Dawson v State of Queensland [2025] QSC 3

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Dawson v State of Queensland [2025] QSC 3 PARTIES: TRAVIS DAWSON (plaintiff/respondent) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (defendant/applicant) FILE NO/S: BS No 1044 of 2024 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 22 January 2025 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 22 October 2024, further written submission 31 October 2024 JUDGE: Martin SJA ORDERS: 1. The “Amended Statement of Claim” filed on 6 September 2024 is struck out. 2. The plaintiff/respondent has leave to replead. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PLEADINGS – STRIKING OUT – GENERALLY – where the respondent commenced proceedings against the applicant seeking relief under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) (PID Act) for alleged reprisals against him – where the respondent claims he made a number of public interest disclosures under the PID Act, that action was taken against him as reprisal for the disclosures, and that he suffered loss and damage as a result – where the applicant seeks orders striking out parts of the respondent’s fifth and latest attempt to plead his claim – where the applicant also seeks further and better particulars – where the applicant argues that the respondent’s pleading fails to comply with the requirements of the UCPR in that it fails to plead the elements of a public interest disclosure under the PID Act, it fails to plead the elements of a reprisal under the PID Act, and it includes material which is irrelevant or in the form of submissions or evidence – whether paragraphs of the pleading should be struck out – whether the respondent should provide further and better particulars -- 1 of 14 -- 2 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld), s 13, s 40, s 42 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 150, r 155, r 171 Flori v Winter (No 3) [2023] QCA 229, cited COUNSEL: S A McLeod KC and M R Wilkinson for the applicant/ defendant The respondent/plaintiff appeared in person SOLICITORS: Ashurst Law for the applicant/defendant The respondent/plaintiff appeared in person [1] Travis Dawson has commenced proceedings against the State of Queensland in which he seeks relief under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (PID Act) including damages and aggravated damages for alleged reprisals. He commenced this matter in November 2023 and there has been a parade of inadequate pleadings since then. This application by the State is for orders striking out various parts of an “Amended Statement of Claim” filed on 6 September 2024 or, alternatively, the provision of particulars. It is the fifth attempt (4ASOC) by Mr Dawson to create a pleading which adequately discloses a cause of action and which otherwise complies with the requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. Not all amended versions were filed. [2] The State accepts that the 4ASOC demonstrates that Mr Travis appears to allege that: (a) he made a number of public interest disclosures under the PID Act; (b) action was taken against him as reprisal for making those disclosures; and (c) he has suffered loss and damage. [3] The State's strike-out argument is under three broad headings: (a) a failure to plead the elements of a “public interest disclosure” under s 13 of the PID Act; (b) a failure to plead the elements of an alleged reprisal under s 40 of the PID Act, namely the material facts which would support the alleged state of mind or motivation or reason for acting for each person alleged to have taken reprisal action against Mr Dawson; and (c) the inclusion of irrelevant arguments or submissions or matters of evidence. [4] The State also seeks orders for the provision of particulars: (a) in the alternative to some of the strike-out arguments; and (b) with respect to other paragraphs. [5] This is Mr Dawson’s fifth attempt to plead his case. He was apprised of the arguments advanced by the State in two r 444 letters sent in May and August 2024. -- 2 of 14 -- 3 [6] For the reasons which follow, the 4ASOC is struck out. Striking out a pleading – the relevant principles [7] The State relies upon UCPR r 171. So far as this application is concerned, that rule allows the Court to strike out all or part of a pleading if it: (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action; (b) tends to prejudice or delay the fair trial of a proceeding; or (c) is unnecessary or scandalous. [8] The following statements are of general application in a matter like this: (a) the power to strike out should be used sparingly and only in clear cases; (b) the power should not be exercised where there is a real question of fact or law to be determined; (c) a party will have failed to plead a reasonable cause of action where it does not have some chance of success based on the allegations made; (d) a pleading must clearly state the material facts said to constitute the cause of action and where each element of a cause of action is not pleaded in the pleading it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action; (e) the principal purpose served by a pleading is to allow the opponent to know the case being brought against it; (f) a statement of claim can be struck out where there is such an intermingling of objectionable matter and other permissible matter that the fair trial of the action would be severely impeded; (g) where a pleading includes uncertain and general expressions, the materiality and relevance of which is difficult to discern, then it may be that the entire pleading should be struck out and repleaded; and (h) self-represented litigants are bound by the UCPR rules concerning pleadings to the same extent as all other parties. [9] Rule 150 of the UCPR refers to matters that are required to be specifically pleaded, such as states of mind, motive, intention or other conditions of mind, including knowledge. Where it is alleged that the defendant or another person held a specific state of mind or behaved in a way because of that state of mind, then the material facts to support those allegations or inferences must be specifically pleaded. [10] Similarly, r 155 requires that allegations about damages include particulars about the nature of the loss or damage suffered, the exact circumstances in which the loss or damage was suffered, and the basis on which the amount claimed has been worked out or estimated. -- 3 of 14 -- 4 The PID Act: disclosures, reprisals and damages [11] Chapter 4 of the PID Act contains provisions designed to provide protection to someone who has suffered detriment as a result of reprisals in response to a public interest disclosure. [12] Section 40 defines a reprisal as being a contravention of s 40(1). That subsection provides: “(1) A person must not cause, or attempt or conspire to cause, detriment to another person because, or in the belief that— (a) the other person or someone else has made, or intends to make, a public interest disclosure; or (b) the other person or someone else is, has been, or intends to be, involved in a proceeding under the Act against any person. (2) An attempt to cause detriment includes an attempt to induce a person to cause detriment. (3) A contravention of subsection (1) is a reprisal or the taking of a reprisal. (4) A ground mentioned in subsection (1) as the ground for a reprisal is the unlawful ground for the reprisal. (5) For the contravention mentioned in subsection (3) to happen, it is sufficient if the unlawful ground is a substantial ground for the act or omission that is the reprisal, even if there is another ground for the act or omission.” [13] Section 40 was considered in Flori v Winter (No 3).1 Dalton JA (with whom Morrison and Flanagan JJA agreed) said: “[30] Section 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act is set out above. Relevantly here, the statutory tort of reprisal is made out when a person causes detriment to another because the other has made a public interest disclosure. The language is very similar to s 41(1) of the repealed Whistleblowers Protection Act. That section was considered by this Court in Howard v State of Queensland. Thomas JA, with whom the other members of the Court agreed, said: “… The requirement of s 41(1) is that someone causes detriment ‘because, or in the belief that … anybody has made … a public interest disclosure’. … the section seems to require that the offender’s actions be motivated by some state of knowledge or belief that the target person has acted in a certain way.” [31] The respondents referred us to Board of Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay. There the High Court dealt with s 346 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) which prohibited one person taking adverse action against another, “because the other person engages … in industrial activity”. Gummow and Hayne JJ focused on the word 1 [2023] QCA 229. -- 4 of 14 -- 5 “because”. They stated that it “invites attention to the reasons why the decision-maker so acted”. [32] The word “because” in s 40(1) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act requires an enquiry into the motive or reasons for the action said to be retaliatory.” [14] It follows from that analysis, that the pleading must assert, by pleading material facts, the reason for concluding or inferring that the relevant party had the requisite reason or motive. [15] “Detriment” is defined in Schedule 4: “detriment includes— (a) personal injury or prejudice to safety; and (b) property damage or loss; and (c) intimidation or harassment; and (d) adverse discrimination, disadvantage or adverse treatment about career, profession, employment, trade or business; and (e) financial loss; and (f) damage to reputation, including, for example, personal, professional or business reputation.” [16] Section 42 creates a statutory tort which is relied upon by Mr Dawson: “Damages entitlement for reprisal (1) A reprisal is a tort and a person who takes a reprisal is liable in damages to any person who suffers detriment as a result. (2) Any appropriate remedy that may be granted by a court for a tort, including exemplary damages, may be granted by a court for the taking of a reprisal. (3) If the claim for damages goes to trial in the Supreme Court or the District Court, it must be decided by a judge sitting without a jury. (4) The right of a person to bring proceedings for damages under this section does not affect any other right or remedy available to the person arising from the reprisal. (5) Proceedings for damages may be brought under this section even if a prosecution in relation to the reprisal has not been brought, or can not be brought, under section 41. (6) The Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 does not apply to proceedings for damages brought under this section.” [17] Before any action can exist, there must have been a “public interest disclosure”. A public interest disclosure is defined in Chapter 2 as being a disclosure under that chapter including all information and help given by the discloser to a proper authority. -- 5 of 14 -- 6 [18] Section 13 of the PID Act is in Chapter 2. It deals with public interest disclosures by a “public officer”. Mr Dawson alleges that he was a “public officer”. Section 13 provides: “Disclosure by a public officer (1) This section applies if a person who is a public officer has information about— (a) the conduct of another person that could, if proved, be— (i) corrupt conduct; or (ii) maladministration that adversely affects a person’s interests in a substantial and specific way; or (b) a substantial misuse of public resources (other than an alleged misuse based on mere disagreement over policy that may properly be adopted about amounts, purposes or priorities of expenditure); or (c) a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or (d) a substantial and specific danger to the environment. (2) The person may make a disclosure under section 17 in relation to the information to a proper authority. (3) For subsection (1), a person has information about the conduct of another person or another matter if— (a) the person honestly believes on reasonable grounds that the information tends to show the conduct or other matter; or (b) the information tends to show the conduct or other matter, regardless of whether the person honestly believes the information tends to show the conduct or other matter. (4) If the other person is a commission officer, subsection (1)(a)(i) applies as though the Crime and Corruption Commission were a unit of public administration. (5) In this section— commission officer see the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, schedule 2, definition commission officer, paragraph (a). unit of public administration see the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 20.” [19] To demonstrate that a person has made a public interest disclosure under s 13, it must be shown: (a) that the person “has information about” certain matters, such as another person’s conduct of a specific type; and (b) that a disclosure was made in relation to the information to a proper authority under s 17 of the PID Act. [20] The term “corrupt conduct” as used in the PID Act is defined to have the meaning it is given in s 15 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001: -- 6 of 14 -- 7 “Meaning of corrupt conduct (1) Corrupt conduct means conduct of a person, regardless of whether the person holds or held an appointment, that— (a) adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the performance of functions or the exercise of powers of— (i) a unit of public administration; or (ii) a person holding an appointment; and (b) results, or could result, directly or indirectly, in the performance of functions or the exercise of powers mentioned in paragraph (a) in a way that— (i) is not honest or is not impartial; or (ii) involves a breach of the trust placed in a person holding an appointment, either knowingly or recklessly; or (iii) involves a misuse of information or material acquired in or in connection with the performance of functions or the exercise of powers of a person holding an appointment; and (c) would, if proved, be— (i) a criminal offence; or (ii) a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person’s services, if the person is or were the holder of an appointment. (2) Corrupt conduct also means conduct of a person, regardless of whether the person holds or held an appointment, that— (a) impairs, or could impair, public confidence in public administration; and (b) involves, or could involve, any of the following— (i) collusive tendering; (ii) fraud relating to an application for a licence, permit or other authority under an Act with a purpose or object of any of the following (however described)— (A) protecting health or safety of persons; (B) protecting the environment; (C) protecting or managing the use of the State’s natural, cultural, mining or energy resources; (iii) dishonestly obtaining, or helping someone to dishonestly obtain, a benefit from the payment or application of public funds or the disposition of State assets; (iv) evading a State tax, levy or duty or otherwise fraudulently causing a loss of State revenue; -- 7 of 14 -- 8 (v) fraudulently obtaining or retaining an appointment; and (c) would, if proved, be— (i) a criminal offence; or (ii) a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person’s services, if the person is or were the holder of an appointment.” [21] For the relevant person to “have information” about the conduct of another person, s 13(3) of the PID Act must be satisfied by demonstrating: (a) that the person honestly believes on reasonable grounds that the information the person has tends to show the relevant conduct, e.g., “corrupt conduct”; or (b) that the information that the person has tends to show the conduct or other matter, regardless of whether the person honestly believes that the information tends to show the conduct. [22] It follows, then, that a pleading which alleges that a public interest disclosure was made must allege the material facts to support the proposition that the relevant person had the information in the relevant sense required under s 13 of the PID Act. It would also mean that, where it is alleged that the relevant person had the honest belief referred to in s 13(3), the reasonable grounds (and the material facts to support those grounds) for such an honest belief must be pleaded. If s 13(3)(b) is relied upon, then the material facts identifying the “discloser’s” information and how that information tends to show the relevant conduct must be pleaded. [23] Where, as here, damages for lost income and superannuation are claimed, then the pleading should include the causal link between the reprisal and the damage. The same applies where aggravated damages are claimed. The parts of the pleading the subject of this application Paragraphs 1 – 4 [24] These are bare conclusions or assertions unsupported by any pleading of material facts, e.g., paragraph 2 pleads: “Applicant’s injunction can be granted by the Supreme Court under the PID Act if it is satisfied that a person has or is engaging in conduct that amounts any type of knowledge of or participation in a reprisal due to section 49 of the PID Act.” [25] Those paragraphs are struck out. Paragraphs 5 – 24 [26] The State now accepts that these paragraphs are sufficient but applies for further and better particulars of paragraphs 15(c)(i), 15(c)(ii) and 15(c)(iv) which read: “(c) The Applicant honestly believed the information they2 were reporting was grounds for Mr Barbagallo’s termination based on: 2 Mr Dawson uses the pronoun “they” rather than “him” or “he”. This can cause confusion, e.g., when the pronoun “they” or “their” is used to refer to the plaintiff and then it seems, in the same paragraph, to two other people. -- 8 of 14 -- 9 (i) The information they received from Mr Nibbs (ii) Their own search of parliamentary records … (iv) Their experience in working with Mr Nibbs and Ms O’Donoghue as far back as 2009 or 2010 which the Applicant to believe that they would not be mistaken about Mr Barbagallo’s Share Ownership.” [27] The State is entitled to know: what information Mr Dawson says he received from Mr Nibbs, what his search of parliamentary records disclosed, and his alleged belief in (iv). Paragraphs 25 – 34 [28] In these paragraphs, Mr Dawson makes a series of allegations about improper delegations under the Ministerial and Other Office Holders Staff Act 2010 (the MOOHS Act). The various allegations appear to be designed to impugn certain delegations said to have been made under the MOOHS Act. In his response, Mr Dawson submits that the State should be on notice that these delegations should not have been made, that the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) was negligent in various ways, that Mr Barbagallo and others misused the delegation and that DPC had caused a miscarriage of justice by not advising their legal representatives of this delegation in 2021 in a matter before the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. None of those matters are relevant to the claim for damages or other relief made by Mr Dawson. [29] Those paragraphs are struck out. Paragraphs 35 and 37 – 39 [30] These paragraphs purport to allege a reprisal by a Mr Mitchell, but they do not deal with the requirements of s 40 and the need to plead the basis for Mr Mitchell’s motivation or reason for acting as alleged. [31] These paragraphs, so far as they refer to Mr Mitchell, are struck out. [32] The State also seeks particulars of paragraphs 37 and 39. Those paragraphs plead the involvement of Ms Spinks and Mr Barbagallo in vague terms such as “controlling the re-allocation of staffing following the election and deliberately not placing the Applicant into a role” or through alleged attempts “to hide the reprisal … behind the large number of ministerial staff movements”. This type of pleading does not afford the State an opportunity to understand the case Mr Dawson seeks to advance. Further and better particulars of these paragraphs must be provided. Paragraphs 43 – 45 [33] These paragraphs allege a further reprisal by Mr Barbagallo and Ms Spinks. The allegations are vague. They include a reference to a Mr Moorehead without identifying him. They consist, to a considerable extent, of bare allegations of a particular motive or motives but say nothing about the basis upon which the allegation is made. They do not meet the requirements of s 40 of the PID Act. -- 9 of 14 -- 10 [34] They appear to be based upon assertions that Mr Dawson was “diverted” to the office of another Minister but it is not alleged that there is any causal link between that “diversion” and any detriment allegedly caused. [35] Paragraphs 43 – 45 are struck out. Paragraphs 48 – 51 [36] These paragraphs concern one element of the alleged reprisals, namely the termination of Mr Dawson’s employment. They do not plead the requirements of a reprisal under s 40 of the PID Act. [37] Paragraph 48 contains a list of “motivations” for Mr Barbagallo and Ms Spinks to engage in the termination of Mr Dawson’s employment. It does not provide any basis for the inference sought to be drawn about those person’s relevant state of mind. Two of the examples concern assertions that Mr Barbagallo and Ms Spinks were aware of certain things, but no particulars of the basis for that awareness are given. Some of the matters alleged have nothing to do with public interest disclosure – maintaining or bolstering professional authority or threatening Mr Dawson and his partner. [38] Paragraph 51 pleads a series of reasons for Mr Dawson believing that there would not be a “retaliatory sacking”. That is irrelevant. [39] Paragraphs 48 – 51 are struck out. Paragraphs 53 and 54 [40] These paragraphs plead that Mr Dawson would not have known certain things at the time he made the first disclosure or that he would not have made the disclosure had he understood a particular thing. Neither of those matters are relevant. [41] Paragraphs 53 and 54 are struck out. Paragraph 55(d) [42] Paragraph 55 contains assertions as to what would have occurred to the applicant had he not made the first disclosure. It is relevant, then, to the question of damages. But sub-paragraph (d) should be further particularised as it refers to an alleged discussion. Paragraphs 56 and 57 [43] Paragraph 56 appears to assert that Ms Mitchell took reprisal action against the plaintiff – “participated in the retaliation”. The pleading requirements, referred to above, created by s 40 have not been observed. [44] Paragraph 57 is irrelevant. [45] Paragraphs 56 and 57 are struck out. Paragraph 62 [46] This is an irrelevant assertion or submission. It is struck out. -- 10 of 14 -- 11 Paragraph 63 [47] The State seeks particulars of this assertion that Mr Barbagallo refused to disclose the reasons for the plaintiff’s termination to a Minister. Particulars are unnecessary as it is irrelevant and is struck out. Paragraph 70 and 71 [48] It is alleged that a telephone conversation between Mr Murphy and Mr Dawson on or around 24 March 2020 was a public interest disclosure. The allegations are insufficient to establish the elements of a public interest disclosure and Mr Dawson has not pleaded anything which would come within s 13(3). These two paragraphs are confusing and appear to be based on the assumption that an assertion of conduct is information that tends to show that conduct. [49] These paragraphs do not make clear whether Mr Dawson is relying upon s 13(3)(a) or (b) of the PID Act. They do not afford the State the appropriate level of information to allow to know what the case against it is. [50] Paragraphs 70 and 71 are struck out. Paragraphs 72 and 73 [51] The State’s application did not include an objection to these paragraphs, but the written submissions did and Mr Dawson had an opportunity to respond in writing, which he did. I will consider these paragraphs. [52] Paragraph 72 is a submission as to the effect of s 61 of the PID Act. It is not a material fact and is wrong in law. [53] Paragraph 73 is an assertion that Mr Murphy ignored all requests from Mr Dawson between his commencement as Chief of Staff and May 2020. On the current state of the pleadings, this is irrelevant and is impermissibly vague. [54] Paragraphs 72 and 73 are struck out. Paragraph 80 [55] The State seeks further particulars of this paragraph. Mr Dawson must provide particulars of: (a) when and how Ms Swanson was allowed to access “Disclosure Two”; (b) the alleged direction to administrative staff to print “Disclosure Two”; and (c) the alleged discussion in 80(d). Paragraphs 83 – 85 [56] Mr Dawson pleads in these paragraphs that Ms Morgan and Ms Fraser were responsible for supporting him and protecting him from reprisal. These allegations appear to rely upon the “delegation” issue under MOOHS Act which I have already held to be irrelevant. The conduct is not alleged to be a reprisal nor causative of any detriment. These paragraphs are irrelevant. -- 11 of 14 -- 12 [57] Paragraphs 83 – 85 are struck out. Paragraphs 86 – 91 [58] These paragraphs appear to be related to an allegation that Mr Murphy, Ms Spinks and Mr Mitchell took reprisal action by attempting to terminate Mr Dawson’s employment after the November 2019 election. No attempt is made to plead the factual basis on which any relevant motivation or reason might be inferred under s 40 of the PID Act. [59] In paragraph 90, for example, it is alleged that Mr Murphy’s motivation included a “desire to punish” Mr Dawson, “inducements to undertake the reprisal” by others, and “[h]is personal work ethos to ignore any matter raised with him regarding the conduct being reported to him”. No material facts are pleaded which would support these allegations. [60] Paragraph 91 consists, like paragraph 90, of bare allegations without assertions of relevant material facts to support an inference of a relevant motivation. [61] Paragraphs 86 – 91 are struck out. Paragraphs 93 and 94 [62] These paragraphs consist of a complaint about the conduct of Ms Morgan who is alleged to have had a responsibility to protect the plaintiff from reprisal. It is not pleaded that her conduct was a reprisal nor that it was causative of any detriment. These paragraphs are irrelevant. [63] Paragraphs 93 and 94 are struck out Paragraph 95 [64] This paragraph, again, raises the issue of “delegation” under MOOHS Act. It is irrelevant and is struck out. Paragraphs 97 – 99 [65] Paragraphs 97 is a counterfactual allegation based upon the earlier delegation assertions under the MOOHS Act. It is irrelevant. [66] Paragraphs 98 and 99 concern alleged communications between Mr Dawson and the Crime and Corruption Commission. They are irrelevant. [67] Paragraphs 97 – 99 are struck out. Paragraphs 100 – 104 [68] These paragraphs concern proceedings in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission and the delegation assertions. They are irrelevant and they are struck out. -- 12 of 14 -- 13 Paragraphs 105 – 108 [69] These paragraphs are irrelevant and are struck out. Paragraphs 109 – 112 [70] These paragraphs concern assertions of communications between Mr Dawson and Mr Keene. There is no assertion that they constitute a new or different public interest disclosure. It appears to be a complaint that the Department of Premier and Cabinet had no reasonable procedures in place as contemplated in s 28 and s 29 of the PID Act. There is no assertion that, if that were the case, it had any effect or caused any detriment. They are irrelevant and are struck out. Paragraphs 113 – 123 [71] These paragraphs seek to establish a further disclosure and reprisal. This is said to have occurred by the repetition of Disclosure One and Disclosure Two to Ms Fanning. The relevance of paragraphs 113 – 115 is not apparent. There is an assertion that there was an agreement to recommend a salary increase for Mr Dawson to “remediate the damage” he had suffered. No particulars are given of this agreement. [72] The pleading in this section of 4ASOC contains: (a) repeated assertions about delegations under the MOOSH Act; (b) an assertion that a disclosure made on 18 March 2024 was both a public interest disclosure and a reprisal; and (c) an assertion similar in effect to paragraph 71. [73] It may be that Mr Dawson wishes to assert that a failure to approve a salary increase was a reprisal. If that is so, then he has not pleaded the elements of a reprisal including the material facts to support the relevant alleged states of mind or motivation. [74] Paragraphs 113 – 123 are struck out. Paragraphs 124 – 129 [75] These paragraphs are not relevant to the cause of action and appear to be little more than a narrative of events said to have occurred concerning the alleged salary increase having not been processed. A further, irrelevant assertion concerning a delegation under the MOOSH Act is also made. These allegations are irrelevant. [76] Paragraphs 124 – 129 are struck out. Paragraphs 130 – 134 [77] These paragraphs allege false statements being made on behalf of the State in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission proceedings. They are irrelevant. [78] Paragraphs 130 – 134 struck out. -- 13 of 14 -- 14 Paragraphs 135 – 145 [79] Mr Dawson appears to plead a new Disclosure Four. These paragraphs suffer from the same faults as many of the others in this pleading. They do not satisfy the requirements of s 13 of the PID Act. In any event, no reprisal is pleaded connected to any such disclosure. [80] Paragraphs 135 – 145 are struck out. Paragraphs 146 – 153 [81] These paragraphs concern Mr Dawson’s claim for aggravated damages. Given that substantial parts of the pleading have been struck out there is now nothing in the pleading to support the claim for aggravated damages. These paragraphs are struck out. The disposition of this matter [82] The orders made above have the consequence that the 4ASOC is, effectively, dismantled. It would not be in the best interests of either party for Mr Dawson to attempt to reform this pleading in a piecemeal fashion. The State also seeks particulars of various paragraphs. I have dealt with some of these above but most need to be accommodated in a new pleading. [83] The most appropriate order to make, in light of the orders set out above, is that the entire pleading be struck out. Mr Dawson has leave to replead. He should pay close attention to the reasons above when he formulates the next, and what should be final, version of his pleading. He cannot expect that he will be allowed to continue this action in the absence of a properly formulated statement of claim. Orders [84] The 4ASOC is struck out. [85] Mr Dawson has leave to replead. [86] I will hear the parties on costs and on an appropriate timetable for the taking of further steps. -- 14 of 14 --