Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Galinovic [2025] QDC 120

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Galinovic [2025] QDC 120 PARTIES: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED ABN 11 005 357 522 (Plaintiff) v CHRISTINA GALINOVIC (Defendant) FILE NO: 2054/24 DIVISION: Civil PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: District Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 29 August 2025 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 15 August 2025 JUDGE: Porter KC DCJ ORDERS: 1. The application is dismissed. 2. The Court orders pursuant to r. 117 that service under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 of the claim and statement of claim occurred on 11 May 2025. 3. The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application on the standard basis. 4. The defendant must file and serve an unconditional notice of intention to defend and defence by 10 October 2025. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – whether the originating process could be set aside under Rule 16 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) or struck out or stayed because it was not properly served under Rules 105 and 106 UCPR – whether service was effected under Rule 117 UCPR – whether the proceedings should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction – whether the claim and statement of claim should be struck out -- 1 of 21 -- 2 for failures of form and failure to disclose a cause of action – whether, consistent with Rules 19 and 46 UCPR, a signature in the name of the plaintiff’s firm was a valid form of signature on the originating process – whether the proceedings should be stayed COUNSEL: S. Walpole for the plaintiff The defendant appeared in person SOLICITORS: Gadens for the plaintiff Contents Summary............................................................................................................................. 3 The service issues ............................................................................................................... 3 The Supreme Court proceedings .................................................................................... 3 Events outside Court on 8 May 2025.............................................................................. 4 Subsequent events ........................................................................................................... 7 The legal issues ............................................................................................................... 9 Analysis............................................................................................................................ 9 Personal service on 8 May 2025? ................................................................................. 10 Service by email ............................................................................................................. 12 Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 14 Complaints relating to jurisdiction ................................................................................ 14 First dot point: Service and jurisdiction....................................................................... 14 Second dot point: Alleged incorrect district ................................................................. 15 Third dot point: Dismissal under r. 38(5)(a)(ii) ........................................................... 15 Fourth dot point: Counterclaim issue .......................................................................... 15 Fifth dot point: Other issues ......................................................................................... 15 Form and content complaints ......................................................................................... 15 Signing of the claim and statement of claim ................................................................ 16 Omission of an email address ....................................................................................... 18 The pleading discloses causes of action ....................................................................... 18 Particulars ..................................................................................................................... 19 Procedural fairness ....................................................................................................... 20 Part B Alternative Orders ............................................................................................... 20 No stay pending a special leave application ................................................................. 20 No stay pending “investigations” ................................................................................. 20 Transfer to the Supreme Court..................................................................................... 21 Costs .................................................................................................................................. 21 -- 2 of 21 -- 3 Summary [1] The plaintiff (the bank) sues the defendant for possession of a home unit (the unit) following alleged default under a registered mortgage securing a loan advance, and for judgment on the loan sum allegedly due and owing. [2] The defendant has brought an interlocutory application. The principle issues raised by the application are: (a) Whether the originating process should be set aside under r. 16 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) and/or or the proceedings struck out or stayed because the proceedings were not properly served under rr 105 and 106 UCPR; (b) Whether any purported service by email should be declared invalid; (c) Whether the proceeding should be dismissed for “want of jurisdiction” on various grounds; (d) Whether the claim and statement of claim should be struck out for failures of form and failure to disclose a cause of action; and (e) Whether the proceedings should be stayed or transferred to the Supreme Court. [3] Each of the defendant’s contentions on these issues fail. The application is dismissed. The service issues The Supreme Court proceedings [4] The bank commenced these proceedings on 25 July 2024. Attempts at service did not commence until May 2025. I infer that is because four days after these proceedings were commenced, the defendant commenced proceedings (as plaintiff, though I will continue to refer to her as the defendant) in the Supreme Court of Queensland against the bank and officers of the bank claiming damages of some $300m arising from fraud, negligence, breach of contract and various other causes of action (the Supreme Court proceedings). By the Supreme Court proceedings, the defendant also sought orders and declarations to the effect that no debt was due from the defendant to the bank and for release of the mortgage on the unit. [5] The bank parties applied to have the Supreme Court proceedings struck out. Justice Crow set aside the claim and statement of claim and dismissed the Supreme Court proceedings. He did so, in summary, because he concluded that there was no discernible cause of action advanced in the statement of claim and that there was no suggestion that any other claim existed which had not been advanced in the defective pleading. [6] The defendant, having failed to appeal within time, brought an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. She articulated numerous complaints about the reasoning of the learned trial judge. They are helpfully summarised in submissions -- 3 of 21 -- 4 from the bank on the appeal and in the judgment of the Court. The Court found no error in his Honour’s judgment and the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs. Events outside Court on 8 May 2025 [7] The application for leave to appeal was heard on 8 May 2025. On that day, after the hearing, the bank took steps personally to serve the defendant with these proceedings outside the law courts building. The events are disputed. [8] Ms Forrest, a partner of the bank’s solicitors Gadens, said she knew what the defendant looked like because she had seen her appear in person before Justice Crow in the Court of Appeal. Further, after the hearing in the Court of Appeal, Ms Forrest saw the defendant along with three women and a man who had been in court with her, walking out of the court complex and onto the George Street footpath. She said that at 12.26 pm, the following occurred: While I do not recall the exact words spoken by myself or the Defendant, I recall that at the time of service of the Claim and Statement of Claim on the Defendant: (a) I approached the Defendant and said “Christina” and the Defendant looked at me; (b) I identified the Defendant by asking “Are you Christina Galinovic”; (c) the Defendant responded with words to the effect that she is “not of that name”; (d) I then said “I know you are Christina Galinovic and I am serving you with a sealed copy of ANZ’s proceedings” and attempted to hand the Defendant the Claim and Statement of Claim when an unidentified female (who was one of the four people who had been present with the Defendant during the course of the hearing of her Appeal in the Court of Appeal Proceeding) stepped in front of the Defendant and spread her arms in front of and across the Defendant; (e) the Defendant did not take the copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim; (f) I placed the copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim that I had tried to hand the Defendant at her feet and said words to the effect “I am placing a copy of the Sealed Claim and Statement at your feet”; (g) the Defendant did not pick up the copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim and walked away (with the four people who had all been present with the Defendant during the hearing of her Appeal in the Court of Appeal Proceeding on the morning of 8 May 2025), leaving the copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim on the footpath; and (h) Ms Milligan, the solicitor who assists with the conduct of this proceeding, was present at the time of service. [9] Ms Milligan is a solicitor employed by Gadens who assists Ms Forrest. She also said she knew what the defendant looked like and that she saw the defendant outside the law courts building as Ms Forrest described. She said that at 12.26pm she approached the defendant with Ms Forrest and heard most but not all of what was said. She gave the following evidence: I recall the following words, or words to their effect, were spoken: -- 4 of 21 -- 5 (a) as Ms Forrest and I approached the Defendant, Ms Forrest said “Christina” and the Defendant looked at Ms Forrest; (b) Ms Forrest then said “Are you Christina Galinovic?”; (c) the Defendant responded with words to the effect that “I don’t acknowledge that name”; (d) Ms Forrest then stated to the Defendant “I know you are Christina Galinovic” and attempted to hand the Defendant a sealed copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim in this proceeding (the Claim and Statement of Claim), when one of the females who had been present in the Appeal Court stepped in front of the Defendant and put her arms out, as if to block Ms Forrest; (e) the Defendant refused to accept the Claim and Statement of Claim; (f) Ms Forrest then placed a copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim at the Defendant’s feet; and (g) the Defendant did not pick up the Claim and Statement of Claim and walked away (with the 4 other people), leaving the Claim and Statement of Claim on the footpath. [10] That evidence is adduced in support of personal service of the proceedings on the defendant under r. 106(2) UCPR. Rule 106 relevantly provides: 106 How personal service is performed (1) To serve a document personally, the person serving it must give the document, or a copy of the document, to the person intended to be served. (2) However, if the person does not accept the document, or copy, the party serving it may serve it by putting it down in the person’s presence and telling him or her what it is. [11] The defendant and her witnesses give different versions of those events, though there is some agreement. They each agree that: (a) A woman approached the defendant broadly when and where the bank’s witnesses say; (b) That the woman said words to the effect of “Are you Christina” or called the name Christina; and (c) That the defendant said, “I am not that person”. [12] The witness Denis John gave more detail consistent in some respects with the bank’s witnesses. He said his group were approached by two women with the more senior woman carrying paper in her hand; 3. Next, I heard the more senior woman say, “Are you CHRISTINA?” or something like that; 4. My friend Christina, who at the time being accompanied by three (3) women associates, as well as myself, responded “I am not that person”. and kept walking along the footpath of George Street; 5. The more senior woman then said “you are CHRISTINA, aren’t you?” or words to that effect. However, by this time Christina had moved some distance away; -- 5 of 21 -- 6 6. I saw the older woman then throw the paper she had in her hands, onto the footpath, some meters behind Christina, who had progressed further down the street; 7. Neither woman identified themselves by name, and or said what the mentioned paper was about. [13] The witness Christine Buckley agreed there were two women. She said: 3. I heard one of the two women say a name that sounded like christine, followed by another unclear word, which confused me since my name is christine. She didn’t say who she was or what it was about. 4. I then heard my friend, christina, [sic] who was with us, say words to the effect of “I am not that name.” I then saw christina [sic] continue to walk in the direction of the train station with another lady in our group as I was trying to pass the two females who were impeding my passage. I still didn’t know who these females were as they never made any attempt at explanation, which made me feel unsafe. 5. I walked around those two females, who didn’t appear to be attempting to move out of our way, and observed the two other friends in my group walk around them to also join our other 2 associates, who were now about 20 feet in front of us. 6. I then observed one of the two females had dropped some paperwork she was holding on the floor as she said something that I didn’t hear clearly, so I stepped around the paperwork and the female who had dropped it there and continued on my way towards my other two associates who were halfway up the street by that time. [14] The witness Clara said: 1. that upon exiting the building and standing out front of George Street at approximately lunchtime, an unidentified woman stepped towards the group of friends; 2. that the unidentified woman, words to the effect ‘CHRISTINA, CHRISTINA’ only failing to state what the papers were; to which the woman known as the appellation of Christina responded with “I am not that person” and immediately continued walking towards the statute of Themis, Greek goddess of Justice at the end of the building, as my friend was keen to show me the de jure seal of the Supreme Court of Queensland that is on the statute’s belt; 3. that in peripheral vision, it appeared that the unidentified woman threw some paper on the ground, but by this stage, we had walked off some distance from the unidentified woman, and three of the friends. [15] Finally, the defendant said: 5. An unidentified woman approached and said to the effect, “Are you CHRISTINA?” Her words trailed off and I did not hear anything else; and 6. There were a number of people around, including 4 of my friends, one of whom is ‘Christine’; and 7. I said, “I am not that person”, and my friend and I continued to walk in the direction of where I had seen the statue of Themis, Greek goddess of Justice, two days prior; and 8. I am unaware of why this woman was asking that question or what her intention was, as this woman did not identify herself and did not explain why she had approached me and my friends; and 9. At no time did I see this unidentified woman place documents at my feet, as I was walking with my friend as this was happening. -- 6 of 21 -- 7 Subsequent events [16] On the afternoon of 8 May 2025, Ms Forrest sent a further copy of the claim and statement of claim to the defendant by email to the address [email protected] The covering email stated: Dear Christina I refer to the personal service of the sealed claim and statement of claim in the above proceedings on you today at 12:26pm on the footpath of George Street, Brisbane where a copy of the sealed claim and statement of claim was placed at your feet but you did not pick up that copy before walking away. Attached for your reference is a copy of the sealed claim and statement of claim in Brisbane District Court Proceedings BD2054 of 2024 which was placed at your feet earlier today. Regards Susan [17] On about 11 May 2025, the defendant posted a document entitled “Demand for Further Particulars” by post to Gadens in which, relevantly, she articulates her objections to events on 8 May 2025 and contends there was no proper service. She also states that the email of 8 May was opened in error and that the “attachment was not opened or read”. 2 The defendant went on: In your unsolicited email of 8 May 2025, which was opened in error, as it was thought to be a correspondence from you in relation to the Appeal, you state in the email that “a copy of the sealed claim and statement of claim was placed at your feet but you did not pick up that copy before walking away” and “which was placed at your feet earlier today.” [18] If it was correct on 11 May 2025 that the defendant had not read the claim and statement of claim, the defendant must have soon had a change of heart because on or about 21 May 2025, the defendant sent a request by post for documents under r. 222 UCPR “referred to in or relied upon in support of” the claim and statement of claim. That request seeks documents referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 11, 13, 14 and 16 of the statement of claim.3 That request could not have been drafted without close attention to the text of the statement of claim. [19] On or about 28 May 2025, Gadens responded to the 11 and 21 May letters from the defendant. That letter responds to a number of the defendant’s complaints and encloses the affidavits relied upon by the bank in this hearing (referred to in paragraphs [8]and [9] above). Those affidavits include further copies of the claim and statement of claim. [20] By letter sent on or about 4 June 2025,4 the defendant responded to Gadens 28 May 2025 letter. There are extensive submissions in that letter about events on 8 May 2025 along with allegations of misconduct, risks of perjury and professional 1 Forrest CD 3 Exs pp 7-14. 2 Forrest CD 9 Exs pp 299-302. 3 Forrest CD 9 Exs pp 306-307. 4 CD 9 p. 343. -- 7 of 21 -- 8 consequences for Ms Forrest should she not concede that that the defendant was not personally served on 8 May 2025. [21] That letter also refers to the affidavits served with Gadens’ 28 May 2025 letter (which affidavits had the claim and statement of claim attached). The defendant also asserts:5 2. No cure by Subsequent Knowledge or Possession Your later provision of the Claim and Statement of Claim, or any subsequent knowledge or possession of those documents, does not cure defective service. As a solicitor, you would know or ought to know that strict compliance with Rules 105 and 106 at the time of service is required. Any assertion to the contrary is legally unfounded. 3. Affidavit Misconduct and Professional Obligations It is noted with concern that your Affidavit includes a copy of the Claim and Statement of Claim sent after the alleged purported service, and that the affidavit of your colleague does not support compliance with Rules 105 and 106… [22] On 6 June 2025, the defendant filed a Conditional Notice of Defence, by which the defendant raised her objections to service along with most of the grounds relied upon in her application. On 16 June, Gadens pointed out the obligation under Rule 144 requiring a defendant who files a conditional notice to bring an application under r. 16 UCPR. [23] On 18 June 2025, the defendant filed this application. At the defendant’s request, it was not listed for hearing until after 12 August 2025. It was listed in applications on 15 August 2025. The application was supported by an affidavit of the defendant which was in substance her submissions in support of the orders (the affidavit in support).6 [24] On 10 July 2025, Gadens wrote to the defendant responding, amongst other things, to the defendant’s complaints about service as follows7: Personal Service of Claim and Statement of Claim in the District Court Proceedings (Claim and Statement of Claim) 3. Your position is noted but not accepted. At the outset, we advise that the affidavits of service of the Claim and Statement of Claim on you will not be withdrawn and your assertions concerning perjury are strenuously denied. 4. In any event: (a) by your letter of 21 May 2025 you made a request pursuant to Rule 222 of the UCPR to inspect documents purportedly referred to in the Claim and Statement of Claim; (b) on 6 June 2025 you filed a Conditional Notice of Intention to Defend in the District Court Proceedings; (c) on 18 June 2025 you filed an Application in the District Court Proceedings in which you seek various relief; and 5 CD 9 p. 344. 6 CD 7. 7 CD 9 p. 367. -- 8 of 21 -- 9 (d) you affirm in your affidavit of 16 June 2025, filed in the District Court Proceedings in support of your Application, that you knew you had to file a Conditional Notice of Intention to Defend by 5 June 2025; which clearly evidences that you were aware of the Claim and Statement of Claim and its contents on 8 May 2025. Whilst not resiling from the fact the Claim and Statement of Claim was personally served on you on 8 May 2025, ANZ is entitled at a minimum to have the Court make an order pursuant to Rule 117 of the UCPR that informal service of the Claim and Statement of Claim was effected on you on 8 May 2025. The legal issues [25] The defendant seeks the following orders in respect of service of the claim and statement of claim: A. Primary (Threshold) Orders 1. That the originating process be set aside under Rule 16, for non-compliance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) rules 105 and 106; 2. That the proceeding be struck out or stayed for lack of proper service (Rules 16; 171); 3. That any attempted purported service by email be declared invalid, as there was no email provided for the Defendant for service and there was no consent to service by electronic means; 4. That the proceeding be dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 16, including without limitation the following grounds: • The Plaintiff has failed to effect proper service in accordance with the UCPR, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter; and Analysis [26] Rule 16 UCPR provides: 16 Setting aside originating process The court may— (a) declare that a proceeding for which an originating process has been issued has not, for want of jurisdiction, been properly started; or (b) declare that an originating process has not been properly served; or (c) set aside an order for service of an originating process; or (d) set aside an order extending the period for service of an originating process; or (e) set aside an originating process; or (f) set aside service of an originating process; or (g) stay a proceeding; or (h) set aside or amend an order made under rule 126(1) or 129G(1); or (i) make another order the court considers appropriate. [27] The relief sought by the defendant in paragraphs A1, A2 and A4 (first dot point) seek various summary orders bringing the bank’s proceedings to an end based on the alleged failure properly to serve the proceedings. Those paragraphs are misconceived. Lack of valid service of proceedings provides no basis for a -- 9 of 21 -- 10 proceeding to be dismissed, stayed, or set aside. All it means is that the proceedings remain to be served on the defendant. Every proceeding begins its life having not been served, and failure to serve the proceedings simply leaves them in that state. For that reason, those paragraphs of the application fail. [28] However, the real issue raised by the defendant’s application is whether the proceedings have been validly served. The defendant vindicate her contention that the proceedings have not been validly served (either personally or informally) by seeking a declaration to that effect under r. 16(b) UCPR, as she does in substance by paragraph A3 of her application. The real issues raised by the defendant’s application therefore is whether the evidence sustains a declaration that the claim and statement of claim have not been properly served by: (a) The alleged service on 8 May 2025; or (b) Any purported service arising from the emailing of the claim and statement of claim on 8 May 2025. [29] It is convenient at this point to deal with the submission by the bank in its outline of argument that the Court should make an order under r. 117 UCPR that the proceedings were served on 8 May 2025. This order plainly relies on service by the email sent that afternoon by Ms Forrest. The defendant objected to the bank being permitted to seek that order without a formal written cross application. It would have been better had the bank filed such an application. However, the defendant’s application puts the validity of service by the email into issue and she made extensive submissions about the matter. In those circumstances, there is no unfairness to the defendant in permitting the bank to seek that order. Personal service on 8 May 2025? [30] The six witnesses to events on 8 May outside Court gave different accounts. That is not surprising. Differences in recollection of points of detail by witnesses who have been involved in the same one-off event are common. Further, I was not assisted by cross examination of any of the witnesses. The lack of cross examination does not exclude a Court from making findings on credibility and reliability, though it makes it more difficult. [31] The gravamen of the defendant’s submission as to the findings I should make on the facts seems to proceed on the basis that the evidence of four witnesses trumps the evidence of two witnesses. However, disputes of fact are not resolved by weight of numbers. Rather, factual findings turn on considerations such as likelihood, detail of recollection, opportunity to observe, inconsistency and partiality and the nature of the involvement of the witness in the events. [32] The following findings can be made with confidence. [33] First, Ms Forrest and Ms Milligan approached the defendant and her friends outside the court complex at around 12.26pm on 8 May 2025 for the purpose of attempting personal service on the defendant. This follows because: -- 10 of 21 -- 11 (a) The defendant’s witnesses generally corroborate the bank’s witnesses that they were approached at that time and place by one/two females, that one of the females had documents, and that those document were put on the ground. All of this is consistent with an attempt at personal service by Ms Forrest; and (b) Ms Forrest had good reason to attempt service given the proceedings remained unserved. [34] Second, Ms Forrest asked the defendant if she was Christina Galinovic. It is a normal first step in attempting to serve the defendant to ask their name, even where, as here, Ms Forrest knew that the defendant had used that name and was the defendant in the proceedings. Further, all the defendant’s witnesses, and the defendant, recall the defendant saying words to the effect that she was “not that person”. It is highly improbable that the defendant would say that unless Ms Forrest used the name Christina Galinovic (which the defendant appears no longer to use). Further, it is highly likely Ms Forrest would have challenged that denial by the defendant as she says she did, given that for all practical purposes, the defendant is the person who used that name, as Ms Forrest well knew from the defendant’s appearances in Court. [35] Third, Ms Forrest did put the claim and statement of claim on the ground in the vicinity of the defendant. Everyone agrees some such event occurred and there is no reason to doubt it was the claim and statement of claim which were so provided. [36] The areas of uncertainly relate to points of detail important to service under r. 106 UCPR. For personal service to be performed without the defendant accepting the document, the elements of r. 106(2) must be made out. Those elements are: (a) The person serving the document must give a copy to the defendant; (b) The defendant must not accept the document; (c) The person serving must then do two things: (i) Put the document down in the person’s presence; and (ii) Tell the person what the document is. [37] The uncertainty as to what occurred relates to the last two matters: (a) Whether Ms Forrest and the defendant were physically proximate enough to establish that Ms Forrest placed them down in the defendant’s presence; and (b) Whether Ms Forrest told the defendant what the documents were. [38] I have some reservations about the defendant’s denial of these two matters. One reason to doubt her evidence is because of her statement that she did not know who Ms Forrest was (if that is what she means by calling Ms Forrest an “unidentified woman”). It is difficult to accept that this could be correct. The correspondence and documents relating to the Supreme Court proceedings show that the defendant knew Ms Forrest was the solicitor at Gadens conducting the matter. Indeed, she -- 11 of 21 -- 12 looked her up on the QLS website.8 Further, Ms Forrest said she instructed at the hearing before Justice Crow and the leave application in the Court of Appeal. It is highly likely Ms Forrest would have been prominent at the bar table instructing, and sitting close to the defendant. It is difficult to credit that the defendant did not recognise Ms Forrest. [39] I also have reservations about the reliability of the defendant’s other witnesses, at least in relation to dealings with the bank, because of their apparent adoption of, or support for, the defendant’s nonsensical ideas about identity. [40] Further, as to the identification of the documents, at least one of the defendant’s witnesses recalls that Ms Forrest dropped documents on the ground as she said something.9 It is likely given the circumstances that Ms Forrest would have described the documents as she said she did in her affidavit. [41] However, it is unnecessary for me finally to determine these remaining questions of fact. That is because the he defendant seeks a declaration that she was not validly served at that point and bears the onus of establishing that proposition. I am not persuaded on the balance of probabilities that she was not served. Her application in that respect must fail. The bank for its part does not seek to rely on service outside the court complex to establish service. So it is unnecessary to make further findings on the events outside the court complex on 8 May 2025. Service by email [42] Rule 117 provides: 117 Informal service If— (a) for any reason, a document is not served as required by this chapter but the document or a copy of it came into the possession of the person to be served; and (b) the court is satisfied on evidence before it that the document came into the person’s possession on or before a particular day; the court may, by order, decide that the possession of the document is service for these rules on the day it came into the person’s possession or another day stated in the order. [43] Rule 117 reflects the policy which underlies all issues of service. The purpose of service is to bring legal proceedings to the attention of another party so that the party has a reasonable opportunity to take such steps as they consider in their interests in response: Ainsworth v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78 at 85. The legal principles and statutes which underpin the law of service are directed at facilitating that purpose. Service is not an end in itself and should not be allowed to become so. [44] Rule 117 is not the only rule which reflects that underlying policy. It is also evident in other rules contained in Chapter 4 UCPR. For example, r. 116(1) authorises a court to dispense with personal service where personal service would 8 Forrest CD 8 p. 183. 9 Buckley para. 6. -- 12 of 21 -- 13 be impracticable. However, alternative modes of service must bring the document to the attention of the other party: r. 116(2). As the cases make clear, there has to be a very high level of confidence that the alternative mode of service will achieve that result: Miscamble v Phillips and Hoeflich (No 2) [1936] St R Qd 272 (HC) at 274 per Starke J. [45] In this case, Ms Forrest sent the claim and statement of claim by email to the defendant. The email address was one which the defendant used.10 The defendant received the email. In her letter of 11 May 2025, noted at paragraph [17] above, she said she had not opened the attachments at that time but went on to make clear she had read the covering email. The inference is that the defendant knew what the attachments were. In those circumstances, she had been served with the documents. They had come into her possession (and to the extent necessary, she knew what they were). A defendant cannot avoid service in that circumstance by choosing not to read the documents. [46] In any event, the defendant did read them, and with care. That is the inference from her r. 222 request: see paragraph [18] above. In the course of argument, I made clear to the defendant that that inference prima facie arose. She said nothing to dispel it.11 Accordingly, if the defendant was not served when she opened the 8 May 2025 email, the claim and statement of claim came into her possession when she obtained the copy which she used to write her letter of 21 May 2025, wherever that came from (presumably though it was the copy attached to the 8 May email). [47] The conclusion that the claim and statement of claim came into the defendant’s possession also follows from the inclusion of those documents as attachments to the affidavits of the bank’s witnesses which the defendant received and commented upon in her own material: see paragraph [19] above. [48] The defendant maintained that service by email on 8 May was not proper service because she did not consent to being served in that manner. There is no merit in that argument. There was nothing unlawful about Gadens using that email address to communicate with the defendant, especially where there was concern (evidently well-founded) that the defendant might cavil with service outside the court complex. [49] The defendant submitted that even if service had been effected under r. 117, I should exercise my discretion not to make an order under that rule because it encourages the misconduct she alleges against Ms Forrest and, perhaps, because personal service is in some kind of special category. Nothing in the evidence supports a basis to ascribe misconduct to Ms Forrest or Gadens. The defendant’s intemperate assertions of such misconduct, in writing and orally, might ultimately risk her being in contempt of court, particularly if she persists in making them after the Court directs her to cease.12 Robust submissions may be made in a Court but the defendant needs to cease making intemperate allegations of misconduct. 10 CD9 pp 254 and 256, 257 and 262, 287. 11 TS1-49.15 to .49. 12 See s. 129(1)(b), (c), (e) and (f) District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). -- 13 of 21 -- 14 Further, there is nothing special about personal service per se. What is important is that the proceedings come to the attention of a party so they have a reasonable opportunity to decide how to respond. That is the purpose of service. [50] Given the defendant has had the claim and statement of claim for some time prior to the hearing, and through more than one source, the agitation of service issues by the defendant was pointless. Her application proceeded on the basis that there could be “No Cure by Subsequent Knowledge or Possession”. That proposition is wrong, as any fair reading of r. 117 would have demonstrated. Conclusion [51] The Court orders pursuant to r. 117 that service under the UCPR of the claim and statement of claim occurred on 11 May 2025. The defendant needs to file a defence. I will give her longer than the usual 28 days to do so. She must file any defence by 10 October 2025, a period of some 7 weeks. [52] I would have made a similar order in respect of possession of the documents on 21 May 2025 and on service of the bank’s affidavits on 28 May 2025, though no order is required as a party only needs to be served once. Complaints relating to jurisdiction [53] The defendant’s application raises the following grounds for seeking the dismissal of the proceedings for want of jurisdiction: 4. That the proceeding be dismissed for want of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 16, including without limitation the following grounds: • The Plaintiff has failed to effect proper service in accordance with the UCPR, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter; and • The proceeding was commenced in the incorrect district, contrary to rule 35; and • Pursuant to 38(5)(a)(ii), the Court has discretion to dismiss the proceeding outright, which is appropriate in the circumstances given the multiple jurisdictional and procedural defects; and • Under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court, if compelled to defend, this will force a counterclaim to be filed for the Defendant which will exceed the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court as set out in s 68 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1976 (Qld), thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction; • Other deficiencies as to subject matter, parties, or other jurisdictional limits. [54] None of those grounds establish a want of jurisdiction in the Court to hear the proceedings. First dot point: Service and jurisdiction [55] As I have explained, failure to serve a proceeding has no effect on the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine an action under s. 68 District Court of Queensland Act 1967. -- 14 of 21 -- 15 Second dot point: Alleged incorrect district [56] The defendant relies on r. 35 UCPR to contend that the proceedings have been commenced in the wrong district. Her submissions in support of that contention are at paragraphs 38 to 50 of her affidavit in support. As pointed out in the bank’s submissions, r. 35 does not apply if a proceeding is commenced in the central registry of the District Court: see r. 34 UCPR. The Brisbane registry is the central registry. The bank commenced these proceedings in the Brisbane registry. They were properly commenced and r. 35 has no application. When I pointed this out in oral argument, the defendant maintained her position that r. 35 applied to the proceeding.13 There is no merit in this submission, as would have been obvious to the defendant if she had read the relevant rules with an open mind. The defendant made further attacks on Ms Forrest arising out of this issue. Those attacks were scandalous and misconceived. Third dot point: Dismissal under r. 38(5)(a)(ii) [57] That provision does not apply to this proceeding because the proceeding was commenced in the central registry: r. 38(1) UCPR. Fourth dot point: Counterclaim issue [58] This dot point is irrelevant for two reasons. (a) First, no counterclaim has yet been filed. (b) Second, if the defendant wishes to file a counterclaim, she may do so in this Court regardless of the monetary sum involved. The question of venue will then be determined by s. 29 Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld). As to the defendant’s submissions about convenience, this Court is entirely indifferent as to whether the proceeding continues here or in the Supreme Court, whether in Rockhampton or elsewhere. But that matter can be dealt with on an application under s. 29 if either party brings one following the filing of a counterclaim. Fifth dot point: Other issues [59] Nothing is relied upon that I could discern which otherwise sustains the conclusion that the proceedings should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Form and content complaints [60] The application next raises matters of form and content of the claim and statement of claim which are said to justify the striking out of the claim and statement of claim under various rules. The application relevantly states: 5. That the Claim and Statement of Claim be struck out for non-compliance with rules 17, 19, 146, 149 and 171 of the UCPR: 13 TS1-53. -- 15 of 21 -- 16 • Failure to comply with approved forms and signature requirements; • Failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action; • Failure to plead material facts necessary to establish lawful standing to enforce the alleged loan or mortgage. [61] The defendant expands on that summary statement in the application and the affidavit in support. The issues raised can be dealt with under the following headings. Signing of the claim and statement of claim [62] The defendant contends that:14 The Claim and Statement of Claim do not bear the handwritten signature of a solicitor, as required under UCPR rule 19 and rule 146. The documents are signed only in the name of a business entity, which is not authorised to sign an originating process. I have not received any affidavit or document confirming the identity or authority of the person who executed the filing… [63] Rule 19 provides: 19 Originating process must be signed (1) The plaintiff or applicant, or the person’s solicitor, must sign the originating process. (2) This rule applies subject to rule 975A(1). [64] Rule 146(1) provides: 146 Formal requirements (1) A pleading must— (a) state the number of the proceeding; and (b) state the description of the pleading; and (c) be filed and state the date on which it is filed; and (d) be signed by the solicitor for the party filing it or, if the party appears or defends in person, the party; and (e) be consecutively numbered on each page; and (f) be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs and, if necessary, subparagraphs, each containing, as far as practicable, a separate allegation; and (g) if it is settled by counsel—state the counsel’s name. [65] The UCPR should be construed in the legal and statutory context in which it operates. At the time it was enacted, a solicitor could carry on business as a sole practitioner or in partnership with other solicitors. The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) now recognises other structures, including incorporated law practices. However, many solicitors continue to practice as sole practitioners or as partnerships of solicitors. Gadens operates as a partnership. Ms Forrest is a partner of that firm. 14 CD 7 [60]. -- 16 of 21 -- 17 [66] When a client retains a law firm operating as a partnership, they retain the partnership, not the individual lawyer who actually does the work.15 That is because partners in a partnership carry on their practices in common with a view to profit. (Note, the defendant is wrong in her assumption that the firm is a business entity. A firm is not an entity at law). The partners are jointly liable for or all debts and obligations of the firm incurred while a partner.16 Every partner is an agent of the other for the purpose of the partnership business and a partner may bind the partnership by executing a document in the firm name.17 where a party retains a law firm or a partner of a law firm, a party’s solicitor comprises the all partners of the firm, not just the individual partner doing the work. [67] Absent some specific statutory provision to the contrary, the common law context in which the UCPR falls to be construed would support the conclusion that where a law firm is retained to conduct litigation, the claim and statement of claim may properly be signed by or on behalf of the partnership, not the individual solicitor or partner with conduct of the proceedings. [68] I cannot identify any specific statutory direction to the contrary in the UCPR. The UCPR is not entirely consistent in its use of the term solicitor. However, it can be discerned that where the UCPR intends to identify an individual solicitor specifically, the language of the rule dictates that conclusion. Examples include r. 261E (which refers to independent solicitors) and r. 629 ( “a solicitor’s attendance notes”). [69] The terms of r. 17(1)(b) UCPR draw a distinction between an individual solicitor and a firm. However, in doing so it also recognises that a solicitor may be practicing in a firm of solicitors. That rule provides little definitive guidance either way as to the scope of r. 19(1) UCPR. Rule 146 UCPR also provides little assistance either way. However, there is nothing in either rule which in my view suggests the intention is to require an individual partner to sign his or her name, rather than a firm, on a claim or statement of claim. After all, the purpose of the signature is to adopt those documents as documents of the client’s solicitor and indicate to the Court and the other side that there are solicitors acting. As the High Court observed in Birketu Pty Ltd v Atanaskovic (2025) 421 ALR 256 at [49]: The importance in litigation of having a solicitor on the record should not be underestimated. It is an important focal point for the court. As Pring J said in Ex parte Browne: “[T]he solicitor on the record is the only person whom the Court will recognise as the solicitor acting in the case, and the reason, I think, is that he is the only person who is responsible to the Court, responsible to his client, and responsible to the other party to the litigation.” [70] When a client retains a firm to act, it is the firm which is acting, not just the member of the firm directly involved. So signing in the name of the firm is 15 Kelly v Jowett (2009) 76 NSWLR 405 at [70]. 16 Section 12(1) Partnership Act 1891(Qld). 17 Sections 8 and 9 Partnership Act 1891(Qld). -- 17 of 21 -- 18 consistent with the policy which evidently underpins the requirement for signature on the proceedings. [71] A similar conclusion has been reached, via slightly different reasoning, by Victorian Courts on this same issue in relation to cognate rules.18 [72] To the extent it is relevant, I am aware from my own experience since 1992 that pleadings in Queensland are usually signed in the firm name, rather than in the name of an individual partner of the firm, although the latter sometimes also occurs. [73] In my view, for those reasons, on the proper construction of rr 19 and 146, a claim and statement of claim respectively may be signed in the name of the firm retained by the plaintiff or in the name of an individual partner of the firm. [74] Nothing in Justice Crow’s judgment in the Supreme Court proceedings suggests the contrary. His Honour observed that there was no specific requirement for a notice of intention to defend or defence to be signed at all, so arguments about who may validly sign did not strictly arise.19 However, his Honour’s observations20 are consistent with my conclusion that a signature in the name of the firm was a valid form of signature by a party’s solicitor. Omission of an email address [75] The defendant is correct that the claim should have included the email address of Ms Forrest and of Gadens: r. 17(1)(b)(viii) UCPR. The bank accepts that it should have and the firm involved should attend to its precedent. However, the omission is an irregularity and does not make the claim a nullity: r. 371(1) UCPR. Further, no order is called for to address the irregularity. The defendant knows Ms Forrest’s email address from the Supreme Court proceedings and has been provided with it in these proceedings. It appears in each of the affidavits filed by Gadens in the proceedings. The omission of the general Gadens email address does not call for any action. The pleading discloses causes of action [76] Paragraphs 75 to 80 of the affidavit in support articulate the defendant’s contention that the statement of claim fails to disclose a cause of action. The gravamen of the defendant’s arguments is that the bank cannot prove it has standing to sue on the mortgage nor that a debt is owing. The bank pleads it is the lender under the pleaded loan agreement, that it is the mortgagee under a written mortgage which secures the loan, that the loan was advanced and that the defendant has defaulted. It pleads its mortgage has been registered. Those allegations are sufficient to plead standing to sue and articulate a basis to sue on both the loan agreement and the mortgage. Nothing more needs to be pleaded. Proof is a matter for trial. 18 Permanent Custodians Limited v Palmer [2009] VSCA 80 at [13]. 19 CD 9 Exs p. 242 at .5 to .25. 20 TS2-1.23 to .26; CD9 Exs p. 370 -- 18 of 21 -- 19 [77] If the defendant wishes to defend on the basis that the benefit of the mortgage and/or the loan has been assigned (though that would not of itself mean the bank could not sue on the loan and the mortgage) she can do so by her defence, though how that will be sustained I am unsure given the following points. [78] First, the defendant’s allegations about some form of securitisation by the bank are based on a document she styles an expert report. That document is a combination of speculation, wrong propositions of law and fanciful calculations.21 It is inadmissible and of no weight. Propounding that document further in these proceedings or advancing factual or legal arguments based on the assumed correctness of its assertions, is likely to be an abuse of process. No submission based upon it can be justified.22 [79] Second, arguments about standing face the two problems identified by the bank:23 (a) The bank’s interest is registered in the freehold land register. By s 179 of the Land title Act 1994 (Qld), this is “conclusive evidence” of the bank’s indefeasible title to the mortgage; and (b) Second, the evidence is that: (i) The bank has not sold the loan agreement, mortgage or debt owing under the loan agreement or registered mortgage to any third party; and (ii) The bank has not assigned the legal or beneficial interest in any of these instruments to any third party. [80] Though that evidence can be challenged, it does create a practical difficulty for the defendant given she appears to have no evidence to the contrary. [81] Third, the submission at paragraph 76 of the affidavit in support misunderstands the legal effect of registration. Registration of an interest confers indefeasible title to that interest in land: Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376 at 385 to 386. There is no presumption to be rebutted. Section 36 Land Title Act 1994 has nothing to do with the indefeasible title of the bank in respect of its registered mortgage. Contrary to the defendant’s understanding, registration alone does establish that the bank has a legal mortgage over the land. This point appears to have been raised in the Supreme Court proceedings and rejected there as well: see [27] of the judgment. Particulars [82] The defendant alleges that the statement of claim is inadequately particularised. Insofar as that is based on the belief that the bank has securitised the loans and/or the mortgage, that is not a proper complaint as to particulars. There are some paragraphs of the pleading which might properly be the subject of a request for 21 CD 5 Exhibit C. 22 See the submissions at CD 7 paras 93-02. 23 CD 12 [33(a)-(b)]. -- 19 of 21 -- 20 further particulars, but no such proper request is before the Court. There is no basis to strike out the pleading for lack of particulars. Procedural fairness [83] It appears that the defendant considers that the case cannot proceed fairly unless she is provided with the documents she seeks. The bank has duties of disclosure regulated by the UCPR on the close of pleadings. The time of disclosure has not yet arisen. The bank also needs to respond to proper requests for documents under Rule 222 UCPR. However, neither issue justifies striking out the statement of claim. Part B Alternative Orders [84] Part B of the application seeks three further orders in the alternative: (a) That the proceedings be stayed pending an application to the High Court for special leave to appeal in relation to the Court of Appeal judgment; (b) That the proceedings be stayed pending “on-going investigations into fraud on title”; and (c) That, if not stayed, the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court in Rockhampton because of a pending counterclaim. [85] None of those orders should be made. No stay pending a special leave application [86] No stay will be granted pending a special leave application. [87] First, the defendant’s material contains no special leave application. I infer none has yet been filed. Any stay is premature. [88] Second, this proceeding is distinct from the defendant’s proceeding which was dealt with by the Court of Appeal. It is not clear what issues to be raised in the special leave application would overlap with issues in this proceeding. [89] Third, even if there is a sufficient overlap to make the Supreme Court decision relevant, a special leave application does not operate as a stay of the Court of Appeal decision. That will be all the more so for this proceeding. Indeed, even if special leave is granted and an appeal is filed in the High Court, there is no stay: r. 42.09 High Court Rules. Unless and until a stay of the Court of Appeal decision is granted, this Court should continue with these proceedings. No stay pending “investigations” [90] The principal evidence as to the alleged investigations appears in paragraphs 97 and 105 of the affidavit in support. That evidence does not justify any stay in this proceeding. -- 20 of 21 -- 21 Transfer to the Supreme Court [91] For the reasons given in paragraph [58] above, it is premature to consider the impact of a counterclaim which exceeds the Court’s monetary jurisdiction. Costs [92] Both parties addressed costs in their written submissions. The defendant has failed on all aspects of her application. No order for costs should be made in her favour. [93] The bank seeks an order for costs on the indemnity basis. The bank seeks that order on two grounds: that the application raised matters already determined in the Supreme Court proceedings and that the bank’s solicitors made an offer consistent with the outcome of the application which was rejected. [94] As to the former matter, I am not satisfied that there was sufficient overlap in the issues to justify costs on an indemnity basis for that reason. [95] As to the latter matter, the bank relies on offers in the nature of a Calderbank offer. Care must be taken in importing Calderbank principles in interlocutory applications. Further, I have not heard from the defendant on that issue. I am not persuaded that indemnity costs should follow in those circumstances. [96] There is another matter which might have justified an indemnity costs order. That is that the defendant has run arguments which are clearly hopeless. Such can itself provide a basis for an indemnity costs order, including against self-represented persons. As the bank did not raise this, I will not decide costs on that basis. However, I make the following observations. [97] First, the defendant’s position on her relationship to the name Christina Galinovic is nonsense. She refers in her supporting affidavit to Kelly v Flander [2023] WASC 187 at [11], [14] and [40]. That case articulates the propositions that the defendant presumably relies upon and explains that they are wrong and based on fundamentally misguided notions. The defendant does not lack intelligence. She presumably understands that judgment. To continue to advance such propositions can amount to an abuse of process justifying indemnity costs: see Levick v DCT 168 ALR 383. [98] Second, the defendant has also done considerable work to try to identify rules and statutory provisions which support her contentions. I recognise that effort. However, the defendant’s approach to legal analysis lacks objectivity. She finds a rule or statutory provision which seems to assist her and ignores anything which does not assist her. Her position on r. 35 UCPR is a good example. There will come a point where ignoring explanations as to why her propositions are clearly wrong will also amount to advancing vexatious contentions which can also justify indemnity costs orders. [99] But for now, I order the defendant to pay the bank’s costs on the standard basis. -- 21 of 21 --