Bradley v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 108

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Bradley v Commissioner of Police [2025] QDC 108 PARTIES: TRAVIS MURRAY BRADLEY (Appellant) v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (Respondent) FILE NO/S: BD 340/25 DIVISION: Appellate DELIVERED ON: 15 July 2025 (ex tempore) DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 15 July 2025 JUDGE: Allen KC DCJ ORDERS: 1. The appeal against sentence is allowed. 2. The sentence is varied by substituting a sentence of two years’ imprisonment instead of the two and a- half years’ imprisonment imposed by the sentencing Magistrate. 3. The declaration of time in custody will not be disturbed. 4. The date that the appellant be released on parole is today’s date, the 15 th of July 2025. CATCHWORDS CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the appellant appeals against sentence pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning bodily harm – considerations of totality – whether the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222 Cusick v QPS [2023] QDC 173 Day v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 77 Edwards v QPS [2021] QDC 88 Gray v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 179 R v Ball [2012] QCA 51 R v Ellison [2012] QCA 113 R v Hakaria & Relia QDCSR 21-1190 -- 1 of 4 -- 2 R v Hills [2004] QCA 205 R v Ireland QDCSR 23-336 R v Prasser; R v Ainsworth & Ors; ex parte Attorney- General (Qld); R v Bennett [2003] QCA 468 R v West [2006] QCA 252 COUNSEL: Ms E Taylor for the Crown Ms C Robertson for the appellant SOLICITORS: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant [1] The appellant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court at Richlands on 15 January 2025 after pleading guilty to one charge of assault occasioning bodily harm. The sentencing Magistrate imposed a sentence of two and a-half years’ imprisonment. Sixty-eight days pre-sentence custody was declared as time served. A parole release date of 8 September 2025 was ordered, i.e. after the appellant had served 10 months, or one- third of the head sentence. [2] The appellant has appealed against sentence pursuant to section 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld). The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive. [3] The appellant was 28 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence. He and the victim of the offence were both prisoners in the Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre. There appears to have been some pre-existing animosity between the appellant and his victim. [4] On 23 June 2024, the victim was mopping the floor of a unit. He was approached by the appellant, who marched towards him in an aggressive manner. The victim backed away from the appellant, who continued to march forwards towards him. The victim then swung a mop at the appellant. The appellant raised his arm, blocking the mop. The appellant then began striking the victim with closed fists to his head and body. The victim turned and ran and was chased by the appellant. The appellant tackled the victim to the ground and continued to punch him. During this time, the appellant also stomped on the victim. At some stage during the assault, the victim lost consciousness. The assault was stopped by correctional officers, deploying CS gas on the appellant. [5] The victim was taken to hospital with bleeding and bruising to his head and face. [6] CCTV footage showed the appellant throwing four punches as both men were standing in the initial assault. After the victim runs and falls, the appellant delivers a further 10 or more punches and two stomps. [7] The appellant had a relevant criminal history, which included previous convictions for assault occasioning bodily harm and numerous contraventions of a domestic violence order. On 29 November 2019, the appellant was sentenced in the District Court at Beenleigh for an offence of grievous bodily harm in a public place while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance, and was sentenced to three years, four -- 2 of 4 -- 3 months’ imprisonment, as well as 50 hours’ community service. His extensive criminal history also included numerous offences of dishonesty and wilful damage, mainly by graffiti. [8] Considerations of totality were enlivened in the following circumstances. The offence was committed on 23 June 2024, when the appellant was in custody on remand. On 10 July 2024, the appellant was sentenced to a total period of 13 months’ imprisonment, with a parole release date of 11 July 2024. One hundred and sixty-one days of pre-sentence custody was declared as time served. The appellant was released on parole on 11 July 2024. On 23 July 2024, his parole was suspended, and he was returned to custody on 30 July 2024. He was not charged with the offence of assault occasioning bodily harm until 8 November 2024, but had been in custody for that additional period of time since 30 July 2024. [9] The sentencing Magistrate recognised that totality was an issue, but to the limited extent of considering what sentence might have been imposed if sentencing the appellant for those sentences dealt with on 10 July 2024 in addition to the offence of assault occasioning bodily harm. The sentencing Magistrate indicated that, in those circumstances, he would have imposed the maximum penalty available in the Magistrates Court of three years’ imprisonment for the totality of the offending, but then stated, “Given that this has been left some time thereafter, that constraint doesn’t apply in quite the same way as it did previously”. Although I cannot confidently interpret such a comment, it does tend to suggest that the sentencing Magistrate may have given insufficient consideration to the total time the appellant had spent in prison prior to the sentence being imposed. [10] More illuminating is the comment that immediately follows, where the sentencing Magistrate indicated that, had he been dealing with the charge of assault occasioning bodily harm on its own, he probably would have committed the appellant to the District Court because he would have felt that three years would not have been an adequate sentence, having regard to the appellant’s history of violence in his criminal history and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. [11] The comments of the sentencing Magistrate clearly indicate that he reasoned from a from a notional sentence of three or more years’ imprisonment, moderating such sentence to that imposed for reasons of totality. Such a starting point is not one supported by comparative decisions: c.f. R v Prasser; R v Ainsworth & Ors; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld); R v Bennett [2003] QCA 468, R v Hakaria & Relia QDCSR 21-1190, and R v Ireland QDCSR 23-336. [12] A consideration of comparative sentences referred to on behalf of the appellant – Cusick v QPS [2023] QDC 173, Edwards v QPS [2021] QDC 88, Gray v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 179, Day v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 77 and R v Ball [2012] QCA 51 – do support a conclusion that that the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive. [13] The comparative decisions referred to on behalf of the respondent of R v West [2006] QCA 252 and R v Hills [2004] QCA 205 involve considerably more serious offending, and the decision of R v Ellison [2012] QCA 113 does not tend to support the contention of the respondent that the sentence imposed on the appellant is not manifestly excessive. -- 3 of 4 -- 4 [14] I should note that the sentencing Magistrate was not assisted by any submissions by the prosecutor as to an appropriate range of sentence, or by either legal representative by way of reference to comparative sentencing decisions. [15] In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the sentence imposed is one that is manifestly excessive. [16] The appeal against sentence is allowed. [17] The sentence is varied by substituting a sentence of two years’ imprisonment instead of the two and a-half years’ imprisonment imposed by the sentencing Magistrate. [18] The declaration of time in custody will not be disturbed. [19] Given that the appellant has now served more than one-third of the substituted head sentence, taking into account time served, I order that the date that the appellant by released on parole is today’s date, the 15th of July 2025. [20] So the appellant will need to be advised that he will be taken to be immediately subject to a court-ordered parole order containing the conditions in section 200 of the Corrective Services Act, and that he will be required to report to a Probation and Parole Office within two business days of his release from custody and obtain a copy of that court-ordered parole order, and that failing to do so will render him liable to have his parole suspended. -- 4 of 4 --