Corella Rd Dev Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Gympie Pines Fairway Villas CTS 36509 [2025] QCA 3
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Corella Rd Dev Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Gympie Pines
Fairway Villas CTS 36509 [2025] QCA 3
PARTIES: CORELLA RD DEV PTY LTD
(applicant)
v
BODY CORPORATE FOR GYMPIE PINES FAIRWAY
VILLAS CTS 36509
(respondent)
FILE NO/S: CA No 171 of 2023
DC No 1431 of 2022
DIVISION: Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING: Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING
COURT: District Court at Brisbane – [2023] QDC 152 (Kefford DCJ)
DELIVERED ON: 31 January 2025
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 6 June 2024
JUDGES: Mullins P and Boddice JA and Brown AJA
ORDERS: 1. Leave to adduce further evidence by the applicant
refused.
2. Leave to appeal refused.
3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of the
applications.
CATCHWORDS: REAL PROPERTY – STRATA AND RELATED TITLES –
VARIATION, TERMINATION AND RENEWAL – OTHER
MATTERS – where the applicant obtained development
approval in respect of a material change of use of lot – where
the applicant failed to provide notice of a change to a scheme
to the respondent as required under s 29 of the Body Corporate
and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) – where the
Magistrate found the applicant guilty of a contravention of the
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld)
– where the applicant’s appeal to the District Court was
reheard on the evidence and dismissed – where the applicant
sought leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court of
Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) – whether the trial judge erred in
relying on the Standard Planning and Development Certificate
as evidence that the Preliminary Approval was in effect –
whether there was a “current development approval for the
scheme” under s 29 of the Body Corporate and Community
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Management Act 1997 (Qld) – meaning of “current
development approval”
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997
(Qld), s 10, s 12, s 29, s 57, s 66, sch 6
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 223, s 225
Planning Act 2016 (Qld), s 88(2)(b), s 88(2)(c), s 265
Planning Regulation 2017 (Qld), s 71, sch 23
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, cited
McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612;
[2017] QCA 255, cited
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, cited
COUNSEL: P W Hackett for the applicant
E J Morzone KC, with B P Strangman, for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Small Myer Hughes Lawyers for the applicant
Bugden Allen Graham Lawyers for the respondent
[1] MULLINS P: I agree with Brown AJA.
[2] BODDICE JA: I agree with Brown AJA.
[3] BROWN AJA: The principal question for consideration on this appeal is what is the
“current development approval” for a community titles scheme under s 29 of the Body
Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCM Act), arising out of
a private prosecution under that provision.
[4] The Body Corporate for Gympie Pines Fairway Villas CTS 36509, the respondent, is
the Body Corporate for a Community Title Scheme (the scheme) consisting of
54 residential lots and one undeveloped lot, being lot 101 on SP199607. Corella Rd
Dev Pty Ltd, the applicant, is the owner of lot 101, having acquired it from the original
developer in September 2019. The development the subject of the scheme was
a progressive development which was to be developed over some years in five stages.
The preliminary development approval for a material change of use, DA10463, had
been granted in 2005 (Preliminary Approval). It provided that “any development
resulting from this approval will be code assessable development with respect to
a Material Change of Use (Multi-Unit Accommodation - 90 attached housing units)”.
The last stage of the scheme to be completed was stage 3, which was the subject of
development approval DA15262 granted in 2009. Stages 4 and 5 were contained
within lot 101.
[5] The applicant applied in 2020 for a development approval in respect of a material
change of use of lot 101 for 21 single-storey dwellings, being 18 two-bedroom and
three one-bedroom dwellings, which was granted in November 2020. Section 29 of
the BCCM Act obliged notice of a change to a scheme in prescribed circumstances
to be given to the body corporate of a scheme and buyers of a proposed lot in the
scheme. It is uncontroversial that notice of the application was not given to the
respondent by the applicant. The respondent filed a complaint and summons on
21 May 2021, pursuant to s 29 of the BCCM Act, and prosecuted the applicant as
a result of the failure to give notice.
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[6] The applicant was found guilty of a contravention of s 29 of the BCCM Act by
Magistrate Callaghan on 19 May 2022. It was fined $125,000 and ordered to pay the
costs of the respondent amounting to $115,000.
[7] The applicant appealed to the District Court.
[8] The appeal was dismissed by Kefford DCJ. The appeal was conducted by way of re-
hearing on the evidence before the Magistrate. No application was made to adduce
fresh, additional or substituted evidence in that appeal.
[9] One of the critical issues before the Magistrate which was then the subject of the
appeal to the District Court was whether there was a “current development approval
for the scheme” or whether it had lapsed.
Leave required
[10] The applicant has applied for leave to appeal to this Court. In order to obtain leave,
the applicant typically needs to show a reasonable argument that there is an error to
be corrected and that it is necessary to correct a substantial injustice to the applicant,
it involves an important question of law, or a question of public importance is raised.1
If leave is granted, it is an appeal stricto sensu, where the sole duty of the Court is to
determine whether error has been shown on the part of the court below.2
[11] In the present case the applicant contends that the grant of leave to appeal is necessary
to correct a substantial injustice and an error. The respondent contends that leave
should not be granted.
Section 29 of the BCCM Act
[12] Section 29 of the BCCM Act provides:
“29 Notice about change of scheme being developed
progressively
(1) This section applies if—
(a) a community titles scheme is intended to be
developed progressively; and
(b) the developer intends to change the scheme in a
way that, if carried out—
(i) would affect the nature of the development
or 1 or more stages of the development; and
(ii) would not be consistent with the current
development approval for the scheme.
(2) The developer must give written notice of the change as
required under this section to—
1 McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at 621 [27] and 625-6 [39] per Bowskill J
(with whom Fraser and Philippides JJA agreed); Robertson v Robertson [2024] QCA 92 at [23] per
Bond JA (with whom Crow and Crowley JJ agreed).
2 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 129 [32] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ; Bowskill J
summarised the relevant principles in McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2018] 2 Qd R 612 at
625-6 [39].
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(a) the body corporate; and
(b) each person who has entered into a contract with
the developer to buy a proposed lot in the scheme.
Maximum penalty for subsection (2) —300 penalty units.
(3) The notice must be given at least 30 days before the
developer applies for development approval for the
changed scheme.”
The decisions below
[13] In the original hearing of the matter, the Magistrate found the defendant, now
applicant, guilty. The Magistrate identified the relevant, and uncontroversial,
elements of the offence to be that:
(a) the community title scheme is intended to be developed progressively;
(b) the defendant is “the developer” of the Gympie Pines Fairway Villas
Community Titles Scheme 36509 within the meaning of that expression in s 29
of the BCCM Act;
(c) by reason of the defendant’s application for the development approval, the
defendant intended to change the scheme in a way that, if carried out:
(i) would affect the nature of the development or one or more stages of the
development; and
(ii) would not be consistent with the current development approval for the
scheme; and
(d) the defendant failed to give written notice of the change at least 30 days before
the developer applied for the development approval for the changed scheme to:
(i) the body corporate; and
(ii) each person who has entered into a contract with the developer to buy a
proposed lot of the scheme.
[14] The Magistrate found all elements to be established. The question of whether there
was a “current development approval for the scheme” was a matter the subject of
extensive evidence and argument. The applicant contended that the approval of the
development application identified by the respondent as the “current development
approval”, the Preliminary Approval, had lapsed under the Sustainable Planning Act
2009 or its successor, the Planning Act 2016 (Planning Act), and therefore the third
element above could not be established.
[15] Notwithstanding that the respondent had particularised the “current development
approval” to be the Preliminary Approval, which was amended on 27 March 2006,3
and sought to prove it was a current development approval on the basis of it being
recorded as being “in effect” on the Standard Planning and Development Certificate
tendered by the respondent as evidence, the respondent submitted in closing
submissions that the word “current” did not refer to a current, not lapsed development
approval under the Planning Act, “but rather relates to a development approval which
3 See Particulars filed 29 July 2021 at [1(i)].
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is reflected in the current community management statement” for the Scheme which
was relevantly the Preliminary Approval.
[16] In adopting the respondent’s construction, the Magistrate reasoned that:
“[24] The words “development approval” are defined in the BCCM
to mean in part “a development approval under the Planning
Act…” Part 6 of chapter 2 of the BCCM sets up a scheme of
requirements providing that there be community management
statements in respect of each community title and that there be
a first community management statement for a community titles
scheme. Existing statements for community titles schemes
can’t be amended but new community managements statements
can be recorded in place of the existing ones. A request to
record a new community management statement for
a community titles scheme must be lodged when a new plan of
subdivision affecting the scheme (including affecting a lot in, or
the common property for, the scheme) is lodged. The body
corporate must give copies of the statement to the local
government. And if there is to be a new community
management statement in place of the existing statement then
consent to the same must be given by each member of the body
corporate in the form of a resolution without dissent. The
community management statement in addition to identifying the
scheme land, among other things, must identify the name of the
scheme, the name of the body corporate, must include
a contribution schedule, must include any bylaws that are not
bylaws set out in schedule 4 of the GCCM and if the scheme is
intended to be developed progressively (as this one is) and the
development is not complete, it must explain the proposed
development and illustrate it by concept drawings and state the
purpose of any future allocations for the scheme and the stages
in which the future allocations are to be made.
[25] In my view, if one was to interpret the word current in the
manner that is argued by the defendant it would mean that even
if there was an existing development approval then a developer
(either the original or a new developer who had purchased the
same from the original) could cancel a development approval
and then submit a new development approval without giving
notice. If that were so, the purposes of S 29 of the BCCM, to
allow the body corporate sufficient time to consider its position
as an owner and to object to any application, would not be
achieved.
[26] I therefore find that the words “current development approval”
where it relates to a progressive development is the
development approval explained and illustrated in the current
community management statement.” (footnotes omitted).
[17] In the appeal to the District Court, the applicant contended that there were two errors
in the Magistrate’s decision, namely:
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(a) that the Magistrate erred in the interpretation of s 29 of the BCCM Act and, in
particular, the construction of the term “current development approval”; and
(b) the Magistrate erred in finding the complaint was made out and the applicant
was guilty of the offence.
[18] As to the first ground, the applicant contended that the “current development
approval” was not the development described in the community management
statement but the current development approval relevant to the Scheme under the
Planning Act. It contended that the Preliminary Approval, was not a current
development approval as it had lapsed.
[19] Judge Kefford found that the Magistrate had erred in construing “current development
approval” as being the development described in the community management
statement. Her Honour found that, properly construed, “current development
approval” is a development approval that is “valid and effective at the relevant time”
under the Planning Act.4
[20] Her Honour, however, rejected the applicant’s contention that the Preliminary
Approval had lapsed pursuant to s 88 of the Planning Act, which provides:
“88 Lapsing of approval for failing to complete development
(1) A development approval, other than a variation approval,
for development lapses to the extent the development is
not completed within any period or periods required
under a development condition.
(2) A variation approval for development lapses to the extent
the development is not completed within—
(a) if a development condition required the
development to be completed within a stated period
or periods—the stated period or periods; or
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply—the period or
periods the applicant nominated in the
development application; or
(c) otherwise—5 years after the approval starts to have
effect.
(3) However, despite the lapsing of the development
approval, any security paid under a condition stated in
section 65(2)(e) may be used as stated in the approval or
agreement under section 67 (to finish the development,
for example).”
[21] The applicant, in particular, had relied on s 88(2)(c) in contending that the Preliminary
Approval had lapsed on the basis that it was the only relevant subsection. It was
uncontroversial that five years had passed since the Preliminary Approval started to
have effect by the time the Planning Act commenced on 3 July 2017.5 Her Honour,
4 Corella Rd Dev Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Gympie Pines Fairway Villas CTS 36509 [2023]
QDC 152 at [30] (Reasons).
5 Reasons at [33].
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however, found that the applicant had not demonstrated that the Preliminary Approval
had lapsed because it did not establish that the development application for the
Preliminary Approval did not nominate a period within which the development would
be completed, such that the approval could be shown to have lapsed under s 88(2)(b).6
[22] In reliance on a Standard Planning and Development Certificate from Gympie
Regional Council for the land, her Honour found that the Preliminary Approval was
in effect and was a current development approval. In that regard her Honour relied
upon s 265 of the Planning Act and s 71 and sch 23 of the Planning Regulation 2017
(Qld).
[23] Judge Kefford found that the applicant intended to change the community title
scheme in a way that would not be consistent with that Preliminary Approval.7 Her
Honour concluded that the applicant had not otherwise discharged its onus to set aside
the conviction. The appeal was dismissed.
Proposed Grounds of Appeal
[24] The applicant seeks leave to appeal only the findings of her Honour in [33] to [36] of
her reasons, namely that the Preliminary Approval was the “current development
approval” and had not lapsed. It contends that her Honour erred in relying on the
Standard Planning and Development Certificate as evidence that the Preliminary
Approval was in effect and finding that an essential element of the offence was
established beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant further contends that her Honour
reversed the onus of proof for an essential element of the offence and denied
procedural fairness in deciding the appeal on an issue, namely the application of
s 88(2)(b) of the Planning Act, which was not subject of argument on appeal.
[25] The applicant also seeks leave to adduce further evidence, namely the amended
Preliminary Approval, to demonstrate that there was no nominated date for
completion of the development within the meaning of s 88(2)(b) of the Planning Act.
Given this appeal is stricto sensu, that could only be relevant to the question of
whether substantial injustice will be caused if leave to appeal is not granted.
[26] The respondent contended although the District Court judge had found error in the
Magistrate’s construction, the finding that the relevant approval, being the
Preliminary Approval, was current was correct including her reliance on the Standard
Planning and Development Certificate which had been admitted without objection.
It did not file any Notice of Contention to contend that the Magistrate’s construction
of “current development approval” was correct.
A question of construction
[27] While it was not part of the applicant’s appeal and there was no notice of cross-
contention, this Court raised with the applicant at the outset of the appeal the question
of the correctness of the construction of the District Court judge, as opposed to the
construction by the Magistrate, it being a matter of law. As a result of the Court
raising this matter, the applicant and respondent were given leave to file further
written submissions.
6 Reasons at [34].
7 Reasons at [35].
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[28] In its supplementary outline, the applicant submitted that the Magistrate’s
construction, being an adoption of one proposed by the respondent in its closing
submissions following the trial, was made without the applicant being given the
opportunity to respond as the construction was articulated in the respondent’s written
submissions after the delivery of the applicant’s submissions where no provision was
made for submissions in reply. It contends that the respondent’s submissions in this
respect departed from the Particulars provided and, as a result, the Magistrate denied
the applicant procedural fairness by adopting a construction in relation to which the
applicant could not respond as a matter of law or fact.
[29] The applicant contends that the interpretation of “current development approval”
adopted by the District Court judge was the correct construction. Schedule 6 of the
BCCM Act defines “development approval” to relevantly include “a development
approval under the Planning Act” and “Planning Act” is defined to mean “Planning
Act 2016”. In the applicant’s submission, the construction adopted by the Magistrate
conflated “current development approval” with “development approval explained and
illustrated in the current community management statement”. It contends that
section 12 of the BCCM Act, which defines a “community management statement”,
and s 66 of the BCCM Act, which sets out the requirements for a community
management statement, do not refer to any requirement to explain or illustrate the
current development approval.
[30] The applicant contends there is no ambiguity in the words “current development
approval”. Development approval is defined in sch 6 of the BCCM Act to include
“a development approval under the Planning Act”, while “current” bears an ordinary
meaning of present, which was also adopted by the respondent.8 The words differ
from and were not intended to have the same meaning as different words used
elsewhere in the BCCM Act, such as the “existing community management
statement”, which is used in s 57 of the BCCM Act in the context of community titles
intended to be developed progressively, or “existing statement”, which is defined in
sch 6 of the BCCM Act. It contends the Magistrate’s construction treats the words as
if they have the equivalent meaning in circumstances where ss 29 and 57 are
enlivened in different circumstances.
[31] The applicant contends that it is unnecessary to have regard to the explanatory note
relevant to the introduction of s 29 of the BCCM Act and s 14A of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), because it is uncontentious between the parties that
“current” means current at the time the developer intends to change the scheme, which
is evident from s 29(1)(b) of the BCCM Act and the meaning is otherwise clear. The
applicant submits that, the words “the current development approval for the scheme”
bear their natural and ordinary meaning. The applicant also contends that the words
“current development approval” have been used in other decisions in the way the
applicant contends they should be construed, although not in relation to the BCCM
Act.
[32] The respondent contends that the development approval for the “scheme” in s 29 of
the BCCM Act refers to the “community titles scheme”, as defined in s 10 of the
8 Although the District Court judge adopted a definition from Macquarie Dictionary, “passing in time,
or belonging to the time actually passing”, the Oxford Dictionary includes as one of the definitions
“Existing or occurring now; at this time; present” as well as “Of a law, writ etc: in force in a particular
place or at a particular time”.
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BCCM Act, and should be construed to be the approval which affects all lots
contained in the scheme and common property, not just one particular stage.
[33] The respondent contends that this construction is consistent with s 10, which provides
that:
“10 Meaning of community titles scheme
(1) A community titles scheme is—
(a) a single community management statement
recorded by the registrar identifying land
(the scheme land); and
(b) the scheme land.
(2) Land may be identified as scheme land only if it consists
of—
(a) 2 or more lots; and
(b) other land (the common property for the
community titles scheme) that is not included in
a lot mentioned in paragraph (a)…”
[34] The respondent ultimately contends, consistent with the intended consumer
protection of s 29, that “current development approval” for the scheme should be
construed to mean the development approval under the Planning Act, which affects
all the lots contained in the scheme and not just development approvals for each
individual stage. It contends that “current development approval” for the scheme
means the development approval under the Planning Act affecting all lots contained
in the scheme, which was “current” at the time the community management scheme
was recorded, particularly Schedule B of the existing community management
statement. The community management statement is the document that is recorded
on the Register and which is readily accessible by consumers and provides the
intended consumer protection of the provision. It contends the construction is
consistent with the fact that the community management statement must comply with
s 66(1)(f) of the BCCM Act if a progressive development, which provides details of
the development of the scheme.
[35] The respondent contends that the Preliminary Approval, DA10463, is the only
development approval that applies to the scheme as a whole. It created lot 2 on
SP 177854 (which was later subdivided to create stage 1 to 3 lots and a balance
development lot, namely lot 101), which formed the parcel of land in which the
scheme exists and granted preliminary approval for the material change of use for
multi-unit accommodation units.
Proper construction of “current development approval”
[36] While the applicant contends that it is unnecessary to have regard to the explanatory
note in construing s 29 of the BCCM Act because of the plain words of the statute,
that does not accord with the modern statutory approach. While one starts with the
words of the statute in order to ascertain the meaning of a statute, one must also have
regard to the context and purpose of the statute, even where the words are clear. As
was recognised by Kiefel CJ and Keane J in R v A2, “It is now accepted that even
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words having an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed
a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete”.9
[37] Nor is s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) predicated on any ambiguity
being found in the provision concerned. The Court is to prefer the interpretation that
will best achieve the purpose of the Act.10
[38] There is, in any event, some ambiguity in s 29 of the BCCM Act by the use of
“current” in combination with “for the scheme”. While “development approval”, is
defined relevantly to refer to development approval under the Planning Act, the
relevant phrase being construed in section 29(1)(b)(ii) is “current development
approval for the scheme”. It does not therefore necessarily mean, as the applicant
contends, the development approval under the Planning Act current at the time the
developer seeks to change the scheme.
[39] The words in the provision itself and the context of the provision in the BCCM Act
as a whole provides some assistance to its construction.
[40] The word “scheme” in s 29(1)(b) of the BCCM Act clearly refers to the community
titles scheme which is being progressively developed, which is referred to in
s 29(1)(a). A scheme is defined in s 10(1) and is a “single community management
statement recorded by the registrar identifying land” and “scheme land”.
Section 10(4) of the BCCM Act provides that for each community titles scheme, there
must be:
“(a) at least 2 lots; and
(b) common property; and
(c) a single body corporate; and
(d) a single community management statement.”
[41] Under s 12 of the BCCM Act, “community management statement” is defined as
being “basic to the identification of a community titles scheme”.
[42] Section 66(1) of the BCCM Act provides that the “community management
statement” for a community titles scheme, in addition to identifying the scheme land,
must, amongst other things:
“(f) if the scheme is intended to be developed progressively
(including, for example, subdivision of scheme land to create
further lots for the scheme or to establish a subsidiary scheme,
or excision of a lot from, or addition of a lot to, scheme land)
and the development is not complete—
(i) explain the proposed development and illustrate it by
concept drawings; and
(ii) state the purpose of any future allocations for the scheme
and the stages in which the future allocations are to be
made; …” (emphasis added).
9 R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507 at 521 [32] per Kiefel CJ and Keane J. Similarly, see SZTAL v Minister
for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362 at 368 [14] per Kiefel CJ, Nettle and
Gordon JJ.
10 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A.
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[43] While s 66(1)(f) does not refer to the development approval, the details required to
be provided would be derived at least in part from the development approval which
applied to the scheme to explain the proposed development.
[44] That existing statement for a community titles scheme cannot be amended but a new
community statement may be recorded if the body corporate consents.11 A motion to
change an existing community management scheme can generally only be submitted
by the body corporate committee, the owner of a lot included in the scheme or a body
corporate manager.12
[45] However, in the case of a progressive development, a developer is required to prepare
a new community management scheme where a new plan for subdivision is proposed
in circumstances prescribed by s 57 BCCM Act. This includes where the new
subdivision plan is inconsistent with the existing community management statement
for the scheme because the plan changes the scheme in a way that affects the nature
of the development or one or more stages of the development as provided in s 57(3)
of the BCCM Act. Section 57(5) of the BCCM Act requires that the developer
prepare a new community management statement required under s 56(1) for the
scheme and for it to be given to the body corporate to provide its consent. That does
not, however, replace the requirement to give notice under s 29 of the BCCM Act.
Section 57(7) of the BCCM Act provides that:
“(7) However, if this section applies because of the circumstances
stated in subsection (3), the body corporate is not required to
endorse its consent on the statement unless—
(a) the developer has—
(i) given the body corporate a notice as required under
section 29(2)(a); and
(ii) obtained development approval for the changed
scheme; and
(b) the new community management statement is consistent
with each development approval for the changed scheme;
…”
[46] As the applicant submits, ss 29 and 57 operate in different circumstances but are
interrelated, with the s 29 statement being required to be provided before a body
corporate is required to endorse its consent on the statement under s 57 of the BCCM
Act. Section 29, however, operates at the stage of development approval being
intended rather than having been made.
[47] Section 57, however, makes clear that there is an interconnection between a
development approval and the community titles scheme through the community
management statement where there is a new plan of subdivision that is inconsistent
with the community management scheme as provided in s 57(3) which largely
combines the two requirements in s 29(1)(b).
[48] It is evident that “current” refers to the development approval that is current as
recorded under the community titles scheme and not “current” under the Planning Act
11 BCCM Act s 54.
12 BCCM Act s 55.
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and that it is a development approval “for the scheme” referring to the approval which
governs the development of the scheme as a whole intended to be developed
progressively, including in stages and is current at the time of the existing community
management statement. That would, in a case such as this include the planning
approval for the scheme relevant to its use and any approval for the development of
the scheme which has required a new community management statement for the
scheme under s 56 and s 57 of the BCCM Act as a result of a new plan of subdivision
and is the subject of the existing community management scheme at the time the
developer intends to change the scheme. In this case, that would be both the
preliminary approval for the material change of use and the development approval for
the latest stage current at the time of the community management statement executed
on 19 March 2009.
[49] I consider that this is the proper construction for the following reasons:
(a) Section 29 is found in the part of the BCCM Act dealing with the
“Establishment of Community Titles Scheme” with the other provisions
referring to the establishment of the scheme and the changing of the scheme.
(b) Even though development approval is defined to be a development approval
under the Planning Act, the reference in s 29 is “current development approval
for the scheme” in the context of a scheme being developed progressively. The
words “for the scheme” indicate it is not merely reference to a development
approval that is current under the Planning Act. The reference to the “scheme”
plainly refers to the community title scheme being developed progressively
which is referred to in ss 29(1)(a) and 29(1)(b).
(c) Notice under s 29(2) is required to be given not only to the body corporate but
to “each person who has entered into a contract with the developer to buy
a proposed lot in the scheme”. The existing community management statement
for the community title scheme is one of the principal information sources for
the buyer as to the nature of the development in which the buyer has bought
a lot.
(d) The explanatory note when the provision was introduced is consistent with a
legislative intention that the “current development approval for the scheme” is
the approval or approvals the subject of the latest community management
statement. It stated that the provision “… provides for notice to be given to the
body corporate where a scheme, that is a progressive or staged development, is
to be changed by the developer from that already disclosed in the community
management statement” (emphasis added).13
(e) Details of how the scheme is to be developed progressively is required to be
contained in the community management statement by s 66(1)(f) of the BCCM
Act. While that section provides for information to be given as to the nature
of the development relevant to s 29(1)(b)(i), it is also relevant to s 29(b)(ii).
The development would be the subject of a development approval obtained for
a scheme and potentially for each stage of development within the scheme. The
development approval would underpin the nature of the development and be
relevant to the provision of information as to the nature of the development of
the scheme required to be contained in the community management statement.
13 Explanatory Note, Body Corporate and Community Management and Other Legislation and
Amendment Bill 2002 (Qld) at 15, noting that the provision was originally inserted as s 30A.
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The reference to the development approval in s 29(b)(ii) is not disconnected
and separate from the information provided in the community management
statement.
(f) It best gives effect to the purpose of the Act which includes as the secondary
objects “to provide an appropriate level of consumer protection for owners and
intending buyers of lots included in community titles schemes” and “to ensure
accessibility to information about community titles scheme issues”.14
Regardless of the currency of a development approval under the Planning Act,
a departure from the development of scheme land outlined in the community
management statement and the seeking of a new approval in different terms
could affect intending buyers, including in the sense that the proposed
development cannot occur as proposed because the relevant development
approval is no longer current. No such corresponding notice is required to be
given to a buyer under the Planning Act. That is consistent with the explanatory
notes which stated the purpose of the notice requirement was three-fold:15
“Firstly it is to allow the body corporate sufficient time to
consider its position as an owner who may object to an
application under the planning process contained in the
Integrated Planning Act 1997. Secondly, the notice must also
be given to buyers of proposed lots, as they need to be informed
as to whether any change may adversely affect them and
therefore their ability to complete the contract to purchase.
Thirdly, it puts developers on notice to be honest and open in
development proposals and also to be aware of their obligations
to the body corporate and future owners of the scheme.”
[50] This is also supported in the context of the scheme as a whole, given s 57(7) of the
BCCM Act acts as an additional safeguard for compliance with s 29 BCCM Act to
the extent that it provides that a body corporate is not obliged to endorse its consent
on the statement unless the developer has given the body corporate a notice as
required under s 29(2)(a), obtained development approval for the changed scheme,
and ensured that the new community management scheme is consistent with each
development approval for the changed scheme. Section 57 also requires updated
community management statements where there is a new subdivision plan which
maintains the currency of what is proposed to be developed as part of a scheme.
[51] Such a construction does not conflate ss 29(1)(b)(i) and 29(1)(b)(ii) or “current
development approval for the scheme” with the “existing community management
statement for the scheme”, as found in other sections in the BCCM Act, including
s 57, or “existing statement” as defined in schedule 6. The proposed change to the
scheme must refer to a change in how or the order in which a development is to be
carried out which is not consistent with the development approval the subject of the
scheme reflected in the community management statement for the scheme before any
notice must be given.
[52] As the District Court judge discussed, there is potential for some overlap between
s 29(b)(i) and (b)(ii) insofar as the nature of the development for a progressive
14 See BCCM Act s 4(g)-(h).
15 Explanatory Note, Body Corporate and Community Management and Other Legislation and
Amendment Bill 2002 (Qld) at 16.
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development will, to a certain extent, be explained in the community management
statement given the requirements of s 66(1)(f), as opposed to the current development
approval. However, construing “current development approval for the scheme” as
referable to the development approval that is reflected in the community management
statement does not mean that s 29(b)(i) and (b)(ii) have the same meaning or favour a
construction whereby the currency of the development approval is to be determined
according to the Planning Act. The nature of the development described in schedule B is
not necessarily the full scale of the development for which development approval was
given. Thus, the duality of the requirements before notice has to be given by the
developer. Section 29(1)(b)(ii) provides for the possibility that the intended change
by the developer, although it will affect the nature of the development or one or more
stages of the development, may still fall within the scope of the current development
approval relating to the work described in the community management scheme. That
is consistent with the fact that s 57 requires a new community management statement
where there is a new plan of subdivision affecting the scheme as set out in that section.
The change to the development the subject of the scheme may be necessary in order
to meet a condition of the development approval given. Thus, it would still be open
as a defence to demonstrate that the proposed change by the developer to the scheme
still falls within the scope of the development approval that was current at the time of
the community management statement.
[53] Section 29 of the BCCM Act is directed to changing the nature of the development
of the scheme described in the community titles scheme through the community
management statement and the commensurate development approval relevant to the
development described and serves to provide information to owners of lots and
potential buyers into the development the subject of the scheme. While the legality
of the development and the currency of the approval to proceed with the development
would be a source of concern, the legality of the development proceeding in
accordance with the required development approval under the Planning Act is
a matter which is addressed by the Planning Act.
[54] A review of the cases referred to by the applicant in relation to decisions said to
involve similar words in other legislation, not the BCCM Act, does not cast any light
on the construction that should be adopted in relation to s 29 of the BCCM Act.
[55] The District Court judge placed too much emphasis on the reference to “development
approval” and not the words “for the scheme”. Those words in the context of the
section and the BCCM Act as a whole indicate that “current” was referable to the
development approval current for the scheme, which was to be determined by
reference to the latest community management statement for the community titles
scheme. The District Court judge also did not consider the significance of service of
the notice on a buyer of a proposed lot and the explanatory note which was relevant
to the context of the provision. “Current”, in its context, does not mean current under
the terms of the Planning Act, albeit any development approval is granted and remains
in force for the purposes of the development pursuant to the terms of the Planning
Act. In finding that to be the case, the District Court judge erred in her construction
of s 29 of the BCCM Act.
Should Leave Be Given?
[56] Given the proper construction of “current development approval of the scheme” is
consistent with the construction adopted by the Magistrate, the question then arises
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as to how this construction should affect the present application, given that
construction was not adopted in the District Court judgment on appeal, nor was it
raised by the parties in the context of this application.
[57] As a result of the construction adopted, the question of whether the Preliminary
Approval, DA10463, had lapsed under the Planning Act is not the relevant question
for this Court under s 29 of the BCCM Act. The further evidence which the applicant
has sought to adduce before this Court to demonstrate that there is evidence
supporting the fact that the Preliminary Approval had lapsed under s 88(2), contrary
to her Honour’s finding, is therefore irrelevant to the construction of “current
development approval” in s 29(1)(b)(ii). That application to adduce further evidence
should be refused.
[58] The applicant contends it did not have the opportunity to respond to the construction
adopted by the Magistrate following the trial. According to the applicant the
construction proposed by the respondent was only raised in its written closing
submissions before the Magistrate and that was not consistent with the charge as
particularised, and the applicant was not given the opportunity to respond to that
proposed construction. It contended in oral submissions that if the Court adopted the
construction of “current development approval” adopted by the Magistrate, the matter
should be remitted back to the Magistrate so the parties can make submissions to the
Magistrate in relation to that construction in terms of the effect of that construction
on the prosecution of the applicant.
[59] The respondent, however, submits that leave should not be given by this Court and
the application should be refused. It contends that the applicant was not denied
natural justice as its case at trial and before the District Court was that the Preliminary
Approval was the “current development approval” for the purposes of s 29 of the
BCCM Act and that “current” was determined by reference to what development
approval was reflected in schedule B of the existing community management
statement. It submits the applicant made a tactical decision to contend that the
development approval had lapsed under the Planning Act and did not mount any
substantial argument to respond to the respondent’s position. Rather, the applicant
did not object to the admission of the Town Planning and Development Certificate
and sought to contend that it was not reliable in a number of respects. It contends that
the Particulars of the charge had identified the parts of the community management
statement relevant to the offence in subparagraphs [1](a)-(h), (i) and (k) and that the
applicant was sufficiently on notice as to the legal and factual basis of the complaint.
Further, it had the opportunity to appeal to the District Court by way of rehearing
under s 223 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) where the respondent’s position remained
unchanged. Thus, any denial of natural justice could not survive the appeal to the
District Court and the applicant’s choice to present the case as it did.
[60] The respondent further contends that if the “current development approval” means
the development approval for the scheme that was “current” at the time of the current
community management statement for the scheme, the Preliminary Approval was
explained in accordance with s 66(1)(f) of the BCCM Act in schedule B of the third
community management statement and was in force at the time of the community
management statement, which accorded with its case at trial.
[61] The Particulars set out the proposed development for the scheme land derived from
schedule B of each community management statement, including the third
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community management statement recorded on 19 March 2009. The “Current
Development Approval” was defined as “Preliminary Approval DA10463” given by
the Cooloola Shire Council on 21 June 2005 and amended on 27 March 2006. The
Particulars stated, “That amended development approval is in effect for the Scheme
Land and is a development approval for the scheme”. Part of the defence of the
applicant at the trial was that that development approval was not “in effect” for the
scheme land and had lapsed. In subparagraph [1](j), the particulars further identify
the survey plans by which the land was reconfigured. In subparagraph [1](k), it
specifies that the development of the scheme, and creation of lots and common
property, was consistent with the “Current Development Approval”. They did not,
identify DA15262 relevant to the development of stage 3 of the land the subject of
the scheme, which presumably resulted in the third community management
statement. However, the applicant conceded before the District Court judge that the
Preliminary Approval was the only development approval relevant to stages 4 and 5
which are now lot 101 and the subject of the developer’s intended change to the
scheme.
[62] While the particulars did set out details of the development and proposed lots in each
community management statement, they did not particularise the “Current
Development Approval” to be the development approval current at the time of the
existing community management statement, namely the third community
management statement, at the time the developer intended to propose the scheme.
Rather, the particulars only referred to the Preliminary Approval. On the basis of the
particulars provided, the respondent’s case was not clear.
[63] The respondent’s position as to the construction of “current development approval of
the scheme” was made clear in its closing submissions, however, no provision was
made for the applicant to reply to those submissions. In the context of a quasi-
prosecution that is unsurprising, although it is surprising that the applicant did not
make any application to the Magistrate to object to a case not particularised being
relied upon by the applicant.
[64] However, the applicant had the opportunity to raise the question of the denial of
natural justice in the appeal before the District Court judge, which was by way of
rehearing under s 223 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). A denial of natural justice was
relevantly an error that could have been raised before the District Court judge who
would have had the power to remit the matter back to the Magistrate under s 225 of
the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
[65] While the applicant had asserted the denial of natural justice before the District Court
judge on appeal as a result of the Magistrate adopting the construction proposed by
the respondent which differed from particulars of charge before the District Court
judge on appeal, the applicant did not contend that, if the construction of the
Magistrate was correct, the case should be remitted back to the Magistrate for further
submissions and potentially further evidence based on that construction, as a result of
the denial of natural justice, although the Notice of Appeal was broad enough for it
to do so. In oral submissions before the District Court judge, the applicant agreed
that the Preliminary Approval was the only approval which related to stages 4 and 5
and that, if it had not lapsed, it was the current development approval her Honour
should look to for the purposes of determining whether there was an intention to
change the scheme that was inconsistent with the Preliminary Approval.
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[66] A review of the transcript before the District Court does show that the District Court
judge raised with the applicant the position if the Preliminary Approval was found to
be the current development approval. According to the District Court judge’s
reasons, the applicant did “not challenge that the development the subject of its
development application to Gympie Regional Council is not consistent with the
Preliminary Approval”16 but contended that the Magistrate’s construction was in
error and there was no “current development approval” at all. The applicant has not
sought to contend in its proposed appeal that her Honour was in error in that regard.
[67] The District Court judge found that the Magistrate was not in error in determining
that the applicant intended to change the scheme in a way that, if carried out, would
affect the nature of the development or one or more stages of the development under
s 29(1)(b)(i). That finding is not the subject of challenge by the applicant in its
proposed appeal for which leave is sought.
[68] While there is substance in the applicant’s contention that it was denied natural justice
in the Magistrates Court, given that argument was not pursued in the appeal before
the District Court when it was open for it do so, any denial of natural justice could
have been addressed at the time of the appeal. In any event, while the applicant had
made detailed submissions before the Magistrate as to the chronology of the
development approvals, it is evident on the basis of that chronology that, at the time
of the third community management statement, the Preliminary Approval was current
and would not have expired until 21 June 2009 if the “use” had not commenced
beforehand.
[69] The question of whether there would be an inconsistency between the proposed
intended change of the scheme by the applicant and the current Development
Approval was a matter canvassed by the applicant’s counsel before the District Court
judge and her Honour recorded in her reasons the concession made, that there is an
inconsistency and that proposed finding was not the subject of this proposed appeal.
While the applicant chose to confine the appeal to the construction adopted by the
District Court judge, it is evident that the gravamen of its defence was that the
Preliminary Approval had lapsed, and it ran not only the trial but the appeal before
the District Court judge on that basis. In the circumstances, I do not consider that any
substantial injustice will be suffered by the applicant if leave is not granted.
[70] Given that the applicant has been unsuccessful in both the application for leave to
adduce evidence and for leave to appeal, costs should follow the event and the
applicant pay the costs of the respondent of the applications.
Proposed Orders
[71] I would make the following orders:
(a) Leave to adduce further evidence by the applicant refused;
(b) Leave to appeal refused;
(c) The applicant pay the costs of the respondent of the applications.
16 Reasons at [27].
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCA/2025/003