to enable local resolution. Should this effort fail to address your concerns, please escalate to the Nursing Director and to myself as Service Group Director. Lastly, your response asserts that MHSG have brought this matter to you to intimidate you, and to stop you from making complaints. In review of the steps taken to work through your concerns and support you have received from your line management, I am satisfied that the MHSG have undertaken reasonable management action in addressing this matter. I was unable to identify evidence to support your statement that MHSG are trying to intimidate you and to stop you from making complaints. I consider the action taken to be appropriate in the circumstances and accordingly, I now consider the matter to be closed. Future disciplinary action You should note that this warming is not considered as a disciplinary action against you, However, if you fail to accurately and appropriately use CIMHA or any other patient medical record system required in your role, I will take this warning into consideration in determining an appropriate course of action.25 ('Ms Mallet's letter') 25 Exhibit 11. -- 10 of 62 -- 11 [35] It is not in dispute that Ms Mallett's letter was received by Mr Corney on 17 November 2021.26 Mr Corney's grievance against Mr Baird and Ms Mallet [36] By email sent on 3 December 2021 to Ms Stefanie Loro, Human Resources Business Partner of the Health Service ('Ms Loro'), Mr Corney lodged a formal grievance against Mr Baird and Ms Mallett ('Mr Corney's grievance'). After setting out the background to his grievance, Mr Corney stated: On the 17 th August 2021 I received a formal complaint letter from Mr John Baird, Nursing Director/Program Manager, Rehabilitation Services, Mental Health Service Group. The letter stated "I refer to your employment as on Enrolled Nurse with the Townsville Community Care Unit (TCCU), Mental Health Service Group and information I have received concerning conduct in your role. The incident relates to you accessing the electronic medical records of two consumers, ... between 24 and 26 July 2021 without apparent legitimate reason to do so." I emailed John to ask for the source of the complaint and who asked for the report from CIMHA team. John admitted that he generated the complaint and report. Mr Baird called for an impromptu meeting on 08/09/2021 and sent Amanda Beckinsale NUM of TCCU to get me. I was not told the purpose of the meeting prior to attending the meeting. I was not offered to have a support person. I had not been given a formal response back from my letter addressing the complaint by Mr Baird. The file note and my response are attached. After the 08/09/2021 meeting where I expressed to Mr Baird that I felt I was being bullied. This is based on the belief that Mr Baird is using his position of Team Leader to intimidate me with the complaint to try and stop or inhibit me making legitimate complaints of breaches of the Mental Health Act. On the 17/11/2021 I received the formal outcome from the complaint from Mr Baird. The response was signed by the Mental Health Service Group Director, Ann Marie Mallett. Ms Mallett stated "I have determined that the allocated AAMHIU (PDSU) nurse had direct clinical care of the two consumers, and you did not have direct clinical care over these consumers, therefore I consider your access to both consumers' records was unauthorised." Ms Mallett stated the reasoning for her decision was based on the policy THHSSUP140794v3 Monitored access – Consumer Integrated Mental Health and Addiction Application (CIMHA) "CIMHA users are reminded of their responsibilities under the Queensland Health Code of Conduct in particular: • You should only access a consumer's record in CIMHA when it is part of your duties, if it is a legal requirement, or when specific consent is given. • Consumer information must not be made available to any person or authority other than those staff responsible for the health care of the consumer, unless authorised through existing policy, legislation and standards." It appears that Mr Baird and Ms Mallet didn't follow the THHSCOR171181v1 TITLE Privacy and confidentiality - monitoring and breach management (including inappropriate access to personal, sensitive, or confidential information) Procedure. Which states, "Breaches of privacy, misuse of information and inappropriate access to information are Code of Conduct matters and will be dealt with via the disciplinary procedure process. 26 Exhibit 14, first page, eighth paragraph. -- 11 of 62 -- 12 Any privacy concerns should be reported using the Privacy Concern Notification Form at Appendix 1, emailed to THHS Privacy and Confidentiality Alternatively, privacy concerns can be communicated to the Manager, Clinical Information Services on Ext. 31333 or the Release of Information Team on Ext. 31319" "If you are identified as accessing information outside of your scope of work or responsibility, your Line Manager will be notified. You will then be required to explain the circumstances and reason why you should not lose your access/ why a disciplinary process should not be initiated. All privacy concerns and the outcomes are logged in a Privacy Concern database to facilitate monitoring of each privacy concern notification." I contacted the Manager, Clinical Information Services, to ask if a complaint had been generated regarding the alleged breach that Mr Baird was accusing me of. They stated that they had not received any compliant [sic] or correspondence. As for the investigation and conclusion of the breach. I do not believe I breached policies and code of conduct. 1. There was already established information sharing of PDSU patients to TCCU staff via written handover sheet and verbal handover of the PDSU patients to TCCU staff. 2. There was a requirement under law to share information about PDSU patients. As the TCCU staff were the clinical backup and duress response for PDSU. Therefore, TCCU nurses would be considered part of the care team of PDSU patient whilst housed on the TCCU Campus. 3. Guideline Information Sharing Between mental health staff, consumers, family carers, nominated support persons and others. Clearly shows that Information sharing is allowed for the purpose "1. Sharing information that is necessary for the consumer's treatment and care Relevant information about the consumer's assessment and treatment may be shared with a key person involved in the consumer's care and recovery from mental illness. 3. Sharing information to prevent serious risk to life, health or safety All Queensland Health staff have a duty of care to disclose any relevant information about a consumer to avert a serious risk to the life, health or safety of the consumer or another person or to public safety." 4. In the time frame around the alleged breach TCCU nurses responded to 4 critical incidents and actively assisted the PDSU nurse. 2 suicide attempts and 2 aggressive behaviour events. I believe Ms Mallett and Mr Baird are using their power and authority to try to intimidate me because I have valid complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act that have embarrassed the Mental Health Service group.27 ('Mr Corney's grievance'). The relevant policies at the time of Mr Corney's grievance [37] At the time Mr Corney lodged his grievance, the applicable Queensland Health Human Resources polices were: • Policy E13, 'Workplace Harassment' ('the Harassment Policy');28 and • Policy E12, 'Individual employee grievances' ('the Grievance Policy').29 27 Exhibit 14. 28 Exhibit 16. 29 Exhibit 18. -- 12 of 62 -- 13 [38] The Harassment Policy relevantly provided:. 7.1 Workplace Harassment A person is subjected to workplace harassment if the person is subjected to repeated behaviour, other than behaviour amounting to sexual harassment, by a person, including the person's employer, a co- worker or a group of co-workers, that: • is unwelcome and unsolicited • the person considers to be offensive, intimidating, humiliating or threatening • a reasonable person would consider to be offensive, humiliating, intimidating or threatening. Workplace harassment does not include reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the person's employer in connection with the person's employment. Managers and supervisors have a responsibility to direct subordinate staff in the corporate interest.30 [39] Attachment One to the Grievance Policy set out the process when an employee commences an individual grievance under the Grievance Policy which was not about the Director-General or a Health Service Chief Executive.31 [40] Furthermore, relevantly to Mr Corney's grievance, was the Health Service's privacy and confidentiality policy entitled 'Privacy and confidentiality-monitoring and breach management (including inappropriate access to personal, sensitive or confidential information)', being Health Service policy THHSCOR171181v1, which was effective from 26 February 2018 ('the first Privacy Policy'). 32 [41] A later version of the policy, effective from 30 March 2022, was entitled 'Privacy and Confidentiality Monitoring and Breach Management', being Health Service policy THHSCOR171181v2 ('the second Privacy Policy').33 Mr Eaton's investigation of Mr Corney's grievance [42] Mr Eaton investigated Mr Corney's grievance. [43] There was a delay in Mr Eaton's investigation of Mr Corney's grievance. By email sent on 9 December 2021 from Ms Loro, she advised Mr Corney that she had received his grievance, and stated that as Mr Baird and Ms Mallett were named within his grievance, it may be appropriate for his concerns to be considered by Mr Eaton as Chief Operating Officer.34 [44] By email sent on 22 December 2021 from Ms Danielle Hornsby, Acting Chief Operating Officer, Mr Corney was advised that Mr Eaton would review his grievance given that Ms Mallett and Mr Baird were named within his grievance. Mr Corney was further advised that with the upcoming compulsory Christmas closure, an update would be provided to him in the New Year.35 There is no dispute that Mr Eaton was away on leave over the Christmas/New Year period for approximately six weeks.36 30 Exhibit 16, page 3 of 9. 31 Exhibit 18, Attachment 1, pages 1-3. 32 Exhibit 29. 33 Exhibit 12. 34 Exhibit 26, second page. 35 Exhibit 27. 36 T4-12, ll 7-11. -- 13 of 62 -- 14 [45] By email sent on 10 January 2022, Mr Corney asked Ms Loro for an update about his grievance. Ms Loro (now named Ms Stanhope) responded by email on 10 January 2022, and advised that while the appropriate delegate was still being considered, the Health Service's present focus was on its COVID-19 response. By email sent on 1 February 2022 to Mr Corney, Ms Stanhope advised that Mr Eaton had returned to work and that he would be delegated to review Mr Corney's grievance. By email sent on 18 February 2022, Mr Corney advised Ms Stanhope that he would be on leave from 21 February 2022 until 21 March 2022 and that he was happy to be contacted while he was on leave about his grievance.37 Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance [46] By letter dated 2 March 2022, Mr Eaton informed Mr Corney of the outcome of the investigation he conducted of his (Mr Corney's) grievance. After setting out the relevant background and summarising Mr Corney's grievances, Mr Eaton stated: Considerations Workplace harassment is defined as repeated and unreasonable behaviour directed towards an individual or group of workers that creates a risk to health and safety. It occurs when a person is subjected to repeated behaviour that is unwelcome and unsolicited; the person considers (the behaviour) to be to be [sic] offensive, intimidating, humiliating or threatening; and a reasonable person would consider (the behaviour) to be offensive, intimidating, humiliating or threatening (attachment 1: Bullying Fact Sheet). Findings 1. Using the above definition of harassment, I find no evidence of repeated inappropriate behaviour against you by Mr Baird. As noted by Mr Baird in his file note dated 8.9.21 and acknowledged by you in your correspondence dated 16.9.21 that you had heard his statement, Mr Baird reiterated he had not directed you to stop making complaints and he has no concerns with you raising issues regarding risk and safety, and then further outlined the appropriate process to undertake if there are any future concerns. In examining whether the process undertaken to request information from you regarding a potential breach of confidentiality and privacy was designed to intimidate you; I find the process to afford you with the opportunity to provide further information is consistent with practice across the THHS and is a reasonable management action. Therefore, I find the concern that Mr Baird is intimidating you by raising this matter with you, and to stop future complaints being raised by you is unsubstantiated. 2. In dealing with privacy and confidentiality breaches, the disciplinary process and appropriate referrals to CIS, the CCC and police are to be followed when the health service has clearly established grounds that inappropriate breaches have occurred. As you should appreciate, it would be highly stressful on staff if the health service were to immediately make those referrals purely based on suspicion without undertaking a less formal process where possible to first review the circumstances. As indicated in her correspondence to you, Ms Mallett determined your access appeared to be for work related purposes, albeit the access itself was unauthorised. Given this may have been a grey area, Ms Mallett has now provided clear direction on any future access to consumer records being dependent on you providing direct clinical care to the consumer or escalating any concerns to the appropriate line manager or clinician. I consider it reasonable that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett were able to undertake a less formal process to determine that there was no need in this instance to escalate to the more formal course of action. Therefore, I find the concern that Ms Mallett and Mr Baird did not follow an appropriate process in addressing a potential privacy concern to be unsubstantiated. 37 Exhibit 26, first and second pages. -- 14 of 62 -- 15 3. The outcome provided to you by Ms Mallett does not indicate you have breached the Code of Conduct and goes on to state that this is not considered a disciplinary action. Regarding the relevant policies, Ms Mallett has made a determination regarding your circumstances in accessing the PDSU consumer information in relation to the policy, and then provided clarity regarding her expectations in the future. I appreciate that you may disagree with Ms Mallet's decision, however as an accountable officer, she has now provided you with a reasonable direction regarding managing similar issues in the future. I find your concern regarding this matter is unsubstantiated. 4. As noted previously, I find it is reasonable to review and investigate potential breaches of privacy and confidentiality of consumer records. I have also considered that in Mr Baird's meeting with you and in Ms Mallett's correspondence, both have again tried to reassure you that you are still entitled to raise any issues regarding risk and safety. Therefore, I find your concern that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett have used that process because you had raised concerns regarding the Mental Health Act to be unsubstantiated. I would reiterate the sentiment that the health service expects all employees to be vigilant where there may be potential risks and safety issues that may affect the care and wellbeing of our consumers and patients. Identifying potential breaches of the MHA before any harm can occur will never be seen as an embarrassment but is encouraged to promote best practice and continuous improvement, as well as good care outcomes for our consumers.38 ('Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance). The meeting between Mr Eaton and Mr Corney on 6 April 2022 [47] By email sent on 4 April 2022, Mr Corney requested a meeting with Mr Eaton to discuss Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance.39 [48] On 6 April 2022, a meeting took place between Mr Eaton, with Mr Aubrey Murakami, Human Resources Business Partner, and Mr Corney regarding Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance.40 [49] In that meeting Mr Corney raised a number of concerns about his treatment by the Health Service up to that point. Mr Eaton's letter dated 25 May 2022 [50] By letter dated 25 May 2022, Mr Eaton responded to the concerns raised by Mr Corney in the meeting held on 6 April 2022 (Mr Eaton's 25 May letter').41 [51] The concerns raised by Mr Corney in the meeting held on 6 April 2022, and the issues addressed in Mr Eaton's letter dated 25 May 2022, were: • Ms Mallett's formal warning letter dated 29 October 2021;42 • whether there had been compliance by the Health Service with the second Privacy Policy in respect of his access to CIMHA regarding the two PDSU patients;43 38 Exhibit 15. 39 Exhibit 25. 40 T 4-13, ll 14-23 and Exhibit 17, first paragraph. 41 Exhibit 17. 42 Exhibit 17, page 1. 43 Exhibit 17, page 2. -- 15 of 62 -- 16 • that Mr Eaton had not contacted him as part of a formal investigation as required by the Grievance Policy;44 • whether Mr Baird had a conflict of interest in raising his concern with him (Mr Corney) about his access to CIMHA in respect of the two PDSU patients and determining the outcome of his concerns;45 and • whether he had been the subject of bullying.46 [52] In respect of Ms Mallett's formal warning letter dated 29 October 2021, Mr Eaton relevantly stated: In the warning letter provided to you by Ms Mallett, she states, "I have determined that the allocated AAMHIU (PDSU) nurse had direct clinical care of the two consumers, and you did not have direct clinical care over these consumers, therefore I consider your access to both consumers' records was unauthorised". Critically, I note that the PDSU consumers were never under your direct care, and there was no impediment to you raising any queries you had at handover or with your line manager. Given the above considerations, I confirm that Ms Mallett's decision finding that your access of consumer records who were not under your direct care was unauthorised; is appropriate and fair.47 [53] As to whether there had been compliance by the Health Service with the second Privacy Policy in respect of Mr Corney's access to CIMHA regarding the two PDSU patients, Mr Eaton relevantly stated: In our discussion you noted that the above procedure provides the process on how to manage and report potential privacy breaches, which includes notification to CIS via the Potential Privacy Breach Notification form, with matters to be recorded in the Privacy Register. I confirm that a notification has not yet occurred, and as such, I will direct the service group to complete this task retrospectively, and to have the outcome recorded on the Privacy Register. I do note that potential privacy breaches involving CIMHA are required to be referred back to the Mental Health Information Officer for review, however a notification should have occurred. Even though the notification to CIS did not occur, I do not consider it had a material bearing on Ms Mallett's finding.48 [54] As to whether stage 2 of the Grievance Policy had been adhered to in respect of Mr Eaton's investigation of Mr Corney's grievance, Mr Eaton relevantly stated: Reviewing the circumstances of your matter, I deemed a formal investigation was not required. As outlined in my letter to you dated 2 March 2022, I found the process to afford you the opportunity to provide information in response to a concern is consistent with practice across the Townsville HHS, is a reasonable management action, and I was able to make that finding on review of the material that had been presented to me.49 [55] In respect of whether Mr Baird had a conflict of interest, Mr Eaton relevantly stated: In the workplace context, Mr Baird is not a complainant as he is one of your line managers and he has a legitimate authority to address and review concerns that occur within his area of program management. At the stage that he commenced the please explain process it would have been reasonable for him as a Nursing Director to have made a finding into the matter he had raised with 44 Exhibit 17, page 3. 45 Exhibit 17, page 3. 46 Exhibit 17, pages 3-4. 47 Exhibit 17, page 2. 48 Exhibit 17, page 2. 49 Exhibit 17, page 3. -- 16 of 62 -- 17 you, and then determine if your matter required escalation to a formal process or could be resolved with an outcome letter. In this instance as Mr Baird became aware that you were concerned with his continued management of the matter, I find he exercised good judgment to ask Ms Mallett to consider the matter and provide you with an outcome letter, and therefore prevent any actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest occurring.50 [56] Finally, in respect of whether Mr Corney had been the subject of bullying, Mr Eaton relevantly stated: Bullying As noted in my previous correspondence, I found that there was no evidence in the material that was presented to me that bullying had occurred. Providing you with an opportunity to respond to a concern is not in itself a form of bullying. Our policies allow that reasonable comment, advice, administrative action or discussions by a manager with an employee regarding their work performance and/or behaviour is not bullying behaviour (Manager's guide – bulling and harassment, attachment 3). Similarly, raising a concern of a potential breach of privacy and confidentiality is not considered as a vexatious complaint as our managers are tasked with the responsibility of protecting the personal and confidential health information of our patients and consumers. I acknowledge you raised in our discussion that you felt you had been targeted as a result of raising various concerns with management, and this action was to stop you making complaints as you had embarrassed management by identifying breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016. I do note that in the file note provided to you of your meeting dated 8 September 2021 with Mr Baird and in the correspondence from Ms Mallett dated 29 October 2021, both managers clearly iterated that there were no concerns with you continuing to raise any issues of risk or safety, and provided you with escalation pathways for any future risk and safety concerns. I have raised your concern with Ms Mallett that you felt targeted as you believed you were the only person to receive a please explain letter, even though there were other employees who were in a similar situation. She was unaware of this. If you are able, please provide Ms Mallett further details on the instances that this occurred. You also raised that when you met with Mr Baird and Ms Beckinsale on 8 September 2021 , you felt that you should have been offered a support person. Queensland Health, as an employer, has the right to directly communicate with its employees on work-related issues. In those circumstances, it may not be necessary or appropriate for an employee to have a support person present at a meeting with the supervisor or line manager. However, if at any time during the meeting you believe it has progressed to a formal discussion about work performance or behavioural issues, or if you feel intimidated, you are entitled to pause the meeting and request a support person. As discussed in our meeting, if you have evidence of other specific and repeated instances where you believe either Mr Baird or Ms Mallett have acted with unreasonable behaviour that is humiliating, intimidating, threatening or demeaning, please provide me with further detail.51 Mr Corney's letter to Mr Eaton dated 8 June 2022 [57] Following Mr Eaton's letter to Mr Corney dated 25 May 2022, Mr Corney wrote to Mr Eaton, by letter dated 8 June 2022, disputing Mr Eaton's conclusions as recorded in his letter dated 25 May 2022.52 [58] Mr Corney relevantly wrote: Dear Mr Eaton, Thank you for your response and decision regarding my grievance. 50 Exhibit 17, page 3. 51 Exhibit 17, pages 3-4. 52 Exhibit 28. -- 17 of 62 -- 18 Regarding the alleged breach of confidentiality, I note that you have supported the original decision that I am in breach of confidentiality. I strongly disagree with your assessment. I am concerned that deficiencies in the original complaint and subsequent 'investigation' mean that I have not been afforded procedural fairness. For clarity, my concern is that everyone involved with investigating this 'breach of confidentiality' has not done so with due regard to the facts or is supporting a vexatious complaint by Mr Baird. I feel it is important to register that I have felt subjected to bullying behaviour and am afraid that it will continue. As noted, you are taking the management action of recording the incident on the Breach of Confidentiality Register which is recorded against my employment record and requires a mandatory Notification to the Queensland Health Ombudsman of the alleged Breach of confidentiality. I believe your administrative decision constitutes adverse action and is unfair and unreasonable. I can prove with facts that I have not breached confidentiality.53 [59] Mr Corney then set out certain parts of s 139, s 142 and s 145 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, namely: Part 7 Confidentiality Division 1 Interpretation and application 139 Definitions for pt 7 In this part– confidential information means– (a) information, acquired by a person in the person's capacity as a designated person, from which a person who is receiving or has received a public sector health service could be identified; or … Division 2 Confidentiality Subdivision 1 Prohibited disclosure of confidential information 142 Confidential information must not be disclosed by designated persons (1) A designated person must not disclose, directly or indirectly, confidential information to another person unless the disclosure is required or permitted under this Act. Maximum penalty–100 penalty units. … 145 Disclosure of confidential information for care or treatment of person A designated person or prescribed health professional may disclose confidential information if the disclosure is for the care or treatment of the person to whom the information relates.54 [60] Mr Corney then seemed to refer to an internal Department set of principles, dated September 2017, that dealt with confidentiality, namely: Queensland Health Confidentiality General Principles Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 53 Exhibit 28, first page. 54 Exhibit 28, first and second pages. -- 18 of 62 -- 19 September 2017 Section 145 – Disclosure of confidential information for care or treatment of person The duty of confidentiality does not apply to the disclosure of confidential information by staff or prescribed health practitioners if the disclosure is required for the care 11 or treatment of the person concerned. For example, if the information is disclosed: • by a staff member to another staff member at the same facility; for example, a receptionist at a Hospital and Health Service community health facility disclosing information to a physiotherapist employed by the facility for the purpose of treating a patient • by a staff member to another staff member within the same Hospital and Health Service; for example, a staff member at one facility in the Hospital and Health Service providing documents to another facility for the purpose of patients being placed on a waiting list for treatment at the second facility • by a staff member to a health professional engaged to deliver a health service to a public patient in another Hospital and Health Service, for example, an administrative officer in the Release of Information area providing clinical notes to an emergency department of other hospital • by a health professional or any other staff member to a health care provider as long as it is relevant for care and treatment purposes; for example, by a Hospital and Health Service doctor to a Queensland Ambulance Service officer, or by a Hospital and Health Service nurse to a home carer for a person requiring home care following release from hospital: Although the department or Hospital and Health Service does not legally require patient consent for disclosure of confidential information for treatment or health care it is still considered to be best practice to discuss this with the patient prior to the disclosure to [sic] 11 Care in this context means 'health care'. Health care is generally accepted to mean care or treatment of, or a service or procedure to diagnose, maintain or treat a physical or mental condition which is carried out by, or at the direction of, or supervised by, a health provider.55 [61] Mr Corney then stated: 1. PDSU nurses gave clinical handover 3 times a day in the TCCU Nursing shift handover. Under the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011. If PDSU nurse [sic] are handing over clinical information, then TCCU nurses MUST be involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients or PDSU nurses have Breached Confidentiality. 2. Some of the Nurses sent by Acute to PDSU were Enrolled Nurses. Enrolled Nurses MUST be supervised by a Registered Nurse. A Registered Nurse from TCCU would be required to supervise the Enrolled Nurse. Again, Nurses from TCCU are involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. 3. Some medications require two nurses to sign for the medication to be given. This requires the PDSU nurse and a TCCU [sic] to access ieMR to look at the PDSU patient's medication order (confidential information). Then the two nurses will check patient ID with the patient and give the medication then sign for it on ieMR. This means TCCU nurses are involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients. If Mr Baird asserts that a specific rule excludes TCCU Nurses from viewing PDSU patients CIMHA notes, then this MUST be explicitly stated to what information and or documents are excluded from the general rule. 55 Exhibit 28, third page. -- 19 of 62 -- 20 The general knowledge of confidentiality as shown above should be known by Mr Baird, Ms Mallett, yourself, and any information expert you relied on for advice. I again assert that Mr Baird knowingly made a false claim that I had breached confidentiality and proceeded with an unfair and unjust management action. Mr Baird did not follow documented policies and procedures. He had stated he was going to be the decision maker in the first instance which was a conflict of interest. Ms Mallett failed in her duty to properly investigate Mr Baird's claim that 'I had breached confidentiality', by not following the documented policies and procedures. Ms Mallett issued an unfair and unjust administrative decision. As stated above I believe your administrative decision is unjust and unfair ('Mr Corney's 8 June response to Mr Eaton'). 56 Mr Corney's personal injury sustained on 16 June 2022 [62] On 16 June 2022, Mr Corney suffered a personal injury, namely, an adjustment disorder.57 [63] As stated earlier, there is no dispute that Mr Corney suffered a personal injury of a psychological nature, that injury arose out of or in the course of his employment and his employment was a significant contributing factor to that injury. Professor Keyes' letter dated 6 January 2023 [64] Mr Corney, by letter dated 1 September 2022, commenced a grievance against Mr Eaton and one other person. This grievance was dealt with by Professor Keyes. In the course of dealing with Mr Corney's grievance, Professor Keyes met with Mr Corney on 4 January 2023.58 [65] By letter dated 6 January 2023, Professor Keyes rescinded the warning given by Ms Mallett to Mr Corney by her letter dated 29 October 2021, for the reason that, according to Professor Keyes at that time, Mr Corney '… did not breach confidentiality' ('Professor Keyes' letter').59 The identification of the issues in dispute [66] Mr Corney filed final written submissions on 22 May 2025 ('Mr Corney submissions') and the Regulator filed its final written submissions on 25 June 2025 ('the Regulator's submissions'). On 1 August 2025, Mr Corney and the Regulator also made oral submissions. [67] In her oral submissions, Ms Willson of Counsel, on behalf of the Regulator, submitted, following Mr Corney's closing oral submissions, that Mr Corney's case '…must be limited to the statement of facts and contentions that have been filed and the case that has been run.'60 I agree. [68] In Fellows v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Office of Industrial Relations and Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor,61 I relevantly stated (citations and emphasis omitted): 56 Exhibit 28, third and fourth pages. 57 Exhibits 21, Exhibit 22, fifth page and Exhibit 23. 58 Exhibit 1. 59 Exhibit 1. 60 T 5-32, ll 14-19 (1 August 2025). 61 [2025] QIRC 107. -- 20 of 62 -- 21 [55] The purpose of Directions Orders issued by the Commission, for the filing and serving of statements of facts and contentions, was addressed by Martin J, President in Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator ('Yousif'). Although that case concerned an appeal under the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 to the Commission, his Honour's comments about the purpose of statements of facts and contentions are apposite: Statements of Facts and Contentions [10] The Commissioner relied, in part, on the Statement of Facts and Contentions filed by the appellant. The role of such Statements was the subject of submissions and it will assist if their status is examined before the grounds of appeal are considered. [11] In appeals brought to the Commission under the Act, it was once the standard practice for a direction to be given requiring the appellant to file and serve a Statement of Stressors. It is now the common practice for a direction to be given requiring the parties to file and serve Statements of Facts and Contentions. The legislative power to make such a direction is found in s 451(2)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act). More detailed provisions are contained in r 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011. Rule 45 also provides that, among other things, the Commission may dismiss a proceeding if there is a failure to comply with a direction. [12] In Blackwood v Adams, I referred to Statements of Stressors as setting "the boundaries of the application". More recently, in Carlton v Blackwood I said: "An appellant's case has to be known before the hearing starts. The Commission cannot allow a case to "evolve" and place the respondent in the position of having to contend with the shifting sands of an undefined argument. If an appellant wishes to advance a different case, then that should be done by seeking an amendment to the Statement of Stressors or the document identifying the facts and contentions. The Commission can then decide whether or not to allow such an amendment." [13] A Statement of Facts and Contentions is not attended with the same level of formality as pleadings in the traditional sense are. The Commission is relieved, by s 531 of the IR Act, of many of the strict rules which apply in the civil courts. But, the Commission is still in charge of its own procedure and may, consistently with the provisions of s 531, require parties to provide an outline of their respective cases. This is particularly important in appeals under the Act where the nature of injuries, their cause, and the times at which they were suffered are essential to the resolution of an appeal. It follows, then, that the Commission is entitled to rely on the Statement as a complete statement of a party's case and, if an admission is made, to rely on that admission. [14] Section 531 requires that the Commission be: "… guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of– (a) the persons immediately concerned; and (b) the community as a whole." [15] It is consistent with the requirements of s 531 for a party in an appeal under the Act to set out its case by way of a Statement of Facts and Contentions. It alerts the other party to the case it will have to deal with and it identifies the issues which exist which, in turn, allow for a confinement of the matters in dispute. An appeal under the Act is not the time for a broad ranging inquiry into an unlimited number of complaints or grievances. The time and resources of the Commission are constrained and it is necessary for those constraints to be acknowledged in this way. Subject always to the Commission's power to allow appropriate amendments (so that s 531 may be observed) a party will be bound by its Statement of Facts and Contentions and may not lead evidence which is not relevant to the identified issues. [56] Directions Orders made by Members of the Commission are made pursuant to r 41 of the Rules and, as provided in r 6 of the Rules, the purpose of the Rules is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Commission at a minimum of expense. [69] The issues in dispute arise from Mr Corney's contentions filed on 24 August 2023 ('Mr Corney's contentions') and the Regulator's amended contentions in response filed on -- 21 of 62 -- 22 11 June 2024. Mr Corney's contentions did not always clearly set out the material facts upon which he relied and the contentions he advanced.62 [70] In order to determine the central question of whether Mr Corney's adjustment disorder is removed from being a compensable injury as a consequence of the application of s 32(5)(a) or (b) of the Act, I must have regard to Mr Corney's contentions. Because Mr Corney decompensated on 16 June 2022, it is only the management actions Mr Corney contends were unreasonable, that occurred before that date, that could have any causal connection with his injury. [71] The issues in dispute are whether the following allegations, contained in Mr Corney's contentions, are made out such that they amount to management action that was unreasonable or, in the alternative, amount to reasonable management action that was taken in an unreasonable way. They are: • that Mr Baird's 17 August letter was '… a formal complaint letter' that he (Mr Corney) had '… breached confidentiality';63 • that Mr Baird, by virtue of his 17 August letter, was trying to bully him (Mr Corney) in that Mr Baird was using his position of team leader to intimidate Mr Corney with the complaint to stop or inhibit Mr Corney from making '… legitimate complaints of breaches of the Mental Health Act.';64 • that in respect of the 8 September meeting, Mr Baird called for an '…impromptu meeting' and directed Ms Beckinsale, to secure his presence at the meeting, and in that regard: - he was not told the purpose of the meeting; - he was not offered to have a support person; and - he had not, at that point, had a response back from Mr Baird's 17 August letter;65 • that Mr Baird conducted an '… unfair and unjust investigation' and he (Mr Baird) had '…an obvious conflict of interest;66 62 Further, the paragraphs in Mr Corney's contentions were not numbered and his contentions were not paginated. As a consequence, I will identify the relevant contentions by referring to the paragraph, in the order it appears, on the relevant page of Mr Corney's contentions. 63 Mr Corney's contentions, first page, second paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 5 and 6 and the written submissions of the Workers' Compensation Regulator filed on 25 June 2025 ('the Regulator's submissions'), paras. 42-56. 64 Mr Corney's contentions, first page, third paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 5, 6 and 17 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 111-113. 65 Mr Corney's contentions, first page, third paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 11-18 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 57-66. 66 Mr Corney's contentions, second page, sixth paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 19-21 and 22-25 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 67-78. -- 22 of 62 -- 23 • that Mr Baird, and by her letter, Ms Mallett, did not follow the first Privacy Policy;67 • that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett (by her letter it appears) used their power and authority to try to unduly influence Mr Corney because he made '… relevant complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act that have embarrassed the Mental Health Service group';68 • Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance;69 and • Mr Eaton's further decision about Mr Corney's grievance contained in his 25 May letter.70 [72] The Regulator does not dispute that all of these above actions of the Health Service, as pointed to by Mr Corney in his contentions, amounted to management action.71 [73] There are other allegations made by Mr Corney in his final submissions that were not made in his contentions. I identify, and deal with, those matters later in these reasons. [74] Before proceeding to determine if s 32(5)(a) or s 32(5)(b) of the Act has any application in respect of Mr Corney's claim for workers' compensation, there is one other matter to address. Did the management action, the subject of the disputed issues, have a causal connection with Mr Corney's personal injury? [75] The Regulator does concede that Mr Corney suffered a personal injury, namely, an adjustment disorder, and that injury arose out of, or in the course of his employment by the Health Service and that his employment was a significant contributing factor to that injury. [76] However, it also must be the case that there is a causal or temporal connection between the management action the subject of the disputed issues (whether reasonable or taken in a reasonable manner, or not) and Mr Corney's injury.72 [77] The Regulator submitted that: • there did not seem to be any evidence of any causal connection between the alleged failure by Mr Baird and Ms Mallet to comply with the first Privacy Policy and Mr Corney's injury;73 67 Mr Corney's contentions, second page, second paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 26-30 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 79-85. 68 Mr Corney's contentions, second page, fifth paragraph. The Regulator, in its submissions at paras. 111-113, identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney. 69 Mr Corney's contentions, second page, sixth paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 31-40 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 91-101. 70 Mr Corney's contentions, third page, first paragraph. The Regulator identified this issue as a contention advanced by Mr Corney: the Regulator's contentions, paras. 41-42 and the Regulator's submissions, paras. 102-110. 71 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 119-120. 72 Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010, [53] (Martin J, President). 73 T 5-38, ll 14-19. -- 23 of 62 -- 24 • there was no medical evidence of a causal connection between the issue of the delay in Mr Eaton commencing his investigation of Mr Corney's grievance about Mr Baird and Ms Mallett and Mr Corney's injury;74 and • there is no evidence that Mr Corney's complaint, that Mr Eaton should not have considered Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 2 of the Grievance Policy, had a causal connection with Mr Corney's injury.75 [78] The unchallenged evidence of Dr Benedict Ponti, Mr Corney's General Practitioner, was that the mechanism for Mr Corney's adjustment disorder was that he felt recent complaints made against him were vexatious in nature and were in response to complaints he had previously made.76 Exhibit 23 is a medical report dated 9 December 2024 by Dr Ponti in which he states that he treated Mr Corney '… regarding a workers' compensation claim' on six dates in 2022 and 2023. Dr Ponti further stated that Mr Corney presented '… after conflict in his workplace' and that he (Mr Corney) '… had felt recent complaints made against him were vexatious in nature and a response to complaints he himself had previously made' and that Mr Corney '… had escalated the matter to the chief operating officer of the hospital.' [79] Dr Ponti then stated: I provisionally diagnosed him with an adjustment disorder at that time and recommended he go on modified duties which included working in a different department with no interaction between himself and those he had made complaints against nor had lodged complaints against him. [80] On the basis of Dr Ponti's unchallenged evidence, although the management actions are broadly identified, I conclude that there was a causal connection between Mr Corney's adjustment disorder and the management action of: • Mr Baird, being his 17 August correspondence with Mr Corney, about Mr Corney accessing the electronic medical records on CIMHA in respect of the two PDSU patients, and Mr Baird's subsequent meeting with Mr Corney about how Mr Corney should escalate complaints of alleged breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016; • Ms Mallett, by the decision contained in her letter dated 29 October 2021, that Mr Corney was not authorised to access the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients, and warning Mr Corney not to access the electronic medical records of patients for whom he did not have direct care; and • Mr Eaton, by his action in determining Mr Corney's grievance against Mr Baird and Ms Mallett. [81] I accept the Regulator's submission that there is no medical or other evidence of a causal connection between the issue of the delay in Mr Eaton commencing his investigation of 74 The Regulator's submissions, para. 90. 75 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 104-107. 76 Exhibit 21, Exhibit 22 and the entry for 16 June 2022 and Exhibit 23. -- 24 of 62 -- 25 Mr Corney's grievance about Mr Baird and Ms Mallett and Mr Corney's injury. There is no such evidence. [82] Also, I accept the Regulator's submission that there is no evidence of any causal connection between the alleged failure by Mr Baird and Ms Mallet to comply with the first Privacy Policy and Mr Corney's injury. There was no specific mention made of this issue when Mr Corney consulted Dr Ponti on the date he decompensated, namely 16 June 2022.77 Mr Corney's complaint to Dr Ponti, about what caused the deterioration of his mental state, is made clear in the medical records of Dr Ponti. That was that Mr Corney felt as though he was being bullied in the workplace in that he was subject to retribution for making his complaint about the alleged contravention of the Mental Health Act 2016 in respect of the two PDSU patients.78 [83] Further, I accept the Regulator's submission that there is no evidence that suggests a causal connection between Mr Corney's complaint, that Mr Eaton did not, in the first instance, consider his grievance at Stage 1 of the Grievance Policy and Mr Corney's injury. The decision contained in Mr Eaton's 25 May letter came about because Mr Corney requested a meeting with Mr Eaton following Mr Eaton's first decision about Mr Corney's grievance. That meeting occurred on 6 April 2022. One of the issues raised was whether Mr Eaton should have contacted Mr Corney as part of Mr Eaton's consideration of Mr Corney's grievance. At that meeting, no issue was raised by Mr Corney about Mr Eaton undertaking his review in accordance with Stage 2 of the Grievance Policy. Furthermore, the evidence is that when Mr Corney first consulted his General Practitioner on 16 June 2022 about his mental state, there was no record taken by Mr Corney's General Practitioner that Mr Eaton's action, in reviewing Mr Corney's grievance in accordance with Stage 2 (and not Stage 1) of the Grievance Policy, was a cause of Mr Corney's deteriorating mental state. As the Regulator submits, the entry in respect of that consultation was that Mr Corney had '… escalated through usual pathways to level of COO.'79 Did Mr Corney's personal injury arise out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the Health Service in connection with Mr Corney's employment within the meaning of s 32(5)(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003? Section 32(5)(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 [84] In Townsend v Workers' Compensation Regulator,80 I set out the relevant principles in respect of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act (citations omitted): [15] Section 32(5)(a) of the Act only operates to remove a psychological disorder from the statutory definition of 'injury' where reasonable management action is taken in a reasonable way. Management action 77 Exhibit 22 and the entry for 16 June 2022. 78 Exhibit 21, Exhibit 22 and the entry for 16 June 2022 and Exhibit 23. 79 Exhibit 22 and the entry for 16 June 2022. 80 [2022] QIRC 105. -- 25 of 62 -- 26 [16] The verb 'manage' relevantly means '… to handle, direct, govern, or control in action or use' and the noun 'management' relevantly means '… the act or manner of managing; handling, direction, or control.' [17] Section 32 of the Act provides the following examples of actions that may be reasonable management actions taken in a reasonable way, namely: • action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, redeploy, retrench or dismiss the worker • a decision not to award or provide promotion, reclassification or transfer of, or leave of absence or benefit in connection with, the worker's employment [18] An example in an Act of the operation of a provision of the Act is part of the Act. Section 14D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 provides that if an Act includes an example of the operation of the provision: • the example is not exhaustive; and • the example does not limit, but may extend, the meaning of the provision; and • the example and the provision are to be read in the context of each other and the other provisions of the Act, but, if the example and the provision so read are inconsistent, the provision prevails. [19] The examples contained in s 32 of the Act are an aid to its interpretation and, having regard to the examples, the phrase 'management action' means action taken by a manager, in relation to a worker, in managing, handling, directing or controlling the worker. [20] Further, the exclusory action in s 32(5) of the Act was intended by Parliament to relate to specific management action directed to the worker's employment itself, as opposed to action forming part of the everyday duties or tasks that the worker performed in employment, such that the management action said to enliven s 32(5) of the Act must be something different to the everyday duties and incidental tasks of the worker's employment. Section 32(5)(a) of the Act [21] In State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator, the relevant principles in respect of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act were summarised, namely: [22] In order for s 32(5)(a) of the Act to apply, three things must be shown, namely: • that there was reasonable management action; and • that it was taken in a reasonable way; and • that the 'action' gave rise to the disorder. [23] The correct enquiry is not whether or not unreasonable management action was the dominant cause of the injury. The phrase 'arising out of' in section 32(5)(a) of the Act can be readily understood, when combined with 'reasonable management action,' as requiring the demonstration of a causal relationship; and the phrase 'in the course of' in section 32(5)(a) of the Act generally requires a temporal connection. [24] The task for the Commission, when applying s 32(5)(a) of the Act, does not involve setting out what it regards as the type of actions that would have been reasonable in the circumstances. The proper task is to assess the management action which was taken and determine whether it was reasonable and whether it was taken in a reasonable way; and sometimes that may involve consideration of what else might have been done however that will only be relevant to whether what was done was, in fact, reasonable. [25] The determination of whether the management action is reasonable and whether such action was taken in a reasonable way is evaluative as well as judgemental. Whether the management action is reasonable and whether such action was taken in a reasonable way will be an inquiry of fact to be determined objectively. -- 26 of 62 -- 27 [26] Reasonableness does not necessarily equate with 'industrial fairness' although considerations of 'fairness' will always be relevant. An imperfection in management action may not justify the characterisation of the management action as unreasonable. Management action need only be reasonable; it does not need to be perfect. Instances of imperfect but reasonable management action may, in the appropriate circumstances, be considered a blemish and management action does not need to be without blemish to be reasonable. [27] Reasonable, in the context of s 32(5) of the Act, means reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. It is the reality of the employer's conduct that must be considered and not the employee's perception of the employer's conduct. [28] However, the reasonableness of action by management has to be considered '… in connection with the worker's employment' which requires consideration of all disparate elements which contribute to the injury. In an appropriate case, that consideration may require a global view of the management action to determine if the action was reasonable. However, simply because a large number of stressors are nominated does not mean a consideration of the impact of the stressors on a global basis is justified. [29] Such a global view may be justified where there are repetitive blemishes joined by subject matter, time and personality in a discordant workplace housing. [85] I will address the question of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act by dealing with each of the issues in dispute. [86] It is necessary, however, to address an issue referred to by Mr Corney and by the Regulator in their submissions, namely, whether Mr Corney, for the reasons he has advanced, on 24 and 26 July 2021, had the authority to access the records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA. [87] The determination of this issue is at the heart of Mr Corney's appeal, namely, whether or not the management action that followed his access of the records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA, was reasonable or was taken in a reasonable way. Did Mr Corney have authority to access the two PDSU patients' records through CIMHA for the reasons he asserts? [88] Exhibit 5 puts it beyond dispute that, on 24 and 26 July 2021, Mr Corney accessed the records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA. [89] In his written submissions, Mr Corney submitted that: • a PDSU nurse could only hand over confidential patient information if TCCU nurses (like himself) were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients and, as a consequence, TCCU nurses are involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients;81 and 81 The written submissions of Mr Steven Corney filed on 22 May 2025 ('Mr Corney's submissions'), para. 29. -- 27 of 62 -- 28 • by virtue of s 14582 and s 161C(1) and (2)83 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 ('the HHB Act'), he was '… authorised by Law to access the patient records on the CIMHA system.'84 [90] The Regulator submits that the evidence proves that Mr Corney did not need to, and should not have, accessed CIMHA for the purposes of ascertaining the mental health status of the two PDSU patients.85 [91] I accept the Regulator's submissions. There are three reasons for this. The weight of the evidence [92] First, the weight of evidence is that, in respect of the two PDSU patients, it was not part of Mr Corney's duties to access their medical records on CIMHA to ascertain their mental health status. [93] Mr Corney's evidence was: • he was provided confidential information about the two PDSU patients by a PDSU nurse at a shift handover;86 • while he was a nurse who had direct care for up to six patients in the TCCU, he was '…still part of the care team for everyone on (the TCCU) campus';87 • s 145 of the HHB Act provides that once he had been given confidential information about a patient, then '…that involves the care and treatment of the patient;'88 • the medical information in the written handover to him about the two PDSU patients included their mental health status under the Mental Health Act 2016, namely: - whether or not the two PDSU patients were under a treatment authority, forensic order or treatment support order; - the category of the two PDSU patients, namely, whether they were inpatient or community; and 82 Section 145 of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011 is set out in paragraph [59] of these reasons for decision. 83 Section 161C(1) and (2) of the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2011, in July 2021 provided: 161C Prescribed health practitioner may access prescribed information system and particular information (1) A prescribed health practitioner may access a prescribed information system. (2) A prescribed health practitioner must not access information contained in a prescribed information system unless– (a) the information is necessary for the prescribed health practitioner to facilitate the care or treatment of an individual 84 Mr Corney's submissions, para. 31. 85 The Regulator's submissions, para. 29. 86 T 1-80, ll 5-29. 87 T 1-16, ll 19-24. 88 T 1-16, ll 15-17. -- 28 of 62 -- 29 - any leave they had under any limited community treatment;89 • that was the information about the two PDSU patients that he accessed on CIMHA,90 and was confidential information that had already been handed over to him in the handover process;91 • he accessed the medical records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA because of his view that their allocation to the PDSU in the TCCU was in breach of the Mental Health Act 2016;92 • he did not need specific consent to access the records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA, because: - (on the basis of the evidence I have referred to immediately above) he was involved in the care and treatment of those patients;93 and - it was part of his duty to access CIMHA in respect of the two PDSU patients:  to ensure that '…mental health patients are not abused by having their liberty deprived of them';94 and  because he had to '…ensure that patients are not abused by misuse of the Mental Health Act in depriving them of their liberty.'95 [94] In his written submissions, Mr Corney submitted: 32 . The initial Management action stemmed from the Applicant accessing patient records following a handover from PDSU staff to TCCU nurses. This was done in good faith to confirm documentation to fulfil my Duty to protect patient rights under the [missing text] and to Protect the Patients Human Rights as per the [missing text]. 33. There was a clear public interest and clinical duty motivating this access, not misconduct. [95] In his oral submissions, Mr Corney referred to s 161C of the HHB Act and specifically submitted: Part 2 of that section: a prescribed health professional must not access information contained in a prescribed information system unless (a) the information is necessary for the prescribed health professional to facilitate the care and treatment of an individual. That's what I was doing. Care and treatment includes the protecting of patients' rights, as defined in the Human Rights Act, as defined in the Mental Health Act. So that clearly establishes all TCCU nurses were involved in the care and treatment of PDSU patients, regardless of whether that care is direct care or indirect care. The legislation doesn't limit. If they hand it over to me, I am involved in the care and treatment, and because I'm involved in the care and treatment, I can lawfully access CIMHA to check the mental health status of a patient, to verify information already given to me. 89 T 1-17, l 49 to T 1-18, l 5. 90 T 1-18, l 9. 91 T 1-18, ll 10-11. 92 Exhibit 2, page 4 and T 1-18, ll 24-31. 93 T 1-83, ll 6-7. 94 T 1-83, ll 15-17. 95 T 1-83, ll 20-21. -- 29 of 62 -- 30 I already had the information. I'm not looking at new information. The information was verbally handed over to me that these patients were still under inpatient orders. And as I stated, the documents stored in CIMHA are the true and accurate source of the information. I was just confirming again what I had been told and confirming that the patient's human rights were being violated. Deprivation of liberty. Both the Mental Health Act and the Human Rights Act clearly state I had a duty to adhere to these acts and to report any wrongdoing.96 [96] The Regulator submitted that: • witnesses, who held supervisor or management positions with the Health Service were consistent in the view that a TCCU nurse in the position of Mr Corney did not need, and should not access, CIMHA '… for the purpose of ascertaining the mental health status of the consumer';97 and • every witness, (except Mr Corney) formed the view that accessing CIMHA to determine the mental health status of a consumer not under direct care, is not necessary and should not be done, and the responsibility and governance of the mental health status remained with the PDSU.98 [97] In support of its submissions, the Regulator pointed to certain evidence given by the following witnesses.99 Ms Beckinsale [98] Ms Beckinsale who, in July 2021 was the Nurse Unit Manager of the TCCU,100 gave evidence in chief that if there was a concern about LCT breaches (namely, breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016) in respect of a PDSU patient, it should have been the PDSU nurse who should have been checking on LCT breaches and not Mr Corney.101 [99] Further, Ms Beckinsale's clear evidence in cross-examination was that it was '..not okay' for Mr Corney to be accessing the records of the two PDSU patients and to then have a conversation with a PDSU nurse (as he did on 27 July 2021 as recorded in Exhibit 4) about his concern that there were LCT breaches in respect of the two PDSU patients.102 Mr Baird [100] Mr Baird's evidence in chief was that: • Mr Corney had access to CIMHA as part of his duties for consumers for who he had '… direct care';103 and 96 T 5-4, ll 11-29 (1 August 2025). My emphasis. 97 The Regulator's submissions, para. 24. 98 The Regulator's submissions, para. 29. 99 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 26-28. 100 T 4-19, ll 26-28. 101 T 4-23, ll 6-12. 102 T 4-27, l 27 to T 4-28, l 2. 103 T 3-43, ll 43-47. -- 30 of 62 -- 31 • it was not Mr Corney's duty that he '… had direct patient care' with the two PDSU patients.104 Ms Mallett [101] Ms Mallett's evidence in chief was that the two PDSU patients were not under Mr Corney's direct care105 and that he would be '... in breach' if he accessed CIMHA about those patients.106 [102] In my view, the weight of the evidence of these witnesses (being witnesses called to give evidence by Mr Corney) – that in respect of the two PDSU patients, it was not part of Mr Corney's duty to access their medical records on CIMHA – outweighs his evidence to the contrary. [103] Mr Corney unilaterally determined that he had direct care of, or was to provide care and treatment to, the two PDSU patients. [104] Mr Corney made this unilateral determination: • by his own interpretation of s 145 and s 161C of the HHB Act; • by his own assumption about the identity of the patients for whom he should provide direct care; and • by his own interpretation of the Mental Health Act 2016 and the Human Rights Act 2019 that he had a '… duty' to protect those patients. [105] However, Mr Corney was employed as an Enrolled Nurse. Mr Corney was not employed in any managerial or supervisory position in respect of the two public health units at the centre of his appeal, namely the TCCU and the PDSU. Therefore, it was not a matter for him to unilaterally determine the circumstances by which he could access the confidential medical records of patients from a different public health unit (the PDSU) to that of his own (the TCCU). The mere fact that a nurse from one public health unit, conveys certain information about their patient or patients in the presence of another nurse from a different public health unit, without more (such as a lawful direction to care for such a patient or patients), does not mean that the second nurse can assume that they then have the co-responsibility for the care or treatment of that patient. Yet, that is Mr Corney's argument as to why he says he was authorised, under s 145 and s 161C(2)(a) of the HHB Act, to access the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients. That is, by the mere fact he was told information about the mental health status of the two PDSU patients by a PDSU nurse, Mr Corney assumed, by only that one circumstance, that he was subsequently co-caring for those patients or co-treating them and, by that assumption, he then had the authority to access their records. There is no evidence of any direction being given to Mr Corney that he was responsible for the care and treatment of the two PDSU patients whose electronic medical records he accessed on CIMHA. There is no evidence Mr Corney, on 24 and 26 July 2021, was given any authority by any 104 T 3-44, ll 9-11. 105 T 3-63, l 44. 106 T 3-64, ll 5-11. -- 31 of 62 -- 32 manager, or by any person in a position of authority, to access the records of those two patients. [106] The evidence of Ms Beckinsale as the TCCU Nurse Unit Manager, of Mr Baird as the Nursing Director/Program Manger Rehabilitation Services of the Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service, and of Ms Mallett as the Service Group Director of the Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service – that as the two PDSU patients were not under Mr Corney's direct care, he had no authority to access their medical records through CIMHA – clearly outweighs Mr Corney's subjective determination about the scope of his authority to access those records. [107] Ms Beckinsale, Mr Baird and Ms Mallett were witnesses that were called by Mr Corney. Their evidence was given clearly and directly. Further, their evidence was given as senior managers in the Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service. In light of their evidence, Mr Corney's subjective determination about the scope of his authority to access those records is not accepted. [108] The Regulator also submitted that the finding by the Health Service, that Mr Corney may have breached confidentiality rules and the CIMHA access procedure, was a reasonable determination and open on the evidence.107 In this regard, the Regulator referred to part of the Health Service's procedure (THHSUP140794v3) MHGS Monitored Access CIMHA procedure (referred to in Exhibit 11, page 2, being Ms Mallett's letter) in support of its submission. It was not disputed that procedure relevantly provides that '…you should only access a consumer's record in CIMHA when it is part of your duties, if it is a legal requirement, or when specific consent is given.' [109] This procedure is consistent with the evidence of Ms Beckinsale, Mr Baird and Ms Mallett. [110] For all the above reasons, I accept their evidence over Mr Corney's evidence. Mr Corney's justification for accessing the medical records of the two PDSU patients lacks any merit [111] Secondly, Mr Corney's justification for accessing the medical records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA lacks any merit. [112] Mr Corney's fundamental reason for accessing the confidential information about the two PDSU patients on CIMHA on 24 and 26 July 2021, was that as part of the handover at the beginning of his shift, a PDSU nurse gave him information about the mental health status of the two PDSU patients. Upon receipt of that information, Mr Corney formed his own opinion that their physical presence in the TCCU, without LCTs, was a breach of the Mental Health Act 2016 given that the TCCU was not an authorised mental health unit.108 As stated earlier, according to Mr Corney, on his view of s 145 and 161C of the HHB Act, as a consequence of that handover in which he received confidential information, he was then involved in the care or treatment of the two PDSU patients. 107 The Regulator's submissions, para. 30. 108 T 1-17, l 43 to T 1-18, l 5 and T 1-80, ll 8-29. -- 32 of 62 -- 33 [113] This justification by Mr Corney for his conduct, in accessing the medical records of the two PDSU patients on CIMHA, does not bear up to scrutiny when all the relevant evidence is considered. For the reasons that follow, I find that the fact that there was a handover between the PDSU nurses and the TCCU nurses did not mean that Mr Corney had any direct care of any PDSU patients, and did not mean that he was involved in their care or treatment such that his access to their electronic medical records was necessary to facilitate their care or treatment. [114] Mr Corney contended that: • the PDSU was to be staffed by a single nurse supplied by the AAMHIU with TCCU nurses providing '… clinical support and safety/duress response'; • the AAMHIU nurse was to document PDSU patients on the TCCU handover sheet and provide a verbal handover in a joint handover with the TCCU and PDSU nurses at every shift change; and • the information to be provided on the handover sheet was to include '…the Mental Health Act status of the patient.'109 [115] Mr Corney's own evidence about the handover process (set out immediately below), and the evidence of other witnesses, is that the hand over process did not involve a particular PDSU nurse providing information directly to Mr Corney, about a specific patient, for the purposes of Mr Corney providing any type of direct care or treatment in respect of such a specific patient. [116] In cross-examination, it was suggested to Mr Corney that the (handover) information was coming from the PDSU. Mr Corney's evidence was that the information was coming from the PDSU nurse '… sitting in the handover room with us, sharing the information to all the nurses.'110 Mr Corney went on to state: There was usually about 4 to 5 people on shift, and the information we shared – even when we were handing over our TCCU patients, the PDSU nurse was in there hearing the confidential information that we were – about our patients just in case they were required to know if there was any interaction between our patient and their patient.111 [117] Similarly, Ms Beckinsale's evidence was that the handover process was conducted on a general basis as between groups of nurses rather than as between specific nurses in respect of a specific patient. Ms Beckinsale's evidence was that the PDSU nurses were invited to those handovers and each allocated nurse would go through their cares for their patient that day, discuss anything that needed following up into the next shift, as well as discussing any risks or concerns that were happening '… on the campus.'112 [118] Ms Beckinsale went further in her evidence about the relationship between the TCCU nurses and the PDSU nurses. When asked by Mr Corney to describe how the TCCU nurses were providing support to the PDSU nurses, Ms Beckinsale's evidence was that it 109 Mr Corney's contentions, first page, first paragraph. 110 T 1-80, ll 15-18. 111 T 1-80, ll 18-21. 112 T 4-19, ll 33-35. -- 33 of 62 -- 34 was '… a supportive role' in that if the mental status of a PDSU nurse's patient had been deteriorating and they needed some support, TCCU nurses would provide that support in a '… very collegial kind of way.'113 [119] Ms Mallett was asked by Mr Corney to explain her understanding of the handover process '… at TCCU when PDSU was there?' Ms Mallett's evidence was: My understanding of the handover process was to give you the information that you required in order to provide support to those nurses in the event that they needed your assistance.114 [120] Ms Anderson's evidence was of a similar nature. Ms Anderson was asked to describe the handover process at the TCCU when the '… PDSU was open'.115 Ms Anderson's evidence was: … So we would gather as a group, the nurses, those going off shift, those coming off shift, and then we share information about the – ah – consumers that we have on campus. Ah – that would include – um – how they were presenting, what the risks might be, what they might need to be done during the day, that sort of thing. So which nurses in particular attended that when PDSU was open?---At 7 o'clock in the morning, it would normally be the senior nurse from the nightshift and those nurses coming on and the – ah – rehabilitation assistants. So that would include all the PDSU nurses if they – if there were any on shift and any of – um – enrolled nurses, registered nurses, clinical nurses coming on. Um – at a lunchtime handover, it would be all the morning nurses that were onsite in the morning handover to all those that were coming on in the afternoon. Again, that included PDSU nurses. So the information sharing in that process was both ways? So PDSU nurses heard everything about our patients and we heard everything about their patients?---That's correct.116 [121] Ms Clayton's evidence was also of the same nature. Ms Clayton was asked by Mr Corney to describe the written and verbal handover processes '… that was happening between TCCU nurses and PDSU nurses.'117 Ms Clayton's evidence was that the TCCU nurses would handover information regarding the consumers '… that were in your care' and that the PDSU nurses would '… handover their consumers as well.' Ms Clayton also stated that when this occurred everyone was in the room.118 [122] The above evidence proves that the handover process as described by Mr Corney, so as to provide a foundation to his general claim – that by the handover process he was given specific responsibility for the care and treatment of patients in the PDSU – should not be accepted. On the basis of the above evidence, I do not accept this contention advanced by Mr Corney. [123] The evidence is that the handover process was conducted generally, namely, between a group consisting of the TCCU nurses and the PDSU nurses. The information exchanged was that the TCCU nurses would provide information about TCCU patients, and the PDSU nurses would provide information about PDSU patients. The exchange of information in that manner was for the purpose of the nurses being able to provide support to each other about their patients if ever needed. It was not for the purpose, as Mr Corney 113 T 4-21, ll 32-35. 114 T 3-64, ll 11-16. My emphasis. 115 T 3-47, l 33. 116 T 3-47, l 37 to T 3-48, l 6. 117 T 5-3, ll 43-45. 118 T 5-3, l 42 to T 5-4, 1. -- 34 of 62 -- 35 essentially asserts, of a specific TCCU nurse to have specific responsibility for the care and treatment of a specific PDSU patient or patients. [124] However, this is not the only basis upon which I reject Mr Corney's contention that as a consequence of the handover process, he had the responsibility for the care and treatment of patients in the PDSU such that, as a consequence, he had the authority to access the private medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA. [125] Mr Corney's claim – that because of the handover process between the PDSU nurses and the TCCU nurses, he became part of the team directly caring for and treating the PDSU patients – was directly rejected by Ms Beckinsale, the Nurse Unit Manager of the TCCU. [126] The transcript records Mr Corney asking Ms Beckinsale, when she was giving her evidence in chief, the following question, and of her giving the following answer: So if I as a nurse receive a confidential handover from another nurse, would I be considered part of their care team that day?--- No.119 [127] In addition, Ms Beckinsale made this point in equally direct terms when she was asked by Mr Corney, in the course of her evidence in chief, if it would be appropriate for an enrolled nurse (such as himself in the TCCU) to have a conversation with the PDSU nurse about the mental health status and '… LCT breaches of current PDSU patients.' Ms Beckinsale's answer was: 'No.' 120 [128] Mr Corney's follow-up question was the suggestion that, as a consequence of Ms Beckinsale's last answer, he should not be making the PDSU nurse '… aware that there was continued breaches of the Mental Health Act?' Ms Beckinsale's evidence was: 'She was the one who was there from PDSU. So the PDSU nurse should have been checking on any LCT breaches.'121 Ms Beckinsale gave the same evidence when the same question was put to her again a short time later.122 [129] Mr Corney asked Ms Anderson a number of questions about TCCU nurses having responsibility for PDSU patients. The evidence given by Ms Anderson does not support the claims made by Mr Corney. The following evidence was given: Okay. You mentioned that TCCU nurses were allocated the PDSU patients?---From time to time, yes. How was that allowed, seeing, you know, told that they had governance and clinical control over the patients?---Okay, so you're very well aware of nursing ratios. We'd have so many people on the floor. PDSU nurse may call in sick, there might not be in any – ah – staff available to come across from the acute unit, and – and this happened quite frequently, as you're well aware, so we would step up and we would take on their patients. It would be like any other casual – um – nursing arrangement. So we would pick up their patients through the day to make sure that their patients received continuity of care through – through the time that they – they didn't have nurses available. So TCCU nurses were allowed to access CIMHA of PDSU patients?---When they were responsible for the care of that patient, yes. I mean, I couldn't – I couldn't have a patient and not write a clinic note about them. I couldn't have a patient and give them good care when I didn't know what was happening 119 T 4-20, ll 30-31. 120 T 4-23, ll 6-8. 121 T 4-23, ll 10-12. 122 T 4-24, ll 22-23. -- 35 of 62 -- 36 with them, what they needed that day. So yes, if I was looking after a PDSU patient, it would be my expect – expectation to be able to access clinic notes.123 [130] I accept Ms Anderson's evidence, about the ability of a TCCU nurse to access the medical records of the PDSU patient, in the circumstances she describes in her evidence; namely, when the fact is that a PDSU patient is directly allocated to a TCCU nurse for care. [131] However, those were not the circumstances in which Mr Corney, on 24 and 26 July 2021, accessed the medical records of the two PDSU patients. It is not Mr Corney's case that he had authority to access those records because he was specifically allocated the care or treatment of the two PDSU patients because a PDSU nurse called in sick or was otherwise not available. Mr Corney's case is that he had the care or treatment of the two PDSU patients because of the information he heard about them in the handover. [132] There is one other reason that fortifies my conclusion that Mr Corney's access of the medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA was not authorised. On Mr Corney's own evidence, he did not need to access the medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA to make his allegation that there had been breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 [133] Mr Corney's evidence was that the information, about the two PDSU patients that he accessed through CIMHA on 24 and 26 July 2021, was information that had already been given to him earlier in the handover process.124 [134] Mr Corney further stated that he could have written his complaint (the email he sent to Dr Lee and Ms Floriani on 24 July 2021125) that there were breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 in respect of the two PDSU patients, based on the information provided to him in the handover.126 Mr Corney made that written complaint on 24 July 2021. Yet, on the evidence before me, being the Audit Trail that forms part of Exhibit 5, Mr Corney accessed the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA on 24 July 2021, and then again on 26 July 2021, which was after the date that he made his written complaint to Dr Lee and Ms Floriani. [135] Nevertheless, Mr Corney's evidence was that he accessed the same information (about the mental health status of the two PDSU patients) through CIMHA due to '…due diligence' so that he could make sure that '… their information was correct because in the timeframe that it took for them to give me the information in the handover, the documentation may have been updated, therefore, they wouldn't be in breach of the Act.'127 [136] In cross-examination, Mr Corney conceded that he did not have any foundation to think that the handover material (that caused him to believe that, in respect of the two PDSU patients, there were breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016) was incorrect.128 123 T 3-52, ll 8-26. Emphasis added. 124 T 1-18, ll 9-12 and T 1-80, ll 31-33. 125 Exhibit 2, pages 4 and 5. 126 T 1-80, ll 33-34. 127 T 1-80, ll 35-38. My emphasis. 128 T 1-81, ll 12-13. -- 36 of 62 -- 37 [137] In further cross-examination, when it was put to Mr Corney that he did not need to go back and check the CIMHA system about the information provided to him in the handover, his answer was: When I'm trying to show the PDSU nurse after handover that the document is in breach of the Mental Health Act, yes, I do.129 [138] This evidence clearly demonstrates that in respect of Mr Corney's concern, as a consequence of the information he had been provided in the handover (that the two PDSU patients were allegedly being detained in a way that was contrary to the Mental Health Act 2016) the next step that he took – in accessing those patient's electronic medical records through CIMHA – was not required for him to be able to make a complaint about his concern to an appropriate manager or supervisor. [139] This evidence proves that Mr Corney took the step of accessing CIMHA in respect of the two PDSU patients when he did not even have to take that step. That is, Mr Corney could have alerted a relevant manager to his concern about the alleged breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 without accessing CIMHA. Further, the inference I draw from Mr Corney's evidence referred to in paragraph [135] is that he was very anxious to catch the Health Service, or someone in the Health Service, in the act of such a breach (as he alleged) of the Mental Health Act 2016 while he could. All of this evidence further supports my conclusion that Mr Corney's access of the patient's electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA was not authorised. Conclusion [140] My findings in respect of these matters leads me to conclude that Mr Corney was not authorised to access the medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA. This was because Mr Corney did not have direct care of those two PDSU patients. [141] Furthermore, for the reasons that I explain below, these findings have a direct effect on my assessment of the principal management actions Mr Corney impugns as being unreasonable, or that he impugns as being taken in an unreasonable way. [142] I will now consider the particular management actions Mr Corney impugns as being unreasonable. [143] The Regulator submits that Mr Corney should not have accessed CIMHA for the purposes of ascertaining the mental health status of the two PDSU patients. As a consequence, the Regulator then submits that, the subsequent steps taken by the Health Service managers – that Mr Corney impugns – amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the Health Service.130 [144] For the reasons that follow, I accept the Regulator's submissions. Mr Baird's 17 August letter was a formal complaint letter that Mr Corney had breached confidentiality 129 T 1-81, ll 30-31. 130 The Regulator's submissions, para. 32. -- 37 of 62 -- 38 [145] In oral submissions, Mr Cormey submitted that Mr Baird's 17 August letter was unreasonable management action taken in an unreasonable way because: • after Mr Baird obtained the audit (of Mr Corney's access of CIMHA on 24 and 26 July 2021) that led him (Mr Baird) to believe he (Mr Corney) breached confidentiality;131 and • as the originator of the complaint (against Mr Corney), Mr Baird had '… a conflict of interest and a bias in investigating his own allegation against me of a breach of confidentiality.'132 [146] In his later oral submissions, Mr Corney submitted that Mr Baird had conducted an investigation of his (Mr Corney's) alleged breach of confidentiality.133 [147] Mr Corney made the same submissions in his written submissions.134 [148] The Regulator submitted that Mr Baird's 17 August letter was an opportunity to provide information and, on Mr Baird's evidence given in cross-examination, was not a work performance matter or a disciplinary matter135 and, for those reasons, Mr Baird's 17 August letter amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way.136 [149] I accept the Regulator's submissions. [150] Dr Lee and Ms Margaret Farrell, Nursing Director and Adult Services Program Manager of the Mental Health Service Group, by emails sent on 28 July 2021 to, amongst others, Mr Baird, asked the question of how Mr Corney obtained the medical records of the two PDSU patients.137 [151] Mr Baird's evidence was that as a consequence of that, he followed the Mental Health Service Group CIMHA monitored access procedure in asking the CIMHA team to obtain the audit of Mr Corney's access to CIMHA.138 [152] The material part of Mr Baird's 17 August letter is set out in paragraph 28 of these reasons [153] By its terms, Mr Baird's letter does not contain a disciplinary allegation, does not set out findings of fact in respect of any disciplinary allegation following any investigation conducted by Mr Baird, and is not an opportunity to show cause in relation to any disciplinary finding of fact. That is to say, Mr Baird's letter is not in terms that it is a formal complaint that Mr Corney had breached confidentiality. Mr Baird's letter does not contain a finding of fact, after an investigation conducted by Mr Baird, that Mr Corney breached confidentiality. 131 T 5-6, l 29 to T 5-7, l 4 (1 August 2025). 132 T 5-7, ll 6-12 (1 August 2025). 133 T 5-19, ll 25-33 (1 August 2025). 134 Mr Corney submissions, para. 34. 135 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 53-54. 136 The Regulator's submissions, para. 56. 137 Exhibit 2 (pages 2 and 3). 138 T 3-31, ll 3-45 and T 3-32, ll 27-35 and T 3-33, ll 4-10. -- 38 of 62 -- 39 [154] Mr Baird, in that letter, referred to Mr Corney's access to the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients '… without apparent legitimate reason to do so.' Furthermore, Mr Baird, by that letter, was merely seeking information from Mr Corney so that he '… may better understand the circumstances before making a decision as to how to proceed.'139 Mr Baird annexed to that letter the CIMHA audit trail that he had received. [155] Having regard to the fact that Mr Corney accessed the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients, the circumstances of how that matter came to Mr Baird's attention and how Mr Baird came to be in possession of the CIMHA audit, it was entirely reasonable for Mr Baird to ask Mr Corney for information as to how it was that he (Mr Corney) came to access that material for the purposes of Mr Baird then determining '… how to proceed.' Indeed, the evidence is that Mr Corney provided a response to Mr Baird.140 [156] Mr Baird's management action in sending his August 17 letter to Mr Corney amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. Mr Corney's perceptions that Mr Baird found he breached confidentiality and that Mr Baird conducted his own biased investigation leading to that conclusion, are wrong. Mr Baird, by virtue of his 17 August letter, was trying to bully Mr Corney and intimidate him to stop, or inhibit him from, making legitimate complaints of breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 [157] In his oral submissions, Mr Corney submitted that he was '… falsely accused' by Mr Baird and '… I was wrongly found guilty of breaching patient confidentiality.' 141 Mr Corney then submitted: It had a major effect on my mental state. I wasn't sure if this was incompetence or retaliation for making a complaint. It clearly shows that they were trying to keep it in-house and not make the mandatory notifications, and also make – not make the mandatory notifications of the breach of the Mental Health Act. That's big. That requires investigation of why they didn't make mandatory notifications about the suspected criminal activity.142 [158] Mr Corney's evidence was that because at the meeting on 8 September 2021, when Mr Baird and Ms Beckinsale stated to him that if he had concerns about contraventions of the Mental Health Act 2016 he should escalate his concerns through the Clinical Nurse Consultant or the Shift Coordinator, they were implying to him that was the only way he could escalate such concerns, and that by limiting his ability to take complaints outside '… the unit, they were trying to keep it in-house so they could cover it up.'143 Mr Baird's evidence was that he did not at any stage say to Mr Corney that he could not use any other reporting pathway to raise such issues, and that he never intended to put pressure on Mr Corney or to intimidate him in that respect.144 139 Exhibit 5. 140 T 3-36, l 12. 141 T 5-15, ll 13-15 (1 August 2025). 142 T 5-15, ll 15-20 (1 August 2025). 143 T 2-27, ll 13-24. 144 T 3-41, ll 12-21. -- 39 of 62 -- 40 [159] The Regulator submitted that Mr Corney was not bullied by Mr Baird and that at no time was he ever told not to report '… his issues', namely, his concerns about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016. The Regulator further submitted that Mr Baird was called by Mr Corney and that he gave his evidence honestly and was a witness of credit.145 [160] In my view, there is no evidence that Mr Baird, by sending Mr Corney his letter dated 17 August 2021, was trying to bully or intimidate Mr Corney against making complaints about contraventions of the Mental Health Act 2016 or that he was trying to pressure Mr Corney about how he should make such complaints. There is no evidence of any workplace harassment of Mr Corney by Mr Baird of the kind defined in the Harassment Policy as set out in paragraph [38] of these reasons. [161] For the reasons I have given earlier, Mr Baird's management action in sending Mr Corney his letter dated 17 August 2021 was reasonable given the circumstances in which Mr Baird sent that letter. [162] I accept Mr Baird's denials that, by his involvement in Mr Corney's complaint about the Mental Health Act 2016 being contravened in respect of the two PDSU patients, he was trying to pressure or intimidate Mr Corney in any way. For the reasons I give below about the 8 September meeting, there is no evidence Mr Baird tried to place any pressure on Mr Corney against raising such allegations or how he should raise such allegations within the Health Service. [163] Mr Baird's entire conduct in his dealing with Mr Corney about the material issues was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. [164] Mr Corney's perception, that Mr Baird's management action of sending the 17 August letter amounted to Mr Baird trying to bully him and intimidate him to stop making complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016, is wrong. The 8 September meeting was conducted in an unfair manner [165] Mr Corney did not make any written or oral submissions in relation to this management action. [166] However, Mr Corney contended that this management action was not reasonable because he was not told of the purpose of the meeting prior to attending it, he had not been offered to have a support person with him and he had not been given a formal response back from Mr Baird. [167] The Regulator dealt with this matter in its written submissions at paragraphs 57-66. In summary, the Regulator submits that Mr Baird's management action in holding the 8 September meeting was reasonable because there was no evidence the meeting was a performance or a disciplinary meeting and, as a consequence of its nature, there was no requirement for Mr Corney to be offered a support person. Furthermore, the Regulator submits that: 145 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 111-113. -- 40 of 62 -- 41 • there is no evidence that, during the meeting, it was implied to Mr Corney that there was only one way he should, in the future, escalate his concerns about alleged breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016, and that any such implication is inconsistent with the documentary evidence contained in Exhibits 3, 4, 7 and 10; and • there is no evidence Mr Corney was bullied or intimidated by Mr Baird or by Ms Beckinsale about any issue during the meeting. [168] The file note of the 8 September meeting is in evidence as is Mr Corney's written response to the file note. [169] Mr Baird's evidence, in cross-examination, was that the meeting was not a performance meeting and was not a disciplinary meeting.146 Mr Baird's other evidence was that he did not intend to pressure or intimidate Mr Corney in any way and that Ms Beckinsale, who was also at the meeting, did not pressure Mr Corney or intimidate him in any way.147 [170] There is nothing in the file note to indicate that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss Mr Corney's performance or that it was for the purposes of discussing, with Mr Corney, any disciplinary allegation. [171] The file note, authored by Mr Baird, stated that Mr Baird explained to Mr Corney that the reason for the meeting was to acknowledge Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird's 17 August letter, to advise Mr Corney that he would receive a formal response, and to discuss pathways for future escalation of any such concerns held by Mr Corney (about alleged breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016.) The file note then records that Mr Baird also advised Mr Corney that he had no concerns with Mr Corney raising any issues with regards to risk or safety, and that he actively encouraged him to do so, but he did '… request' that Mr Corney follow '… an appropriate pathway to endeavour to resolve at a local level in the first instance by communicating with the shift lead CNC (or NUM if CNC was unavailable)' and that if Mr Corney was not satisfied with the outcomes '… he should progress his concerns to myself and to the SGD if still not satisfied with responses or actions.' 148 [172] Mr Corney's written response to the file note forms part of Exhibit 10. Amongst a range of other matters, Mr Corney stated: I feel the issue of giving me a direction to the appropriate escalation process could have easily been addressed as part of Mr Baird's formal written response to the complaint letter. The meeting I felt was unnecessary and gave Mr Baird an opportunity to further bully regarding my making complaints for breaches of the Mental Health Act that have all been Proven correct. I was not asked or given the opportunity to bring a support person to the meeting allowing Mr Baird to try and intimidate me and to escalate my behaviour so that he could say I was being aggressive in the meeting. [173] In my view, Mr Baird asking for this meeting to occur, and the manner in which it occurred, amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. 146 T 3-42, ll 5-10. 147 T 3-41, ll 5-25. 148 Exhibit 10, first page. -- 41 of 62 -- 42 [174] The undisputed evidence was that the purpose of the meeting was not about Mr Corney's work performance and was not about any disciplinary allegation being made against him. The purpose of the meeting was, as Mr Baird set out in the file note, to acknowledge Mr Baird's receipt of Mr Corney's response to the 17 August letter, to advise Mr Corney that he would receive a formal response to his response, and to discuss pathways about how Mr Corney should raise similar concerns in the future. [175] Because of the nature of the meeting, it was not unreasonable that Mr Corney not be informed of its purpose before he attended the meeting. This conclusion may have been different if the meeting was about Mr Corney's alleged poor work performance or if it was about a disciplinary allegation, but the meeting was not. Similarly, given the purpose of the meeting, there was no need for Mr Corney to be offered a support person. Mr Corney's claim that Mr Baird did not offer Mr Corney the ability to bring a support person so that Mr Baird could intimidate him (Mr Corney) into reacting aggressively towards him (Mr Baird) makes no reasonable sense. Mr Corney does not state how or why the presence of a support person would stop him (Mr Corney) from being aggressive in the meeting. [176] Moreover, the way the meeting was conducted was reasonable. It was quite reasonable for Mr Baird to request that Mr Corney, if he had similar concerns in the future about alleged contraventions of the Mental Health Act 2016, to raise them with the Clinical Nurse Consultant or the Nurse Unit Manager. As recorded in the file note, Mr Baird then went on to say that if Mr Corney was not happy with the outcomes from raising his concerns in that way, he could escalate those matters to himself or to '… SGD' being Ms Mallett, the Senior Group Director. [177] Mr Corney was given Mr Baird's file note of the meeting and was then given the opportunity to provide a response. As is evident from Exhibit 10, Mr Corney took up that opportunity. [178] Furthermore, it was reasonable for Mr Baird, as the Nursing Director/Program Manager for Rehabilitation Services Mental Health Service Group, to '…request' that Mr Corney make such allegations in a particular way. There was no direction, but a request. It was entirely reasonable for Mr Baird to request that Mr Corney raise any similar future concerns by first going to his immediate supervisors, and to then raise the issue with him or Ms Mallett if he was dissatisfied. This was entirely reasonable because Mr Corney was an employee of the Health Service, subject to the control of his employer, about how he may raise such concerns. [179] I accept Mr Baird's evidence that during the meeting he did not intend to pressure or intimidate Mr Corney in any way in respect of how he raised any other allegations about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016. Mr Baird gave his evidence very clearly and directly. I have no hesitation in accepting his evidence. There is no evidence before me that tends to prove Mr Baird was trying to intimidate Mr Corney to act in a particular way so that any allegations Mr Corney made of contraventions of the Mental Health Act 2016 could be covered up. On the evidence before me, I find that Mr Corney's allegation that Mr Baird was trying to bully or intimidate him in the meeting to achieve such an outcome arises from Mr Corney's wrong perception of the facts. -- 42 of 62 -- 43 [180] Similarly, there is no probative evidence before me that Ms Beckinsale, in that meeting, acted in a way towards Mr Corney that amounted to bullying or intimidation. [181] For all these reasons, the management action of asking Mr Corney to attend that meeting, and the way that the meeting was conducted, amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. Mr Baird conducted an unfair and unjust investigation and had an obvious conflict of interest [182] In oral submissions, Mr Corney submitted that Mr Baird was the '… origin of the complaint'149 who then determined, when he (Mr Baird) analysed the audit of the CIMHA access, that he (Mr Corney) '… had breached confidentiality.'150 As a consequence, Mr Corney submits that Mr Baird, '… as the originator of the complaint, would have a conflict of interest and a bias in investigating his own allegation against me of a breach of confidentiality.'151 [183] In oral submissions, the Regulator submitted,152 having regard to Mr Corney's other evidence given in cross-examination when he was taken to Exhibit 2, that Mr Corney accepted that Mr Baird became aware of the issue (of Mr Corney's access to the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients through CIMHA) by virtue of the emails he received from Dr Lee and Ms Farrell,153 and therefore was not the originator of any complaint against him. Mr Corney's evidence was that at the time (August 2021), he believed Mr Baird was the originator of the complaint and the investigator of the complaint.154 [184] In fact, Mr Corney went on to concede that, in the circumstances pointed out to him by the content of Exhibit 2, that it was reasonable for Mr Baird, once those complaints were made to him, to ask CIMHA for an audit.155 [185] Despite Mr Corney's evidence given in cross examination, Mr Corney persisted with this claim (that Mr Baird was the originator of a complaint against him) in his final oral submissions. [186] On the basis of Exhibit 2, and Mr Corney's evidence given in cross examination about Exhibit 2, I reject Mr Corney's contention that Mr Baird engaged in a conflict of interest by being the person who made the complaint against him and who then investigated the complaint. 149 T 5-6, ll 44-49 (1 August 2025). 150 T 5-7, ll 1-4 (1 August 2025). 151 T 5-7, ll 6-8 (1 August 2025). 152 T 5-37, ll 4-33 (1 August 2025). 153 T 1-91, l 27 to T 1-92, l 4. 154 T 1-92, ll 6-7. 155 T 1-92, ll 9-10. -- 43 of 62 -- 44 [187] On the clear evidence before me, Mr Baird did not make any complaint, or indeed raise the issue, about Mr Corney's alleged unauthorised access of CIMHA in respect of the two PDSU patients. [188] Furthermore, on the clear evidence before me, the person who took the ultimate management action decision (not a disciplinary action decision) about Mr Corney's access of the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients was Ms Mallett and not Mr Baird. [189] For these reasons, Mr Baird did not act unreasonably in any way. Mr Baird did not put himself in a position of a conflict of interest in respect of the issue brought to his attention about Mr Corney's potential unauthorised access to electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients. Mr Baird, and by her letter, Ms Mallett, did not follow the first Privacy Policy [190] For the reasons given earlier, there is no clear medical or other evidence that tends to prove that there was a causal connection between the alleged failure by Mr Baird and Ms Mallett to follow the first Privacy Policy, and Mr Corney's adjustment disorder. [191] For that reason, this aspect of Mr Corney's claim is dismissed. [192] In any event, even if there was evidence upon which I could conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, there was a causal connection between such alleged failures and Mr Corney's adjustment disorder, I would have concluded that the management action Mr Corney impugns in these respects was reasonable management action and was management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. [193] The first Privacy Policy is Exhibit 29. The relevant part of that policy, referred to by Mr Corney in his written156 and oral submissions,157 states: Breaches of privacy, misuse of information and inappropriate access to information are Code of Conduct matters and will be dealt with via the disciplinary procedure process.158 … 1. Employees identify a privacy concern • Report any privacy concern to the relevant Line Manager, unit Manager or directly to the Release of Information Team at THHS Privacy and [email protected] Employees can report a privacy concern in a number of ways: • Directly to a Team Leader, Line Manager or any senior employee, who then have the responsibility of undertaking a review and notifying the outcome of the review to the Release of Information Team 156 Mr Corney's submissions, paras. 40 and 43. 157 T 5-15, ll -8 (1 August 2025). 158 Exhibit 29, page 1 of 12. -- 44 of 62 -- 45 • By completing the Privacy Concern Notification Form (see Appendix 1), which is to be delivered to the Release of Information Team located in the Clinical Information Services Unit or emailed to THHS Privacy and [email protected] • In person or by phone on [number deleted] to the Release of Information Team, who are located in the Clinical Information Services Unit at The Townsville Hospital Sufficient information must be provided to undertake a review, including the name of the person notifying the privacy concern, the name of any employees involved in the privacy concern, the date and time the privacy concern occurred and other details relevant to the circumstances. Employees who identify a Privacy Concern should: • Contain the breach where practical, e.g. identifiable health information on the floor? Pick up the notes and file them in the appropriate location • Inform the Manager in the Unit/Location where you see the privacy concern/your Line Manager/the Privacy Contact Officer • Complete the Privacy Concern Notification Form and email to THHS Privacy and [email protected] [194] Mr Corney submits that, inconsistently with the above provisions of the first Privacy Policy, neither Mr Baird nor Ms Mallett notified the '… Privacy and Confidentiality Team of the complaint or the findings of their investigation.'159 [195] Mr Corney then goes on to submit: 42. This Process I believe would have initiated a disciplinary delegate being appointed and afford me the appropriate process for the Disciplinary Delegate to conduct a separate investigation and process as per the Delegation Directive. As the step in the process was missed I was denied the appropriate process and Natural Justice. This makes the Process Unreasonable. 43. The THHS Procedure THHSCOR171181 Privacy and confidentiality monitoring and breach management clerly [sic] states under PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE heading, "Breaches of privacy, misuse of information and inappropriate access to information are Code of Conduct matters and will be dealt with via Human Resources disciplinary procedures". [196] Mr Corney made the same points in his oral submissions.160 [197] I cannot accept these submissions. [198] Mr Corney's argument about the first Privacy Policy is that it should have been enlivened by Mr Baird or Ms Mallett so that formal disciplinary action was commenced against him, a separate disciplinary investigation was conducted about his alleged breach of confidentiality and that he be given the opportunity to respond in those particular circumstances. [199] Mr Corney made this point clear in his oral submissions. Mr Corney submitted: Any breach as the privacy and confidentiality breach management policy states, "any breach or suspected inappropriate access will be dealt with by the human resources disciplinary procedure." Will be dealt with. She has to escalate it. She has no authority to decide. If it went to a delegate and 159 Mr Corney's submissions, paras. 39-40. 160 T 5-12, l 41 to T 5-18, l 25 (1 August 2025). -- 45 of 62 -- 46 the delegate wanted to push it back down to her, that is lawful. She has no authority to make that decision that she can just issue a warning. It has to go to a delegate for the delegate to assess the situation. The delegate then makes a finding, whether I breached or not and if appropriate, what action to take. Not Ms Mallet. She chose to keep it in-house and not to escalate it. I can only assume because it had serious implications to the hospital about my complaint. They were unlawfully detaining patients. The fact she didn't follow the policy, in any way, shape or form, she didn't report it to the appropriate authority in the privacy and confidentiality team and she didn't escalate it to a disciplinary delegate.161 [200] The failure of Mr Baird and Ms Mallett to enliven the first Privacy Policy does not make their management action, as alleged by Mr Corney, unreasonable. [201] Mr Baird asked Mr Corney for information about his access to the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients following Mr Baird's receipt of the audit trail from the CIMHA team. Mr Baird's August 17 letter did not contain any disciplinary allegation. Mr Baird asked Mr Corney for information to help inform him of what step he (Mr Baird) would take next. Indeed, Mr Baird's 17 August letter did not come about because of any complaint made by someone about Mr Corney. As is clearly evident from Exhibit 2, Mr Baird's 17 August letter came about because of Mr Corney's complaint, as set out in Exhibit 2 on pages 4 and 5, and the inquiries senior managers then wanted to be made about Mr Corney's access to the relevant confidential medical records. Mr Corney then responded to Mr Baird. In my view, that management action of Mr Baird was reasonable and taken in a reasonable way. Because of the inquiries of the senior managers, Mr Baird was asking for information from Mr Corney about why he accessed the confidential information of the two patients to help inform him of his next step. [202] Ms Mallett then, as the Service Group Director of the Mental Health Service Group, reviewed all the information gathered by Ms Loro of Human Resources about the issue, including the CIMHA audit.162 Ms Mallett did not conduct that review as part of any formal complaint against Mr Corney.163 Ms Mallett's review came about as a consequence of a series of events triggered by the complaint made by Mr Corney himself on 26 July 2021 as set out in Exhibit 2. [203] Ms Mallet's letter is set out in paragraph [34] of these reasons. Ms Mallett determined that, because Mr Corney did not have direct care of the two PDSU patients, he had no authority to access their electronic medical records. Mr Mallett then warned Mr Corney that, in the future, he could only access the electronic medical records of patients for whom he had direct care. For the reasons I have given earlier (paragraphs [88] to [140]) on the evidence before me, it was reasonable for Ms Mallett to come to the conclusion that as Mr Corney did not have responsibility for the direct care of those two patients, his access to their electronic medical records was unauthorised. [204] Ms Mallett dealt with the matter in an informal manner for the purposes of warning Mr Corney about his access to the electronic medical records of consumers. Mr Corney had the opportunity to respond to Mr Baird in the sense of explaining the circumstances as to why he accessed the electronic medical records of those two patients. Ms Mallett 161 T 5-17, l 47 to T 5-18, 13 (1 August 2025). 162 T 3-63, ll 13-16. 163 T 3-73, ll 1-2. -- 46 of 62 -- 47 took that into account in taking the action she did. As a consequence, Mr Corney suffered no unfairness. Further, Mr Corney was not treated arbitrarily by Ms Mallett in that, on the face of her letter, her decision was objectively fair and was fairly reasoned, including by her taking into account Mr Corney's response to Mr Baird. [205] The fact that Ms Mallett did not take a step that would have resulted in an actual disciplinary process being taken against Mr Corney cannot mean her management action was unreasonable or undertaken in an unreasonable way. Again, Mr Corney has suffered no unfairness or arbitrary treatment. True, as he submits, he had a warning against him which later could have been taken into account by Ms Mallett in respect of any disciplinary action he faced. However, that warning was given in the circumstances where he was asked by Mr Baird to give information about his access to the relevant medical records, being information Mr Corney gave and which, as set out in her letter, was taken into account by Ms Mallett. [206] In light of my above analysis of their conduct, the management action of Mr Baird and of Ms Mallett, namely, by not taking the step of making a notification under the first Privacy Policy so as not to put in place steps where formal disciplinary action, and a formal disciplinary investigation, were undertaken in respect of Mr Corney, cannot mean that action was unreasonable. [207] For these reasons, even if there was evidence that demonstrated a causal connection between the fact that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett did not take steps to enliven the first Privacy Policy and Mr Corney's injury, I would not have found that their management action was unreasonable or was taken in an unreasonable way. Mr Baird and Ms Mallett used their power and authority to try to unduly influence Mr Corney because he made complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 [208] Mr Corney's contention is that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett used their power and authority, in the management action they took in respect of his employment, in an endeavour to unduly influence him because, by his complaint about the two PDSU patients, he embarrassed the Mental Health Service Group. [209] In fact, having regard to all of Mr Corney's submissions about the conduct of Mr Baird and Ms Mallett, that I have set out in paragraphs [145] to [207] of these reasons, Mr Corney's contention is that the management action taken by Mr Baird and Ms Mallett was to retaliate against him because he had caused such an embarrassment or to try to influence him in respect of how he should make future complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 so that such issues could be hidden from any independent scrutiny. [210] For the reasons I have given in paragraphs [145] to [207] of these reasons: • there is no evidence at all that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett were using their power and authority, in respect of Mr Corney, to try to retaliate against him or to unduly influence his future conduct because he had made complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016; and -- 47 of 62 -- 48 • the management action of Mr Baird and Ms Mallett that Mr Corney impugns was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance [211] On 3 December 2021, Mr Corney lodged a formal grievance against Mr Baird and Ms Mallett. Mr Corney's grievance is set out in paragraph [36] of these reasons. [212] The material parts of Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance are set out in paragraph [46] of these reasons. [213] Mr Corney's written submissions about Mr Eaton's decision (about his grievance) are that Mr Eaton did not follow the Grievance Policy in that Mr Eaton did not contact him before coming to his decision, and thereby did not conduct an independent investigation, the consequence of which was he was denied natural justice to have his grievance '… heard by an unbiased and competent person.'164 [214] In his oral submissions, Mr Corney submitted that: • Mr Eaton admitted, when giving his evidence, that he did not follow the grievance process and '… progress my grievance as per stage 2 of the procedure', particularly clauses 8.3(a) and 9 of the Grievance Policy;165 • Mr Eaton admitted, when giving his evidence, that he did not do an independent investigation of the investigation '… conducted by Mr Baird and Ms Mallett into the alleged breach of confidentiality' in that he only used '…their evidence; he didn't go to find other information' such as from the Health Service's Privacy and Confidentiality Team as contemplated in the first Privacy Policy;166 • Mr Eaton relied on the '… flawed investigation by Mr Baird and Ms Mallett.';167 • Mr Eaton's findings '… are flawed and incompetent', he (Mr Corney) was not afforded procedural fairness and was not afforded alternative dispute resolution '… as per stage 1 of the grievance process' in that Mr Eaton just assessed '… their' (Mr Baird and Ms Mallett's) decision and obtained no further information;168 and • Mr Eaton '… totally skipped stage 1 of my grievance.'169 [215] The Regulator submitted (footnotes omitted): 91. Mr Eaton reviewed the material and came to a conclusion in his letter dated 2 March 2022. 164 Mr Corney's submissions, paras. 50. 165 T 5-18, ll 27-35 (1 August 2025). 166 T 5-19, ll 25-32 (1 August 2025). 167 T 5-19, ll 32-33 (1 August 2025). 168 T 5-19, ll 35-42 (1 August 2025). 169 T 5-19, l 44 (1 August 2025). -- 48 of 62 -- 49 92. When asked what actions he took to conduct the preliminary enquiry as per stage 1, Mr Eaton responded: "I reviewed all of the information available to me, which included the relevant correspondence that had occurred with yourself, John Baird and Ann Marie Mallett. So – yeah. They were – that was the information that I reviewed at the time." 93. When queried as to why no further information was sought from the appellant at this stage, Ms [sic] Eaton advised: "Yes, I think I felt that based on the information received, I couldn't see any repeated incidences of bullying or harassment. I made specific reference to the fact that it wasn't a disciplinary action. I know your interpretation was that a warning is, you know, either feels like or is disciplinary, and I think I acknowledge that. But just to be absolutely clear that any disciplinary action that takes place under Townsville Hospital and Health Service policy is undertaken by the Industrial Relations Department and is governed by the executive director of People, Strategy and Governance. A service group director cannot – cannot invoke a disciplinary action. It's not within their delegation to do so. So I think based on – on those matters, I felt that the management action was reasonable. It was only a warning and it was just an ability just to carry off from me. And I noted also that any specific issues that you had, there was definitely an encouragement that you could raise any specific issues. There was an escalation path in which to do so." 94. The Respondent submits that the steps taken by Mr Eaton in responding to the Appellant’s grievance was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in all of the circumstances. [216] The above evidence of Mr Eaton, referred to in the Regulator's submissions, came from Mr Eaton's evidence in chief when being asked questions by Mr Corney. [217] The Grievance Policy relevantly provided: • at the first stage of the grievance process, following a formal employee grievance being made in writing, the action to resolve a formal employee grievance by the relevant authorised delegate '… may include, but is not limited to, one or more' of the following: • conducting preliminary enquiries to determine appropriate options for resolution of the employee agreements • alternative dispute resolution (ADR) strategies, including facilitated discussion, mediation, conciliation or negotiation • gathering information, including from witnesses • investigation • other reasonable action in the circumstances.170 [218] Stage 2 of the Grievance Policy relevantly provides that if an employee is dissatisfied with the decision made by the delegate, at Stage 1, the employee can make a written request to the relevant authorised delegate for internal review, where the internal review is to be completed within 14 days.171 170 Exhibit 18, Attachment One, page 1 of 4. 171 Exhibit 18, Attachment One, page 2 of 4. -- 49 of 62 -- 50 [219] Mr Eaton's evidence was that with support he received from the Health Service's Human Resources section, it was considered that Ms Mallett's decision was the enlivenment of Stage 1 of the Grievance Policy (in assessing the local action taken by Mr Baird) and his (Mr Eaton's involvement) involved Stage 2.172 On the basis of my reading of the Grievance Policy, the advice Mr Eaton obviously obtained from Human Resources was wrong and did not contain the correct advice about the application of the Grievance Policy. Mr Corney's grievance about Mr Baird and Ms Mallett, sent on 3 December 2021, should have been considered at stage 1 of the Grievance Policy. [220] However, despite that flaw in the application of the Grievance Policy, I am not persuaded that Mr Eaton's management action, in considering Mr Corney's grievance and the manner in which he considered that grievance, amounted to unreasonable management action undertaken in an unreasonable way. The principles in respect of the application of s 32(5)(a) of the Act are set out earlier in these reasons. To reiterate, management action only needs to be reasonable, it does not need to be perfect and instances of imperfect but reasonable management action may, in the appropriate circumstances, be considered a blemish. In addition, management action does not need to be without blemish to be reasonable. Furthermore, for management action to be reasonable, it has to be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. [221] In my view, the manner in which Mr Eaton dealt with Mr Corney's grievance, and the outcome of Mr Eaton's considerations, amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. This is for four reasons. [222] First, the way Mr Eaton dealt with Mr Corney's complaints in his grievance was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. [223] Mr Eaton's decision (his letter to Mr Corney dated 2 March 2022) about Mr Corney's grievance is Exhibit 15. On the first and second pages of that letter, Mr Eaton sets out the material that he read in dealing with Mr Corney's grievance. Mr Eaton then set out his summary of that material. That material consisted of nine documents beginning with Mr Corney's complaint dated 24 July 2021 to Dr Lee and to Ms Floriani, through to the contents of Mr Corney's formal grievance dated 3 December 2021. Then, at the bottom of the second page, Mr Eaton set out Mr Corney's four complaints in his grievance namely: • that Mr Baird was using his position to bully and intimidate him to try to stop him from making legitimate complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016; • Mr Baird and Ms Mallett did not follow the first Privacy Policy; • he did not breach any policy or the Code of Conduct; and • he believed Ms Mallett and Mr Baird were using their power and authority to try to intimidate him because he had made valid complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 that embarrassed the Mental Health Service Group. 172 T 4-5, l 40 to T 4-6, l 34. -- 50 of 62 -- 51 [224] Mr Eaton's consideration of the issues, in respect of each of these complaints, and his reasons for his decision in respect of each of these complaints, were, as is evidenced by the content of his decision as set out earlier in these reasons, comprehensive and clear. [225] Mr Eaton's evidence in cross-examination was that he was satisfied, having read the information placed before him, that he did not need any further information to make his decision about Mr Corney's grievance.173 In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, there is nothing unreasonable in Mr Eaton determining, following his review of all the material, that he did not need any further information to make a decision about the four complaints in Mr Corney's grievance. [226] Mr Corney submits that the only information that was not before Mr Eaton, and which resulted in Mr Eaton's decision being wrong, was any relevant information that could have been sourced from the Privacy and Confidentiality Team, and that Mr Eaton only relied upon the ' … flawed investigation' by Mr Baird and Ms Mallett.174 However, there was no evidence before me of such evidence from the Privacy and Confidentiality Team that could be placed before Mr Eaton that may have resulted in a different decision from Mr Eaton. In any event, for the reasons given earlier, there was nothing unreasonable in the management action of Mr Baird and Ms Mallett in not referring Mr Corney's original complaint to the Privacy and Confidentiality Team in accordance with the first Privacy Policy. [227] Secondly, despite the failure by Mr Eaton to consider Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 1 of the Grievance Policy, it is evident from the content of Mr Eaton's decision that he gave full, proper and objective consideration to all the relevant material before him in considering each of the four complaints that comprised Mr Corney's grievance. There is no evidence before me that Mr Eaton's decision was unfair or was arbitrary. Having regard to the material to which Mr Eaton summarised and referred to in his decision, it was entirely open and reasonable for Mr Eaton to come to the conclusions contained in his decision. [228] More to the point, having regard to all the evidence before me, it was entirely open and reasonable for Mr Eaton to come to the conclusions contained in this decision in that: • there was no evidence of Mr Baird using his position to bully and intimidate Mr Corney to inhibit him from making legitimate complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016; • in all of the circumstances of Mr Corney's complaint, there was nothing unreasonable in Mr Baird and Ms Mallett not applying the first Privacy Policy in respect of Mr Corney's original complaint; • there was clear evidence upon which it is reasonably open to conclude that Mr Corney's access of the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients was unauthorised because he did not have direct clinical care for those patients; and 173 T 4-12, ll 19-21 (1 August 2025). 174 T 5-19, 25-33 (1 August 2025). -- 51 of 62 -- 52 • there was no evidence that Mr Baird and Ms Mallett were using their power and authority to try to intimidate Mr Corney because he had made valid complaints about breaches of the Mental Health Act 2016 that embarrassed the Mental Health Service Group. [229] Thirdly, Mr Corney submits he was denied procedural fairness. However, as a matter of practicality and looking at the evidence as a whole, given the very comprehensive nature of Mr Corney's written grievance, Mr Cormey articulated every complaint that he wanted to make about Mr Baird and Ms Mallett. Apart from the very broad and vague complaints made by Mr Corney in his oral submissions that he was denied procedural fairness, Mr Corney does not point to any specific matter upon which he was denied the opportunity to be heard. On the evidence before me, I am unable to conclude that Mr Corney has suffered any practical injustice in respect of the way Mr Eaton considered Mr Corney's grievance. [230] Mr Eaton made his decision about the complaints made by Mr Corney as contained in his written grievance. The fact that Mr Corney did not accept Mr Eaton's decision does not mean that Mr Eaton's decision was unreasonable or that he came to a reasonable decision in a way that was unreasonable. [231] Fourthly, Mr Corney submitted that because Mr Eaton did not follow the Grievance Policy he (Mr Corney) was denied natural justice by Mr Eaton '… to have my Grievance heard by an unbiased and competent person.'175 Mr Eaton is the Chief Operating Officer of the Health Service. In my view, Mr Eaton did receive the wrong advice from Human Resources, namely, to consider Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 2 of the Grievance Policy as opposed to Stage 1. However, Mr Eaton is a very senior employee of the Health Service and was obviously a competent person to deal with the content of Mr Corney's grievance. Furthermore, Mr Corney has not specifically identified any valid or acceptable reason Mr Eaton would be biased against him, either actually or ostensibly, in considering his grievance. [232] For the reasons given earlier, there is no evidence that the delay in Mr Eaton making his decision about Mr Corney's grievance had any causal connection with Mr Corney's adjustment disorder. Indeed, Mr Corney's submissions were about the process adopted by Mr Eaton in determining his grievance and the content of Mr Eaton's decision about his grievance, not the delay. [233] In my view, Mr Eaton's management action in the way that he dealt with Mr Corney's grievance, and in respect of his conclusions about the complaints made within Mr Corney's grievance, was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. The decision contained in Mr Eaton's 25 May letter [234] The circumstances as to how Mr Eaton came to make the decision in his 25 May letter is set out earlier in these reasons. The decision in Mr Eaton's 25 May letter concerned specific issues raised by Mr Corney, in a meeting that he had with Mr Eaton and Mr Murakami, on 6 April 2022. 175 Mr Corney's submissions, para. 53. -- 52 of 62 -- 53 [235] Mr Corney's contention about the decision contained in Mr Eaton's 25 May letter was that it confirmed Ms Mallett's warning to him as a consequence of his authorised access of the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients where he did not have direct care for those two patients.176 For all the reasons I have previously given, that decision by Ms Mallett was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. [236] In his written submissions,177 Mr Corney submits that the unreasonableness of this aspect of Mr Eaton's management action was that Mr Eaton should have considered Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 1 of the Grievance Policy, which would then have allowed Mr Corney to ask for a Stage 2 review of Mr Eaton's Stage 1 decision (assuming Mr Corney was dissatisfied with it); and that the Stage 2 review would have been conducted by Professor Keyes. [237] Mr Corney made the same point in his oral submissions by referring to the third page of Mr Eaton's 25 May letter (Exhibit 17) under the heading of 'Stage 2 grievance'. Mr Corney submitted that Mr Eaton acknowledged that he did not follow the Grievance Policy in that he assessed Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 2. Mr Corney submitted that, as a consequence, he was denied the opportunity to seek an internal review and as such, 'I was denied procedural fairness.'178 [238] The Regulator submitted that: • after Mr Corney had received Mr Eaton's decision about his grievance, Mr Corney contacted Mr Eaton for the purposes of requesting Mr Eaton to revisit his decision about Mr Corney's grievance'; • as a consequence, a meeting occurred on 6 April 2022 between Mr Corney, Mr Eaton and Mr Murakami, during which Mr Corney was given the opportunity to raise the issues he wanted to discuss about Mr Eaton's decision; • following that meeting, Mr Eaton reviewed his decision and provided another decision in response to Mr Corney's raised issues, being the decision contained in Mr Eaton's letter dated 25 May 2022; and • the management action Mr Eaton took was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way.179 176 Mr Corney's contentions, third page, first paragraph. In his contentions, Mr Corney contended that Mr Eaton, in his letter dated 25 May 2022, stated he was referring Mr Corney '… for disciplinary action for Breaching confidentiality.' No such statement was made by Mr Eaton in that letter. Mr Eaton stated that, given the issues Mr Corney had raised about non-compliance with the second Privacy Policy, he was directing the Mental Health Service Group to retrospectively complete a 'Potential Privacy Breach Notification' and that, as a consequence, he would direct the matter to be assessed by the Industrial Relations team '… to determine if consideration of disciplinary action or referral to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) is warranted in this instance, or if the initial warning letter provided to you by Ms Mallett is sufficient.' Exhibit 17, pages 2-3. 177 Mr Corney's submissions, para. 52. 178 T 5-26, ll 43-49 (1 August 2025). 179 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 96-101. -- 53 of 62 -- 54 [239] In oral submissions, the Regulator referred to Exhibit 19 being a number of emails exchanged between Mr Corney and Mr Eaton in March and April 2022. In particular, the Regulator referred to an email from Mr Corney to Mr Eaton sent on 4 April 2022 in which Mr Corney requested an update on his earlier request for a meeting (with Mr Eaton) to discuss Mr Eaton's decision about Mr Corney's grievance (concerning Mr Baird and Ms Mallett).180 [240] After listing out all the issues Mr Corney had with Mr Eaton's decision, under the heading of 'What I would like to happen?', Mr Corney stated: I would like to give Mr Eaton the opportunity to rescind his decision and conducted [sic] a proper investigation as per the Public Service Commission – Managing Workplace Investigations: a practical guide for the Queensland public sector.181 [241] The Regulator then submitted that if there was any breach of the Grievance Policy, given that Mr Eaton met with Mr Corney on 6 April 2022 following Mr Corney's specific request, any prejudice to Mr Corney was ameliorated by that step taken by Mr Eaton in meeting Mr Corney and by then considering the issues he raised.182 [242] For the reasons I have given earlier, there is no evidence that Mr Corney made a contemporaneous complaint to his General Practitioner that it was the stage of the Grievance Policy that was first applied by Mr Eaton that had a causal connection with his adjustment disorder. Mr Corney has not pointed to other evidence that may prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there existed such a causal connection. Indeed, as submitted by the Regulator,183 Mr Eaton's evidence was that at the meeting on 6 April 2022, while Mr Corney raised the issue that he (Mr Eaton) did not contact Mr Corney in coming to his decision about Mr Corney's grievance, Mr Corney did not raise with Mr Eaton the fact that Mr Eaton considered his grievance at Stage 2 of the Grievance Policy instead of Stage 1.184 [243] In any event, Mr Eaton's management action, leading up to and including his decision contained in his 25 May letter, was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. [244] Mr Eaton made his first decision about Mr Corney's grievance. Following that, Mr Corney requested a meeting to discuss certain issues with Mr Eaton about his decision with a view to having Mr Eaton rescind his decision. Mr Eaton then met with Mr Corney to discuss those issues. Objectively, Mr Eaton's management action of meeting with Mr Corney, and listening to Mr Corney's complaints about Mr Eaton's first decision, was reasonable management action and was taken in a reasonable way. [245] Furthermore, on the evidence before me, the issue the subject of Mr Corney's final submissions – that because Mr Eaton considered Mr Corney's grievance at Stage 2 of the Grievance Procedure, he was denied natural justice in that he was unable to have a third- party review of Mr Eaton's first decision – was not an issue agitated by Mr Corney in his meeting with Mr Eaton (and Mr Murakami) on 6 April 2022. Mr Corney does not raise 180 T 5-40, ll 9-30 (1 August 2025). 181 Exhibit 19, third page. 182 T 5-40, ll 34-49 (1 August 2025) 183 The Regulator's submissions, para. 104. 184 T 4-15, ll 3-9. -- 54 of 62 -- 55 this matter in his email to Mr Eaton dated 4 April 2022 (Exhibit 19, third page). Mr Eaton gave evidence that this matter was not raised in the meeting on 6 April 2022 and, consequently, it was not a matter referred to in Mr Eaton's 25 May letter. The fact that Mr Eaton did not deal with a matter not raised with him at the meeting on 6 April 2022 cannot mean there was any unreasonable management action in not considering that issue. [246] Finally, Mr Eaton by his 25 May letter, gives detailed consideration to the issues raised by Mr Corney at the meeting on 6 April 2022. I have set Mr Eaton's reasons as set out in that letter, for rejecting the issues raised by Mr Corney, in paragraphs [52]-[56] of these reasons. It is obvious that Mr Eaton gave appropriate consideration of all issues raised by Mr Corney. [247] In particular, Mr Eaton: • confirmed Ms Mallett's conclusion that Mr Corney's access to the electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients was unauthorised because Mr Corney did not have direct care for those patients; • set out the reasons why he did not meet with Mr Corney in making his decision about Mr Corney's grievance; • rejected Mr Corney's allegation that Mr Baird had a conflict of interest; and • rejected Mr Corney's contention that he had been the subject of bullying by Mr Baird or Ms Mallett. [248] For the reasons I have given earlier in these reasons for decision, on the evidence before me, each of those conclusions reached by Mr Eaton were open on the evidence and were reasonable. For these reasons, Mr Eaton's conclusions about those matters amounted to reasonable management action. [249] Furthermore, the method by which Mr Eaton came to those conclusions, by meeting with Mr Corney on his request, and then giving consideration to the issues raised by Mr Corney in that meeting, meant that this management action by Mr Eaton was taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. Conclusion [250] For these reasons, s 32(5)(a) of the Act applies. Mr Corney's personal injury is not a compensable injury. Other issues [251] Other matters were ventilated by Mr Corney that were not the subject of any contention made by him. Despite this, I will address those matters where appropriate. Mr Corney's interactions with Ms Beckinsale on 27 July 2021 and 18 August 2021 -- 55 of 62 -- 56 [252] Mr Corney made no reference to these events in his contentions. As the Regulator expressly responded to them as a matter of caution, I will deal with them. 27 July 2021. [253] The events about Mr Corney's interaction with Ms Beckinsale on 27 July 2021 are recorded in Exhibit 4 which contains a file note taken by Ms Beckinsale of those events. The file note records that Mr Corney was in a conversation with a PDSU nurse regarding his concern that the Mental Health Act 2016 had been breached in respect of the two PDSU patients. The file note then records Ms Beckinsale asking Mr Corney to '… stop wasting copious amounts of time talking about the PDSU patients' and Ms Beckinsale's reiteration to Mr Corney that the '… PDSU does not come under TCCU governance and the fact that he had pointed out the discrepancy to the PDSU nurse was sufficient.' [254] Objectively, there is nothing unreasonable at all about Ms Beckinsale's comments to Mr Corney on that day as recorded in the file note. [255] Even if this matter amounted to management action that Mr Corney contended had a causal connection with his adjustment disorder, my conclusion would have been that it amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. 18 August 2021 [256] This matter involves a subsequent interaction involving Ms Beckinsale and Mr Corney on 18 August 2021. Again the events were recorded in a file note taken by Ms Beckinsale (Exhibit 7). Ms Beckinsale asked Mr Corney to escalate the issues contained in his email to Dr Lee and to Ms Floriani sent on 24 July 2021 (Exhibit 2, pages 4 and 5) to the Shift- Coordinator or the Clinical Nurse Consultant who would be able to follow up. Ms Beckinsale records that she asked Mr Corney to lower his voice as he was becoming quite loud to which he responded that she was talking over him and not letting him speak. Ms Beckinsale records that, at the end of the conversation, she reiterated with Mr Corney how he should escalate such concerns about LCT issues. [257] Mr Corney was cross-examined about this interaction and his evidence was that Ms Beckinsale was targeting him because he had made a complaint.185 [258] The Regulator then makes the following submissions:186 • Ms Beckinsale's evidence in cross-examination was: - she provided Mr Corney with a direction to escalate his issues to the Shift Coordinator or the Clinical Nurse Consultant, and while Mr Corney did not accept that escalation process:  she did not advise him that he could not email Ms Floriani about such issues; 185 T 2-17, ll 35-36. 186 The Regulator's submissions, paras. 37-41. -- 56 of 62 -- 57  she did not advise him that escalating his issues to the Shift Coordinator or the Clinical Nurse Consultant was the only way he could escalate such issues; and  she denied that she had the conversation with him because she wanted him to stop raising issues;187 and - she did not intend to intimidate or bully him by these conversations;188 and • Mr Corney gave no evidence that this interaction had any causal connection with his adjustment disorder and it was not referred to in his contentions. [259] I accept the Regulator's submissions. [260] First, on the evidence before me, Ms Beckinsale's conversation with Mr Corney on 18 August 2021 was reasonable management action which was taken in a reasonable way. As the Nurse Unit Manager, Ms Beckinsale had the authority to direct Mr Corney as to how he should escalate his concerns about any alleged contraventions of the Mental Health Act 2016. Furthermore, it appears to me that Ms Beckinsale, very reasonably, made a file note of her conversation with Mr Corney in respect of which he was given an opportunity to make comments. Having regard to Exhibit 7, Mr Corney availed himself of that opportunity. [261] Finally, there is no evidence that what Ms Beckinsale said to Mr Corney that day was done with the intention to intimidate or bully Mr Corney. Further, there is no evidence that what Ms Beckinsale did say to Mr Corney on that day amounted to any actual intimidation or bullying of him. [262] Even if this matter amounted to management action that Mr Corney claimed had a causal connection with his adjustment disorder, my conclusion would have been that it amounted to reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with his employment. Other matters raised or argued by Mr Corney [263] In its oral submissions, the Regulator submitted189 that Mr Corney's oral submissions also dealt with issues that related to alleged: • corruption; • Criminal Code offences; • public interest disclosure issues and the application of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994; • the failure to offer him alternative dispute resolution processes; 187 T 4-28, ll 13-14, 19-20 and 35-41. 188 T 4-28, ll 43-45. 189 T 5-32, ll 21-25. -- 57 of 62 -- 58 • failures to make relevant reports to the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency; and • non-compliance with the Industrial Relations Act 2016. [264] The Regulator then submitted that those issues were not part of Mr Corney's case from the outset, and did not feature in his contentions190 and that, as such, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine those issues.191 [265] I accept these submissions. [266] Mr Corney did indeed raise these issues in his oral submissions to the Commission.192 For the reasons I gave earlier, Mr Corney, in respect of the case he advanced to this Commission, is bound by the allegations he made in his contentions. In terms of determining whether or not the identified management action was reasonable or not for the purposes of determining whether Mr Corney has a compensable injury within the meaning of the Act, I have no jurisdiction to give consideration to those submissions or issues. Professor Keyes' letter [267] In its written submissions,193 the Regulator referred to part of Professor Keyes' letter to Mr Corney dated 6 January 2023194 (which was in response to Mr Corney's grievance, dated 1 September 2022, against Mr Eaton and another employee of the Health Service), namely: Outcome I have now carefully considered all the information available to me and I provide you with the following outcomes: 1. The warning provided to you by Ms Ann Marie Mallett, Mental Health Service Group Director on 29 October 2021, is now rescinded as you did not breach confidentiality. 2. The Employer response dated 13 July 2022 be resubmitted to Workcover to conclude that the management action was not reasonable management action that was undertaken in a reasonable way. [268] The Regulator then referred195 to the evidence given by Professor Keyes in cross- examination about how he reached that conclusion: 190 T 5-32, ll 27-28. 191 T 5-32, ll 19-20. 192 Alleged corruption at T 5-4, l 42 to T 5-5, l 29; alleged Criminal Code offences at T 5-4, ll 23-40; alleged public interest disclosure issues and the application of the Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 at T 5-5, l 37 to T 5-6, l 7; alleged failure to be offered alternative dispute resolution processes at 5-19, ll 39-40; alleged failure to make relevant reports to the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency at T 5-25, ll 31-32; and alleged breaches of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 at T 5-25, ll 34-35. 193 The Regulator's submissions, para. 114. 194 Exhibit 1. 195 The Regulator's submissions, para. 115. -- 58 of 62 -- 59 Now, in your letter and exhibit 1, there is a reference to the term ''unreasonable''. Did you want to explain to the court what your understanding of that term unreasonable means?---Can I just confirm was it a reference to being unreasonable or not reasonable? Not reasonable. Thank you?---Thank you. As I explained to Mr Corney when we met – and I think I've discussed here this afternoon – the fact that I bring a - arrive at, you know, a different outcome having considered the same facts as another party doesn't mean that the other party was unreasonable. It's just that I've arrived at a different outcome. Thank you. You didn’t have a cause to turn to section 32(5) of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act to consider the term ''reasonable'' - - -?---No. - - - when you wrote the letter?---No. And you didn't look up any case law?---No. No. Thank you. You didn't consider that the letter that Mr Baird sent to Steven Corney, you didn't consider that to be a vexatious letter, did you?---No. And you didn't see that the meeting that Mr Baird called to have with Mr Corney about more information, you didn't see that as being an overreach?---No. And you didn't see the warning that Ann Marie Mallett gave Steven Corney to be unreasonable?---Even though I arrived at a different view to her, no. Nor the letters of Stephen Eaton?---No. And you didn't consider that John Baird, Ann Marie Mallett or Stephen Eaton bullied, intimidated or acted with retribution towards Steven Corney?---No.196 [269] The Regulator submitted that as Professor Keyes stated, merely because he reached a different conclusion to the earlier decisions made by the relevant persons in the Health Service (Mr Baird, Ms Mallett and Mr Eaton), that decision did not mean the conduct of those persons was unreasonable in any way.197 I accept this submission. [270] Mr Corney, in his submissions, directly contends that Professor Keyes' decision has the effect of (retrospectively) rendering invalid Ms Mallett's conclusions. Mr Corney contends that, as a consequence of Professor Keyes' decision, the earlier management action of Mr Baird, Ms Mallett (and, I assume, Mr Eaton) was unreasonable. In his written submissions, Mr Corney submits (footnote omitted): 26. The Respondent must act as a model Litigant by. "not contesting matters which it accepts as correct, in particular by: not requiring a party to prove a matter which the State knows to be true". 27. Ms Mallett and Mr Baird continued to provide false information to the WCR after Prof. Keyes letter 6 th Jan 2023 stating the applicant did not breach confidentiality. The WCR ignored Prof. Keyes findings to accept the findings of a person who no [sic] authority to make a finding. [271] I cannot accept Mr Corney's submission. The hearing of Mr Corney's appeal before the Commission is a hearing de novo. The issue at the centre of Ms Mallett's warning to Mr Corney was his unauthorised access of the two PDSU patients' records through 196 T 2-65, ll 1-32. 197 The Regulator's submissions, para. 116. -- 59 of 62 -- 60 CIMHA. For the reasons given by Ms Mallett in her letter, that access was unauthorised as Mr Corney did not have direct care of those two patients. [272] Further, Ms Malett found that while Mr Corney felt he had genuine reasons for accessing the patients' records, she stated that: • he must only access records of consumers who were within his direct clinical care'; • if he identified any concerns '… regarding the care of PDSU consumers' he was to '… escalate these concerns to your Shift Coordinator or Clinical Nurse Consultant in the first instance to enable local resolution'; and • if those efforts fail to address his concerns, then he was to escalate the matter to the Nursing Director or to herself.198 [273] The determination of whether or not Ms Mallett's management action was reasonable, or was taken in a reasonable way, is a determination for this Commission to make on an objective basis upon admissible evidence. [274] While Professor Keyes, in January 2023, came to a different conclusion, I am not bound by his conclusion and, in light of the evidence before me, his conclusion is not persuasive. [275] For the reasons I have given earlier, the management action undertaken by Ms Mallett, as expressed in her letter, was reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with Mr Corney's employment. Whether Ms Mallett was authorised to make the decision she made [276] Mr Corney also submitted that Ms Mallett was not authorised '… to say I breached confidentiality'.199 The basis of this submission by Mr Corney was that Ms Mallett, by warning him, took disciplinary action against him, and that Ms Mallett was not authorised to take disciplinary action against him because '… her finding must be sent to the privacy and confidentiality team, the outcome of her investigation, to then be processed by a disciplinary delegate following the disciplinary procedures.'200 [277] Mr Corney's submission is that Ms Mallett was not authorised to take disciplinary action against him because she had not made the appropriate notification under the first Privacy Policy which would have then enlivened a formal disciplinary process and a formal disciplinary investigation against him. Mr Corney's submission then is that it would only be in those circumstances that Ms Mallett would have the authority to take disciplinary action against him, with him having the right to be heard as to why he did not engage in any disciplinary breach and why he should not be disciplined.201 [278] Even if Mr Corney contended that Ms Mallett lacked the authority to issue the warning to him that she did issue, and it is assumed that management action had a causal connection with his adjustment disorder, Mr Corney's argument could not be accepted. 198 Exhibit 11. 199 T 5-13, ll 29-30. 200 T 5-13, ll 39-41. 201 T 5-17, l 34 to T 5-18, l 23. -- 60 of 62 -- 61 [279] This is for two reasons. [280] First, for the reasons I have previously given, in the circumstances of Mr Corney's case, there was nothing unreasonable in Ms Mallett coming to the conclusion that Mr Corney was not authorised to access electronic medical records of the two PDSU patients in the absence of her making any notification to the Privacy and Confidentiality Team under the first Privacy Policy. [281] Second of all, and in any event, on the evidence before me, Ms Mallett did not take disciplinary action against Mr Corney. There is no evidence that Mr Corney was the subject of disciplinary action within the meaning of ch 6, pt 2 of the Public Service Act 2008. In fact, Ms Mallett stated in her letter to him (Exhibit 11) that the warning she gave him was not disciplinary action. Ms Mallett's action was management action. Ms Mallett, as the Service Group Director of the Mental Health Service Group of the Health Service, clearly had the authority to take the management action of giving Mr Corney a warning. [282] For all these reasons, this argument by Mr Corney, even if it was one that he had formally contended and where there was evidence that Ms Mallett's alleged lack of legal authority to give him a warning had a causal connection with his injury, could not have succeeded. Conclusion [283] In this appeal, the onus was on Mr Corney to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act. [284] For the reasons I have given, Mr Corney did not suffer an injury within the meaning of the Act. [285] The review decision of the Regulator is confirmed. [286] I will hear the parties as to costs. Orders [287] I make the following orders: 1. Pursuant to s 558(1)(a) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, the Respondent's review decision of 18 November 2022, contained in the Respondent's correspondence to the Appellant dated 21 November 2022 (Reference 62779), is confirmed. 2. Pursuant to r 41(1) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011: (a) the parties are to exchange and file written submissions on the costs of the hearing (of no more than two (2) pages, 12-point font size, line and a half spacing with numbered paragraphs and pages) by 4.00pm on Wednesday, 25 March 2026; and -- 61 of 62 -- 62 (b) unless otherwise ordered, the decision on costs be determined on the papers. -- 62 of 62 --