DM v State of Queensland & Anor [2025] QCAT 517

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: DM v State of Queensland & Anor [2025] QCAT 517 PARTIES: DM (applicant) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (first respondent) MARK COMLEY (second respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: ADL047-24 MATTER TYPE: DELIVERED ON: Anti-discrimination matters 8 December 2025 HEARING DATES: On the papers HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Roney KC ORDER/S: The complaint is dismissed. I grant the parties liberty to apply in respect of any other consequential or other orders which might be required to be made. CATCHWORDS: HUMAN RIGHTS – ANTI-DISCRIMINATION – where police allegedly engaged in direct discrimination on the basis of mental health – whether police made decisions in a way that was compatible with human rights or is limited only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justified – where police allegedly directly discriminated against a person on the basis of a person’s impairments by making condescending or insulting remarks – whether breach of a person’s right to access health services without discrimination Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 9, s 101 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) Abo El Wafa v England [1997] QADT 27 Austin BMI Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier [2023] QSC 95 Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] 2 NZLR 864 Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352 Harding v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2025] QCAT 415 -- 1 of 11 -- 2 Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 2) (2020) 5 QR 623 Johnston v Carroll (2024) 329 IR 365 Moffatt obo Saunders v Whittaker [1998] QADT 16 Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services (2021) 9 QR 250 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 Performance of functions, the exercise of powers, or responsibilities for the administration of a state law or program .................................................................................................... 3 Police failure to respond to phone calls from the applicant requesting assistance ............ 4 Publicly serving a domestic violence order......................................................................... 5 The speeding incident 21 September 2022 ........................................................................ 6 Speaking to the applicant in a smart voice ......................................................................... 8 Speaking ill of or showing disrespect for him ..................................................................... 9 Insulting, mocking or humiliating words .............................................................................. 9 Non-publication order ....................................................................................................... 10 Human Rights Act complaint – the substantive limb ........................................................ 10 REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction [1] The applicant lodged a complaint with the Queensland Human Rights Commission (‘QHRC’) on 17 July 2023 (‘the Complaint’), which was accepted by the QHRC under section 141 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (‘the AD Act’) and section 76 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HR Act’). [2] The applicant has not filed a statement of contentions in the Tribunal or anything that sets out the shape and scope of his case, or references it to the AD Act or laws surrounding contraventions of anti-discrimination laws or the HR Act. He has not articulated whether the alleged discrimination is said to be direct, indirect or both, who the appropriate comparator is said to be, how the applicant was treated less favourably; and what term was imposed, if any, with which the applicant could not comply. [3] When asked in the complaint form to the QHRC what “kind of outcome would you like to resolve your complaint”, he left it blank. In his statement in the Tribunal of July 2025 he says he wants an apology from the officer. [4] When asked “what loss, harm or hurt (personal and/or financial) have you experienced because of what happened to you” he responded saying “financial loss for having to travel to court in Mareeba multiple times to fight DVO, emotional distress, anxiety and depression”. -- 2 of 11 -- 3 [5] He says that he has impairments namely anxiety and depression which I infer he would say are protected attributes. Elsewhere in his statement he says he has “mental health issues”. The respondents say they did not know he had those attributes. I cannot ascertain from the two statements filed by the applicant how and when he says he told the second respondent that he had those issues, if he did. [6] To be successful in his application, the applicant needs to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondents knew or believed that the applicant possessed a protected attribute or attributes, that he was treated by the respondents less favourably than a person without the attribute or attributes and the less favourable treatment was on the basis that he had or was presumed to possess the attribute or attributes. Performance of functions, the exercise of powers, or responsibilities for the administration of a state law or program [7] The first respondent, and Queensland Police Service (‘QPS’), its agency performs functions, exercises powers, or has responsibilities for the administration of a state law or program, within the meaning of section 101 of the AD Act. I find that it performed those functions, exercised those powers, or discharged those responsibilities through individual employees of the QPS and is, as well as its individual employees, a public entity pursuant to section 9 of the HR Act. [8] Section 101 of the AD Act provides that: A person who— (a) performs any function or exercises any power under State law or for the purposes of a State Government program; or (b) has any other responsibility for the administration of State law or the conduct of a State Government program; must not discriminate in— (c) the performance of the function; or (d) the exercise of the power; or (e) the carrying out of the responsibility. [9] I find that the applicant’s case falls within the scope of s 101. [10] The applicant lived in a small town about 300 km inland from Cairns. He says it has “two pubs, and two little shops, a service station and a hospital that has the flying doctor”. The second respondent has been the Officer-in-Charge of Chillagoe Police Station since 30 June 2018. [11] The applicant had moved to the town from NSW and was living in the town for close to a month when he resumed talking to his ex-partner. They had split up 10 years earlier. She moved up there to be with him. That did not last long before they fell out and she was going to leave him but engaged in provocative conduct. He says he was “emotional and mentally screwed up” and tried to speak to the police about his situation. [12] He says the second respondent came and spoke to him for over an hour and he told the applicant that “he believes that the relationship is over, and that (he) should end it”. -- 3 of 11 -- 4 [13] There were various attempts to get the relationship back on foot but in the end it all failed badly. There was some kind of altercation, the woman fell over but then went to police and alleged he had assaulted her. He says he was charged, although his statement is confused as to whether it was a domestic violence proceeding or a criminal charge or both. Police failure to respond to phone calls from the applicant requesting assistance [14] The first allegation made in the complaint was that police at the town where he lived with a population of only 120 people failed to respond to phone calls from the applicant to the station requesting assistance about his relationship situation “crying and begging for help” on 29 June 2022 at 1:17pm, on 30 June 2022 at 10:01am, on 6 July 2022 at 3:34pm, on 10 July 2022 at 1:40pm, on 11 July 2022 at 5:30pm, on 11 October 2022 at 10:07am, and later the same day at 12:52pm. This complaint is not necessarily only referable to the conduct of the second respondent although the evidence of the applicant is that he is the only police officer in town. The applicant says he has recordings of some of those messages. They are not in evidence. [15] I accept that the second respondent was on leave on 29 June 2022 and was not responsible for any messages left on the station phone on this date. Noel Stanton was acting in charge. He says he unable to specifically recall the events of 29 June 2022 but to the best of his recollection and knowledge, there were no messages left at the Chillagoe Police Station from the applicant on 29 June 2022. [16] The second respondent returned to work on 30 June 2022 and was provided a handover from the relieving police officer, during which he was not advised of any messages being left on the station phone from the applicant. By referencing police records, not from his own recollections, he says no voicemail messages were left from the applicant that day and if any messages were left, the second respondent says he would have returned them. [17] The second respondent was on a rostered day off on 6 July 2022 and says that upon his return to work on 7 July 2022, no voicemail messages were left on the station phone by the applicant. If any messages were left, the second respondent says he would have returned them. [18] The second respondent says that on 10 July 2022, and also 11 July 2022, no voicemail messages were left on the station phone from the applicant. If any messages were left, the second respondent says he would have returned them. He says there was a ‘job’ on the system in relation to the applicant, which was attended to and finalised by him. [19] The second respondent investigated a matter involving the applicant and it was on this date that the applicant was served the paperwork. [20] The second respondent says that on 11 October no voicemail messages were left on the station phone from the applicant. [21] On 11 July 2022, he was working a 2pm–10pm shift. Although the applicant asserts that the second respondent failed to respond to his call for assistance on this date in fact, he attended his residence and spoke with him at length regarding a job. At approximately 2:02pm on 11 July 2022, the applicant’s partner attended Chillagoe Police Station and made allegations of having been assaulted earlier that day. She showed injuries to her body that were consistent with her allegation of having been assaulted. As a result of the allegation, he commenced an investigation into the -- 4 of 11 -- 5 allegations of Domestic Violence. At approximately 2:52pm he attended the residence and spoke with the applicant at length regarding the allegations made by his partner. It was recorded on body worn camera. [22] The second respondent advised him that he would be proceeding by way of a Domestic Violence Referral naming him as respondent and his partner as aggrieved. When leaving, the applicant shook his hand and thanked him, stating words to the effect of ‘Thanks mate’. Another officer authorised an application for a Domestic Violence Protection Order naming him as respondent and his partner as aggrieved. [23] Conceptually, intentionally not returning phone calls by a professional authority, such as the police service, on the basis of someone’s race, for example, could well be seen as constituting material detriment or significant disadvantage and constitute discriminatory conduct. There is no reliable evidence that the respondents knew or believed that the applicant possessed the alleged protected attributes of anxiety and depression. [24] Ordinary life experience teaches us that there are many reasons why phone calls, in respect of which messages are left, are not returned. The mere fact that they are not returned does not, in my view, lead to an inference that it was on the basis of some protected attribute. [25] On the evidence I am not persuaded that police intentionally did not return his phone calls when he left messages. Even if I had been persuaded that police intentionally did not return his phone calls when he left messages, I am unable to find on the evidence that police did so on the basis of some protected attribute. Publicly serving a domestic violence order [26] The second allegation made in the complaint was that on or around July or August 2022, the second respondent served the applicant with a Domestic Violence Order (‘DVO’) at the Cockatoo Hotel, Chillagoe in the presence of the owner of the hotel. The hotel owner and he were sitting and talking out the front of the hotel, the second respondent parked his police car and walked across the road and said that he would like to talk to him about a DVO. The publican said to the second respondent and him that she would go back inside as this was personal. The second respondent replied to her that it is not personal and she could stay there. She went back into the hotel anyway. [27] On 12 July 2022 the second respondent served a Police Protection Notice on him. He conducted a second field interview with him regarding production of a Dangerous Drug. The respondents have body worn camera footage of these interactions. [28] On 18 July 2022 the second respondent attended the applicant’s residence to serve him with his copy of the Temporary Protection Order, however he was not home. He then drove by the Chillagoe Post Office Hotel, thinking he may be at the hotel but he was not at this location. The second respondent drove to the Cockatoo Hotel and saw him sitting outside with the owner. Once the second respondent got out of his vehicle, he told the applicant he had some paperwork for him and the owner of the hotel asked if she needed to leave. The second respondent informed her that it was up to her and the applicant and thereafter, the owner walked inside the hotel. Subsequently, the second respondent served the paperwork on him. No other persons were present when -- 5 of 11 -- 6 the paperwork was served on him. The second respondent has body worn camera footage of these interactions. [29] They then discussed how he would be doing his driver’s licence and the transferring of his vehicle registration from interstate to Queensland. [30] Pursuant to sections 133(1), 183 and 184 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), a police officer must personally serve a copy of a domestic violence order (including a temporary order) on the respondent/defendant. Further, police officers have an obligation under section 100 of the Act to investigate domestic violence, ensuring that a person is protected immediately from further domestic violence, and to consider what is the most effective action to take to immediately protect the person. [31] The second respondent says that taking into consideration just five days beforehand on 12 July 2022, he was given permission to serve him with the Protection Notice and Statement – Police Protection Notice while sitting at the front of the Chillagoe Post Office Hotel while other customers were present, he believed that on this occasion he did not hold any concerns with the service of the Temporary Protection Order and a Notice as there were no other people present at the Chillagoe Cockatoo Hotel. I accept that evidence. [32] I am unable to find on the evidence that the reasons there was service or attempted service on him initially in the presence of another person was on the basis of some protected attribute. As I have already found, there is no reliable evidence that the respondents knew or believed that the applicant possessed the alleged protected attributes of anxiety and depression. [33] Even if it could be shown that the decision to serve him in public was an intentional act of humiliation, I am unable to infer from the circumstances that this occurred on the basis of some protected attribute. The second respondent explained why he did this in the way that he did. That evidence is not inherently implausible and has not been challenged, of course, by evidence to the contrary. [34] He has sought potentially to be able to recover the costs of defending the domestic violence proceedings. [35] He does not quantify those or explain how the incurring of those costs was related to the service of the DVO on him, however, even were there such evidence, I cannot see that incurring the costs of defending such a proceeding results from or was caused by the way in which he was served with the material. Those costs, if any, arose out of the fact that there was a proceeding on foot, which he was obliged to defend. The speeding incident 21 September 2022 [36] The third allegation made in the complaint was that on 21 September 2022 the second respondent stopped the applicant to issue him with a speeding ticket when he was driving to the Mareeba Hospital to seek treatment for asthma and anxiety. The second respondent allegedly delayed the applicant by asking questions and refused the applicant’s request to call an ambulance or to escort him to the hospital. [37] The applicant said he was having anxiety and asthma all day at the hotel. He had another beer, went into town and decided to go to the Chillagoe medical centre; however, it was closed by the time he got there. He didn’t really know what to do, -- 6 of 11 -- 7 and didn’t want to call for the ambulance as other people might be in need, so he decided to take himself to the Mareeba Hospital, 150 km from his small town. [38] The applicant said in his complaint that the second respondent stopped him for driving 71 km/h in a 60 km/h zone in a tiny place called Petford and then asked him for his license and information, as if he didn't already know. He then asked if he knew what speed he was doing, to which he replied that he didn’t and that he was on his way to the Mareeba Hospital as he had been having asthma and anxiety attacks all day. Police informed him that he was doing 71 km/h in a 60 km/h zone and then asked why he was speeding. The applicant said it was to get to the Mareeba Hospital, and when asked why he didn’t go to the Chillagoe Hospital, he replied it was 4:10pm and they were closed. [39] He claims that the second respondent then said why didn’t he press the call button. He didn’t know about that button as he had not lived there very long and he was not sure what to do, so he decided to drive to the Mareeba Hospital. Police then again asked him where he was going and again told him to the Mareeba Hospital. The applicant then asked him to please hurry up as he was scared and wanted treatment. He then asked the applicant if he had an Asthma spray, to which he said yes. He then asked if he could he see it, so he gave police his Asthma spray. He then pulled the cartridge out, inspected it, put it back in and the started to squeeze the puffer. He did this seven or eight times until the applicant asked him to stop wasting his spray. He then responded smiling that he wasn't wasting it, until he then requested it back. Police again asked him what hospital he was going to attend. The applicant said he was not answering that again as he had already told him and to please hurry up and let him get on his way. [40] Police then allegedly said that there was nothing wrong with him and that if he had asthma, he wouldn’t have a can of coke in the console. The applicant allegedly then asked the second respondent to call him an ambulance and he refused. He said in that case, you can take me to the hospital or you can follow and then told police that he was going, and to stop holding him up. With that, he drove to the Mareeba Hospital and was kept overnight and returned home the next day. [41] Were the applicant’s version of his roadside experience after being caught speeding to be taken at face value, it does suggest that the police officer concerned was toying with him and being rather mischievous, intentionally delaying him. [42] The respondents have body worn camera footage of this interaction. The footage is inconsistent with the applicant’s version of events. They do not show that the police officer concerned was toying with him and being rather mischievous, intentionally delaying him. [43] The second respondent says, and I accept, that the applicant did not appear to be in any medical distress and the second respondent suspected, at that time, he was providing an excuse or reason for speeding. He investigated the reason provided by asking him questions and determined that he should be issued a traffic infringement for speeding. It was his view at the time that it was not necessary for an ambulance to be called or for him to be escorted to hospital as he was able to drive and did continue his travel. I accept that evidence. [44] The body worn camera footage of these interactions shows that: -- 7 of 11 -- 8 (a) The applicant stated he was driving from Chillagoe to Mareeba Hospital after experiencing asthmas attacks while at home in Chillagoe starting in the morning and continuing throughout the day. (b) The applicant admitted that at no time had he contacted triple zero seeking urgent medical assistance. (c) The applicant admitted that at no time had he attempted to contact the Chillagoe Health Clinic seeking urgent medical assistance. (d) The applicant admitted that at no time had he driven himself to the Chillagoe Health Clinic to seek urgent medical assistance. (e) The applicant admitted that prior to departing Chillagoe he contacted a friend named Matty and he asked Matty to look after his dog. At no time did he ask Matty for assistance either to contact triple zero for him, contact the Chillagoe Health Clinic nurse for him, drive him to the Chillagoe Health Clinic or drive him to the Mareeba Hospital. (f) On interception of the vehicle in Petford he was able to disembark from his vehicle and briskly walk towards the police vehicle. He was taking deep breathes and was able to clearly state words to the effect ‘I’m having an asthma attack. I’m driving, I got to go to hospital.’ (g) At no time on the roadside did he state that he was experiencing a panic attack. His conversation was based on him experiencing asthma attacks. (h) As for the asthma puffer, he did not squeeze the puffer seven or eight times. He checked to see if it was prescribed medication. [45] I prefer the second respondent’s evidence as to what happened in that interaction. [46] Even if I had been persuaded that second respondent did what he alleges, I am unable to find on the evidence that police did so on the basis of a protected attribute. Speaking to the applicant in a smart voice [47] The applicant mentions that sometime later he was sitting outside the Post Office Hotel having a beer. The second respondent was inside talking with Herman the publican. When he exited the bar, he saw the applicant and said hi. The applicant did not say anything to him. He then said hello again after a few minutes, and once again, he did not respond, just looked at him. Then, after a few more steps the second respondent turned around and said “aren’t you talking to me today” in a “smart” voice. He still said nothing. The second respondent then opened his police car door and got inside. The second respondent then leaned out of the window and said, “I am only doing my job”. The applicant then got up and walked back into the pub and waited inside until the second respondent was gone. [48] Again, even if this conduct occurred in the way that the applicant suggests, it does not follow that this occurred on the basis of some protected attribute, it may have arisen out of some sense of disrespect or animosity toward the applicant. [49] I am unable to identify how the applicant says this was discriminatory on the basis of some protected attribute or at all. It was not. -- 8 of 11 -- 9 Speaking ill of or showing disrespect for him [50] The fourth allegation made in the complaint is that on 29 December 2022 the second respondent spoke to a female resident of Chillagoe and commented that another resident just wants to “clean Chillagoe from people like him”. He says also that the second respondent has also made reference to him having the DTs pretty bad and that he drinks every day. The applicant says he has told him that he lives with depression and severe anxiety causing him to shake a lot. [51] He says in his statement: A person that is in charge of a town should be a people person He or she would have a brilliant job in a small town like Chillagoe. The cop shop is never open. He should not be in charge of a station. He should be under the supervision of others. To think he is the judge jury and executioner is criminal. If he has issues with people who drink he needs to take ownership of that. If I'm not driving under the influence, walking the streets with alcohol. I have done nothing wrong. All I would do is sit down the front of the pub and drink. I've never been out to hurt anyone or to make trouble. I want an apology from him. [52] The second respondent denies this allegation and says it did not occur in the way the applicant suggests. He says the applicant had left two voice messages at Chillagoe Police Station on 23 December 2022, at 5:10pm and 5:16pm, and as part of his investigation, the second respondent very briefly spoke with a female resident of Chillagoe and she mentioned that the applicant and a Mr Chant were having issues with each other and Mr Chant did not want the Applicant in Chillagoe. At no time did the second respondent discuss the applicant or Mr Chant with the female resident. The comment the applicant has referred to was made by the female resident and not the second respondent. [53] The respondents therefore submit that Mr Chant’s opinions and actions are not the opinions or actions of the respondents. [54] As for the final complaint concerning statements that he was undesirable in effect and should be got out of town, repeating what someone else has said, again, they are words if said only capable of suggesting some disrespect or animosity toward the applicant, but that is not unlawful under the AD Act. I am not persuaded they were said. [55] Even if those things were said I am unable to identify how the applicant says this was discriminatory on the basis of some protected attribute or at all. It was not. Even if I had been persuaded that police did what he alleges, I am unable to find on the evidence that police did so on the basis of some protected attribute. Insulting, mocking or humiliating words [56] I accept that one possible interpretation of the words attributed to the second respondent is to mockingly suggest that he was pretending to have impairments he did not have, or was a heavy drinker, or an undesirable member of the community. [57] As I held in Harding v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2025] QCAT 415, whether insulting, mocking or humiliating words amount to discrimination or are no more than insults or taunting is always a question of fact and -- 9 of 11 -- 10 degree. Some authorities1 have suggested that mere insults do not constitute discrimination. Comments were made by Kiefel J as she then was in Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352 which were adopted in later decisions to the effect that that in deciding if a respondent’s act of racial discrimination was ‘reasonably likely in all the circumstances to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people’, the act in question must have ‘profound and serious effects, not to be likened to mere slights’. That is ‘mere slights’ in the sense of acts which, for example, are reasonably likely to cause technical, but not real, offence or insult. [58] Whilst, if said, the alleged comments may have been patronising or insulting, I struggle to conclude that they constituted treating him, in a material way, less favourably in the material sense, than another person who had to deal with police in a similar situation, where a speeding ticket was being issued, or an order was being served on that person by police. [59] Even had I upheld this aspect of the complaint, in my view it was a relatively insignificant incident, which had no compensable consequences and, in my view, did not plausibly infringe upon his human rights. Non-publication order [60] The Tribunal has previously made an order pursuant to s 66(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), that the publication of: a. the contents of all documents or things filed in or produced to the Tribunal in the proceeding; b. evidence given before the Tribunal; and c. any order made or reasons given by the Tribunal, other than to the parties to this proceeding and their legal representatives, is prohibited to the extent that it could identify or lead to the identification of individuals who are parties to domestic violence proceedings referred to in the Complaint. Human Rights Act complaint – the substantive limb [61] The substantive limb in s 58(1)(a) of the HR Act required the respondents to act and make decisions in a way that is ‘compatible with human rights’, a concept defined in s 8 of the HR Act as being where a human right is either not limited, or if limited, is limited only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justified. [62] Conceptually there might be able to be made declarations which it is said are suitably vindicative of breaches of human rights and promote the rule of law.2 [63] A human right will be limited if the act or decision “places limitations or restrictions on, or interferes with” a human right. This involves considering whether the impact of the act or decision comes within the scope of the right. I accept that in considering a right’s scope, human rights protected by the HR Act are to be construed in the 1 See, eg, Moffatt obo Saunders v Whittaker [1998] QADT 16; Abo El Wafa v England [1997] QADT 27. 2 Johnston v Carroll (2024) 329 IR 365, [55]; Borrowdale v Director-General of Health [2020] 2 NZLR 864, [288]. -- 10 of 11 -- 11 “broadest possible way” by reference to their fundamental values and interests and absent limitation.3 [64] Section 13(1) provides the overarching test for assessing if a limit is nonetheless compatible with human rights. Any such limitation may only be subject under law to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom. Section 13(2) then provides a list of non-exhaustive factors to be considered. [65] An applicant for human rights relief, in this case for an apology , need only establish a prima facie limit before the burden shifts to the respondent to justify the limits by reason of s 13 of the HR Act. The burden on public entities has been described as a “heavy one and cannot be discharged simply by the decision-maker reciting that [they] held a particular belief without providing any basis for that belief.” The evidence should be “cogent and persuasive and make clear to the court the consequences of imposing or not imposing the limit.” It requires “a degree of probability commensurate with the occasion, and must be strictly imposed in circumstances where the individual concerned is particularly vulnerable”.4 [66] The applicant made no submissions on this issue. The referral from the QHRC said the complaint suggests he alleges an unreasonable limitation of the right to recognition and equality before the law, right to privacy and reputation and the right to health services. I find that there has been no unreasonable limitation of those rights in this case. [67] For the reasons that I have given, the complaint is dismissed. [68] I grant the parties liberty to apply in respect of any other consequential or other orders which might be required to be made. 3 Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 2) (2020) 5 QR 623, [222]–[224], [291]–[292]; Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services (2021) 9 QR 250, 296–7 [130]; Austin BMI Pty Ltd v Deputy Premier [2023] QSC 95, [306]. 4 Owen-D’Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services (2021) 9 QR 250, [109], [128]– [132], [250]; Johnston v Carroll (2024) 329 IR 365, [70]–[71]; Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) (2017) 52 VR 441, [203]. -- 11 of 11 --