Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Armstrong [2025] QSC 335

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: PARTIES: FILE NO/S: DIVISION: PROCEEDING: ORIGINATING COURT: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Armstrong [2025] QSC 335 ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (Applicant) v STUART WILLIAM ARMSTRONG (Respondent) 10494/10 Trial Division Application pursuant to s 22 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: Ex tempore reasons delivered 16 September 2025 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 16 September 2025 JUDGE: Smith J ORDER: 1. I find on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent contravened a requirement of the Supervision Order made on 15 June 2023. 2. Pursuant to section 22(7) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) I find that the respondent has satisfied the court on the balance of probabilities that adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention of the existing order, be ensured by an amended Supervision Order. 3. I order the respondent be released from prison on the conditions set out in the draft order signed by me and placed with the file. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – GENERALLY – where the respondent breached a supervision order – where the respondent has significant mental health conditions – where he is a high risk of reoffending if released without a supervision order – whether the order should be for five years – whether -- 1 of 11 -- 2 there should be a condition that he does not threaten violence to people and property Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 22 Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) s 50 Attorney-General v KAH [2019] 3 Qd R 329, cited COUNSEL: Mr J Tate for the Attorney-General Ms J Horne for the respondent. SOLICITORS: Crown Solicitor for the Attorney-General Legal Aid (Queensland) for the respondent [1] This is a contravention proceeding against Mr Armstrong brought by the Attorney- General pursuant to section 22 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (“DPSOA”) [2] Section 22 of the DPSOA provides: “22 Court may make further order (1) The following subsections apply if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the released prisoner is likely to contravene, is contravening, or has contravened, a requirement of the supervision order or interim supervision order (each the existing order). (2) Unless the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by the existing order as amended under subsection (7), the court must— (a) if the existing order is a supervision order, rescind it and make a continuing detention order; or (b) if the existing order is an interim supervision order, rescind it and make an order that the released prisoner be detained in custody for the period stated in the order. (3) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a continuing detention order as mentioned in subsection (2)(a), the court may do any or all of the following— (a) act on any evidence before it or that was before the court when the existing order was made; -- 2 of 11 -- 3 (b) make any order necessary to enable evidence of a kind mentioned in section 13(4) to be brought before it, including, for example, an order— (i) in the nature of a risk assessment order, subject to the restriction under section 8(2); or (ii) for the revision of a report about the released prisoner produced under section 8A; (c) consider any further report or revised report in the nature of a report of a type mentioned in section 8A. (4) To remove any doubt, it is declared that the court need not make an order in the nature of a risk assessment order if the court is satisfied that the evidence otherwise available under subsection (3) is sufficient to make a decision under subsection (2)(a). (5) If the court makes an order in the nature of a risk assessment order, the psychiatrist or each psychiatrist examining the released prisoner must prepare a report about the released prisoner and, for that purpose, section 11 applies. (6) For applying section 11 to the preparation of the report— (a) section 11(2) applies with the necessary changes; and (b) section 11(3) only applies to the extent that a report or information mentioned in the subsection has not previously been given to the psychiatrist. (7) If the released prisoner satisfies the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention or likely contravention of the existing order, be ensured by a supervision order or interim supervision order, the court— (a) must amend the existing order to include all of the requirements under section 16(1) if the order does not already include all of those requirements; and (b) may otherwise amend the existing order in a way the court considers appropriate— (i) to ensure adequate protection of the community; or (ii) for the prisoner’s rehabilitation or care or treatment. (8) The existing order may not be amended under subsection (7)(b) so as to remove any requirements mentioned in section 16(1).” [3] If the court is satisfied that the prisoner has contravened a requirement of the supervision order, the onus passes to the respondent to satisfy the court that the existing supervision order, despite the contravention, provides adequate protection to the community. The -- 3 of 11 -- 4 effect of section 22 is either to rescind the supervision order and make a continuing detention order or release the prisoner on a supervision order with any amendments the court considers appropriate. [4] The original supervision order in this case was made a long time ago now by Acting Justice Dick on the 14th of March 2011. Justice Mullins, as she then was, also released the respondent to a supervision order on the 12th of March 2021 with a number of conditions. That was extended by both Justice Callaghan and Justice Kelly, who extended it until the 14th of July 2026. [5] Turning to Mr Armstrong, he was born on the 15th of July 1970. He is now 55. He has a reasonably significant history. The most relevant convictions are: (a) rapes and indecent assault in Townsville Supreme Court, 30th of June 1998 (b) assault occasioning bodily harm and robbery (6 th of November 1991), Brisbane District Court, 15 th of April 1994; (c) assault charges, Townsville District Court, 20th of July 2001; (d) assault with intent to commit rape, Townsville District Court, 31 October 2005; (e) common assault, Richlands Magistrate Court, 13 th September 2013; (f) assault occasioning bodily harm, Richlands Magistrates Court, 8th August 2017; and (g) Most recently, assaulting the neighbour causing bodily harm, which was dealt with in the Richland Magistrates Court, 17th of June 2025. [6] As to the contraventions on the 18th of July 2023, the respondent signed an acknowledgement of his supervision order and all reasonable directions pertaining to the management under the order with QCS. Those directions included limitations as to the use of internet-capable devices, remaining contactable, disclosing associations and not deleting data, and social media usage. -- 4 of 11 -- 5 [7] In January 2024, he was found by QCS to be using a smartphone to locate and contact female sex workers, breaching three of the requirements. In April 2024, he commenced residing in accommodation within the community, and shortly thereafter, QCS home visits identified an unknown adult female visiting the residence. [8] QCS directed him to have no further contact with the woman, who was homeless and vulnerable, but she continued to attend the residence in breach of requirements 6 and 7. On approximately the same date, QCS identified that the respondent was using his smartphone to access social media, including dating sites in breach of requirements 6, 22 and 38. [9] In July 2024, he moved into alternative accommodation within the community. He was issued with two further reasonable directions relating to not having visitors at his residence without approval and not having females attend without approval. On two occasions, 10 September 2024 and 26 September 2024, the respondent failed to allow Corrective Services officers to conduct a home visit. When challenged at the meeting, he disclosed a female was at the residence, in breach of requirements 6, 7 and 38. [10] From July 2024, QCS was in receipt of intelligence suggesting he was in possession of a second unapproved mobile phone, and it was identified he was regularly deleting data from the phone in breach of requirement 6. That was referred to the QPS for investigation. On 1 October 2024, QPS executed a search warrant at his residence, and he provided the QPS with the phone, in addition to undisclosed email accounts and passwords, which breached requirements 6, 20, 21 and 22. As a result of the search warrant, he also disclosed accessing dating sites and speaking to unapproved women in breach of 6, 22, 38 and 39 of the order. [11] On 2 November 2024, he breached his curfew requirements by leaving the residence at 4.53pm while subject to a 24-hour curfew direction. QCS tried to contact him but was unsuccessful. He subsequently attended the Wacol precinct complaining the mobile phone was not working. There were no defects with it. As a result of this, QCS directed him to remain at the precinct and await the attendance by the ambulance service. He refused and returned to his residence without approval, breaching clauses 6 and 14. -- 5 of 11 -- 6 [12] He was charged with some of these breaches and other offences, namely the assault charge mentioned earlier, wilful damage and unlawful damage of police property. He pleaded guilty in the Richlands Magistrates Court on 17 June 2025 to these charges. He received nine months’ imprisonment, with 219 days declared and court-ordered parole as at 17 June 2025. He then pleaded guilty in the Ipswich Magistrates Court to one count of contravention and received 14 days imprisonment. [13] I find the breaches proved in this case. I now turn to the risk assessments which have been obtained. [14] Dr Brown gave evidence and has provided a report. In her report, she diagnosed the prisoner with mild neurocognitive disorder, cognitive deficits, disorganisation and vulnerability to acute confusion. There have been some head injuries and heavy alcohol and drug use. He is vulnerable to episodes of delirium when physically unwell. He has a psychotic disorder, most likely bipolar affective disorder, characterised by mood disturbance, insomnia, paranoid and grandiose delusions, markedly disorganised thoughts and behaviours, irritability and aggression. There is also a diagnosis of substance use disorder, currently in remission, which is evidenced by very heavy use during his life of alcohol, cannabis, heroin, amphetamine, and other drugs. This has led to considerable social and occupational dysfunction. Despite this, he has continued to use drugs, in particular, medicinal cannabis, which has increased his vulnerability to psychosis. There is a diagnosis of mixed personality disorder, both antisocial and borderline, which has attenuated with age and treatment. There is no paraphilia here, which is of importance. [15] On the risk assessment tool Static-99-R, his risk of sexual reoffending is in the moderate to high or above average risk range. On the PCL-R, he is below the diagnosis of psychopathy; 22 out of 40. But there is a loading consistent with antisocial personality disorder. -- 6 of 11 -- 7 [16] On the RSVP, there are 17 of the factors of concern. In Dr Brown’s opinion, he has an enduring psychotic illness which is relapsing and remitting in nature. There have been a number of episodes of relapse, which occurred as a result of the cessation of psychotropic medication, use of cannabis, physical illness and stress. He is vulnerable to his head injuries and has had episodes of delirium in the past. The details of his return to custody are referred to therein. The contraventions and return to custody in 2024 were similar. He stopped taking his medication because of stress. [17] In Dr Brown’s opinion, Mr Armstrong’s unmodified risk of sexual and violent reoffending remains high. He has a history of sexual and violent offending in the context of personality disturbance, hostility and objectification of women, stress, substance use and destabilised mental state. He is sexually intact and active, and therefore has access to potential victims in the context of relationships. There is a lack of insight into treatment needs, and he repeatedly ceases psychotropic medication, citing drowsiness and sexual side effects. [18] Without a supervision order, there is a significant risk that he will cease mental health treatment altogether and return to drug use in some form, and there will be stress, and the risk of sexual and violent offending will increase. Given his poor insight, he requires robust management of mental health, and he should not be permitted to use medicinal cannabis. He should be under the care of a community psychiatrist and psychologist, and his mental state and risks should be regularly reviewed. There is anger towards the alleged perpetrator of the sexual abuse of his daughter, and his risk of violence should be kept under review. If he becomes unwell and refuses treatment, he should be made the subject of an involuntary treatment order. [19] Ideally, he should be established on depot antipsychotic medication to ensure compliance and reducing the risk of relapse. If he is appropriately medicated, release to a supervision order would reduce his risk of sexual and violent reoffending to low/moderate and manageable. He should be supported to gradually increase his support network and achieve community living, and his intimate relationships should be monitored. He should wear a GPS tracker and remain abstinent from illicit substances -- 7 of 11 -- 8 including medical cannabis and from alcohol. His daughter remains the most important person in his life. The supervision order should be for a period of five years. [20] Dr Timmins has also provided a report. She diagnoses a complex diagnostic picture of several psychiatric disorders, mixed personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits, substance use disorder, and a psychotic illness. It is said to be substance induced psychosis, but there is a heavy organic component, and she cannot rule out an organic psychosis. On her assessment as to risk, he scored 26 out of 40 on the PCL-R, which shows significant psychopathic traits but does not meet the cut-off for psychopathy. On Static-99, well above average, or a high risk of reoffending, and on the RSVP, a high risk of reoffending, if released into the community. [21] Dr Timmins refers to the background of offences and to the current contravention. She notes that he has significant personality vulnerabilities, including antisocial and narcissistic psychopathic traits. His personality and substance use are barriers to treatment, and compliance. Like Dr Brown, she considers there is no paraphilia. Other diagnoses include neurocognitive disorder, PTSD and bipolar disorder. Regardless of the diagnosis, he has a vulnerable brain, probably from head injuries and past substance abuse. He has ongoing substance misuse and poor compliance with treatment. When he becomes unwell, he becomes paranoid and disorganised and struggles to manage his emotions, in particular anger, and tends to act aggressively. [22] Interventions have largely been of limited benefit, and there is heavy reliance on the restrictions of the order. He has engaged in treatment for sexual offending and substance use. He does not drink alcohol but is suspected of the misuse of prescribed medications. He has poor insight into his symptoms, the impact of substances, the need for compliance with treatment and poor insight as to how this links into sexual offending. Despite multiple interventions, there are clearly personal vulnerabilities, substance abuse, and psychotic symptoms. There are indicators of an active sex drive. Dr Timmins thinks the order, that is, the supervision order, has provided the conditions necessary to manage his risk of sexual reoffending in the community. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 [23] She is not convinced he can self-manage. He is heavy reliant, as is the community, on the conditions. There is a risk of reoffending. He is likely to seek out sexual partners or intimacy, and there is the possibility that he may target females, including a stranger, and act out with sexual violence, which would include penetrative sexual offending. There is a risk of physical and psychological harm to the victim. He remains at a high risk of reoffending in a sexual manner, if released into the community at this time without a supervision order and if the court is of a mind to release him, he will require support from a forensic psychologist, monitoring and assistance with treatment, and substance use. The GP needs to be careful to monitor misuse of prescribed medications. A supervision order will assist to reduce the risk to a moderate risk if he complies with the order. [24] Originally, there was a recommendation of three years on top of the 14th of July 2026 order, but in more recent evidence, Dr Timmins thought the order should be for four to five years. [25] I listened to the evidence of both doctors, and it seems very clear to me that Mr Armstrong does have a complex psychiatric condition, with psychosis and delirium. In the absence of medication and treatment for these conditions, there is a high risk of reoffending, so it is very important, it seems to me, for him to comply with treatment and continue to take these important medications. Substance misuse is of concern ,and both doctors were of the opinion that medicinal cannabis is not good in his case. [26] Exhibit 6 sets out the risks with medicinal cannabis, with people with mental health conditions like yours. It is worth, I think, having a read of that. It might give you some information about how it is very risky to take such medication. [27] I have had regard to all of the evidence and the submissions made. The onus is on Mr Armstrong to satisfy the court that the existing supervision order should continue. Also, I am not bound by the psychiatrists’ evidence. It is for the court to independently make the determination, assisted by their evidence. -- 9 of 11 -- 10 [28] Having considered all matters, I consider it is appropriate to make a supervision order. That turns me to the question of the length of it, and the conditions. In that regard, there is a dispute between the parties. I have regard to what Justice Davis said in Attorney- General v KAH [2019] 3 Qd R 329 at [53]. With respect to the length, it is a value judgment to some degree. I take into account that Mr Armstrong is a very complex case, and I note the defence concerns about the effect of any breach. However, I need to consider community protection. I also need to consider the level of risk. Bearing in mind the psychiatric opinions, I consider a five-year supervision order is appropriate commencing from today. [29] Then there are these conditions. The only condition debated was 43. I have some real concerns about the wording of it. It reads, “You must not directly or indirectly threaten or display violent behaviour against anyone with the intent to harm or intimidate, except in self-defence.” Now, a person is entitled to be angry about something, and to display their anger. I consider there are concerns raised about interpretation as to the behaviours intended to be covered by that condition. [30] However, I do think that a condition of not threatening violence to any person or property would be sufficiently clear to encapsulate the intention behind this condition. Whilst there might be a penalty aspect to it, there is also a therapeutic aspect, that is, that if this happens, issues can be picked up early. As the Crown submits here, it is not necessarily the case that someone is returned to custody. It may be that an amendment to the order could be made, or further treatment given. [31] So, I do propose to substitute condition 43 with, “You shall not threaten violence to any person or property.” [32] I also note Dr Timmins’ evidence about the concern as to the respondent possessing guns. I consider it is appropriate to add a condition that he not breach section 50 of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld), which means he cannot possess a firearm. -- 10 of 11 -- 11 [33] Otherwise, I am satisfied that the conditions sufficiently protect the community adequately. [34] So, I propose to make a supervision order in those terms which I will sign. [35] I recommend to Corrective Services that Mr Armstrong receive ongoing psychiatric and psychological treatment for his conditions, and that he be given all consideration in the taking of his prescribed medication. [36] I direct that a copy of the psychiatric and psychological reports be provided to his treating clinical practitioners. -- 11 of 11 --