Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Van De Wetering [2025] QSC 355

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Van De Wetering [2025] QSC 355 PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (Applicant) v PETER JOHN VAN DE WETERING (Respondent) FILE NO: BS 7009 of 2023 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 4 August 2025 (delivered ex tempore) DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 4 August 2025 JUDGE: Hindman J ORDER: Peter John Van De Wetering must follow the rules in the supervision order for eight years, until 4 August 2033. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OD DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER – GENERALLY – where the Supreme Court ordered in September 2023 that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for care, control or treatment (continuing detention order) – where the respondent appealed the continuing detention order – where the Court of Appeal set aside the continuing detention order and that the originating application be remitted to the Supreme Court for rehearing – where there is updated psychiatric evidence from 2025 – where the respondent’s motivations for the index sexual offending remains unknown – where the respondent had partially engaged in sexual rehabilitation programs in custody and engaged in psychological treatment following the appeal – where the parties are agreed that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order – whether the respondent should be released on a supervision order and, if so, the form and length of the supervision order Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s. 13 -- 1 of 8 -- 2 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP [2019] QSC 77, applied Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v GFC [2023] QSC 277, cited Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Van De Wetering [2023] QSC 216, considered Van De Wetering v Attorney-General (Qld) [2024] QCA 222, considered COUNSEL: P J Dunning KC with J B Rolls for the applicant S B Robb KC with N I Congram for the respondent SOLICITORS: Crown Law for the applicant Bell Criminal Lawyers for the respondent Introduction [1] The Attorney-General for the State of Queensland as applicant seeks orders against the respondent pursuant to section 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (the Act). The parties are agreed that the appropriate orders in this case at the present time are that the respondent should be the subject to orders under the Act and the respondent should be released to supervision in the community, subject to such requirements as the Court considers appropriate. [2] The Attorney-General seeks a supervision period of ten years. The respondent’s written submissions record agreement that a length of supervision of ten years can be justified, and does not oppose a term of ten years. However, in oral submissions, the respondent has advanced arguments to suggest that a period of ten years might be viewed as overly conservative based upon a risk that the respondent may suffer from a paraphilia and, given that cannot be, or is not at the moment, confirmed one way or another, a possible length of supervision at somewhat less than ten years could be justified. [3] The applicant’s application was initially heard in September of 2023. It was ordered on the 29th of September 2023 by Justice Muir, upon the Court being satisfied that the respondent was a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order, that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for care, control, or treatment. [4] The respondent appealed that determination and, on the 13th of November 2024, it was ordered by the Court of Appeal that the continuing detention order be set aside and that the originating application be remitted to the trial division for re-hearing. It was further ordered by the Court of Appeal that the respondent be released from prison on an interim supervision order on the 13th of November 2024. The respondent has, since being released on that interim supervision order, complied with the terms of that order. There have been no contravention proceedings commenced. [5] What is now before the Court is the re-hearing of that originating application. -- 2 of 8 -- 3 Background to and evidence in this application [6] The evidence does support, pursuant to section 13(1) of the Act, a finding that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order. That issue was not in contest the last time this application was before the Court, and it is not in contest now. Further, the evidence, and in particular the recent events – that is, the release upon an interim supervision and compliance with same – do support the making of a supervision order pursuant to section 13(5)(b) of the Act, as opposed to a continuing detention order. For today’s purposes, that is not in contest between the parties either. [7] The parties now appeared agreed that, on the evidence before the Court, there could be a supervision order up to ten years. The issue, really, for today’s purposes, is whether some lesser period of supervision is sufficient. It is plain, I will record at the outset, that it needs to be longer than five years, but I will explain why I think it can be less than ten years, and what amount more than five years it needs to be. [8] My reasons can be fairly brief, as much as the relevant material has already been canvassed in adequate detail in the two prior decisions of the court. [9] The statutory scheme is detailed in the decision of Justice Muir in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Van De Wetering [2023] QSC 216 from paragraphs 5 to 9, and I adopt that part of her decision. [10] The relevant facts are set out in the decision of Justice Muir from paragraphs 10 to 56, and in the appeal decision in Van De Wetering v Attorney-(Qld) [2024] QCA 222 from paragraphs 4 to 7. There is also in the appeal decision some details of further evidence that came about, after the first hearing but before the appeal decision, from paragraphs 74 to 81. [11] In terms of the psychiatric reports, insofar as there are reports up to September 2023, they are summarised in Justice Muir’s decision from paragraphs 57 to 86, and I also refer to the appeal decision from paragraphs 8 to 19. [12] There are, though, updated reports from 2025. I have read all of the reports, but with a particular focus on the updated reports, given they have been able to take into account the period that the respondent has now spent in the community since his release to supervision in November 2024. Report of Dr Jane Phillips [13] The first report is that of Dr Jane Phillips. She is the consultant psychiatrist. Her report is dated the 22nd of June 2025, and it was completed following a further face- to-face assessment carried out with the respondent on the 28th of May 2025. Dr Phillips has previously prepared reports on the respondent dated the 28th of July 2023 and the 5th of September 2023. [14] It is relevant to note that Dr Phillips records that at this last meeting with the respondent, the respondent appeared to be more forthcoming than during previous assessments, although Dr Phillips did note that she was not convinced that the respondent was necessarily providing a fully accurate account of his motivations in -- 3 of 8 -- 4 relation to the index offending, and that is something that I will comment upon further in due course. [15] She did administer testing using the various risk assessment tools that are thought to have some validity in assessing the risk of sexual recidivism, which generally obtained the same results as had previous assessments, but the exception was in respect of the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol, Version 2. When that was applied, Dr Phillips noted that there had been some improvement in recent ratings compared to previous assessments and, in particular, that there had been improvements in the respondent’s dynamic risk factors for sexual violence. [16] The dynamic risk factors are the ones that respond to treatment which the respondent has been having. She expressed that, considering the results of the actuarial assessments in the material supplied concerning the respondent, the respondent’s future risk of sexual offending remained in the moderate to high range without a supervision order. She assessed that the respondent did not present as possessing an imminent risk of physical or sexual violence. [17] She considered that a supervision order would assist in reducing the respondent’s risk of sexual reoffending by offering assertive monitoring and interventions to target dynamic risk factors. She observed that a supervision order, in the context of ongoing psychological intervention, abstinence from alcohol and illicit substances, and supervision would cause the respondent’s risk to fall to below moderate, but not to low. [18] She noted the respondent’s positives, including good institutional behaviour and the compliance with the interim supervision order. She noted that there had been no known substance use since admission to supervision. And that is important, because one of the factors that the respondent has identified as potentially being relevant to his offending was the use of illicit substances. [19] She noted that the respondent has completed a Queensland Corrective Services Resilient Program and had had psychological intervention since 2019 and had partially completed the HISOP prior to release from custody. She also noted that the respondent had recently engaged in psychological intervention with Bruce Hamilton, and she also considered it was positive that the respondent was no longer minimising the seriousness of the index offending. [20] Dr Phillips, in terms of the supervision order duration, recommended that the supervision should be for a minimum period of five years, but that a longer period of monitoring on supervision could be clinically justified. She said that, from a clinical risk-management perspective, because of the potential seriousness of future offending, there remains a level of uncertainty regarding the veracity of his self-report regarding the motivation for the index sexual offending and his willingness and capacity to be deceptive. Dr Michael Beach [21] The second report is from Dr Michael Beach. He is also a psychiatrist, who provided an updated report of the 8th of June 2025 following a further face-to-face assessment with the respondent on the 2nd of June 2025. He had previously assessed and reported on the respondent by a report dated the 31st of July 2023. Again, the respondent -- 4 of 8 -- 5 cooperated in the assessment, although Dr Beach did think there was some positive impression management throughout. [22] Dr Beach particularly noted that the respondent had been a model prisoner and, in recent time, had completed a preparation sexual treatment program and partially participated in the HISOP program. The respondent has also engaged with a treating psychologist. He recorded that the respondent is now a compliant supervisee. He is compliant with treatment in the conditions of his order, and there is no indication that the respondent has returned to substance abuse. He noted that the respondent is unemployed, but employment options due to the presence of the order are limited. [23] Dr Beach noted that uncertainty exists in relation to whether the respondent suffers from any sexual paraphilia and remains sceptical of the respondent’s explanation for the offending, but considered that there is unlikely to be further exploration with the respondent on that topic. He considered that the focus now should be on rehabilitation, supervision and monitoring. Dr Beach noted that, with the respondent’s age, which is now nearly 58, that the risk of the respondent committing a further serious sexual offence will reduce with time. [24] Dr Beach considered that the respondent’s risks of committing another serious sexual offence without supervision remains in the moderate to high range, but that the respondent has done well on supervision, has not resorted to drugs, and that the supervision order that is proposed would reduce the respondent’s risks of committing another serious sexual offence to below moderate. He was of the view that, on supervision, the respondent should continue with counselling, that he must remain abstinent, and that his accommodation, movement, and employment should be monitored. [25] Dr Beach, when considering the duration of any order that was to be imposed, said, “The issue is how long he should be supervised for. Again, there is only one sentencing date. However, it was a highly organised, well-planned offence that entailed serious offending. Given the risk that it involved an enactment of a fantasy, I believe that the supervision should be for ten years.” Dr Karen Brown [26] The third assessment by a psychiatrist is that of Dr Karen Brown. Dr Brown provides a risk assessment report of the 7th of July 2025, following a further conference with the respondent by way of video link on the 19th of June 2025. Her views were effectively unchanged from earlier reports, and the important part of her report, for present purposes, provided: “I remain of the opinion that the unmodified risk of sexual offending is high and that a supervision order will reduce this risk to moderate or below, noting that the consequences of sexual reoffending may include very serious physical or psychological harm to a victim. I am, however, cautious when considering when the risk may be sufficiently reduced to low so as not to require the supervision order. For example, if Mr Van De Wetering has a paraphilia and he is concealing an active sex drive, then the risk will be much higher into the future compared with an absence of same. The Court may therefore consider that a longer period of supervision is indicated.” -- 5 of 8 -- 6 Mr Bruce Hamilton [27] There is, finally, in terms of the medical evidence, a report from the treating forensic psychologist Mr Bruce Hamilton. The respondent was referred to Mr Hamilton for treatment pursuant to his interim supervision order. Between November of 2024 and May of 2025, Mr Hamilton had conducted 12 psychological intervention sessions with the respondent, both in person and via video conferencing. [28] Mr Hamilton has provided a report dated the 8th of May 2025. He reports that the respondent has engaged well in treatment, that they have initially focused on completing the outstanding modules from the HISOP program, which was partially completed whilst in custody. Mr Hamilton reported that the respondent was particularly keen to do that, which is hopeful. Mr Hamilton reports that the respondent is presently motivated and amenable to treatment. I think it is telling that Mr Hamilton remains willing to work with the respondent. [29] That is a summary of the updated medical evidence. Consideration Whether the respondent presents an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence [30] The first question for the Court is whether the respondent remains an unacceptable risk to the community. That is because, to make a division 3 order, the Court must be satisfied that the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of such an order and, in particular, there must be an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if released without a supervision order. [31] There is, in my view, sufficient cogent evidence, when considering the matters required to be taken into account pursuant to section 13(4) of the Act, to be satisfied to the high degree of probability necessary that, if released without a division 3 order under the Act, the respondent presents an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence as defined. As I said, that is actually not being contentious, and I do make that finding. Form of supervision order [32] Once it is found that the respondent is an unacceptable risk, then the next question that arises is, “What form should a division 3 order take?” There are certainly no factors present in this case which would cause the Court to exercise its discretion not to make any order at all. There will be an order, and the decision then as to what form of order should be made is motivated by the paramount consideration of the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community. [33] Ultimately, the purpose of the legislation is protective in its terms. Here, the parties agree that supervision is the appropriate option. The onus of demonstrating the supervision order would not afford adequate protection to the community is on the applicant, and the applicant in this case does not seek to demonstrate that. That a supervision order will ensure the adequate protection of the community is supported by the medical evidence, by the respondent’s good behaviour whilst in custody, and -- 6 of 8 -- 7 by the fact that the respondent has now been on supervision since November 2024 without any contraventions. [34] As the medical evidence records, the respondent, without any form of order, does present in terms of risks of serious sexual offending at the high or moderate high range. But a supervision order, I do accept, will reduce those risks to moderate or below a moderate range. [35] There are concerning features about the respondent’s presentation, in that the true drivers for the respondent’s offending remains unknown; in a sense, that cannot now be known with certainty. The respondent has presented to medical practitioners different underlying reasons for the offending, which may or may not be candid, but, because there has been contradictory information provided, there has to be some care taken with reaching any strong conclusion about what the underlying features of the offending actually are. But the respondent has been engaging appropriately, and where there is an absence of clarity with respect to the motivations for the offending, that unfortunately now will remain the case. Bearing in mind the actual nature of the offending and the seriousness of any future offending, it does seem to me that the period of supervision should be more than the minimum of five years. [36] The test to be applied is that which was set out by Justice Applegarth in case of the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP [2019] QSC 77, where his Honour said at paragraph 29, “If the Court is satisfied that adequate protection of the community can be afforded by a supervision order, then it is necessary to consider its terms and its duration. In considering the period of the order, the Court makes a current assessment of future risks and asks: when will the respondent reach a point at which he is an acceptable risk without a supervision order?” The assessment of when a risk will be acceptable or unacceptable is for the Court, not the psychiatrists. However, the opinions of the psychiatrists, concerning risks and matters within their professional expertise, assist the Court in determining the issue. That test was reiterated by Justice Applegarth in the case of the Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v GFC [2023] QSC 277, particularly at paragraph 115. [37] I note that, in the Court of Appeal decision in this case – which is Van De Wetering v Attorney-General (Qld) [2024] QCA 222 – the Court of Appeal said at paragraph 48, when considering the duration of any supervision order, “the other aspects of the statutory scheme about dealing with contraventions, including a return to custody in the circumstances provided for in s 22 of the Act and the possibility that the terms of the supervision order can be amended and the duration of the supervision order extended under s 22(7), however, must be taken into account in determining the period of the supervision order, which affects the adequacy of the supervision order for the purpose of s 13(5) of the decision.” [38] Neither party in argument before me today suggests that those comments of the Court of Appeal properly should be taken as affecting the test that was set out by Justice Applegarth in the two cases I have mentioned. And so what I am focusing on is my assessment, doing the best I can today, of what are the future risks; and then asking myself, when will the respondent reach a point at which he is an acceptable risk without a supervision order? [39] The reports of the psychiatrists suggest that something more than five years is appropriate and, because of the unknowns in this case, at least by reason of the -- 7 of 8 -- 8 unknowns, that the supervision order ought be for a longer period, and at the most up to ten years. I should make clear, though, it is not just the unknowns. It is said by at least two of the experts that the longer period of supervision is justified based on the clinical evidence otherwise before them. [40] I need to be careful not to simply impose ten years as the length of supervision order as a conservative approach. I am required to look at the assessment of future risks and work out the point in time in which this particular respondent will be an acceptable risk without a supervision order. Bearing in mind the unknowns, where the motivations for the respondent’s offending is unclear, the trajectory of any decline in risk is similarly unclear. The possibility of a paraphilia cannot be ignored in that assessment, and the point of there being a paraphilia, as I understand it, is that, if there is a paraphilia, that might suggest that age will not have the ameliorating effect that it would otherwise have. [41] However, in balancing all of the factors, I think that, if the respondent can comply with a supervision order of the period of eight years, that will be a point in time at which he will then be an acceptable risk without a supervision order. A supervision period of eight years, if he manages to comply with it, means he will have not committed any further serious sexual offending for a period of nearly 20 years, given that the offending was in August 2013. He will then be aged around 65 years of age, which, as I understand from reports, is around the age at which the risks would otherwise significantly reduce. [42] I am satisfied that the proper period for the supervision order is eight years. The terms of the supervision order are otherwise consistent with the terms of the interim supervision order, save in respect of some minor matters which have been drawn to my attention, and I think can be properly justified in the circumstances of this case. Save that I will amend paragraph 2 of the order to replace the period of ten years with eight years, I will make an order in terms of the draft initialled by me and placed with the papers. [43] I am satisfied that the respondent Peter John Van De Wetering is a serious danger to the community. The rules in the order are made according to the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). I order that the respondent must follow the rules in the supervision order for eight years until the 4th of August 2033. -- 8 of 8 --