Commissioner of Police v Ryan [2026] QMC 7

MAGISTRATES COURTS OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Commissioner of Police v Ryan [2026] QMC 7 PARTIES: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (Prosecution) v MATTHEW KENT RYAN (Defendant) FILE NO/S: ROCK- MAG-593/25 DIVISION: Magistrates Court PROCEEDING: Hearing ORIGINATING COURT: Rockhampton Magistrates Court DELIVERED ON: 29 May 2026 DELIVERED AT: Rockhampton Magistrates Court HEARING DATE: 4 November 2025 8 December 2025 19 May 2026 MAGISTRATE: Magistrate Rundle ORDER: I find the defendant guilty of charge 1, charge 2 and charge 3 on file 593/25 CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW TRAFFIC CHARGES – VEHICLE MUST BE REGISTERED – DRIVE UNINSURED VEHICLE – DRIVE WITHOUT A LICENCE SPER SUSPENSION – Whether Police witnesses have identified the driver of the vehicle – where defendant is self- represented – the scope of assistance to be given by the court to a self-represented defendant – right to a fair trial – familiarity with the court – where defendant does not acknowledge surname –where defendant contends Queensland Police Service are a corporation –where defendant argues the traffic legislation in Queensland is invalid. -- 1 of 15 -- 2 LEGISLATION: Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) Transport Operations (Road Use Management- Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld) CASE LAW: Bott v Queensland Police Service [2025] QDC 193 Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 HL Cameron v R [2002] HCA 6 David Cox and Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 183 Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 Ex Parte Lam [2003] HCA 6 FEQ v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 186 Heywood v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 1047 Hook v Comm of Police [2022] QDC 35 Hoon v QPS [2025] QDC 71 Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162 Kenny v Ritter [2009] SASC 139 Khamis v R [2010] NSWCCA 179 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81 Knight v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 146 LAF v AP [2022] QDC 66 Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 Malecki v Macko [2022] FC 766 Millar v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 138 MWJ v The Queen [2005] HCA 74 Ngakyunkwokka v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 10 Nikolajuk v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 96 Paixao v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 193 Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12 Queen v Harris [2008] QCA 141 R v Fairbrother [2005] QCA 105 R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401 R v Mathews [2026] QDC 50 R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216 Re HZX [2024] QSC 168 Reiche v Neometals Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 125 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22 Sorensen v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 121 The King v SDG [2024] QDC 85 Wilson v Department of Human Services [2010] NSWSC 1489 -- 2 of 15 -- 3 APPEARANCE: M. Smith Queensland Police Prosecution Corp The defendant appeared on his own behalf The charges before the Magistrates Court [1] The defendant is charged with the following three offences said to occur on 14 January 2025: (1) Vehicles used on roads must be registered under section 10(1) Transport Operations (Road Use Management- Vehicle Registration) Regulation 2021 (Qld). (2) Drive uninsured vehicle under section 20(1) Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld). (3) Driving without a licence SPER suspension Queensland licence under Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld). [2] The hearing proceeded at the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Rockhampton on 4 November 2025, 8 December 2025, and 19 May 2026. My role [3] My role in this hearing is to determine on the evidence whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Verdict according to the evidence [4] I must reach my decision on the evidence and only the evidence which comprises what I have heard from the witnesses who gave evidence in person from the witness box and the documents received and marked as exhibits throughout the hearing. The defendant and his identity in these proceedings [5] The defendant Matthew Kent Ryan was self-represented at the hearing. This matter has been case managed since the first mention on 5 February 2025 and through the summary review callover where the defendant indicated his preference to be referred to as Matthew and not Mr Ryan. The defendant indicated at the start of the hearing that he would prefer to continue to be called Matthew and not Mr Ryan and the hearing proceeded on that basis. For the purposes of this judgment, he will be referred to as the defendant. [6] The defendant’s logic as to why he should be called Matthew and not Mr Ryan is because his birth certificate, tendered to the court and marked as ID2, states his first name and middle name but not a surname. He confirmed the two named persons on the birth certificate are his mother and his father and they have the surname of -- 3 of 15 -- 4 Ryan. He further confirmed the date of birth on the certificate and the date of birth on the bench charge sheet before the court were correct and match. I find that it is reasonable for me to draw the inference that the birth certificate is that of the defendant and notwithstanding the surname Ryan is not on that birth certificate any reference on the bench charge sheet to a Mr Matthew Kent Ryan is the defendant. I am ‘satisfied’ he has ‘appeared’1 before the court for the purposes of this hearing. [7] In the defendant’s closing address, he provided the court written submissions and marked as ID3. They contain documents with the headings “approved person” and “certificate of evidence”. In those documents the defendant refers to himself as Matthew Kent Ryan, he disclosed his date of birth, which is consistent with his birth certificate, he identifies his nationality as a British subject without citizenship and that his entity type is Commonwealth. Familiarity with the court and use of the defendant’s first name [8] I am conscious to ensure there is not a level of familiarity that undermines the ‘court etiquette’2 of the Magistrates Court when referring to the defendant by his first name, that could lead to the perception of bias in this hearing. [9] I am satisfied referring to the defendant by his first name would not give the perception of familiarity between the court and the defendant to such an extent to breach the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).3 I acknowledge that some people sitting in an open court room may be perplexed as to why a judicial officer would refer to a self-represented defendant by his first name. They may question whether it results in an unnecessary familiarity in the court room between the judicial officer and the defendant that could lead to the perception of bias. Unnecessary familiarity was considered in the decision of Wilson v Department of Human Services [2010] NSWSC 1489 where the court found that experienced Counsel4 in a child protection hearing with a self- represented parent greeted the Magistrate with “Good morning, your Honour”, the use of this greeting was said to lead to an ‘apparent familiarity’ and the ‘suspicion’ arising from this degree of familiarity was said to be inappropriate in an adversarial courtroom.5 [10] However, the perception of familiarity must be balanced by ensuring the defendant has access to a fair hearing. It is evident to me from the defendant’s prior appearances before me in the Magistrates Court at Rockhampton that he 1 Re HZX [2024] QSC 168, [39]- [42], [45] (Bowskill CJ). 2 Court etiquette has been described as ‘another body of rules developed over centuries that govern one’s conduct in the courtroom’ which can be premised on the concept of ‘good manners’, Hon. T F Bathurst AC, ‘Don’t Be Court Out: The Basics of Court Etiquette’ [5]-[7] (Toongabbie Legal Centre Seminar, 28 March 2020). 3 Section 31 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). 4 The court articulated there was ‘no personal criticism of’ counsel who ‘conducted the case professionally and courteously’ Wilson v Department of Human Services [2010] NSWSC 1489, [111] (Palmer J). 5 Wilson v Department of Human Services [2010] NSWSC 1489, [108] (Palmer J). -- 4 of 15 -- 5 immediately objects to being called Mr Ryan. If I were to persist with using his surname it would only continue to agitate him further and most likely derail the hearing which would prevent the court arriving at a fair hearing. The defendant, self-represented in these proceedings [11] The defendant was self-represented and had three options on how this matter could proceed. They were: (1) To plead guilty prior to the commencement of the hearing and receive the benefit of the cooperation with the administration of justice as a result of the plea of guilty6, given a plea of guilty on the day of a trial has been recognised ‘to some extent, involve savings’ of time and financial resources in the criminal justice system.7 (2) To apply for an adjournment, for legal advice to assist with preparing for and conducting a hearing.8 (3) To proceed to a criminal law hearing. [12] The defendant chose to proceed to a hearing. As the defendant was self-represented the court had ‘a duty to assist’9 and to provide him with advice10 so he could ‘meet the requirements of law and trial procedure’.11 The duty though must be balanced, and I direct myself to ensure that I ‘maintained the appearance of impartiality’ by considering the ‘level of assistance required’12 by this defendant in the circumstances of this case. The advice of the criminal trial process included but not limited to: (1) The role of the prosecution to present the evidence. (2) The elements of each of the three charges. 6 Section 13(1)(a)-(b) and (2) (a)-(b) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld); Queen v Harris [2008] QCA 141, 4, (Daubney J). 7 Cameron v R [2002] HCA 6, [66] (Kirby J) and albeit late in the criminal law process a plea of guilty will receive credit although it is not considered an early plea of guilty R v Fairbrother [2005] QCA 105, [22] (McMurdo P). 8 The court has the discretion whether to grant an adjournment and will consider the competing claims of the parties and the court resources. In David Cox and Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 183, 3 (Bowskill QC DCJ) the court found the appellant was not denied natural justice where a magistrate would not grant an adjournment for the purposes of obtaining legal advice. Bowskill CJ was sworn in as Chief Justice of Queensland on 22 March 2022 after being sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice on 10 July 2017. 9 R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401, [57] (Haesler SC DCJ). 10 The word ‘advice’ is used by Smith DCJ (as he then was, Justice Smith was appointed to the Supreme Court of Queensland on 31 March 2025) in the decision Knight v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 146 [11]-[12], [15]. 11 Knight v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 146 [12], [14]-[16] (Smith DCJ); R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401, [90] (Haesler SC DCJ). 12 Kenny v Ritter [2009] SASC 139, [23] (Gray and Layton JJ) referred to in R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401, [21] (Haesler SC DCJ). -- 5 of 15 -- 6 (3) The defendant’s opportunity to cross examine prosecution witnesses, to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 HL that upholds the principles of procedural fairness13 to ensure a ‘fair’14 trial described as a ‘principle of fair conduct on the part of an advocate’15 and to conclude a trial that is not ‘unjust’.16 An additional factor to consider is that the rule requires ‘that a party is obliged to give appropriate notice to the other party, and any of that person’s witnesses, of any imputation that the former intends to make against either of the latter about his or her conduct relevant to the case, or a party or a witness’ credit’.17 (4) The opportunity for defence to call evidence. The right to a fair and impartial hearing [13] The defendant has a right to have the three charges considered by the court ‘after a fair’ hearing that is conducted by an ‘independent and impartial court’.18 Impartial has been said to require the magistrate to conduct a hearing with a ‘deep-seated obligation to ensure the outer signs of impartiality are exhibited at all times, and to deal with the legal representatives for both sides in an even-handed fashion’.19 [14] The purpose of taking the defendant through the criminal law trial process was to ensure the defendant was provided with the ‘best opportunity to be heard’ and where required he was ‘offered assistance or guidance on process of the trial, expected order of events and how to raise an objection’.20 [15] The level of advice to be given to a self-represented defendant will ‘differ depending on the nature of the hearing’ and I direct myself to ‘ensure that as far as is reasonably possible’ the defendant remained ‘aware of’ his ‘rights and obligations throughout the hearing’21 to ensure the trial was conducted fairly for the parties and impartially. 13 Khamis v R [2010] NSWCCA 179, [3] (Campbell JA). 14 Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 HL, 70-71 (Lord Herschell L.C) where it was said ‘if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses’. 15 MWJ v The Queen [2005] HCA 74, [18] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J). 16 Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 HL, 76-77 (Lord Halsbury) said ‘nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to’. 17 MWJ v The Queen [2005] HCA 74, [38]-[40] (Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ). 18 Section 31 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). 19 Heywood v Local Court of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 1047, [104] (Lonergan J). 20 Paixao v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 193, [36] (Cash DCJ). 21 Hoon v QPS [2025] QDC 71, [23] (Byrne KC DCJ). -- 6 of 15 -- 7 [16] It has been said that it ‘would be wrong to think that a judge who explained to an accused person the choices open to him would be playing the part of an advocate - he would be performing his duty as a judge by informing the accused of his rights in relation to the conduct of the trial’.22 [17] A fair trial is a key role of a judicial officer in any hearing, however in a self- represented hearing such as this matter it has been emphasised that a judicial officer has a ‘particular duty to ensure self-represented litigants are given due assistance’23 notwithstanding the ‘shortcomings of the self-represented party’.24 Disclosure of the prosecution case and procedural fairness [18] The brief of evidence had been disclosed to the defendant on or before 17 September 2025. At the commencement of the hearing the Police Prosecutor confirmed there was no outstanding material to be disclosed to the defendant. I am satisfied the defendant has had sufficient time ‘to know the case’ that is before the court and to ‘be given an opportunity of replying’25 to what is alleged- if he so desires. I was satisfied there was no prejudice to the defendant for the hearing to commence. The case management process is only one part of ensuring there is procedural fairness and arriving at natural justice. The second part is the conduct of the trial. [19] To achieve the common law principle of procedural fairness and natural justice the court ‘has a fundamental duty’26 and is ‘bound to hear’ from both the prosecution and give the defendant an opportunity if he chooses to make any submission to the court, ‘before exercising power’ of ‘judgment’.27 This hearing occurred over three days, 4 November 2025, 8 December 2025 and 19 May 2026. [20] The obligation on the court to ensure there is procedural fairness and the pathway to arriving at natural justice requires the court to be ‘flexible’ and to ‘adopt fair procedures that are appropriate and adapted to the circumstances of the particular case’.28 This is because fairness has been described as ‘not an abstract concept’.29 [21] Fairness in court proceedings has been described as a concept that is ‘essentially practical’ whereby the trier of fact in their pursuit to a judgment must ensure all material that is relevant to a case is disclosed and a self-represented litigant is given the knowledge to be able to address the trier of fact. In doing so the ‘concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice’ to the defendant.30 22 MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512, 524-525 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson J). 23 LAF v AP [2022] QDC 66, [85] (Smith DCJA). 24 Hook v Comm of Police [2022] QDC 35, [35] (Porter QC DCJ). 25 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81, [11] ( Mason J). 26 Bott v Queensland Police Service [2025] QDC 193, [29]-[31] (Morzone KC DCJ). 27 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81, [11] (Gibbs CJ) 28 Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81, [33] (Mason J). 29 Ex Parte Lam [2003] HCA 6, [37] (Gleeson CJ). 30 Ex Parte Lam [2003] HCA 6, [37] (Gleeson CJ). -- 7 of 15 -- 8 [22] In this hearing the defendant was provided with an overview of the criminal trial process, he requested and was given several breaks to consider his questioning of witnesses and he was assisted from the bench to articulate questions of each witness. The standard of proof and burden in criminal law [23] In the decision of The King v SDG [2024] QDC 85 it was said there are ‘two fundamental principles’ of a criminal law hearing, they are: (1) a defendant is innocent until proven guilty and (2) the ‘onus is on the prosecution to prove’31 ‘each element of’ the offence charged.32 The standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is beyond reasonable doubt.33 There is no obligation on defence to prove the case and the defendant is entitled by law the benefit of any reasonable doubt in my mind.34 [24] As to the defendant calling evidence, it has been said that a defendant can ‘elect to give and call evidence in their case but there is no obligation to do so, and if they do, they generally taken on no burden of proof’. In these proceedings, the prosecution has to satisfy me of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is ‘entitled by law to the benefit of any reasonable doubt that may be left in my mind after considering all of the evidence’.35 [25] Notwithstanding the defendant called 2 witnesses to give evidence this ‘does not mean he has assumed a responsibility of proving his innocence. The burden of proof has not shifted to him’.36 [26] Reasonable doubt is a ‘well understood standard of proof in the trial of criminal offences’ and ‘to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt is, for the purposes of the law, to be certain’.37 Reasonable doubt does not require a finding of impossibility.38 [27] Reasonable doubt is said to require no further explanation, this is because as ‘ordinary people’ it is used by each of us and is ‘understood well enough by the average person in the community’ and any attempt to ‘substitute other expressions’ the High Court has said to avoid casting the court into error ‘it is wise as well as proper to avoid such expressions.’39 Court to give adequate reasons [28] It has been said that ‘the adequacy of reasons will depend upon an assessment of the issues in the case, including the extent to which they are relied upon by’ the 31 The King v SDG [2024] QDC 85, [3], [48] (Clarke DCJ) 32 R v Mathews [2026] QDC 50, [11] (Allen KC DCJ). 33 ‘Chapter 60 Reasonable Doubt’, Queensland Benchbook, [60.3]. 34 The King v SDG [2024] QDC 85, [3], [48] (Clarke DCJ). 35 The King v SDG [2024] QDC 85, [3] (Clarke DCJ). 36 R v Mathews [2026] QDC 50, [12] (Allen KC DCJ). 37 Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162, 169 (Barwick CJ). 38 Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12, [122] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, Gordon & Edelman JJ). 39 Dawson v The Queen (1961) 106 CLR 1, 18 (Dixon CJ). -- 8 of 15 -- 9 prosecution and the self-represented defendant, there ‘bearing upon the elements of the offence, and their significance to the course of the trial’.40 [29] I direct myself of the need to ‘explain’ as ‘a necessary step’41 in my ‘reasoning to an ultimate conclusion’42 in respect of ‘a significant factual or evidential dispute’43 that has arisen in this case to determine whether each offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. [30] I am satisfied in this matter that I am required to give reasons as to why the elements of the offence are established beyond reasonable doubt. I will not devote lengthy judgment writing to issues that have limited bearing on this case such as those raised by the defendant including that Queensland Police and the government are a corporation, the constitutional authority of the court and validity of the legislation. [31] In respect of constitutional authority of this court and the proceedings, it has been said that an argument as to a constitutional issue does not come within the purview of a court ‘merely because’ the defendant says that it does. I find that the alleged constitutional issue raised by the defendant in these proceedings is one that has no merit and given it is ‘unarguable, there is in truth no constitutional issue at all’ for this court to consider.44 The validity of the legislation under which the defendant has been charged [32] The defendant submitted in his closing address that the legislation and regulations in respect of each of the respective three charges are invalid. [33] I am satisfied the Magistrates Court of Queensland has jurisdiction to hear and determine traffic related charges and the legislation and regulation applied in this hearing are valid. This is not the first time a Queensland court has been asked to consider the validity of the law in respect of traffic related charges. In Sorensen v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 121 it was said that the Magistrates Court ‘clearly’ has ‘jurisdiction to hear’ traffic matters and an appeal to the contrary was dismissed.45 Further, in the decision of Millar v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 138, the magistrate at first instance found a defendant guilty of a traffic offence, on appeal the finding was upheld and the appeal dismissed.46 40 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane & Edelman JJ) referred to in Ngakyunkwokka v Commissioner of Police [2026] QDC 10, [58] (Fantin DCJ). 41 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane & Edelman JJ). 42 FEQ v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 186, [42] (Allen KC DCJ). 43 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane & Edelman JJ). 44 Nikolajuk v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 96, [20] (Allen KC DCJ). 45 In Sorensen v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 121, 3 (Paul DCJA) the court was asked to consider the validity of charges under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management- Road Rules) Regulation 2009 (Qld) and the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld). 46 In Millar v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 138, [1]-[2], [10]-[11], [27], [42] (Allen KC DCJ) the defendant was found guilty of driving a motor vehicle without a licence suspended due to an accumulation of demerit points under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld). -- 9 of 15 -- 10 Corporations law and the Queensland Police Service [34] Throughout the hearing and in his closing address the defendant asked questions of witnesses and suggested the Queensland Police Service was a corporation. I interpret his various comments to mean that the Police Officers involved in this investigation may not have had the power to proceed with this matter due to the corporate nature of Queensland Police Service. Although he did suggest towards the end of his closing address that Queensland Police had power, but the legislation was invalid in addition to collusion by Police officers to create evidence against him. [35] The Queensland Police Service is not a corporation and does not meet the definition of a corporation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).47 Queensland Police Service is not an organisation incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The organisation is not registered with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.48 The organisation is not comprised of a director, officers or a company secretary. It is not a proprietary company limited by shares. It is not a public company; it has no shares offered to the public and is not listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Queensland Police have no obligations under, and do not fall within the purview of, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) given Queensland Police do not provide financial services or consumer credit and have no compliance standards under the corporations legislation.49 [36] The argument that the Queensland Police Service is a corporation and therefore a person of interest cannot be lawfully spoken to, or an accused person cannot be arrested and or charged by Queensland Police and brought before the court is a proposition previously argued before Queensland Courts.50 The argument has no basis in fact or law for the following reason. [37] If Queensland Police were a corporation the leading authority of Salomon v Salomon51 enunciated the common law doctrine that a company is a separate legal entity ‘from its members’.52 The statutory authority of the common law doctrine is 47 Sections 9 and 57A Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 48 A company comes into existence on registration under section 119 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 49 The corporations legislation is defined under section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to include the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 50 Nikolajuk v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 96, [14] (Allen KC DCJ); R v Sweet [2021] QDC 216, [6] (Cash QC DCJ). 51 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. 52 Reiche v Neometals Ltd (No 2) [2025] FCA 125, [101] (Feutrill J). -- 10 of 15 -- 11 enshrined under section 124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) which empowers a company with the legal capacity of an individual.53 [38] When a company is incorporated it becomes ‘independent’ because the rights and liabilities of the company ‘appropriate’ to the individual company.54 A company has the power to ‘sue and be sued’55 given it is a ‘separate legal entity’. 56 On that basis if Queensland Police were a corporation they would be fully vested with the rights and liabilities to bring court action against a person, therefore rendering completely ineffective the argument of the defendant. An overview of the evidence presented at the hearing The prosecution case [39] The prosecution case is that on 14 January 2025 the defendant was observed driving a car namely a silver Holden Captiva on Glenmore Road in Park Avenue Rockhampton, the car and Glenmore Road meet the definition of a vehicle and road under the legislation and regulation, at the time of driving the car on Glenmore Road the car was not registered with the Queensland Department of Transport and the defendant’s driver licence was suspended on and from 3 March 2023. [40] One witness was called on behalf of the prosecution, Constable Cullen. He confirmed he knows the defendant due to his interaction with the defendant on 14 January 2025. He gave evidence in person. [41] Constable Cullen was performing his operational duties, including routine patrols, which require him to look for potential wanted persons or suspected vehicles. On 14 January 2025 he was in the back seat of a Camry sedan which is a Police vehicle. The Police vehicle passed a Holden Captiva with the number plate JFK 24 on Glenmore Road in Park Avenue. He seen a male person in an orange t- shirt with facial stubble hair driving the Holden Captiva. There were no other persons in the Holden Captiva. The Police vehicle was in the left lane and the Holden Captiva was in the right lane and at one point they were approximately 10 metres apart. [42] Police were alerted that the number plates on the Holden Captiva were false. Therefore, the Police did a U turn to follow the Holden Captiva which pulled up in the driveway of 148 Glenmore Road, Park Avenue. [43] He gave evidence that when he attended at the home at 148 Glenmore Road, he knocked on the door, and he observed that the male person who drove the vehicle was at the door, and he introduced himself to the defendant. He had a conversation where the defendant confirmed his name. Constable Lee and Senior Constable Cutmore were present with Officer Cullen. The defendant’s licence was checked 53 Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd [2006] FCAFC 144, [114] (Kenny J). 54 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, 30, 42 (Lord Halsbury LC). 55 Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22, 55 (Lord Davey); Malecki v Macko [2022] FC 766, [32] (Besanko J). 56 Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12, 27, 30 (Lord Morris). -- 11 of 15 -- 12 and found to be SPER suspended. The officers checked the VIN number of the car which confirmed it was unregistered and uninsured. The Police seized number plates from the Holden Captiva. [44] The prosecutor played body worn camera footage of Constable Cullen which showed the interaction between the defendant and officers Lee, Cutmore and Cullen. The footage was activated at the time the Police attended at the address and was deactivated upon leaving the address. [45] The body worn camera footage shows officer Cullen at the address of 148 Glenmore Road Park Avenue. There are 2 cars in the front yard of the address with a silver Holden Captiva silver on the right-hand side of the other vehicle. The officer knocks on the front door and the defendant comes from around the side. The defendant acknowledged the Holden Captiva is not registered in Queensland. [46] From my observations of the body worn camera footage the defendant meets the description as identified by Officer Cullen, from the point at which Officer Cullen seen the Holden Captiva being driven by a man on Glenmore Road. During the interaction with Officer Cullen, the defendant identifies his first name as Matthew and says does not have a surname at birth. The defendant says to the Police Officers they are on crown land, and they are trespassing due to Martial law. [47] A notice to appear in respect of three charges is prepared by Officer Cullen which is initially placed on a seat at the front of the property. The officer picks up the notice to appear to follow the defendant to give the notice to him, he follows the defendant into the backyard and he places the notice to appear on the grass in front of the defendant because the defendant said he would not accept the document as the document was a contract. [48] Officer Cullen confirmed in his evidence that he seen the defendant exit the silver Holden Captiva and enter the property after Police had performed the U-Turn. [49] Officer Cullen provided to the court a Certificate of Evidence under sections 123C and 124 of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) to confirm the vehicle as at 14 January 2025 was unregistered. I am satisfied the document is valid and find the Holden Captiva on 14 January 2025 was unregistered. [50] Officer Cullen provided to the court a Certificate of Evidence under section 87X(2)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) to confirm on 13 February 2025 a search of the register kept by the Chief Executive that on 14 January 2025 the Holden Captiva was not insured under the statutory insurance scheme. I am satisfied the document is valid and find the Holden Captiva was not insured on 14 January 2025. [51] Officer Cullen provided to the court a Certificate of Evidence- Driver Unlicenced via Suspension under sections 123C and 124 of the Transport Operations (Road -- 12 of 15 -- 13 Use Management) Act 1995 which states the defendant’s Queensland driver licence was not in force on 14 January 2025. I am satisfied the document is valid and I find on 14 January 2025 the defendant had a suspended Queensland driver licence. [52] Office Cullen was cross examined by the defendant. Officer Cullen confirmed he was performing patrols on 14 January 2025 at around 4.51pm when he noticed the number plate on the Holden Captiva. He conducted a U-Turn to follow the vehicle and pulled up at the house where the car was located. He confirmed he exited the Police vehicle and activate his body worn camera. [53] Officer Cullen’s evidence under cross examination was consistent with his evidence in chief. [54] Officer Cullen’s evidence in this hearing was reliable and credible. In circumstances where he did not know an answer to a question, he was upfront and acknowledged he could not answer the question. Officer Cullen did not attempt to editorialise his evidence to suit the question. [55] The prosecution case closed following the evidence of Officer Cullen. The defence case [56] The defendant advised the court of his intention to call evidence, namely Constable Lee, Constable Cutmore and Senior Constable Duffin. Constable Lee was on maternity leave until September 2026 and was not available. Constable Cutmore and Senior Constable Duffin were available to give evidence in December 2025. [57] The hearing recommenced for day two on Monday 8 December 2025 with the defendant opening his case. [58] Senior Constable Kieran Duffin was called to give evidence by the defendant. His body worn camera footage was played. The footage shows Senior Constable Issac Cullen asking the defendant’s name and the defendant said he is not answering questions and was not born with a surname. The defendant said Queensland Police are a corporation, and he produced his birth certificate. He tells the officer there is Martial law and the Police are working for an American Corporation. Constable Lee is observed in the footage. [59] The footage reveals communication between the officer and the defendant where the defendant asserts contract law when Constable Cullen is attempting to give the defendant the notice to appear. In court the defendant said that the Queensland Police Service operate under contract law as they are a corporation, and he would not accept a piece of paper from Police (the piece of paper is the notice to appear). [60] Senior Constable Duffin gave evidence that he was conducing mobile patrols on Glenmore Road and observed a silver Captiva with the number plate JFK 24. As the car passed Police, he observed a Caucasian male in the driver seat with dark hair -- 13 of 15 -- 14 and facial hair. He conducted a U-Turn and seen the vehicle parked at 148 Glenmore Road. Prior to pulling up at the property he seen the driver exit the car and walk away. When the Police vehicle was closer to the address the driver walked down the right-hand side of the residence. He said there was not a lot of traffic that afternoon and the weather at the time of seeing the Holden Captiva was sunny with no visibility issues. He confirmed the Police car did not have tinted windows. [61] Senior Constable Duffin confirmed that he performed checks on the vehicle in regard to registration. [62] The defendant showed a Google map to Senior Constable Duffin, the map identifies the location of the defendant’s home. Senior Constable Duffin identified on the map the point at which the officer noticed the defendant’s vehicle and performed the U- Turn. [63] Senior Constable Duffin was cross examined by the Prosecutor, and he said he recalled the defendant driving the Holden Captiva with the number plate JFK 24 on Glenmore Road as he seen the defendant in the driver seat. Once the Police car performed the U-Turn he seen the Holden Captiva parked in the front yard of 148 Glenmore Road. [64] Senior Constable Duffin’s evidence was reliable and credible and assisted the prosecution case. [65] The second witness for the defendant was Plain Clothes Senior Constable Cutmore. The body worn camera footage of Senior Constable Cutmore was played. The footage showed her interaction with the defendant who accused the Police of trespassing on crown law, he said will not answer questions and they are under Martial law. The defendant admitted on the footage that the vehicle is not registered in Queensland and the law does not apply to him. He said the plates are not property of the state and Police are not able to take them. He had a conversation with the officer that he was not born with a surname as he was not berthed into a shipping dock but was born. [66] Senior Constable Cullen confirmed Police were driving in an unmarked Police vehicle namely a Camry, she was in the front passenger seat with Officer Duffin and Officer Cullen in the backseat. She said the number plates looked fake which prompted the number plate check. [67] Senior Constable Cullen was shown a Google map of Glenmore Road and the location of the defendant’s address of 148 Glenmore Road. She marked the map to identify where the Holden Captiva was first noticed by Police. She confirmed that she seen the Holden Captiva pull into the driveway of 148 Glenmore Road, the driver was a Caucasian male wearing hi viz shirt with brown hair and brown facial hair and that she seen him walk away from the vehicle. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 [68] The body worn camera footage of Constable Lee was played. The footage showed Constable Lee using an iPad device called QLite. She completes a field property receipt proforma placed under a windscreen wiper of the Holden Captiva. [69] Senior Constable Cutmore was asked by the defendant whether she was asked by another officer to make up a story to say she seen the defendant exit the vehicle and she denied this allegation. [70] Prosecution cross examined Senior Constable Cutmore. She gave evidence she is aware of the defendant as the male matching the description of the driver of the vehicle that Police seen on Glenmore Road, was the same person she seen walk away from the vehicle when it was parked at 148 Glenmore Road. She confirmed that she did not ask anyone to make up a story about the defendant exiting the vehicle. [71] Senior Constable Cutmore gave evidence which I found both reliable and credible. Her evidence assisted the prosecution case. [72] I am not satisfied there is any evidence before this court to show the respective Queensland Police Service Officers involved in this matter colluded against the interests of the defendant. Conclusion [73] I have considered all of the evidence presented in this case. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the elements of each of the three charges has been established by the prosecution. [74] In respect of charge 1, on 14 January 2025 the Holden Captiva was being driven by the defendant on Glenmore Road and the vehicle was not registered. [75] In respect of charge 2, on 14 January 2025 the Holden Captiva was being driven by the defendant on Glenmore Road and the Holden Captiva was uninsured. [76] In respect of charge 3, on 14 January 2025 the defendant was driving a Holden Captiva on Glenmore Road and the defendant’s Queensland driver licence was suspended. [77] Therefore, I find the defendant is guilty of charge 1, charge 2 and charge 3. [78] I will now proceed to a sentencing hearing of the defendant. -- 15 of 15 --