Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council (No 2) [2026] QLC 2

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council (No 2) [2026] QLC 2 PARTIES: Gregory Scott Clark (applicant) v Sunshine Coast Regional Council (respondent) FILE NO: AQL430-24 PROCEEDING: Application to recover part of an advance against compensation and costs of the proceeding DELIVERED ON: 18 March 2026 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD ON: 6 March 2026 HEARD AT: Brisbane MEMBER: JR McNamara ORDERS: 1. The applicant pay the respondent the amount of $329,422.01 outstanding against the advance. 2. The applicant pay the respondent interest on the amount in Order 1 as set out in paragraph [41] of the reasons. 3. The applicant pay 50% of the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding on the standard basis. 4. The parties bear their own costs of this application. CATCHWORDS: REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – PROCEEDINGS FOR COMPENSATION – QUEENSLAND – COSTS – where the Court determined compensation entitlement to the applicant under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 – where the decision has been -- 1 of 16 -- 2 appealed by the applicant – whether costs in the Land Court should be decided before the appeal is heard – where it was determined there is no good reason for delay of the cost decision – where the respondent had issued an advance against compensation to the applicant with a portion remitted to the Australian Tax Office for withholding – where the compensation amount decided was less than the amount advanced to the applicant – where the amount is readily characterised as being part of the ‘advance’ as comprehended by section 23 – whether the Outstanding Amount be stayed – where the advance should be repaid by the applicant – whether interest be awarded on the advance – where it is awarded – whether costs of and incidental to the hearing and determination by the Land Court for the claim be awarded – where the amount claimed was excessive but not necessarily vexatious or grossly so – where the amount claimed by the applicant created a burden for the respondent – whether costs of and incidental to this application be awarded – where the parties are to bear their own costs of this application Acquisition of Land Act 1967 s 23, s 26A, s 27 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A(1) Land Court Act 2000 s 57A(2) Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14-200 Banno v Commonwealth of Australia (1993) 45 FCR 32, 51, cited Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd.R. 454, cited Haber v Chief Executive, Department of Main Roads [2005] 26 QLCR 49, cited North Albury Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Albury Municipal Council (1983) 49 LGRA 215, 221, cited Old Coach Developments Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [2008] QLC 105, cited Pastrello v Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW (2000) 110 LGERA 223, 225, cited Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority 1 (1998) CLR 355, cited Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Leacy (No 2) (2016) 37 QLCR 223, cited Yalgan Investments Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Albert [1997] QLAC 191, cited APPEARANCES: DR Gore KC, with WDJ Macintosh (instructed by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers) for the applicant JM Horton KC, with W Isdale (instructed by Clayton Utz) for the respondent -- 2 of 16 -- 3 Background On 17 December 2025, I determined the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent, Sunshine Coast Regional Council (SCRC) to Mr Clark (the applicant) for the acquisition of his property at 348 Yandina Bli Bli Road, Maroochy River (the subject Land). On 27 January 2026 the applicant filed and served a Notice of Appeal to the Land Appeal Court in respect of that decision. On 17 February 2026 the SCRC filed a General Application in the Land Court to recover from the applicant part of an advance against compensation plus interest, and for its costs of the proceedings in the Land Court. The application was heard on 6 March 2026. On 10 March 2026 the SCRC filed supplementary submissions regarding the advance. The appeal in the Land Appeal Court is listed for hearing on Monday 23 March 2026. Outcomes of the hearing The relevant orders made 17 December 2025 were as follows: 1. Compensation for the taking of the subject Land is determined in the sum of Five Million, Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($5,800,000), less advances paid. 2. Compensation for disturbance costs is determined in the sum of Seventy-Three Thousand, One Hundred and Ninety-Two Dollars and Fifty Cents ($73,192.50). 3. The stamp duty payable is to be determined based on the award of compensation for the taking of the subject Land. The SCRC says that based on the Land value of $5,800,000, they calculate stamp duty to be $314,025 for an investment property. Accordingly, the total compensation amount of $6,187,217.50 comprises: (a) Land value: $5,800,000 (b) Stamp duty: $314,025 (c) Other disturbance costs: $73,192.50. -- 3 of 16 -- 4 Should costs in the Land Court be decided before the appeal is heard? On 7 January 2026, the SCRC made an offer to resolve recovery of the Outstanding Amount and costs. Although the SCRC say1 the applicant did not respond to the offer, the “apparent basis” for the applicant’s refusal was the applicant’s view that costs should be dealt with following the determination of the appeal2. The applicant by letter 11 February 2026 to the SCRC said: “it is our position that the issue of costs should be dealt with following the determination of (the) appeal.” The SCRC say there is no good reason to delay resolution of the application. There is no evidence of hardship (alleged impecuniosity or the like) apparent in the material filed. Further, they say the Court’s judgment should not be treated as merely provisional3. Pursuant to s 57A(2) Land Court Act 2000, the Land Appeal Court may order costs for the proceeding in which the decision appealed against was made whether or not the court had the power to make an order for costs of the proceeding. In Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd4 (McMurdo P, Keane JA and White AJA) – (concerning a stay application) Keane JA at [12] (p455) says: The decision of this Court in Berry v Green suggests that it is not necessary for an applicant for a stay pending appeal to show “special or exceptional circumstances” which warrant a grant of the stay. Nevertheless, it will not be appropriate to grant a stay unless a sufficient basis is shown to outweigh the considerations that judgements of the Trial Division should not be treated as merely provisional, and that a successful party in litigation is entitled to the fruits of its judgment. Generally speaking, courts should not be disposed to delay the enforcement of court orders. The fundamental justification for staying judicial orders pending appeal is to ensure that the orders which might ultimately be made by the courts are fully effective: the power to grant a stay should not be exercised merely because immediate compliance with orders of the court is inconvenient for the party which has been unsuccessful in the litigation. Law of Costs (5th ed) at 20.135 after referencing Cook’s Construction6 says: that a party unsuccessful at first instance intends to appeal is, accordingly no ground by 1 Affidavit of Majella Mary Pollard filed 25 February 2026 at para 8. 2 Affidavit of Majella Mary Pollard filed 25 February 2026. 3 Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd.R. 454. 4 [2008] 2 Qd.R. 454. 5 Gino Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Australia, 5 th ed, 2021), ch 20. 6 [2008] 2 Qd.R. 454. -- 4 of 16 -- 5 itself to stay a costs order. Nor is the fact that immediate compliance with the costs order in inconvenient. As a starting point, prima facie a successful party in entitled to the benefit of the judgment and to proceed on the basis that the judgment is correct. The passage continues7: A costs order may, however, be stayed pending appeal if the court is satisfied that: first, there would be no reasonable probability, were the costs paid, of getting them back should the appeal succeed; and second, there are reasonably arguable grounds of appeal. Yet, these should not be viewed as unyielding prerequisites (or exhaustive of relevant considerations e.g. undue delay in bringing the stay application may prejudice the applicant) to a successful stay application, but as part of the relevant inquiry into the fairness or otherwise of granting a stay. There is no risk in my view that were costs to be paid, they would be recovered if that was the consequence of the outcome of the appeal. There is no good reason presented to delay. The advance The SCRC say that an advance against compensation to the applicant comprised three payments made 19 July 2024, 31 July 2024, and 9 September 2024, totalling $6,516,639.51. The 31 July 2024 component was described as $750,000 remitted to the Australian Tax Office (ATO) for withholding. Where the Land Court determines an amount of compensation payable by a constructing authority (here, the SCRC) which is less than the amount advanced, the Court has jurisdiction to make an order that the difference be repaid - s26A(3) Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (ALA). An order under s 26A(3) can be made at any time after the compensation amount has been decided (s 26A(4)). The SCRC say that the amount of compensation decided by the Land Court ($6,187,217.50) is $329,422.018 (the Outstanding Amount – s26A(2) ALA) less than the amount the SCRC say was advanced to the applicant ($6,516,639.51) under s 23 ALA. 7 Gino Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Australia, 5 th ed, 2021), ch 20. 8 On 7 January 2026 the SCRC incorrectly claimed an outstanding amount of “$349,000 plus interest” whereas that figure in fact included an amount for interest calculated to 4 February 2026. -- 5 of 16 -- 6 The applicant says they agree with the “maths” but challenge jurisdiction as discussed below. Further, any claim for interest, like costs, a matter for the Court’s discretion, is opposed. Jurisdiction In its 18 December 2024 Statement of Facts and Issues the SCRC say, at [9], that on 31 July 2024, the amount of $750,000 was remitted to the ATO for withholding “on the applicant’s behalf” (in conformance with obligations on the Respondent under the Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth)) (TAA). At [11] they say that the total amount advanced to the applicant and the ATO on his behalf, being $6,516,639.51, must be deducted against any orders for compensation and interest to which the applicant is otherwise held to be entitled. The applicant in their 8 January 2025 Statement of Facts and Issues in Reply9 agreed with those matters. The applicant was a ‘foreign resident’ who, by operation of s 14-200(1) of the TAA may have been liable to Capital Gains Tax (CGT) in respect of the subject Land. By s 14-200(2), the SCRC was required to pay the withholding amount to the Commissioner. The amount to be paid was an amount equal to 12.5%10 of the “cost base just after acquisition”. In supplementary written submissions handed up at the hearing, the applicant says that the $750,000 remitted to the ATO was not an amount paid “to the claimant” for the purposes of, inter alia, s 26A ALA. That amount was paid to the Commissioner of Taxation per Section 14-200(2) Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA). Accordingly, the amount of compensation advanced “to the claimant” (applicant) was in fact less than the compensation decided, and therefore there is no recovery of the advance that can be ordered. The applicant says that the introduction of s 26A ALA in 2009 was to remedy a situation where in 2008 the Land Court had found11 the Court had no jurisdiction to award a refund of monies paid in advance. They submit that the parliament did not 9 At para 3. 10 12.5% was the prescribed rate at the relevant time – TAA Compilation No 204, registered 2 November 2023. Applied to a $6M valuation, 12.5% is $750,000. 11 Old Coach Developments Pty Ltd v State of Queensland [2008] QLC 105. -- 6 of 16 -- 7 look beyond that situation, specifically the implications of the TAA “have been overlooked”. The Foreign Resident Capital Gains Withholding Tax on transactions involving Australian property by foreign nationals commenced on 1 July 2016. That is, it post- dated the introduction of s 26A. In the event, the applicant confirmed12 that on 13 November 2024 the ATO “refunded to the applicant” … the sum of $753,633.54 which comprised the amount of $750,000 being the amount remitted to the ATO on 31 July 2024, and the amount of $3,633.54 being interest “on the applicant’s overpayment of Income Tax for the period 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024”. The ATO Notice of Assessment13 – year ended 30 June 2024 - is addressed to the applicant. The Income Tax Account Statement of Account14 addressed to the applicant shows the “Process date” 13 November 2024, the “Effective date” 18 November 2024, and the Description of Transaction: EFT refund for Income Tax for the period form 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024. Despite the TAA imposing an obligation to pay withholding on the person acquiring the property (here, the SCRC), the Notice of Assessment, the Income Tax Account Statement of Account and the EFT payment are all directed to the “foreign resident” (here, the applicant). That is a strong indication that the TAA and the Commissioner treats the receipt of withholding as a payment by or on behalf of the “foreign resident”. There is nothing in the material to suggest that the SCRC had any further role with respect to the ATO, or were informed, of the outcome of the Commissioner’s process. It was only through these proceedings that the SCRC became aware that the withholding was paid to the applicant in full. Arguably, that should be the end of the matter. The SCRC in their supplementary submissions on this issue say that the applicant’s argument is entirely without merit. They say that the issue of legal construction which 12 Affidavit of Chantelle Christie Martin filed 10 March 2026 at para 5. 13 Exhibit CCM-1, Affidavit of Chantelle Christie Martin filed 10 March 2026. 14 Exhibit CCM-2, Affidavit of Chantelle Christie Martin filed 10 March 2026. -- 7 of 16 -- 8 arises is whether an amount paid to the ATO by a constructing authority on behalf of a claimant, in conformity with tax obligations, is part of an ‘advance against compensation’ as comprehended by s 23 ALA. If it is, then there is no question about the operation of s 26A of the ALA in respect of that amount. In that regard, they refer to Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority15: “… the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have …”; and s 14A(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld): “In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.” The SCRC say16 that s 23 ALA “is perfectly general in describing an advance against compensation which the constructing authority may make to the claimant.” I accept that it is an entirely common-sense interpretation, and a reasonable and just construction of s 23 ALA, that such an amount is readily characterised as being part of the ‘advance’ as comprehended by s 23 ALA. The alternative view would result in a disharmonious construction to the ALA, where the applicant would receive more than the compensation determined by the Court under the ALA. It is the intended effect of s 26A ALA that a constructing authority would be repaid advanced amounts which exceed those which are assessed as compensatory by the Court. The Outstanding Amount Despite the challenge to jurisdiction, the applicant agrees with the “maths”. That is, if it is accepted, as I do, that the Court has jurisdiction, the Outstanding Amount is $329,422.01. The applicant submits that any order regarding repayment of the Outstanding Amount (plus interest) should be stayed until the determination of the appeal. There is nothing before me to explain any particular disadvantage or circumstance, exceptional or otherwise, or any other reason, that would justify an order that payment 15 (1998) CLR 355 [78] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 16 Council’s supplementary submissions on overpaid advance filed 10 March 2026 at para 11. -- 8 of 16 -- 9 of the Outstanding Amount be stayed. It is entirely just that the advance ($329,422.01) should be repaid so that the sum ultimately received by the applicant reflects that to which the applicant has been found to be entitled by the Court. Interest Pursuant to s 26A(5) ALA the Land Court may order the claimant pay interest on the Outstanding Amount for all or any of the part of the period starting on the day the amount was advanced and ending on the day the Outstanding Amount is paid. On 2 July 2024, the valuer for the SCRC determined the market value of the subject Land to be $6,000,000. In the course of producing the experts’ Joint Expert Report (JER) the SCRC valuer said that he had gained a better understanding of issues associated with the subject Land. With the production of the JER on 10 July 2025 the valuation advanced by SCRC was amended to $5,800,000. The SCRC say17, and the applicant accepts (if payable), that the interest should be calculated in this way: (b) Interest on the amount of $129,422.01 at the rate of 4.25% from 9 September 2024 up until the date of payment by the applicant; and (c) Interest on the amount of $200,000 at the rate of 4.25% from 10 July 2025 up until the date of payment by the applicant. The applicant’s broad submission18 is that whether or not interest is awarded is discretionary, and for the same reasons that costs are resisted, any order erodes the applicant’s compensation. The advance monies have been in the hands of the applicant since 9 September 2024, and the ATO refund was paid to the applicant on 18 November 2024. The ATO also paid interest on the withholding amount to the applicant. On that basis, it is difficult to see how interest on the advance erodes the applicant’s compensation. In the exercise of my discretion, I award interest on the advance as set out in [41] above. 17 Council’s submissions as to repayment of overpaid advance and costs filed 25 February 2026 at para 10. 18 T1-6, lines 15 to 19. -- 9 of 16 -- 10 Costs The SCRC say they ought to be awarded costs of an incidental to the hearing and determination by the Land Court of the applicant’s claim for compensation; and costs of an incidental to the hearing and determination by the Land Court of this application. In their 11 April 2025 amended Statement of Facts and Issues, the compensation the applicant claimed (less advances paid) was $12,216,461.39, together with interest and costs. Of that amount the land value component was $11,250,000. The amount of compensation for the taking of the subject Land as determined in the proceedings ($5,800,000), is equal to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence19 by the SCRC ($5,800,000). Section 27(2) ALA provides: If the amount of compensation as determined is the amount finally claimed by the claimant in the proceedings or is nearer to that amount than to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the constructing authority, costs (if any) shall be awarded to the claimant, otherwise costs (if any) shall be awarded to the constructing authority. In Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Leacy (No 2)20 (‘Leacy’) the Land Appeal Court (LAC) said: [11] Section 27(2) of the AL Act has the consequence that the only party who can claim costs is the party whose position (as identified in that section) “finally” is closer to the amount of compensation determined by the Land Court than is the other party’s. An application for an order for costs by such a party, nevertheless, is to be determined in the exercise of the unfettered discretion found in s 27(1) of the AL Act. So much appears from the language and structure of the section. In exercising that discretion, the court is to act judicially, by reference to relevant considerations, and in accordance with established principle. [12] It is apparent that the section was intended to avoid the general application of the rule that costs follow the event, which would always result in an award in favour of the dispossessed owner. Moreover, it is well recognised that litigation for compensation for the resumption of land has features which may be of significance in the proper exercise of the discretion. (citations omitted) The LAC in Leacy21 also referred to the following passage from the decision of Wilcox J in Banno v Commonwealth of Australia22 and observed that while these 19 Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld), s 27(2). 20 (2016) 37 QLCR 223. 21 At [14]. 22 (1993) 45 FCR 32, 51. -- 10 of 16 -- 11 statements (also referring to North Albury Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Albury Municipal Council23) were made in other jurisdictions where the power to award costs is a product of different legislation, nevertheless they identify matters relevant to the context in which the discretion conferred by s 27 of the ALA is to be exercised: The Court has a general discretion as to costs, but the discretion must be exercised on principled grounds. The Commonwealth has succeeded on all issues. It would therefore seem difficult to justify ordering it to pay the applicant’s costs. Moreover, if this was ordinary litigation, the Commonwealth might reasonably expect to obtain an order that the applicants pay its costs. But this is not ordinary litigation. The relationship between the parties giving rise to the litigation did not arise out of their mutual desire; it arose because of a unilateral decision of the Commonwealth to acquire the applicants’ land in order to satisfy perceived public need. The acquisition left the applicant in the position of either accepting the Commonwealth’s assessment of the proper compensation or of having the Court rule on its adequacy. Perhaps people in that position should be allowed access to the Court, to present an arguable and well organised case, without being deterred by the prospect of being ordered to pay the Commonwealth’s costs if their case proves unpersuasive. I distinguish the situation of resumees who pursue a vexatious, dishonest or grossly exaggerated claim or present their case in such a way as to impose unnecessary burdens on the Commonwealth or the Court. The applicant submits24 that there should be no order as to costs having regard to the following considerations: (a) The applicant was an involuntary litigant in a process that is highly intrusive; (b) A costs order will erode the compensation assessed by the Court, which is already eroded by the applicant’s own “involuntary” costs; (c) The applicant relied upon independent valuation evidence, and presented a properly arguable case; and (d) It is wrong to have regard merely to the difference between the amount of the claim and the amount of the award. In Pastrello v Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW25, Talbot J (LEC NSW) said: “There needs to be a strong justification for awarding costs against an applicant where the effect of making that order is to erode the benefit of the just compensation26* recovered as a consequence of the Court’s determination. It is only in special cases that the Court will deprive the owner of the full benefit of the compensation which is determined as fair and just in the circumstances of the case.” 23 (1983) 49 LGRA 215, 221. 24 Applicant’s submissions re costs and the advance filed 4 March 2026 at para 1. 25 (2000) 110 LGERA 223, 225. 26 The term “just compensation” is used in the New South Wales legislation. -- 11 of 16 -- 12 The applicant said in oral submissions that they presented an “arguable and well- organised” case, based on expert valuation evidence, and the fact the Court decided a valuation which was the valuation advanced by the SCRC, did not deprive the applicant’s case of that virtue. They say their case was not vexatious or dishonest, nor grossly exaggerated. The applicant’s “own involuntary costs” is their costs in pursuing what they considered to be the correct compensation, based on expert legal and valuation evidence. They say that once s 27(2) is engaged in favour of the constructing authority “the claimant is already penalised”, because it follows from the operation of s 27(2) that the claimant must pay its own costs. That, it was submitted, means the applicant will not receive the full benefit of the compensation determined by the court. Here, the applicant’s own costs are estimated to be $273,201.80.27 The SCRC’s costs are estimated to be $276,027.86 (excluding GST). In total, approximately $550,000 or close to 10% of the determined valuation of the land.28 I do not perceive the applicant to be saying that their status as an “involuntary litigant”, or that the erosive consequences of an adverse costs order should override all other factors which have a legitimate claim to affect the exercise of discretion to award costs. Those “other factors”, per Keane JA in Haber v Chief Executive, Department of Main Roads29, include considerations such as the relevant success of the parties on the issues contested between them, and the extent to which the applicant’s claim could fairly be said to have been excessive, even if not “vexatiously” or “grossly” so. The SCRC say the following discretionary considerations underscore the correctness of the SCRC being awarded its costs: (a) It had very substantial success (the amount awarded being very close to its position); (b) In comparison, the applicant’s claim was grossly exaggerated (being almost twice the sum awarded); and 27 Applicant’s submissions re costs and the advance filed 4 March 2026 para 17. 28 Applicant’s submissions re costs and the advance filed 4 March 2026. 29 [2005] 26 QLCR 49. -- 12 of 16 -- 13 (c) In that context, the applicant’s failed pursuit of its inflated claim was unreasonable and effectively forced Council into litigation. The applicant says Yalgan Investments Pty Ltd v Council of the Shire of Albert30 (Yalgan) remains the leading authority on the general principles where the court summarised propositions from the cases concerning s 27 ALA. At (j) and (k) was the following: (j) Section 27(2) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 should not be regarded as a legislative suggestion that, where the claim is substantially more than the amount awarded, and the amount put in evidence by the constructing authority is not substantially less than the amount awarded, the Court should not merely refrain from awarding any costs to the claimant but should award costs to the authority (Moyses at p. 274). (k) Where the Land Court is considering whether it should award costs to a constructing authority, it could be wrong to have regard merely to the amounts of the claim and of the award and of the value put in evidence by the authority. Usually it would be more relevant to enquire whether the conduct of the claimant (such as, for example, making an exorbitant claim) has been such as to force the authority, unreasonably and unnecessarily, into litigation (Moyses at p. 274) or whether the claimant has pursued a vexatious, dishonest or grossly exaggerated claim or presented his case in such a way as to impose unnecessary burdens on the constructing authority or the Court (Banno at p. 53). I accept that it would be contrary to the principles summarised in Yalgan to award costs only on the basis that the claim significantly exceeded the amount of compensation awarded. The hearing of this matter proceeded in the usual way. The Originating Application was filed 7 November 2024. A Joint Expert Report (JER) was filed 11 July 2025. The hearing commenced 31 October 2025. The expert valuers gave evidence in a concurrent session at the hearing. The decision was delivered on 17 December 2025. It is entirely fair to say that the SCRC was successful in that the amount of compensation for the taking of the subject Land as determined in the proceedings ($5,800,000), was equal to the amount of the valuation finally put in evidence by the SCRC ($5,800,000).31 The amount of compensation for the taking which the applicant argued for was $11,250,000. It is true that the amount claimed by the applicant is almost twice the sum awarded. 30 [1997] QLAC 191. 31 Acquisition of Land Act 2000 (Qld) s 27(2). -- 13 of 16 -- 14 The applicant says that the notion of a “grossly exaggerated claim” has not been fully canvassed by the Courts, but the trend in the cases does not support the proposition that the favouring by the Court of one expert valuation over another can mean the claimant’s claim, which was honestly and fairly based on independent valuation evidence, can be described as “grossly exaggerated”. To be “grossly exaggerated” might be, for example, where the development potential of the land, or the nature and extent of any injurious affection, is exaggerated. In this case there was no dispute about the highest and best use of the land. As the applicant points out, the relevance of location was a fundamental difference of opinion between the valuers, key to the comparative analysis.32 They say that the outcome of the court turned on the preference of one valuer’s opinion over the other. The applicant says the same considerations apply to the use of the terms “inflated” and “unreasonable”. The valuer engaged by the applicant was Mr Rex. The valuer engaged by the SCRC was Mr Kamitsis. In the reasons for judgment I said at [15]: It was agreed that the subject Land is a prestige property and that the highest and best use of the subject Land is “an improved rural lifestyle property”. A fundamental difference of opinion arises between the valuers regarding the influence location and amenity (of the subject Land and the Sales) has on value in this case. Mr Rex considers that proximity to urban amenities including access to the Bruce Highway, the airport, schools, beaches and healthcare was the most critical element to achieve recognition as a “premium rural lifestyle property”. Mr Kamitsis accepts the amenity Maroochy River enjoys, but considers it (Maroochy River) a lower order locality from a prestige property market perspective, relative to the Maleny/Montville area. I noted that there were 12 Sales between 2021 and 2023 considered by the valuers, however there were no “prestige property” sales in Maroochy River in that period. The sales that the valuers considered were spread from Lake Macdonald in the north east, to Bald Knob in the south west. The Sales that Mr Rex considered “the best guide”, were in Mr Kamitsis’ opinion, either too difficult to make a meaningful comparison or vastly superior. 32 Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2025] QLC 32 at [15]. -- 14 of 16 -- 15 In my consideration of the evidence concerning the Sales, I commented, for example, that aspects of Mr Rex’s evidence was not clearly explained33; and I considered fair34 the SCRC’s assessment of Mr Rex’s insistence that improvements to Sale 10 were ‘comparable’ when they were self-evidently superior, to be implausible (insofar as it suggests that the improvements are alike or not materially different in terms of value). But I also acknowledged a shift in opinion by Mr Rex at the hearing from that expressed in the JER, for example in relation to Sale 835. Elsewhere, Mr Rex moderated his “JER opinion” concerning Sale 11 from the position that the structural improvements were “comparable”, to acceptance that they were “superior”36. Mr Kamitsis’ considered the Sale 11 vastly superior overall, as did I. In the decision at [105]37, I said: Mr Rex in the JER at paragraphs 11.12-11.28 comments on the 9 Sales relevant to his conclusion, based on his 6-factor inferior/superior weight classification – some of which were “moderated” during the hearing. However, exactly how this leads to a valuation of $11,250,000 is not easily discerned. I acknowledge that “location” was the key issue which distinguished the opinion of the valuers but the opinion of the valuers concerning the quality of improvements differed at times significantly. There were no “improved rural lifestyle” or “prestige property” or “luxury property” sales in the Maroochy River area considered by the valuers. Had there been, there might have been some support for Mr Rex’s claim of comparability as between the subject Land, its views and its amenity to services and transport, to the clearly superior properties and improvements in the Maleny and Bald Knob and Lake Macdonald locations. But there wasn’t. Ultimately, I concluded that Sale 5 at Lake Macdonald to be the most comparable noting that the residence was more modern, and it was a better rural lifestyle property (without flood impacts which the subject Land experiences, although it was subject to easements). Mr Rex did not rely on Sale 5 and I do not know what effect reliance on it would have had on his valuation. 33 Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2025] QLC 32 at [65]. 34 Ibid [71]-[73]. 35 Ibid [80]. 36 Ibid [87], [96]. 37 Ibid. -- 15 of 16 -- 16 I accept that the applicant is an involuntary participant to the acquisition process, that the applicant faces his own costs, and, that the applicant relied on independent valuation evidence. However, the applicant’s case lacked the evidence necessary for its success and adequate clarity and support for the valuation opinion advanced and presented to the Court. The applicant’s claim was excessive, but not necessarily vexatious. It created a burden for the respondent SCRC. For the reasons which have been given, the court exercises its discretion in favour of the respondent, but taking account of the matters mentioned immediately above, I have decided that the respondent (SCRC) should be awarded 50% of its costs. Costs of this application As a consequence of the orders I have made concerning the advance, interest, and costs of the proceedings, it is in my view appropriate that the parties are to bear their own costs of this application. Orders 1. The applicant pay the respondent the amount of $329,422.01 outstanding against the advance. 2. The applicant pay the respondent interest on the amount in Order 1 as set out in paragraph [41] of the reasons. 3. The applicant pay 50% the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the proceeding. 4. The parties bear their own costs of this application. -- 16 of 16 --