DR v IU & Ors (No 2) [2026] QIRC 32

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: DR v IU &Ors (No. 2) [2026] QIRC 032 PARTIES: DR (Complainant) v IU (First Respondent) and QV (Second Respondent) and GJ (Third Respondent) and AN (Fourth Respondent) and CC (Fifth Respondent) and SB (Sixth Respondent) CASE NO.: AD/2022/78 PROCEEDING: Applications in existing proceedings DELIVERED ON: 10 February 2026 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Merrell DP On the papers ORDERS: 1. Pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the -- 1 of 16 -- 2 Fourth Respondent is struck out as a party in Matter No. AD/2022/78. 2. Pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Sixth Respondent is struck out as a party in Matter No. AD/2022/78. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – MOTIONS, APPLICATIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES – OTHER MATTERS – Complainant made a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission against the Respondents alleging impairment discrimination in the work area – complaint referred to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission – by Directions Order of the Commission, the parties filed statements of facts and contentions – applications in existing proceedings by the Fourth Respondent and by the Sixth Respondent for them to be struck out as respondents to the complaint on the basis that no material allegations of unlawful discrimination are made against them by the Complainant in the Complainant's statement of facts and contentions – whether the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission should exercise discretion, pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, and strike out the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent as respondents to the complaint – consideration of whether the Complainant makes any allegation of unlawful discrimination or any allegation of other liability against the Fourth Respondent and against the Sixth Respondent – no allegation of unlawful discrimination and no allegation of other liability made against the Fourth Respondent or the Sixth Respondent – – the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent struck out as parties in the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint LEGISLATION: Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, s 10, s 15, s 166 and s 174C Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 539 -- 2 of 16 -- 3 Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011, r 97 CASES: Fellows v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Office of Industrial Relations and Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor [2025] QIRC 107 Graafland v State of Queensland (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) and Ors (No. 2) [2025] QIRC 034 Hayes v Lend Lease Darling Park One Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1376 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] On 10 April 2022, the Complainant made a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission ('the QHRC') alleging that he was the subject of unlawful discrimination by the Respondents on the basis of his impairment in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ('the AD Act'). The Complainant also made allegations of a breach of his human rights, that he was unlawfully asked unnecessary questions and that he was unlawfully victimised. The six Respondents to the present proceeding were named as respondents in the Complainant's complaint. [2] On 24 October 2022, the Complainant's complaint was referred to this Commission pursuant to s 166 of the AD Act. [3] Pursuant to an Amended Further Directions Order made by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer on 31 January 2023, the Complainant, on 27 February 2023 filed his statement of facts and contentions ('the Complainant's contentions') and on 3 April 2023, the six Respondents filed their contentions ('the Respondents' contentions'). [4] No party is represented. [5] The Fourth and Sixth Respondents have filed and served applications in existing proceedings for them to be struck out as parties, to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint in this Commission, on the basis that no material allegations have been made against them in the Complainant's contentions. [6] The issue for my determination is whether I should exercise my discretion, pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act'), and strike out the -- 3 of 16 -- 4 Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent, as parties to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint. [7] For the reasons that follow, I will order that the Fourth Respondent and that the Sixth Respondent be struck out as parties to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint. Relevant background The Complainant's contentions [8] The First Respondent is a political party and, having regard to the Complainant's contentions, he was once an active member of that party. [9] By way of broad summary, the Complainant alleges that: • he suffers from schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder;1 • the Third Respondent, on the basis of certain facts contended by the Complainant, directly discriminated against him within the meaning of s 10 of the AD Act;2 • the Second Respondent, on the basis of certain facts contended by the Complainant, directly discriminated against him within the meaning of s 10 of the AD Act;3 • the First Respondent '… and the other individual respondents' supported the (alleged) discrimination by the Third Respondent and by the Second Respondent, by refusing to act on the Complainant's complaints and by refusing to follow the complaint mechanisms outlined in the First Respondent's constitution and in the First Respondent's anti-bullying policy;4 • 'the respondents' directly discriminated against him within the meaning of s 10 of the AD Act, by various ways, contravening s 15 of the AD Act, including by dismissing him as the Treasurer of the First Respondent;5 • he was victimised in various ways by the First Respondent and '…the individual respondents within the meaning of sections 129-131' of the AD Act because of a previous complaint he made to the Australian Human Rights Commission and later to the QHRC;6 and • the First Respondent '…and the individual respondents have vicarious liability within the meaning of sections 132-133' of the AD Act which extends to other 1 The Complainant's contentions filed on 27 February 2023 ('the Complainant's contentions'), para. 1. 2 The Complainant's contentions, paras. 3a). 3 The Complainant's contentions, paras. 3b). 4 The Complainant's contentions, paras. 3c). 5 The Complainant's contentions, paras. 4-6. 6 The Complainant's contentions, para. 7. -- 4 of 16 -- 5 named members of the First Respondent's National Executive but who are not named respondents to the Complainant's complaint.7 [10] The Complainant seeks various remedies including: • his reinstatement as Treasurer of the First Respondent; • public apologies from all the Respondents '… by way of mass emails to all members of the party'; • the payment of $100,000 from the First Respondent '… for psychological trauma and damage to reputation'; • the payment of $50,000 from the Fifth Respondent ' … for psychological trauma and damage to reputation'; and • the payment of $20,000 '… for psychological trauma and damage to reputation' from the Second Respondent, the Third Respondent, the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent'; and • the payment of $10,000 '… for psychological trauma and damage to reputation' from eight named individuals who are not respondents to the Complainant's complaint.8 [11] What then follows in the Complainant's contentions, by paragraphs numbered 1 to 38, is what seems to be further facts upon which the Complainant makes his contentions ('the Complainant's further contended facts'). [12] The Respondents, by their contentions, admit that the Complainant suffered from the medical conditions that the Complainant contends,9 but otherwise deny the allegations contained in the Complainant's contentions.10 In particular, the Respondents expressly responded to the Complainant's further contended facts.11 The decision in DR v IU & Ors [13] By decision dated 21 August 2023 in DR v IU & Ors ('DR No. 1'),12 Industrial Commissioner Dwyer made a number of orders in respect of the Complainant's complaint. The circumstances of how those orders came to be made by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer are set out in paragraphs [1] to [11] of that decision. The orders made by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer were: 7 The Complainant's contentions, para. 8. 8 The Complainant's contentions, paras. 1) and 7)-11). 9 The Respondents' contentions filed on 3 April 2023 ('the Respondents' contentions'), para. 1. 10 The Respondents' contentions, paras. 2-12. 11 The Respondents' contentions, paras. 13-29. 12 [2023] QIRC 251 ('DR No.1') . -- 5 of 16 -- 6 • pursuant to s 451(2)(b) of the IR Act, that the proceedings – namely, the proceedings before the Commission of the Complainant's complaint – be stayed until 21 August 2024 ('the Stay Order'); • that the proceedings were to be listed for mention on a date to be advised not before 22 August 2024; • that the parties have liberty to apply; and • that pursuant to r 97(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011 ('the Rules'), the names of the parties in the proceeding were not to be published ('the non-publication order').13 [14] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer gave detailed reasons for all the orders that he made. [15] By order dated 19 September 2025, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer set aside the Stay Order and also ordered that the Complainant be given liberty to proceed. [16] The Complainant wishes to proceed with the hearing and determination of his complaint before this Commission. [17] The hearing and determination of the Complainant's complaint has been allocated to me. [18] In paragraphs [21] to [22] of Industrial Commissioner Dwyer's decision in DR No. 1, the Industrial Commissioner gave reasons for making the non-publication order. The parties have not addressed me on whether it remains appropriate to continue to anonymise their names. Until that occurs, out of an abundance of caution, I will not publish the names of the parties in this decision. The Directions Orders made on 12 December 2025 [19] Following the Complainant's complaint being allocated to me for hearing, I held a mention of the matter on 11 December 2025. [20] During that mention, I raised the issue of email correspondence dated 16 October 2025 from the Fourth Respondent to the Industrial Registry, which indicated a belief that he and the Sixth Respondent should not be parties to the proceeding because no allegations of discrimination had been made against them.14 The Complainant did not consent to their removal as respondents to his complaint.15 Both the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent indicated that they intended to formally apply to be struck out as respondents to the proceeding.16 13 DR No.1 (n 12) [23]. 14 T 1-2, ll 35-42. 15 T 1-2, l 46 to T 1-3, l 14. 16 T 1-3, ll 35-49. -- 6 of 16 -- 7 [21] As a consequence, during that mention, I outlined for the parties the Directions Orders I would make for the hearing of such applications, including making orders setting the dates that the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent were to file and serve their applications to be struck out as respondents to the proceeding, and for the parties to then file and serve submissions in respect of such applications.17 [22] By Directions Order dated 12 December 2025, I made the following Orders: • the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent each file and serve on the Complainant and on the First, Second, Third and Fifth Respondents, by 16 January 2026: - an application in existing proceedings for an order that they be struck out as a party to the proceeding; and - written submissions in support of the application; • the Complainant and the First, Second, Third and Fifth Respondents, by 30 January 2026, file and serve written submissions in response to the applications in existing proceedings filed and served by the Fourth Respondent and by the Sixth Respondent;18 • the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent, by 6 February 2026, file and serve written submissions in reply; and • that the applications in existing proceedings by the Fourth Respondent and by the Sixth Respondent be determined on the papers. The material filed by the parties following the Directions Order made on 12 December 2025 [23] On 5 January 2026, the Fourth Respondent: • filed and served an application in existing proceedings that he be struck out as a party to the proceeding ('the Fourth Respondent's application'); and • filed and served an affidavit, affirmed by himself, in support of his application ('the Fourth Respondent's affidavit'). [24] The Fourth Respondent's application, and the Fourth Respondent's affidavit, make clear the basis upon which he contends he should be struck out as a party to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint. The Fourth Respondent's affidavit is in the form of a submission. For the purposes of the Fourth Respondent's application, I will treat the Fourth Respondent's affidavit as his submission. 17 T 1-4, ll 1-40. At the same mention, I made other Directions Orders for the hearing of the Complainant's complaint. 18 This particular order specified that the submissions to be filed and served by the Complainant and by the First, Second, Third and Fifth Respondents must only be '… in relation to the application made by the Fourth Respondent, and the application made by the Sixth Respondent, to be struck out as a party to the proceeding.' -- 7 of 16 -- 8 [25] On 6 January 2026, the Complainant filed and served an affidavit affirmed by him on 6 January 2026 ('the Complainant's affidavit'). There is no accompanying email or other correspondence from the Complainant which indicates the purpose of his affidavit or whether it is in response to any Directions Order I made. On a reasonable perusal of the Complainant's affidavit, it seems to be the Complainant's affidavit upon which he intends to rely at the substantive hearing of his complaint. I come to this conclusion because, in addition to the content of the Complainant's affidavit, after the mention before me on 11 December 2025, pursuant to a further Directions Order I made on 12 December 2025, I ordered that the Complainant was to file and serve on each of the Respondents, by 27 March 2026, the affidavit material upon which he intended to rely at the hearing of his complaint. [26] No submissions were filed by the Complainant, in response to the Fourth Respondent's application, by 30 January 2026. In fact, no submissions or other material have been filed by the Complainant in response to the Fourth Respondent's application. [27] On 6 January 2026, the Second Respondent filed and served submissions in response to the Fourth Respondent's application. [28] On 27 January 2026 the Sixth Respondent: • filed and served an application in existing proceedings that he be struck out as a party to the proceeding ('the Sixth Respondent's application'); and • filed and served an affidavit, affirmed by himself, in support of his application ('the Sixth Respondent's affidavit'). [29] The Sixth Respondent's application, and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit, were not filed and served in accordance with the Directions Order I made on 12 December 2025; namely, they were not filed and served by 16 January 2026. Despite this, the Complainant has taken no issue with the late service on him of the Sixth Respondent's application and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit. No communication has been received from the Complainant in response to the filing and serving of the Sixth Respondent's application and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit. [30] The Sixth Respondent's application, and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit, make clear the basis upon which he contends he should be struck out as a party to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint. The Sixth Respondent's affidavit is in the form of a submission and, as I did with the Fourth Respondent, for the purposes of the Sixth Respondent's application, I will treat the Sixth Respondent's affidavit as his submission. [31] On 27 January 2026, the Second Respondent, the Third Respondent, the Fourth Respondent and the Fifth Respondent filed submissions in respect of the Sixth Respondent's application. -- 8 of 16 -- 9 [32] Further, on 29 January 2026, the Fifth Respondent also filed submissions in respect of the Fourth Respondent's application, and on 3 February 2026, the Sixth Respondent filed submissions in respect of the Fourth Respondent's application. The relevant legislative provisions and principles The legislative provisions [33] Section 174C of the AD Act provides: 174C Powers of tribunal under relevant tribunal Act (1) If this Act confers jurisdiction on the tribunal in relation to a complaint or other matter, the tribunal may exercise the powers conferred on it under this Act or the relevant tribunal Act. (2) Nothing in this Act limits the industrial relations commission's powers under the IR Act, section 539. [34] Section 539 of the IR Act relevantly provides: 539 Powers incidental to exercise of jurisdiction Except as otherwise provided for by this Act or the rules, the court, commission or registrar may– (a) at or before a hearing, take steps to find out whether all persons who are to be bound by a decision to be made in proceedings have been called to attend or given notice of, the proceedings; and (b) direct, for proceedings– (i) who the parties to the proceedings are; and (ii) by whom the parties may be represented; and (iii) persons to be called to attend the proceedings, if the persons have not been called and it appears the persons should attend the proceedings; and (iv) parties to be joined or struck out; and (v) who may be heard and on what conditions. [35] I considered s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act in Graafland v State of Queensland (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) and Ors (No. 2)19 in the context of a complaint referred from the QHRC to this Commission alleging a contravention of the AD Act. I relevantly stated (citations omitted): [19] Having regard to ch 7, pt 2, div 1, sub-div 1 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, which confers certain powers on the Commission as part of the pre-hearing process, but which does not contain an express power for the Commission to strike out a party from a proceeding, then the power of the Commission to strike out a party from a proceeding under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 may be derived from s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act. [20] Unlike the power given to courts under civil procedure rules to remove a party from a proceeding, the discretion conferred on the Commission pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act, to strike out a party, does not expressly identify matters that are to be considered. Where a statutory provision, under which a decision is to be made, does not expressly identify matters that are to be considered by the decision maker, the relevant matters that must be taken into account will be determined by the proper construction 19 [2025] QIRC 034. -- 9 of 16 -- 10 of the statutory provision in question, having regard to the Act's subject matter, scope and purpose. [21] One of the main purposes of the IR Act, being '… to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that … supports the delivery of high quality services, economic prosperity and social justice for Queenslanders' is achieved by '… preventing and eliminating sexual harassment, sex or gender-based harassment, discrimination, bullying and other unfair treatment in employment.' [22] Section 531(3) of the IR Act provides that in proceedings, the Commission is to be guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole. In the present case, the statutory context of this provision is in respect of the function of the Commission, under s 174B(a)(iv) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, to hear and decide complaints of unlawful discrimination referred to it by the QHRC. Having regard to s 531(3) of the IR Act, it seems to me that the Commission, in exercising its discretion under s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act, should not depart from established principles of the general law. [23] In Agar v Hyde, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ relevantly stated (citation omitted): 57. It is, of course, well accepted that a court whose jurisdiction is regularly invoked in respect of a local defendant (most often by service of process on that defendant within the geographic limitations of the court's jurisdiction) should not decide the issues raised in those proceedings in a summary way except in the clearest of cases. Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way. [24] This approach has been applied in determining whether a respondent should be removed as a party to a proceeding. [36] In Hayes v Lend Lease Darling Park One Pty Ltd,20 Bellew J, after referring to r 6.29 and r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW),21 stated: 18 Both of these provisions confer power to remove a defendant, or to dismiss proceedings against a defendant, at an interlocutory stage of proceedings. That power must only be exercised where the plaintiff's claim is so clearly deficient that it would be inappropriate to allow the proceedings to continue: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125; [1964] HCA 69 at 129-130 and Cox v Journeaux (No. 2) (1935) 62 CLR 713; (1935) 9 ALJR 127 at 720. The arguments of the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent [37] Both the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent claim: 20 [2017] NSWSC 1376. 21 Rule 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) ('Removal of party by order') provides: The court may order that a person– (a) who has been improperly or unnecessarily joined, or (b) who has ceased to be a proper or necessary party, be removed as a party. -- 10 of 16 -- 11 • in paragraph 3 of the Complainant's contentions, no allegation is made that either of them: - made discriminatory statements or remarks about the Complainant; - took any adverse action against the Complainant; - exercised decision-making power in relation to the conduct alleged by the Complainant; or - authorised, directed, or assisted any conduct alleged to contravene the AD Act • the only references to them in the Complainant's contentions concern their involvement in an internal investigation and related mediation steps following a complaint made by the Complainant; • they are not alleged in the Complainant's contentions, to have engaged in conduct constituting discrimination, victimisation or any other unlawful act under the AD Act; • they are not alleged to have acted as an employer, principal, or person exercising control over the Complainant in relation to the matters of which the Complainant complains; • they are not alleged to have aided, abetted, authorised or have been knowingly concerned in any conduct said to contravene the AD Act; and • to the extent that any liability is asserted against them by reference to vicarious or accessorial liability provisions, '…no material facts are pleaded that identify how those provisions are said' to apply to them.22 [38] Both the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent then contend, having regard to these matters, that there is no proper basis upon which relief could be granted against them in the proceeding.23 Should orders be made that the Fourth Respondent and that the Sixth Respondent be struck out as parties to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint? What claims are made against the Fourth Respondent and against the Sixth Respondent by the Complainant in the Complainant's contentions? 22 The Fourth Respondent's affidavit filed on 5 January 2026 ('the Fourth Respondent's affidavit'), paras. 4-9 and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit filed on 27 January 2026 ('the Sixth Respondent's affidavit'), paras. 4-9. 23 The Fourth Respondent's affidavit, para. 10 and the Sixth Respondent's affidavit, para. 10. -- 11 of 16 -- 12 [39] The role played by Directions Orders made by the Commission for parties to a proceeding to file statements of facts and contentions is significant. [40] In Fellows v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Office of Industrial Relations and Office of the Work Health and Safety Prosecutor,24 I relevantly stated (citations and emphasis omitted): [55] The purpose of Directions Orders issued by the Commission, for the filing and serving of statements of facts and contentions, was addressed by Martin J, President in Yousif v Workers’ Compensation Regulator ('Yousif'). Although that case concerned an appeal under the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 to the Commission, his Honour's comments about the purpose of statements of facts and contentions are apposite: Statements of Facts and Contentions [10] The Commissioner relied, in part, on the Statement of Facts and Contentions filed by the appellant. The role of such Statements was the subject of submissions and it will assist if their status is examined before the grounds of appeal are considered. [11] In appeals brought to the Commission under the Act, it was once the standard practice for a direction to be given requiring the appellant to file and serve a Statement of Stressors. It is now the common practice for a direction to be given requiring the parties to file and serve Statements of Facts and Contentions. The legislative power to make such a direction is found in s 451(2)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act). More detailed provisions are contained in r 41 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011. Rule 45 also provides that, among other things, the Commission may dismiss a proceeding if there is a failure to comply with a direction. [12] In Blackwood v Adams, I referred to Statements of Stressors as setting "the boundaries of the application". More recently, in Carlton v Blackwood I said: "An appellant's case has to be known before the hearing starts. The Commission cannot allow a case to ''evolve'' and place the respondent in the position of having to contend with the shifting sands of an undefined argument. If an appellant wishes to advance a different case, then that should be done by seeking an amendment to the Statement of Stressors or the document identifying the facts and contentions. The Commission can then decide whether or not to allow such an amendment." [13] A Statement of Facts and Contentions is not attended with the same level of formality as pleadings in the traditional sense are. The Commission is relieved, by s 531 of the IR Act, of many of the strict rules which apply in the civil courts. But, the Commission is still in charge of its own procedure and may, consistently with the provisions of s 531, require parties to provide an outline of their respective cases. This is particularly important in appeals under the Act where the nature of injuries, their cause, and the times at which they were suffered are essential to the resolution of an appeal. It follows, then, that the Commission is entitled to rely on the Statement as a complete statement of a party's case and, if an admission is made, to rely on that admission. [14] Section 531 requires that the Commission be: "… guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of– (a) the persons immediately concerned; and (b) the community as a whole." [15] It is consistent with the requirements of s 531 for a party in an appeal under the Act to set out its case by way of a Statement of Facts and Contentions. It alerts the other party to the case it will have to deal with and it identifies the issues 24 [2025] QIRC 107. -- 12 of 16 -- 13 which exist which, in turn, allow for a confinement of the matters in dispute. An appeal under the Act is not the time for a broad ranging inquiry into an unlimited number of complaints or grievances. The time and resources of the Commission are constrained and it is necessary for those constraints to be acknowledged in this way. Subject always to the Commission's power to allow appropriate amendments (so that s 531 may be observed) a party will be bound by its Statement of Facts and Contentions and may not lead evidence which is not relevant to the identified issues. [56] Directions Orders made by Members of the Commission are made pursuant to r 41 of the Rules and, as provided in r 6 of the Rules, the purpose of the Rules is to provide for the just and expeditious disposition of the business of the Commission at a minimum of expense. [41] Having regard to the Commission's file for this matter, the Complainant's contentions were filed and served pursuant to an Amended Further Directions Order made by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer on 31 January 2023. [42] In respect of the complaint made by the Complainant as referred from the QHRC to this Commission, that Amended Further Directions Order relevantly provided: 2. That the Complainant's statement of facts and contentions must: (a) if the complaint referred by the Queensland Human Rights Commission (the QHRC) contained allegations of direct, and, or in the alternative, indirect discrimination, identify the attribute or attributes, within the meaning of s 7 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (the AD Act) upon which each allegation is made; (b) for a complaint of direct discrimination: (i) identify the section or sections of the AD Act alleged to have been contravened; (ii) identify the name or names of the persons alleged to have contravened the AD Act; (iii) if the Complainant relies upon an actual person as the comparator, state the name of the comparator and why that person is an appropriate comparator; (iv) in the alternative, if the Complainant relies upon a hypothetical comparator as the appropriate comparator, describe the hypothetical comparator; (v) describe how the Complainant contends that they were treated less favourably, than the appropriate comparator, by the person or persons alleged to have contravened the AD Act;25 … (f) if the complaint referred by the QHRC included an allegation of victimisation: 25 My emphasis. -- 13 of 16 -- 14 (i) state the name of the person or persons who engaged in the conduct alleged to be victimisation within the meaning of s 130 of the AD Act;26 and (ii) state the exact circumstances upon which the Complainant relies to claim the conduct alleged was victimisation within the meaning of s 130 of the AD Act; [43] A number of things may be said about the Complainant's contentions. [44] First, it is only in respect of the allegations contained in paragraph 3) of the Complainant's contentions, that he identifies the name or names of the persons, who are Respondents to his complaint, that he alleges contravened the AD Act by allegedly engaging in direct discrimination. Those persons are the Third Respondent, the Second Respondent and, on a basis that is not contended, the First Respondent. That is to say, as the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent contend, no allegation of (direct) discrimination is made against them as named individuals. [45] Secondly, no person is identified by name, in the allegations contained in paragraph 4), as allegedly contravening the AD Act by allegedly engaging in direct discrimination. [46] Thirdly, no person is identified by name, in the allegations contained in paragraph 7), as allegedly contravening the AD Act by allegedly victimising the Complainant. [47] Fourthly, to the extent the Complainant alleges in paragraph 8) that '… the individual respondents have vicarious liability within the meaning of s 132-133 of the Act': • no person is identified by name as having any such alleged vicarious liability in respect of any alleged contravention of the AD Act; and • no contention is made, based upon any alleged facts, of how '… the individual respondents', including the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent, have any such alleged vicarious liability within the meaning of s 132-133 of the AD Act. [48] Fifthly, in respect of the Complainant's further contended facts contained in paragraphs 1 to 38 of the Complainant's contentions, the only relevant mention of the Fourth Respondent and of the Sixth Respondent is: • in paragraphs 25 to 27: - in which the Complainant alleges the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent offered to, and did, conduct an investigation of allegations made by the Complainant:  against the Second and Third Respondents; and 26 My emphasis. -- 14 of 16 -- 15  against the First Respondent's national executive of whom the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent were allegedly part; and - in which the Complainant alleges:  that the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent '…were supportive' of certain alleged actions of the Second and Third Respondents; and  that the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent did not see any conflict of interest '…in investigating themselves'; and • in paragraphs 30, 32 and 34 in which the Complainant alleges that he received certain information from other persons (not the Fourth Respondent and not the Sixth Respondent) after the completion of the investigation by the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent. [49] The Complainant: • does not name the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent as being persons who allegedly directly discriminated against him, on the basis of his impairments, in contravention of the AD Act; • does not allege any facts, upon which he makes allegations of unlawful direct discrimination on the basis of his impairments, against the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent; • does not name the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent as being persons who allegedly victimised him in contravention of the AD Act; • does not allege any facts, upon which he makes allegations of victimisation against the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent; and • does not allege any facts upon which he contends that the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent are vicariously liable for alleged contraventions of the AD Act by any other person. [50] In short, no allegations of any contravention of the AD Act, or any other liability under the AD Act, are made against the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent. [51] The Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent, in the Respondents' contentions, make no admissions of any contravention of the AD Act or of any other liability under the AD Act. -- 15 of 16 -- 16 [52] In fact, having regard to the Complainant's affidavit (filed on 6 January 2026), in particular, paragraphs 42, 43, 45 and 46, the Complaint gives no sworn evidence that may tend to prove the Fourth Respondent and, or in the alternative, the Sixth Respondent engaged in any alleged contravention of the AD Act or that they allegedly have any other liability under the AD Act. The Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent should be struck out as parties [53] For the reasons I have given in paragraphs [39] to [50] of these reasons, the Complainant's case against the Fourth Respondent and the Complainant's case against the Sixth Respondent, of any contravention of the AD Act or of any other liability under the AD Act, are so clearly deficient that it would be inappropriate to allow the proceedings against the Fourth Respondent, and against the Sixth Respondent, to continue. [54] I will order that the Fourth Respondent and the Sixth Respondent be struck out as parties to the proceeding of the Complainant's complaint. Orders [55] I make the following orders : 1. Pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Fourth Respondent is struck out as a party in Matter No. AD/2022/78. 2. Pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Sixth Respondent is struck out as a party in Matter No. AD/2022/78. -- 16 of 16 --