Complete Credit Acquisitions Pty Ltd v Loudon [2025] QDC 113

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Complete Credit Acquisitions Pty Ltd v Loudon [2025] QDC 113 PARTIES: COMPLETE CREDIT ACQUISITIONS PTY LTD ACN 163 473 358 (Plaintiff) V AJLE LOUDON (Defendant) FILE NO/S: 1614/24 DIVISION: Civil PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Brisbane District Court DELIVERED ON: 18 August 2025 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 11 August 2025 JUDGE: Porter KC DCJ ORDER: 1. Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), the sealed Claim and Statement of Claim filed 13 June 2024 (Claim) be renewed and extended nunc pro tunc to 13 June 2025. 2. The application is otherwise dismissed. [1] Pursuant to Rule 24(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) the plaintiff seeks orders that the sealed claim and statement of claim filed 13 June 2024 be renewed and extended to 13 September 2025. Rule 24(2) provides a discretion in the registrar to renew a claim where reasonable efforts have been made to serve the defendant or where there is another good reason to renew the claim. In my view, however, that does not confine the power of the Court to renew a claim. Where, as here, the claim was issued only one year ago, I am satisfied the claim should be renewed, though only for a year. That success is the limit of the applicant’s success on its application. [2] The plaintiff also seeks orders for substituted service of the claim and statement of claim pursuant to Rule 116 UCPR. The plaintiff submits that the defendant presently resides at a specified property in Kewarra Beach, 4879, that he is deliberately evading service and is not responding to communications to his mobile number. -- 1 of 3 -- 2 [3] In these circumstances, the plaintiff submits it is impracticable to serve the defendant personally, and that service by post to the Kewerra Beach address and sending the claim as a text message to a mobile number will bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. [4] The plaintiff relies on an affidavit of a solicitor sworn on 16 July 2025. Judges of this Court have continually reminded applicants that evidence tendered in substituted service applications must be admissible and, where practitioners seek to rely on Rule 430(2) UCPR, their affidavits must meet the requirements of that rule, as articulated in the authorities.1 [5] In her affidavit, the solicitor relies upon evidence of matters seen and heard by an unidentified service agent (or possibly agents, as the evidence does not disclose the name of the person or persons acting as agent). The solicitor relies on source documents D to K which are exhibited in her affidavit. These documents comprise emails from ‘Wise Group’ addressed to the plaintiff’s representatives detailing steps taken by unidentified ‘agents’ to serve the defendant. The gravamen of these emails provide that the agent attended at the defendant’s home on numerous occasions, was unable to serve him and was told things by neighbours and other occupants regarding the defendant’s whereabouts. The emails also state that an agent had contact with the defendant over the phone and describe the contents of that interaction. [6] As demonstrated by paragraph [2] of the affidavit, it was evidently intended to have been sworn on information and belief. However, much of the affidavit is inadmissible. [7] First, the exhibited documents D to K which inform the basis of the affidavit fail to identify the source of the information. In documents D to H, one unidentified person being ‘Wise Group’ refers to the actions of a second unidentified ‘agent’. While documents I to J identify the sender of the email to be Zac Wilson, Client Services Officer for Wise Group, it is plain from the emails that he was not the person who did, saw and heard the things described therein. He could not give original evidence of the matters relied on. Consequently, Mr Wilson could not be the source for admissible hearsay pursuant to Rule 430(2) UCPR. [8] Second, the statements in the exhibited emails are relied on for truth of their contents. As these reports are not themselves admissible for the truth of their contents, they cannot be admitted under Rule 430(2). Further, these documents describe numerous comments made from a third unidentified party to the unidentified agent. These statements are hearsay on hearsay. 1 Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Limited v Wilkin [2018] QDC 16; Heritage Bank Ltd v Gleeson [2019] QDC 119 [38]; Middencorp Electric Pty Ltd v Intelligent Infrastructure Solutions Pty Ltd [2020] QDC 72 [9] – [10]; KV Projects Pty Ltd v Regal Bridges Pty Ltd [2020] QDC 261 [5] – [6]; Zurich Capital & Finance Pty Ltd v Williams [2020] QDC 277 [8] – [23]; Sunshine Phone Systems (in liq) v Martens [2021] QDC 36 [10]; Grow Asset Finance Pty Ltd v Bassi [2022] QDC 23 [11]; Wickham FV Pty Ltd v Lindeque [2022] QDC 170 [1]; National Australian Bank Ltd v Garner [2022] QDC 221 [16] – [17]; Faranu Pty Ltd v Tropical Island Constructions Pty Ltd [2023] QDC 107 [10]. See also, similar comments made extra judicially: Judge Ken Barlow KC, ‘Substituted Service and Similar Applications – What is Admissible Evidence?’ (Speech, Queensland Law Society Symposium, 2023); Judge Bernard Porter KC, ‘Evidence on information and belief’ (Speech, Queensland Magistrates State Conference, 26 May 2022). -- 2 of 3 -- 3 [9] This deficiency carries over to the solicitor’s affidavit. Contrary to the requirements of Rule 430(2) UCPR, the solicitor’s affidavit does not identify the source of the information, being the agent, which allegedly attempted service in the manner articulated. The affidavit merely refers to ‘an agent of Wise’. The deponent does not know of the identity of this agent and would be unable to identify them if challenged. Where the source of the information is not provided, the evidence cannot be tested or investigated. [10] Third, the solicitor does not specifically depose to their belief that each of the facts stated therein, as articulated in the exhibited documents, are true. The deponent merely states, ‘I refer to Annexure [D to K] and note the following:’. The solicitor also deposes that the Annexture to which they are referring is a ‘copy’ or ‘true copy’. The deponent then proceeds to reiterate the contents of those documents as conclusory statements. The deponent does not state their belief in the truth of the facts asserted. Rather, at paragraph [2] of the affidavit, the solicitor deposes, ‘[w]here I make statements based on information provided to me by others and based on the information obtained, I believe such information to be true’. This catchall statement fails to address the above-mentioned deficiencies. [11] Fourth, inadmissibility is compounded as multiple paragraphs of the affidavit rely on facts which assume the truth of statements made by unidentified third parties. For example, the solicitor deposes to discussions which the unidentified process servers being ‘Wise Group’ say their unidentified agent had with a third unidentified person being a neighbour or occupant of the property regarding the defendant. These statements are again, hearsay on hearsay. Such evidence would be admissible directly from the unidentified agent however, it is of course not admissible for its truth on information and belief from the solicitor, or indeed ‘Wise Group’. [12] As substituted service applications are ex parte applications made to a Court, solicitors for the applicant must ensure the matter is conducted fairly to the absent party. In this light, the law of evidence on interlocutory applications must be complied with. In this case, it has not. It is the hope of this Court that practitioners will review these judgments to gain an appreciation of what is required in properly bringing an application for substituted service. [13] For the reasons provided, the requirements of Rule 430(2) UCPR have not been complied with. There is no admissible evidence capable of supporting the conclusion that personal service is impracticable and that the alternate modes of service put forward by the plaintiff are likely to bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. Consequently, I dismiss the plaintiff’s application for substituted service and make no order as to costs. -- 3 of 3 --