ACF v Chief Executive – Department of Education [2025] QCAT 443

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: ACF v Chief Executive – Department of Education [2025] QCAT 443 PARTIES: ACF (applicant) v CHIEF EXECUTIVE – DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: GAR346-25 MATTER TYPE: General administrative review matters DELIVERED ON: 10 November 2025 HEARING DATE: 13 October 2025 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Member Taylor ORDERS: Pursuant to s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) the publication of material in this proceeding is prohibited to the extent that it could identify or lead to the identification of any child, by way of direct identification or the identification of the applicant, any family member of the applicant, or any non- party to the proceeding. The respondent’s decision dated 14 May 2025 under s 341 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) to issue a direction prohibiting the applicant from entering the premises of the [named] State School for 365 days from that date is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: EDUCATION – INSTITUTIONS – SCHOOLS – GOVERNMENT – OTHER MATTERS – where the parent of a student of a primary school in Queensland engaged in aggressive conduct towards a student, other parents, and staff at the school on or near school grounds – where that parent had been the subject of warnings and a ban from the school grounds – where the parent had engaged in mediation with the school’s representatives to refrain from statements that may come across as threatening or intimidatory – where despite that commitment the parent engaged shortly thereafter in such conduct – where subsequently he confronted the schools Deputy Principal at the school gates, video and audio recording same and uploading it to social -- 1 of 14 -- 2 media – where the parent was subsequently banned from the school grounds for up to one year – where the parent sought a review of that banning decision – whether the ban should be imposed – whether the period of one-year was excessive Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 54A, s 359, s 359B, s 415 Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), s 5, s 7, s 337, s 340, s 341, s 397 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 13, s 26 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 21, s 24, s 66 Chief Executive Department of Education and Training v Funch [2010] QCAT 604 Chief Executive, Department of Education and Training v Funch [2010] QCAT 434 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: Applicant: Self-represented Respondent: Mr M.G. Duncan of Counsel REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Whilst there is no express provision of legislation requiring this Tribunal to do so, and no submission was made to this Tribunal that such should be done, given the issues raised herein concern children it seemed to me that I should make an order under s 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (“QCAT Act”) prohibiting the publication of material in this proceeding to the extent that it could identify or lead to the identification of any child, by way of direct identification, or the identification of the applicant, any family member of the applicant, or any non- party to the proceeding. An order was made to that effect. For this reason, this document is published in a de-identified format. Overview [2] ACF has been banned for a period of one year from entering the grounds of the primary school at which his daughters attend. Such a ban is one permissibly made under s 341 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) (the “EGP Act”). [3] It was imposed because of a series of events in which he engaged in conduct that was considered would, if permitted to be able to be engaged in again if he was not otherwise banned, have had the effect of causing at the least the apprehension of fear or physical harm to another person when the other person is at the school, and/or to disrupt the good order or management of the school. ACF opposed that ban seeking to have it set-aside by this Tribunal, or at the very least reduced in duration. [4] For the reasons given herein he was unsuccessful. As I discuss it, his conduct was egregious and could not be condoned as being reasonable in any circumstance. But moreover, in the presentation of his case before me he sought to minimise the severity of his conduct and to justify it as being permissible due to the frustration he says he was experiencing due to alleged inaction by the school in terms of his daughter being -- 2 of 14 -- 3 bullied by another student. In all respects he failed to satisfy me that if he was not banned from the school grounds, he might readily repeat such conduct or such like it. [5] My decision was that a one-year ban on ACF from entering the school grounds was the correct and preferable decision. Background [6] ACF’s children attend a state primary school (the “School”). [7] He was given a warning in August 2022 and a second warning in June 2023, both in terms of what was said to be his unacceptable conduct in engaging with a parent of another student. In September 2023 he was given a direction prohibiting him from entering School grounds for up to 60 days following his involvement in an altercation with other persons on the schoolgrounds which caused distress to students and staff. [8] He later engaged in further inappropriate conduct on schoolgrounds whereby: (a) on 1 May 2025 he confronted a young student about her alleged bullying of his daughter; and (b) on 2 May 2025 he confronted teachers in the administration office about their alleged failure to have done anything of substance about the said bullying. [9] On each occasion that conduct was in front of other students. [10] Because of that conduct, on 14 May 2025, the respondent issued a direction prohibiting ACF from entering the schoolgrounds for one year (the “Decision”). [11] On 12 June 2025, ACF applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Decision. He sought to have it set aside, in the alternative to reduce the ban period to allow him to attend his children’s graduation ceremony. [12] That application came before me for determination in a single day hearing on 13 October 2025. By the end of the hearing, ACF had effectively abandoned his application to the extent he sought to have the Decision set aside. He conceded that his actions on 1 and/or 2 May 2025 were sufficient grounds for a direction banning him from the schoolgrounds, submitting that at its highest the ban period should be the 217 days proposed by the School’s Principal. The Issue [13] Given ACF’s concession at the end of the hearing, the singular issue that arose in this proceeding for my determination was – what was the appropriate duration of the ban. However, notwithstanding that concession, I was still required to be reasonably satisfied on the issue of whether a ban should be imposed. Accordingly, I discuss both aspects in these reasons. The Relevant Law Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) [14] The objects of the EGP Act include amongst other things to make available to each Queensland child or young person a high-quality education that will help maximise his or her educational potential; and enable him or her to become an effective and -- 3 of 14 -- 4 informed member of the community.1 Such is to be to be achieved by amongst other things placing responsibilities on parents, and providing for the operation of schools as safe and supportive learning environments.2 The Act also lays out some ‘guiding principles’ aimed at achieving those objects, one of which provides for “parents, teachers [and] school communities [to] work collaboratively to foster a commitment to achieve the best educational outcomes for children and young people.”3 [15] One of the ways in which the Act expressly provides for the implementation of responsibilities on parents, whilst also providing for a safe and supportive environment within a school, is providing for ‘Good order and management of State education institutions’ in the manner expressed in Chapter 12 of the Act. [16] One mechanism provided therein is for a school principal to issue a person a direction about that person’s conduct or movement at the school’s premises. This is found in s 337, which as relevant to this proceeding I extract here: 337 Direction about conduct or movement (1) A State instructional institution’s principal may give a person (the directed person) a written direction about the directed person’s conduct or movement at the institution’s premises for up to 30 days after the day on which the direction is given if the principal is reasonably satisfied it is necessary to give the direction— (a) to ensure the safety or wellbeing of other persons lawfully at the premises; or (b) to prevent or minimise damage to the premises or to property at the premises; or (c) to maintain good order at the premises; or (d) for the proper management of the institution. (2) … [17] A related provision also appears in s 341 of the Act which is at the core of the issues in this proceeding, it providing a mechanism whereby a person may be prohibited from entering a school. For ease of reference, I extract here that section to the extent it is relevant in this proceeding: 341 Prohibition from entering premises (1) The chief executive may give a person (the prohibited person) a written direction requiring the prohibited person not to enter the premises of a State instructional institution for more than 60 days, but not more than 1 year, after the day on which the direction is given if the chief executive is reasonably satisfied that, unless the direction is given, the prohibited person is likely to— (a) cause physical harm to, or apprehension or fear of physical harm in, another person when the other person is at the premises; or 1 Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) s 5(1)(a). 2 Ibid s 5(2)(a), (b). 3 Ibid s 7(d). -- 4 of 14 -- 5 (b) damage the premises or property at the premises; or (c) disrupt the good order or management of the institution. (2) A direction under subsection (1) may not be given to an exempt person for the institution. (3) The direction must state— (a) the terms of the direction; and (b) the ground for the direction; and (c) an outline of the facts and circumstances forming the basis for the ground; and (d) the time the direction is to remain in force. (4) …. (5) The direction has no effect until the chief executive gives it to the prohibited person. (6) …. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) [18] There is also the application of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (the “HR Act”) that I was required to consider. [19] The main objective of the HR Act is to protect and promote fundamental human rights. However, the rights listed therein are not exclusive, nor are the rights protected thereunder absolute. They may be limited, but only as far as is reasonable and justifiable. In deciding whether a limit is reasonable and justifiable relevant factors include inter-alia the nature of the human right, the nature and purpose of the limitation, whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right, and the balance between the last two points. That being so, all statutory provisions, as far as is possible consistent with their purposes, must be interpreted in a way that is compatible, or most compatible, with human rights. Such includes the EGP Act. [20] I return to my discussion on the HR Act at the conclusion of these reasons. The Nature of this Review Proceeding [21] This Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review the Decision arose under the EGP Act Chapter 15 Part 3, more particularly s 397 therein, read together with the QCAT Act Chapter 2 Division 3. In constituting the Tribunal for this proceeding, I was required to exercise this jurisdiction in accordance with both those pieces of legislation and the HR Act. In doing so I had all the functions of the decision-maker for the decision to be made.4 [22] This proceeding was not a traditional adversarial process as one should expect in a commonplace civil proceeding of a claim by one party on another. Nor was it an inquisitorial process such that I was required to question both parties to identify the 4 QCAT Act s 19. -- 5 of 14 -- 6 relevant facts and legal issues. The purpose of the review was to produce the correct and preferable decision, such to be reached by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.5 [23] That being so, the respondent’s representative was not participating in an adversarial role advocating for the correctness of the decision by the respondent’s decision- maker, rather the representative’s role was to help me in making my decision on the review.6 Accordingly it was not necessary for me to consider whether the respondent’s decision-maker had made an error in making the Decision, the focus being solely on the cogency of ACF’s case as presented to this Tribunal. [24] At the conclusion of the review, I was empowered to confirm or amend the Decision; set aside the Decision and substitute my own decision; or set aside the Decision and return the matter to the respondent’s decision-maker for reconsideration with directions I considered to be appropriate.7 The Evidence and Submissions [25] On 5 August 2022, the School Principal gave a warning letter to ACF following ACF having confronted the parent of another student on School grounds on 9 June 2022. That warning brought to ACF’s attention s 337 of EGP Act. That letter contained the following statement of the incident:8 • You (ACF) were entering school, when it appears one of your daughters was knocked over near the main gate, by another parent … • You confronted this parent near the canteen and you and your partner tried to speak to the other parent. • There are two witness statements … which [state that] (sic) the impression of the witnesses, is that your manner could be considered intimidating. • The recording of the incident sent to [person named] by [ACF’s partner named], does not indicate a raised voice on your part, however, it does show, the other parent, clearly trying to move away and being followed. [26] On 9 June 2023, the School Principal sent a letter to ACF raising concerns about his communication with a parent of another student at the School, wherein it was said he did so in a “threatening manner” and stated that the parent had one week to remove their child from the School.9 [27] On 7 September 2023, the School Principal gave a direction to ACF prohibiting him from entering the School grounds for 60 days following his verbal altercation with a member of the public at the front gates of the grounds on 6 September 2023, observed by staff and students on the grounds.10 5 Ibid s 20. 6 Ibid s 21(1). 7 Ibid s 24. 8 Ex 1 pg 27. 9 Ibid pg 31. 10 Ibid pg 32. That is a direction permissible under s 340 of the EGP Act, such to be contrasted to s 341 of the Act which is a direction given by the Chief Executive exceeding 60 days up to 1 year. -- 6 of 14 -- 7 [28] On 28 April 2025, ACF, together with his partner TLX, engaged in a mediation conference with the School Principal wherein the following was expressed in a ‘Mediation Agreement’:11 All parties commit to future communication that is respectful in nature – [ACF and TLX] agree that they will give careful consideration to their communication and refrain in future from any statements that may come across as threatening or intimidatory towards staff. [29] Despite this express recorded agreement, contrary to his agreement in terms of refraining from statements that may be construed as being threatening or intimidatory: (a) on 1 May 2025, whilst on the School grounds he confronted a young student about her alleged bullying of his daughter, such confrontation occurring whilst the student was serving toast to other students at the Chaplain’s Toast Table, with ACF having made this statement;12 and Next time you come near my family [student named] and you harass my (indistinct) child named [name given] I am going to get the older sister to start harassing you. Do you understand? We’ve had enough. Stay away from our family. (b) on 2 May 2025 he confronted teachers in the administration office of the School about their alleged failure to have done anything of substance about the said bullying, during which, in a raised voice, ACF expressed extreme obscenities to the staff making inter-alia these comments:13 It’s OK – just run the school how your doing. Say hi to social media because I’m going to take all your jobs your f..king jobs your c…ts. … if you’re asking us to leave – we’ll leave – that’s fine – but be prepared … … and if you ever touch [name given] again I swear to f…king God, you keep your hands off my child. Do you understand? Do not touch my child. [30] ACF portrays the first of these events in the following manner in his evidence:14 … The environment was noisy, as children were gathered at the table. The recording shows that no yelling or threats were made, no physical intimidation occurred, and my words were brief and limited. My intention was to tell [student named] that what she is doing is unacceptable and try to see how she would feel if she started getting harassed like she was doing to [children named]. It was an effort to try and get her to stop harassing our children. Despite this, the Respondent has sought to portray this incident as aggressive or intimidating. The objective recording demonstrates that my conduct was not threatening and did not justify escalation or disciplinary action. 11 Ibid pg 493 – see para 11 therein. 12 This is as extracted from the audio recording made by ACF forming part of his evidence – see Ex 3 Annexure G. 13 This is as extracted from video and audio recording made by ACF forming part of his evidence – see Ex 3 Annexure H. 14 Ex 3 paras 24 and 25. -- 7 of 14 -- 8 [31] Whilst the first of those events was the subject of an audio recording only, the second was video recorded, with audio, by ACF or a person in attendance with him. The video shows other students present in the administration office area whilst ACF was making these statements. It is unclear from that video and the audio recording as to which person the last statement was directed, that being “if you ever touch [daughter named] again”, but I infer it was to a student, possibly being the student the subject of the confrontation the day prior. [32] On the day following the second of those events, ACF sent an e-mail to the School, which he described in his statement to this Tribunal as being a ‘reflective e-mail’, wherein he made these statements:15 I’m writing to acknowledge the intensity of the verbal exchange that occurred on May 2nd between myself, [ACF’s partner named], and Deputy Principal [name]. While I stand firmly by the concerns raised … I recognise that our approach and language during that exchange were not ideal. I am remorseful for the tone used, though I hope the depth of our frustration is understood. … I want to be clear that our intention during that exchange was never to act aggressively or to cause any physical harm. Our actions stemmed solely from a place of emotional exhaustion and parental desperation after watching our daughter endure consistent bullying, cultural disrespect, and physical intimidation – without any meaningful intervention from the school. … Whilst we regret how our emotions were expressed, we stand by the legitimacy of our concerns. We remain committed to engaging respectfully moving forward … [33] On a date which is not specified, but I infer from the way the evidence was presented it was shortly after the 2 May 2025 incident, ACF confronted the Deputy Principal at the school gates. He once again video and audio recorded it, but also went one more step and later uploaded the recording to social media such that it was visible to the public at large. He entitled it – “Part 2 Discussion with deputy (sic) [name] who managed to forget all the meetings we have had in relation to the bullying.” That video recording contains images of not only a person identified as being the Deputy Principal but of students walking near to that person along the path and through the gate, and thus I infer within hearing distance of the statements made by ACF. [34] In that recording, which ACF admits was made by him and thus I infer was an audio recording of his voice, inter-alia he made this statement:16 You know for 2 years, right 2 years, and I’ve got all thee e-mails and everything [student named] has been bullying [daughter named] for 2 years now. We have all the e-mails. We’ve had many meetings to try and resolve it – its continued. … So if yous (sic) come at [daughter named] for finally snapping after yous (sic) done nothing we are going to sue you and we are going to put it on social media. Do you understand ? … 15 Ex 3 para 29 – Annexure J. 16 Ex 3 Annexure M. -- 8 of 14 -- 9 [35] In his evidence in this proceeding, ACF sought to justify this and similar recordings uploaded to social media in the following manner:17 … These videos were created to raise awareness of [daughter named]’s ongoing victimisation and the Department’s failure to act after repeated complaints. My focus in these videos was on the conduct of school officials … in their capacity as public servants. I rely on my rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) including: - s 21 (Freedom of expression): the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds. - s 25 (Taking part in public life): the right to have a say in public affairs, including the performance of public information. I also rely on the principle that parents are entitled to raise complaints about the operation of Queensland Government schools and their staff without persecution. To penalise me for expressing legitimate criticism of the school on a public platform would be inconsistent with these rights. [36] Following these incidents, on 7 May 2025 the Deputy Principal, in the role of Acting Principal, sent a letter to the respondent’s Regional Director requesting that he consider giving ACF a direction under s 341 of the EGP Act for a period of 217 days. Therein the Deputy Principal made this statement:18 Despite all the support provided to ACF to build his understanding of appropriate parent behaviour, he has continued to act in an inappropriate way towards to the [School named] SS community. [37] Acting on that request, ultimately the Decision was made and issued imposing a one- year ban. [38] In his closing submissions, whilst not disputing any of this evidence, ACF argued that the one-year ban excessive, submitting that it “does not meet the proportionality test under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).”19 Discussion on the Evidence relative to the Law [39] On this review, as the effective decision-maker, it is that last request which is the point in time from when it may be properly said that I pick up the issue. As I discuss in the paragraphs that follow here, I agree with the observations made by the Deputy Principal in that request. The evidence up to that point demonstrated that to be so. Moreover, the presentation by ACF of his case before me did not show me that he had progressed beyond that point. [40] As was observed by the learned Member of this Tribunal in Chief Executive Department of Education and Training v Funch [2010] QCAT 604 (“Funch”):20 In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to invoke the provisions of section 341 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 the tribunal has to balance 17 Ex 3 paras 52–55. As ACF confirmed under cross-examination, this was just one of twelve postings to social media on the same issue. 18 Ex 1 pg 507. 19 Ex 4 paras 24 and 27. 20 Funch [7], [9]. -- 9 of 14 -- 10 complex important and competing policy considerations: protection of staff and students at the school against the interests of a parent as a member of the parent community having access to the school premises. … The proceeding involves an important issue of public interest and serious consequences could arise for the respondent in the event that the tribunal is persuaded to prohibit him from entry onto the school premises for 12 months. On the other hand, serious consequences could arise for the staff and student body at the school in the event that the tribunal is not persuaded to invoke the provisions in section 341 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 given the circumstances that the assault for which the respondent has been convicted took place at the school in the presence of students. [41] It is that balancing of the ‘serious consequences’ which was at the core of what I was being asked to decide in this proceeding. [42] In reading ACF’s written material filed, and listening to him under cross-examination and otherwise in the presentation of his case, I was left with the impression that he firmly believed that his conduct was entirely appropriate save only that he realised the use of swearing during the incident on 2 May 2025 should not have occurred. It was not until the end of the hearing that he appeared to have conceded that it was not so, or alternatively he made that concession for no other reason than he wanted the hearing to finish. [43] ACF did not impress me as a person who could be trusted to do what he says he would do, nor did he impress upon me in any way that he understood his actions, either in part or in whole, were entirely inappropriate and unacceptable in terms of a parent dealing with incidents involving their child at a school. He seemingly failed to have any understanding of what proper conduct of a parent was, nor for that matter proper conduct of an adult when around young children, particularly in an educational setting. He did not demonstrate to me that he had any intent to work collaboratively with the School to foster a commitment to achieve the best educational outcome for children at the School, nor in terms of facilitating a safe and supportive learning environment at the School.21 [44] His confrontation of the young student at the Toast Table on 1 May 2025 can readily be described as not just intimidating but as threatening. His actions are to be condemned as atrocious. It demonstrates an absence of any sense of what is appropriate conduct in any setting. An adult should not at any time approach a young child in such a manner. There is no justification for it. It must be the subject of an admonishment. [45] His conduct on 2 May 2025 must be equally admonished and condemned as being not just atrocious but put more simply – disgusting. Whilst he acknowledged later that his language was not appropriate, he sought to justify it as having occurred out of frustration. Such cannot be accepted as a justification for it. Whilst ACF may have been feeling frustrated with what he considered to be a lack of adequate action by the School’s representatives, there was no justification for the abusive and rude language he used and the manner in which he went about expressing himself to the School staff 21 Consider again the Objects of the EGP Act and the Guiding Principles thereunder as I noted them in paragraphs [14] and [15] herein. -- 10 of 14 -- 11 in front of students, particularly noting these were young primary school students. His conduct, even if one arising out of frustration, is conduct which demonstrates ACF to lack control over his own emotions and his ability to be able to identify conduct which is inappropriate regardless of the circumstances by which it may have come about. [46] What is equally concerning is that, notwithstanding his so-called ‘reflective e-mail’ in which he expressed a commitment to ‘engage respectfully moving forward’, shortly thereafter ACF yet again confronted the Deputy Principal, on that occasion at the school gates, and not only video and audio recorded that confrontation but then uploaded same to a social media platform. Such is also to be admonished as being entirely unacceptable. [47] Yet ACF sought to justify this as being something he is entitled to do in the exercise of his human rights to freedom of expression. He is entirely misguided in that regard. [48] Whilst he is entitled to such freedom, it does not extend to the posting of a recording wherein he threatened to sue the School and to make other postings on social media, seemingly to get the School not to do something it may very well be lawfully entitled to do. Such amounts to one or more contraventions under the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).22 [49] Moreover, the fact that his conduct on both 1 and 2 May 2025 occurred so soon after the recording of that which was said to have been agreed on 28 April 2025, as expressed in the Mediation Agreement, namely to refrain from statements that may come across as threatening or intimidatory, suggests strongly that any such commitment given by him was at best mere ‘lip service’, or at worst an absence of any understanding by him as to what is considered to be conduct that is threatening or intimidatory. This is made even more so concerning given the earlier warnings and ban that occurred in 2022 and 2023. The same can be said about his confrontation of the Deputy Principal at the school gates and uploading of the video to social media, such being entirely inconsistent with the commitment he gave in the reflective e-mail to ‘engage respectfully moving forward’. [50] For all these reasons, I was not just reasonably satisfied, I was entirely satisfied, that ACF had conducted himself in a manner that was likely to not just disrupt the good order or management of the School, it was such that was likely to cause, at the very least, an apprehension of fear of physical harm in another person when that person was at the School in the circumstances of ACF being present on the School grounds. But the past events are not of themselves the basis for imposing a ban under s 341 of the EGP Act, it is the likely degree of the probability of any future recurrence of such conduct that matters.23 [51] I found that there was a high degree of such a probability, it being found in the fact that ACF showed he could not do that which he said he would do, namely that as I have already identified it from the mediation agreement and the reflective e-mail. He has conducted himself in a manner entirely inconsistent with the commitments he had 22 Consider ss 54A, 359. It may also fall into the category of ‘intimidation, harassment or abuse’ when considered in the context of the earlier incidents – see s 359B therein; or even ‘extortion’ under s 415 therein. 23 Chief Executive, Department of Education and Training v Funch [2010] QCAT 434, [21]. Even though the citation for this decision is numbered earlier than the citation for the Funch decision I referred to earlier herein, this decision post-dates that other decision, this being delivered 30 August 2010 the other decision being of an interlocutory matter having been delivered on 10 August 2010. -- 11 of 14 -- 12 given therein. It seemed to me that ACF learned nothing from the past warnings, the earlier ban, nor the agreements and expression of intent reached in the mediation, nor as he committed to in his reflective e-mail. His conduct which so shortly thereafter occurred indicate that there was more than a likely degree of the probability of such conduct occurring once again in some form. But more critically, his presentation of his case before me and his apparent efforts to minimise and justify his conduct demonstrated to me with clarity that he did not possess any degree of insight into his conduct as to the effect it had, or at the very least could have had, on others, and that there was a very real chance of him repeating conduct of the same nature given that absence of insight. [52] The balancing to which I referred earlier did not and could not swing in his favour. The history of his conduct as I have described it herein shows that to be so. Thus, the threshold for a banning direction under s 341 of the EGP Act was met in the review on the merits and so I concluded that a direction banning ACF from the School grounds should issue. [53] The question then arose as to what the appropriate period of the ban should be. Under s 341 it is more than 60 days but not more than one year. ACF submitted that a one- year ban is disproportionate to the nature of the incidents. However, his argument as to why is not simply confused, it is entirely misguided. Firstly, he says it does not meet the proportionality test under the HR Act, but without stating what that test is or where it is found in the legislation. Secondly, he seeks to demonstrate it to be so because of the existence of a one-year ban imposed in Chief Executive, Department of Education and Training v Funch [2010] QCAT 434 in the circumstances of Mr Funch having physically assaulted the Deputy Principal of the school in that matter such that he required medical treatment and had ongoing distress arising from the assault, circumstances entirely different to ACF’s conduct.24 [54] As I discussed it with ACF in the hearing, such is not a proper nor appropriate test of proportionality given that what was imposed there was the maximum permissible ban of one year. This is not an issue such as occurs in sentencing for criminal conduct wherein the degree of severity of conduct is measured against other cases to get a guideline on duration of an adequate sentence. The relevant test under s 341 of the EGP Act is to consider the possibility of repeat conduct over what period, such conduct being that which would fall into the categories under s 341(1)(a) to (c). On the facts as they were before me, as I noted it earlier, ACF had not learned anything from the past warnings, the earlier ban, nor the commitment that he had given as recorded in the mediation agreement, or as he expressed in the reflective e-mail, this all having occurred over a period almost two years. Moreover the egregious conduct he engaged in on 1 and 2 May 2025, only a few days after that mediation agreement was struck, and then his continuation of confrontation of the Deputy Principal at the gates of the School and uploading posts to a social media platform shortly after the commitment in the reflective e-mail to ‘engage respectfully moving forward’ demonstrated to me that he had no intention of ceasing any such behaviour. 24 There are two Funch decisions referred to in these reasons, the first in time being # 604 which was on an interlocutory matter, the second in time being # 434 which was on the substantive application. It appears that the first in time was published after the second in time was published thus the absence of chronological recording in the citation numbers. -- 12 of 14 -- 13 Accordingly, there was no basis for which I conclude a ban period of something less than the maximum permissible was appropriate. Conclusion [55] For the reasons I have given herein, in exercising the discretion under s 341 of the EGP Act as the decision-maker, it seemed to me that the maximum period of a one- year ban was appropriate. Whilst, as noted in Funch, such would have an adverse impact on ACF this was no reason to discount it to a lesser period. Any such lesser period gives rise to the possibility of repeat conduct by him that causes disruption at the School within that one-year period. His conduct, as I have noted it herein, all took place on the School grounds or at its gate, and was conduct that was in all instances engaged in whilst students were present. ACF did not demonstrate to me in the presentation of his case that he would not engage in the same or similar conduct again. To the contrary, I was left with the impression that he may very well do so given his efforts to not just minimise his conduct but to justify it as being permissible as him acting out of frustration. Such is not an excuse that could be in any meaningful way accepted as justifying such conduct. [56] Moreover, he engaged in such conduct very soon after expressing an intention not to do so. To permit even the possibility of that occurring once again within the maximum permissible period would in my opinion give rise to an avoidable risk of serious consequences for the staff and students at the School. For this reason, I concluded that a one-year ban was the correct and preferable decision. Thus, an order was made confirming the Decision. [57] Finally, in conclusion it is necessary for me to return to the HR Act and make a few further comments as I noted earlier herein I would do so, and to also briefly comment on ACF’s reliance on the HR Act to in part justify his conduct, and to avoid a ban at least in part. [58] Starting with that last point first, it is unnecessary for me to express any conclusions on the correctness or otherwise of his entitlement, in terms of his asserted human rights, to engage in posting his videos on social media. Whilst it may be correct that his action is consistent with rights he asserts a reliance on, something I make no finding about, to the extent any right is afforded to him under the HR Act, as I have discussed earlier herein such a right is not absolute and it may be limited in certain circumstances by the application of other legislation. That includes the EGP Act. [59] But critically, whilst ACF is afforded the benefit of rights under the HR Act which must be considered by this Tribunal, there was a competing right that could not be overlooked. It is one that permissibly limits ACF’s rights in the circumstances of the issues for consideration under the EGP Act. That is the right that every child has, without discrimination, to the protection that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s best interests, because of being a child.25 Thus, any decision for the purposes of s 341 of the EGP Act which might be said to infringe ACF’s rights will nevertheless be compatible with the HR Act. This is because, despite any limit the decision places on his human rights, the decision will be justified by the factors outlined under s 13 of the HR Act. This is because, amongst other things, it will have the proper purpose 25 HR Act s 26(2). -- 13 of 14 -- 14 of promoting and achieving the objects of the EGP Act as I identified them in paragraph [14] herein consistent with the guiding principles expressed in that Act. [60] Thus, to the extent ACF is afforded a right under the HR Act, by application of the EGP Act in conjunction with the HR Act in making the correct and preferable decision such rights must yield to the rights of a child and so be limited. That would include the making of a finding of reasonable satisfaction under s 341 of the EGP Act and so impose the ban on him entering the School grounds. Such is consistent with s 13 of the HR Act. [61] Finally, this should also be said. To the extent that ACF might consider there is a less restrictive and reasonably available way to achieve the purpose, as I discussed that concept in paragraph [19] herein, to the extent such methods were available, such as a warning, an earlier ban, and a mediation, the evidence before me showed that these had no effect on ACF, thus demonstrating that a restriction on his human rights is not an inappropriate step to have taken. -- 14 of 14 --