Cramp v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2026] QIRC 9

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Cramp v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2026] QIRC 009 PARTIES: Cramp, Troy Jonathon Applicant v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) Respondent CASE NO: TD/2024/117 PROCEEDING: Application to dismiss proceedings DELIVERED ON: 20 January 2026 HEARING DATE: 16 December 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Pratt IC Carins ORDER: 1. Mr Cramp's application TD/2024/117 is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPLICATION TO DISMISS – where applicant deliberately did not attend hearing – consideration of power to dismiss under r 45 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 – consideration of acceptance of hearsay evidence – found applicant filed and pursued proceedings 'vexatiously' – found applicant's conduct to have caused unnecessary delay and cost – application dismissed -- 1 of 6 -- 2 LEGISLATION: CASES: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 531 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 45 House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 6) [2025] ICQ 2 Khattabi v Qantas Airways Ltd [2025] QIRC 173 Leigh v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 23 Polizzi v Commissioner of Police (No. 2) [2017] WASC 166 Re Poochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 26 AR 247 Workers' Compensation Regulator v Manu [2021] QIRC 298 APPEARANCES: Mr P Zielinkski of counsel, instructed by the State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) -- 2 of 6 -- 3 Reasons for Decision [1] Troy Jonathan Cramp, the Applicant in this matter, sought orders for reinstatement arguing that his dismissal was unfair. Before this matter came to me for hearing, it underwent about a year of procedural steps such as a conciliation conference and a process of filing and exchange of documents, including affidavit evidence and submissions, in preparation for a hearing. The matter was set down for a three-day hearing in Cairns on 16, 17 and 18 December 2025. Mr Cramp did not attend. The Respondent to the proceedings ('TMR') made an application orally on the day that this matter be dismissed. This is the decision arising from that application. What is the legal issue? [2] The legal issue I must resolve is a single question of whether I should exercise a discretionary power to dismiss Mr Cramp's application without a hearing on its merits. Stated briefly, TMR argues that I should because Mr Cramp has abandoned the case. In particular, TMR argues that Mr Cramp deliberately chose not to attend the hearing and has no intention of pursuing the matter. For the reasons that follow, I accept that that is the case. What is the test for dismissing matters without a full hearing? [3] The Commission has the power to dismiss matters in circumstances where a party fails to attend or comply with orders.1 [4] I accept the TMR's submissions that Khattabi v Qantas Airways Ltd2 observes the key principle of the need to exercise the discretion judicially. I would add to that the observations of his Honour, O'Connor VP, in Workers' Compensation Regulator v Manu,3 citing House v The King.4 [5] Care needs to be taken to ensure that the relevant party has not simply misunderstood the process or come to grief in some way as to have been temporarily unable to comply with the orders. It is a serious step to dismiss a cause of action without any hearing on its merits. I accept also TMR's submissions that where a party indicates an ongoing inability or unwillingness to cooperate with the Commission in a way that causes unnecessary delay, expense or prejudice to the other party/ies,5or the proceeding amounts to an abuse of process or is vexatious,6 then an exercise of the discretion is warranted. I also accept TMR's submission that what constitutes bringing a vexatious proceeding is where it can be determined that the "predominant purpose … was to 1 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 45. 2 Citing Khattabi v Qantas Airways Ltd [2025] QIRC 173, ('Khattabi') [84], following House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 504-505. 3 [2021] QIRC 298 [20]. 4 (1936) 55 CLR 499 504-505. 5 Citing Khattabi [89]. 6 Ibid [85]. -- 3 of 6 -- 4 harass or embarrass or gain a collateral advantage unrelated to the vindication of the rights, privileges or immunities in respect of which it was instituted".7 Should I dismiss Mr Cramp's case without a hearing? [6] The answer to this question is 'yes' because I am satisfied that Mr Cramp deliberately chose not to attend the hearing of the matter and for reasons which I set out below. I have concluded that Mr Cramp never intended to attend the hearing and further, that he conducted the proceedings entirely for the purpose of harassing TMR and causing it cost and inconvenience. Accordingly, I have also formed the view that even if the proceedings were rescheduled, for reasons which I discuss below, Mr Cramp has evinced an intention to no longer be involved in the proceedings in any way. [7] A notice of listing for the hearing in Cairns was conveyed to Mr Cramp on 4 August 2025. Hearing time was set aside in the Cairns District Court for 16, 17 and 18 December 2025. I accept the evidence deposed by Mr McDonald, solicitor for TMR, that between 17 November and 5 December 2025, Mr Cramp sent emails to TMR regarding preparations for the hearing, and in particular, TMR's advice that it required a witness, Mr Anderson, to be available for cross-examination. Mr Cramp confirmed in those emails that he was well aware of the hearing and expressed a keenness to have the matter dealt with by that process. On that evidence, I conclude that Mr Cramp was in fact aware of the proceedings scheduled to start on 16 December 2025 and due to run for three days in the Cairns District Court. [8] The evidence deposed by Mr McDonald on 16 December 2025, and by way of affidavit filed in this application to dismiss on 5 January 2026, includes an account of Mr McDonald having spoken to Mr Anderson on the morning of 16 December 2025. Mr McDonald deposed that he spoke to Mr Anderson during the adjournment I allowed in order to see if Mr Cramp or any of his witnesses could be located. Mr McDonald deposes that Mr Anderson told him that he had no knowledge of being required to give evidence that day. [9] Whilst Mr McDonald's account of what Mr Anderson said to him on 16 December 2025 is hearsay evidence, I am inclined to accept it. I am guided in that decision by the observations of O'Neill IC in Leigh v State of Queensland (Department of Education)8 where O'Neill IC observed that the Commission was not bound by the rules of evidence and could in some cases receive hearsay evidence9 so long as that evidence had "rational probative force".10 O'Neill IC drew support for this conclusion from the judgement of his Honour, Brennan J, in Re Poochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs11 who observed that hearsay evidence can be the basis of the decision where it can be fairly said to be reliable. 7 Citing Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 6) [2025] ICQ 2 [28]. 8 [2025] QIRC 23. 9 Ibid [123], citing Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 531(2). 10 Ibid [125], citing Polizzi v Commissioner of Police (No. 2) [2017] WASC 166. 11 (1979) 26 AR 247. -- 4 of 6 -- 5 [10] I have no reason to consider Mr McDonald's evidence as to what Mr Anderson said to him on the morning of 16 December 2025 to be anything other than reliable. Accordingly, I accept this evidence. I therefore find that as of the morning of 16 December 2025, Mr Anderson, a primary witness Mr Cramp notified he was calling to give evidence, had no idea he was due in court that week. I also therefore find that Mr Cramp, who I find knew the hearing was on that day, did not advise Mr Anderson about the need to attend to give evidence that week in the Cairns District Court. [11] That still leaves open the possibility that perhaps Mr Cramp was just tardy with his witness preparation. After all, he is not a lawyer and has not professed to have any experience in procedures such as these. Of most significance in this regard is the evidence received by way of affidavit filed by Mr McDonald on 5 January 2026. In that affidavit Mr McDonald attaches a WhatsApp message received from Mr Cramp on 16 December 2025, time stamped 11:32 PM. Mr Cramp's message reads as follows: Lol, this whole year was just about wasting more of Qld govt money than the $17 k in pro rata LSL that was owed to me. [12] Also in evidence is an email from Mr Cramp sent on the same day and time stamped at 11:50 PM, which was shortly after the above WhatsApp message to Mr McDonald. Mr Cramp's email said: Have you spent more than $17,000 equivalent of the pro rata LSL that should have been paid to me? This was nothing more than a year of shits and giggles for me. Maybe next time you fuck over a staff member when it is obvious that you failed to comply with legislation/Directives/Policy etc just pay what they're entitled to. A big fuck you from me. Troy Cramp [13] Despite orders requiring submissions and evidence to be put on, Mr Cramp has not done so. I conclude that the above email and WhatsApp messages were written by Mr Cramp. I do so because: (a) that conclusion is open in the circumstances I have described above and having regard to the content of each item of correspondence; (b) Mr Cramp has not denied that he was the author of each item of correspondence having had a reasonable opportunity to do so; and (c) I have no reason to doubt Mr McDonald's evidence about having received them. [14] Mr Cramp's application was filed on 11 November 2024. As of 16 December 2025, when the hearing was abandoned, the matter had been on foot for a little over a year. I infer that the entire proceedings, as in the year of process starting with the application on 11 November 2024, leading up to the abandoned hearing on 16 December 2025, is what Mr Cramp was referring to when he said "this was nothing more than a year of shits and giggles for me"; and also his remark "…this whole year was just about wasting more of Qld govt money than the $17 k in pro rata LSL that was owed to me." -- 5 of 6 -- 6 [15] Based on that correspondence, I infer that Mr Cramp filed the proceedings vexatiously and pursued them vexatiously up until 16 December 2025 when he abandoned the hearing. That is because I find that Mr Cramp commenced and continued the proceedings for the predominant purpose of harassing TMR and causing it to spend more in defending the proceedings than the $17,000 figure that Mr Cramp refers to in both items of correspondence above. [16] Based on my findings, I conclude that this is not a case where it is in the public interest to put the matter into abeyance. I find also that Mr Cramp's relevant conduct has, by design, caused unnecessary delay and cost to be incurred by TMR. That includes, I accept, the cost of three witnesses and three representatives travelling to and being accommodated in Cairns as well as the relevant cost to the State of Queensland in the form of wasted Commission resources. [17] For the foregoing reasons I conclude that the discretion to dismiss Mr Cramp's matter should be exercised and I order accordingly. Order 1. Mr Cramp's application TD/2024/117 is dismissed. -- 6 of 6 --