Enever v Myers [2025] QDC 208

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Enever v Myers [2025] QDC 208 PARTIES: LESLEY ELIZABETH ENEVER (Plaintiff) v SARAH DRYSDALE MEYERS (Defendant) FILE NO: 674 of 2022 DIVISION: Civil PROCEEDING: Trial ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 12 December 2025 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 25, 26, 27 November 2025 JUDGE: Loury KC DCJ ORDERS: 1. The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. 2. On the counterclaim it is declared that the defendant is the owner of Sugar. 3. The defendant’s counterclaim is otherwise dismissed. CATCHWORDS: CONTRACT -- dispute over ownership of dog and puppies -- whether there was an agreement for purchase or loan of dog -- whether ongoing breeding agreement existed -- where agreement was partly oral and partly written CASES: County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 COUNSEL: SC Fisher for the plaintiff. S Montgomery for the defendant. SOLICITORS: CNG Law for the plaintiff. Armeli & Molony Lawyers for the defendant. [1] Sugar is a Staffordshire Bull Terrier. The central issue in the trial turns on the terms of an agreement which resulted in Sugar being provided to the defendant in Western Australian by the plaintiff when she was six weeks of age. -- 1 of 7 -- 2 [2] The plaintiff is a registered breeder of Staffordshire Bull Terriers. Sugar is the progeny of the plaintiff’s dog/s. The plaintiff sells purebred Staffordshire Bull Terrier puppies via a Facebook account, “Infernored Staffordshire Bull Terrier”. The defendant ‘met’ the plaintiff through this Facebook account in November 2019 when she, the defendant, was wanting to buy a Staffordshire Bull Terrier puppy. [3] The defendant has had possession of Sugar since she was six weeks of age. The issue in dispute in the trial turns on the nature of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant which led to the plaintiff giving possession of Sugar to the defendant. [4] The plaintiff’s case as pleaded is that in or around January 2020 she and the defendant entered into an agreement whereby the plaintiff would provide Sugar to the defendant for breeding purposes. The terms of the agreement are contended to have included that the plaintiff would remain the owner of Sugar but she would be retained by the defendant until such time as she had been impregnated by the defendant’s male Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Sunny, and produced a litter of puppies. The defendant would receive one puppy from that litter with the balance of the litter being the property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s case is the defendant paid a refundable security deposit of $3000 for Sugar. [5] The plaintiff describes this as a bailment, although that has not been pleaded. Ultimately nothing turns on this, as the resolution of the dispute in the trial turns on the terms of the agreement reached in or around February 2020. [6] The defendant contends that the agreement was that she would purchase Sugar from the plaintiff for $3000 as a pet and companion for her dog, Sunny. She paid $3000 to the plaintiff for Sugar, one-half of that amount as a deposit and the balance on receiving Sugar. The defendant’s case is there was a further agreement reached as between the plaintiff and defendant to breed Sugar with Sunny. She counterclaims for a declaration that she is the owner of Sugar and for nominal damages for the plaintiff’s breach of the breeding agreement. The defendant’s case is this breeding agreement contained terms that from Sugar’s litter the defendant would receive two puppies with the remainder sold and the profits split between herself and the plaintiff. [7] Each of the plaintiff and defendant agree that the agreement/s was/were partly oral and partly in writing in Facebook messages. The terms of the agreement/s is/are said to have been reached through a series of telephone calls between the plaintiff and defendant and in Facebook messages. [8] Whatever the initial agreement was there was no attempt by either party to formalise any agreement in writing. Each party relies upon selected Facebook messages as evidencing some of the terms of the agreement. [9] As there is no written agreement it is necessary to determine the subject matter and terms of the agreement. The principles limiting the use of extrinsic evidence do not apply where the terms are not fully expressed in writing. The court is entitled to consider both prior and subsequent conduct to infer what was agreed.1 1 County Securities Pty Ltd v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 193 at [7] – [27] (Spigelman CJ). -- 2 of 7 -- 3 [10] The plaintiff argues that the defendant has specifically pleaded the agreement was reached on or about 15 – 22 February 2020. It is argued the Facebook messages do not establish that during this period Sugar had been selected as the subject matter of the agreement or the price agreed. Consequently, it is contended, the defendant has not established that a contract existed. [11] The plaintiff’s own evidence however was a Facebook messenger message on 14 February 2020 evidences the original agreement. That message read: “I have talked with my husband, Jayson. We’re both super keen for a puppy from you for us to love and for Sunny’s companion. Regardless of Sunny’s breeding issues. We’ll keep trying to get mains transferred to us from Kirsty. If we’re unsuccessful at getting papers transferred we will not backyard breed Sunny. He will have to go to a kennel or other place. Jayson suggested nuts off, if you think so, but we really don’t want to. To forward breed with the female – that can be done under your supervision with stud of your choosing and stopped when you want. So, poor Sunny doesn’t get mated but he has a mate for his life and we have another family member to love. This also gives leverage over Kirsty as she gets cut out, thinks we may become WA breeders (no thanks – but she won’t know that), increases competition in WA and is better going forward for your line. Watcha think? Was good to sleep on this and come up with solution suggestions. Would you like us to put a deposit?” [12] The defendant’s husband, Mr Meyers said he had a telephone call with the plaintiff in January 2020 where the price for Sugar was discussed and because he and the defendant were content with that price they continued to engage with the plaintiff in respect of the purchase of a puppy. Whilst the plaintiff argues that the first mention of money in the messages is not until 16 March 2020, it is clear from the messages that there had been oral discussions about the price. [13] I am satisfied that an agreement was reached in or around February 2020 in respect of a puppy which was ultimately named Sugar. The real issue is what were the terms of that agreement. Looking at the contemporaneous communications before, at the time of and after the making of the agreement, they reveal the following: 1. The defendant’s initial approach to the plaintiff was to ask if she had any female pups available/coming. She wrote that she had a “red boy” and was hoping for a companion female. She wrote “if you would seel (sic) us a puppy, she would be well cared for.” It is clear that the defendant intended to convey that she wanted to purchase a puppy. 2. The defendant repeatedly said that she wanted a companion for Sunny. -- 3 of 7 -- 4 3. The plaintiff allowed the defendant to choose a puppy and to name it including the pedigree registered name. 4. The defendant’s daughter attended the plaintiff’s house in March 2020 to visit with and view the puppy the defendant had selected. She spent one hour with the plaintiff on the understanding that her mother was purchasing Sugar. She deposes she would not have travelled to the Gold Coast to view Sugar if she was not being purchased by her mother. 5. The plaintiff did not, at any time, register Sugar with her local regional council as required under the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008. 6. The payment of $3000 by the defendant to the plaintiff is referred to by the plaintiff as a purchase price in an email of 26 March 2020 sent by the plaintiff to the defendant’s husband. I do not accept the plaintiff’s evidence that the terms “purchase” and “security deposit” are interchangeable terms. Indeed, at no time does the plaintiff use the term “security deposit” in any of her communications with the defendant. There was nothing in the communications from the plaintiff which convey the idea that the payment to be made is a security deposit. 7. The payment of $3000 for Sugar is consistent with the average sale price for the plaintiff’s puppies. 8. The plaintiff in messages with the defendant referred to Sugar’s family as the defendant’s. [14] As time progresses it is clear that the plaintiff and defendant developed an online friendship through their shared love of red Staffordshire Bull Terriers. The communications between them, when considered as a whole, strongly indicate that the agreement with respect to Sugar was that she was sold to the defendant for $3000. It is clear to me from the messages that the defendant at all times believed that she was the rightful owner of Sugar and that she had purchased Sugar from the plaintiff for $3000. Nothing that the plaintiff said to her in the messages, in any way, disputed the defendant’s understanding. [15] The plaintiff relies upon an agreement she had with Ms Carol Leith (another breeder of Staffordshire Bull Terriers), supposedly entered into prior to Sugar’s delivery to the defendant in Western Australia, for Sugar to be sent by the defendant to Ms Leith in Victoria after she had been bred with Sunny. It is argued that this arrangement supports the plaintiff’s claim that she remained the owner of Sugar as one of her breeding bitches. The plaintiff states that the defendant was aware of this agreement. [16] Paragraph [40] of the plaintiff’s affidavit sworn 10 September 2025 is the first occasion on which the plaintiff mentions any such arrangement between herself and Ms Leith. There are no communications in existence as between the plaintiff and Ms Leith which evidence this agreement. Ms Leith states that she became aware in January 2022 through a conversation with the plaintiff, that the arrangement for Sugar to be mated with her dog in Victoria was no longer able to occur. [17] On 24 May 2022 the plaintiff’s solicitor swore an affidavit in response to an application by the defendant to transfer the proceedings to Western Australia, in -- 4 of 7 -- 5 which he listed seven specific individuals expected to be called at the trial. The list did not include Ms Leith. I accept the plaintiff would have been aware of the significance of the agreement between herself and Ms Leith, if it were made prior to Sugar’s birth in February 2020, when the application to transfer the proceedings was heard. That Ms Leith was not listed as a potential witness only four months after the plaintiff claims she told Ms Leith of the inability of Sugar to be used to breed with her dog, leads me to infer that there was never such an agreement in existence, at least prior to Sugar’s birth. [18] It is the plaintiff who carries the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that the agreement was, as she pleads, for the provision of Sugar for breeding purposes only. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the agreement reached between the plaintiff and defendant was for Sugar to be sold to the defendant for $3000. [19] The owner of Sugar is the defendant. [20] The plaintiff pleads that as part of the agreement for the provision of Sugar to the defendant, that she was provided for the purposes of breeding with Sunny. The only evidence this formed part of the agreement comes from the plaintiff’s evidence of the telephone calls that occurred between herself and the defendant. [21] It is clear enough that there were discussions between the plaintiff and the defendant about the possible breeding of Sugar with Sunny. I am not satisfied however that the agreement the plaintiff contends was made was in fact reached. Indeed, I am not satisfied that any agreement was in fact reached. [22] It is necessary in order to understand my reasoning, to appreciate some of the rules regarding the registration and breeding of purebred dogs. Dogs Queensland (and likewise Dogs West) provides rules regarding the registration and responsible breeding of purebred dogs. The Canine Control Council Queensland Limited (CCCQ) keeps the registers of dogs. Likewise in Western Australia, the Australian National Kennel Council Limited (ANKC) keeps the registers of dogs. There are a number of registration types. Relevantly to this trial are the Main Register and the Limited Register. [23] The Main Register is open to dogs whelped from a Sire and Dam that are both themselves registered. An application for such registration must be accompanied with a DNA profile for the Sire, Dam and all puppies. Dogs registered on the Main Register can be used to breed with other dogs on the Main Register. [24] The Limited Register is open to dogs eligible for registration on the Main Register where the breeder stipulates that the dog is amongst other things, not to be used for breeding purposes. The rules also provide that a member who breeds a litter of dogs, the parents of which are registered or eligible for registration with the CCCQ must register such a litter at one and the same time within 18 months of the date of whelping or prior to sale or rehoming. [25] The plaintiff is a responsible breeder of Staffordshire Bull Terriers and knows and understands these rules well. It is not contentious in the trial that the plaintiff held Sugar’s Main Registration papers. It is also not contentious in the trial that the defendant was provided with limited registration papers for Sunny when he was purchased by her. The defendant and her husband chose not to sign the limited -- 5 of 7 -- 6 registration papers so that the breeder of Sunny, Ms Kirsty Cox could continue to hold Sunny’s Main Registration papers. This would allow Sunny to sire a litter which litter could then be pedigree registered however Ms Cox’s consent to do so would be required. Likewise, the plaintiff’s consent would be required for any litter that Sugar had to be pedigree registered as Sugar’s registration on the Mains Register was held by the plaintiff. [26] The Facebook messages reveal that as early as January 2020, before Sugar was born the defendant and plaintiff communicated about transferring Sunny’s Main Registration to the defendant. Efforts were made by both women as early as January 2020 to engage with Ms Kirsty Cox. Those efforts continued over many months. Ms Kirsty Cox, it seems, refused to speak to either the plaintiff or the defendant despite their persistent attempts. [27] The messages confirm that both the plaintiff and defendant were keen to mate Sugar with Sunny and the messages also make clear that the defendant was keen to continue to breed with Sugar into the future with the assistance of the plaintiff as she was not herself, a registered breeder. [28] Sugar was delivered to the defendant in Western Australia on 28 March 2020. There were many photographs shared by the defendant with the plaintiff and many messages shared between them about Sugar in the way that friends with a common love of dogs might engage. It is clear that discussions continued to be had about mating Sugar with Sunny and about the efforts being made by both women to get Ms Cox’s consent to that mating. As described by Mr Meyers, the defendant’s husband, the discussions were based on goodwill and trust. The discussions were in the nature of communications between friends hopeful of both benefitting from the mating of Sugar and Sunny. [29] By July 2021 it appears that Ms Cox expressed a willingness for Sunny to be mated with Sugar to both the plaintiff and to Mr Meyers. In October 2021 Ms Cox sent a message to Mr Meyers indicating her consent to Sunny and Sugar mating and the transfer of the Main Registration for Sunny to Mr Meyers. [30] On 3 January 2022 Sugar gave birth to five puppies sired by Sunny. For reasons unknown to me, Ms Cox did not transfer the Main Registration for Sunny to the defendant or Mr Meyers. Once Sugar was pregnant, attempts were made to have Ms Cox consent to the registration of the litter on the limited basis. Despite those attempts Ms Cox refused to sign the papers to allow the puppies to be purebred registered. The significance of the puppies not being pedigree registered was in their value when it came to selling them. [31] Again, for reasons that are quite inexplicable on the material before me, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant broke down irretrievably on 5 January 2022. The defendant on that date sent a photograph of Sugar and a photograph of the five puppies to the plaintiff with a message that said, “There is lots of blood at mo”. The plaintiff responded in a positive way with advice. Around 45 minutes later the plaintiff sent a message “Sugars looking stressed and threatened”. About 45 minutes later she sent another message “That’s fucked up Sarah”. There was then a telephone call between the two women in which the plaintiff was abusive. She accused the defendant and her husband of animal cruelty. She claimed ownership of the puppies and said she was having someone collect Sugar and the puppies. -- 6 of 7 -- 7 [32] On 8 January 2022 Mr Meyers telephoned the plaintiff in an attempt to resolve the dispute that had inexplicably arisen. He recorded that telephone call. The plaintiff is insulting and histrionic in the telephone call. The plaintiff’s interest appears only in the puppies, not in Sugar. Mr Meyers offers her $4000 for each of three puppies to settle their dispute. The plaintiff responded that he should put the money in her bank account, and she would be “happy to walk away from the lot”. For reasons unknown to me the dispute did not end there as it should have. [33] I heard evidence in the trial from the plaintiff, defendant and the defendant’s husband, Mr Meyers. I did not find the plaintiff or the defendant to be compelling witnesses. They are two middle-aged women who had a friendship formed over a shared loved of Staffordshire Bull Terriers. Their relationship soured for reasons that are quite inexplicable and broke down irretrievably. They both appeared to me to lack objectivity. Their recollections are clouded by that lack of objectivity. [34] Mr Meyers appeared to me to be the more reliable witness whose recollections are not clouded by emotional responses to the breakdown of a relationship. Mr Meyers runs a successful business. He was calm and considered in his evidence. He said when he commenced communicating with Ms Cox about using Sunny to sire a litter, he was “trying to be Switzerland”. He made a particular concession that to my mind carries a great deal of weight. Mr Meyers said that the discussions about breeding Sunny with Sugar did not become serious until January 2021 with the decision to mate Sunny and Sugar occurring in October 2021. It was then that they (the defendant and plaintiff and Mr Meyers) started to talk about potentially splitting the profits after expenses. That was all to be sorted out in the end with the sale of the puppies. He conceded that there was “no formal agreement. It was just based on goodwill and trust which we had at the time.” This concession made by Mr Meyers, a careful and reliable witness, carries significant weight. [35] I cannot be positively satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a formed agreement as to the breeding of Sugar and Sunny. If there was a formed agreement, I cannot be satisfied at all as to what were its terms. [36] Ultimately the defendant and Mr Meyers retained one puppy as a pet and gave the remaining four puppies away as they were not able to be registered as purebred dogs. The plaintiff received nothing, either in the way of a puppy or its monetary value. [37] The defendant brings a counterclaim for breach of the “breeding contract” following the plaintiff’s failure to pay an equal share of the costs associated with breeding Sugar. She seeks only nominal damages in an amount of less than $3000. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a breeding agreement and I am not satisfied, if there was, as to any terms agreed. The defendant has failed to prove on balance that there was such an agreement or its terms. [38] Consequently, my orders are: 1. The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. 2. On the counterclaim I declare that the defendant is the owner of Sugar. 3. The defendant’s counterclaim is otherwise dismissed. -- 7 of 7 --