Clegg v State of Queensland [2025] QCAT 108

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CITATION: Clegg v State of Queensland [2025] QCAT 108 PARTIES: MICHAEL CLEGG (applicant) v STATE OF QUEENSLAND (respondent) APPLICATION NO/S: ADL020-23 MATTER TYPE: Anti-discrimination matters DELIVERED ON: 21 March 2025 HEARING DATE: 21 March 2025 HEARD AT: Brisbane DECISION OF: Senior Member Traves ORDERS: The application for miscellaneous matters (to dismiss or strike out) filed by the respondent on 21 November 2024 is granted. Pursuant to sections 47 and 48 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the complaint (ADL020-23) is dismissed. CATCHWORDS: DISCRIMINATION – DIRECT DISCRIMINATION – INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION – ATTRIBUTE OF IMPAIRMENT – where complaint accepted as alleging impairment discrimination in the area of state laws and programs – where referral misconceived – where applicant persistently non-compliant with tribunal directions – where referral dismissed pursuant to sections 47 and 48 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 29, s 45, s 47, s 48 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256, Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION: This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) -- 1 of 5 -- 2 REASONS FOR DECISION [1] On 1 December 2021 the applicant, Mr Clegg, made a complaint to the Queensland Human Rights Commission (‘QHRC’) which was referred to the Tribunal on 15 March 2023 (‘the Complaint’). [2] The Tribunal made directions requiring the parties to file their respective contentions. The directions were specific and required the applicant to address matters relevant to the elements of discrimination and human rights underpinning his complaint. After repeatedly failing to comply with the Tribunal’s directions, Mr Clegg filed (but did not serve) his contentions on 9 November 2023. The contentions claim ‘compo $250,000 for shoulder and neck’ that appears to stem from a personal injury he allegedly sustained as a tenant in accommodation provided by the Department of Housing. The contentions did not address any of the matters he was directed to address. [3] The respondent filed a Response to the contentions on 19 January 2023 noting the inherent issues with the contentions and its failure to articulate any discernible claim under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (‘AD Act’) or the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (‘HRA’), to the point the respondent claimed it was unable to identify and respond to any such claim. [4] The Tribunal then issued standard directions requiring the parties to file their statements of evidence. Again, Mr Clegg was non-compliant. [5] On 28 August 2024 Mr Clegg (by his legal representatives) served on the respondent a notice of claim under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2022 (Qld) (‘PIPA claim’). The claim is for personal injuries allegedly sustained on 12 December 2021 as a result of allegedly tripping on ‘defective flooring’ at the tenanted property. The relief sought in that claim mirror those sought in these proceedings. Mr Clegg, by a handwritten document filed (but not served) on 13 August 2024, outlined further issues he had with the tenancy. These issues included various complaints about ‘Kiwis’ working for the respondent and targeting Mr Clegg’s neighbour, who he described as a ‘stupid idiot’ and ‘pervert’. [6] The respondent, being unable to file evidence in response, sought directions to facilitate an application to dismiss the proceedings, which application is now before me. The application to dismiss the proceedings [7] The respondent seeks the proceedings be dismissed on two bases: first, that the Complaint fails to contain any proper, answerable claim of discrimination under the AD Act or of any breaches of the HRA (the s 47 ground); and secondly, due to Mr Clegg’s conduct in the proceeding (the s 48 ground). [8] Mr Clegg’s submissions in response do not respond to the application or the grounds on which the respondent relies but again reiterates a series of complaints relating to his tenancy and the issues he has with particular neighbours. None of the complaints he raises have any apparent basis in discrimination. -- 2 of 5 -- 3 The relevant statutory provisions [9] Section 45 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld) (‘QCAT Act’) provides that each party to a proceeding must act quickly in any dealing relevant to the proceeding. [10] Section 47 of the QCAT Act confers on the Tribunal the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings and relevantly provides that: (1) This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding or a part of a proceeding is— (a) frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or (b) lacking in substance; or (c) otherwise an abuse of process. (2) The tribunal may— (a) if the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal is the applicant for the proceeding, order the proceeding or part be dismissed or struck out; … [11] Section 48 applies if the Tribunal considers a party to a proceeding is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceeding, including by not complying with a tribunal order or direction without reasonable excuse. [12] By s 48(2), if the party causing the disadvantage is the applicant, the Tribunal may order the proceeding be dismissed or struck out. [13] In contemplating a dismissal under s 48, the tribunal must consider: (a) the extent to which the party causing the disadvantage is familiar with the tribunal’s practices and procedures; (b) the capacity of the party causing the disadvantage to understand, and act on, the tribunal’s orders and directions; and (c) whether the party causing the disadvantage is acting deliberately.1 Consideration [14] The power to dismiss proceedings at an interlocutory stage is not to be exercised lightly2 and only ‘when a claim is groundless or futile’.3 Where there are factual issues capable of being disputed and in dispute, the High Court has held that ‘summary dismissal should not be awarded to the respondent simply because the Court has formed the view that the applicant is unlikely to succeed on the factual issue.’4 [15] The Tribunal must make a practical assessment as to whether the applicant has real, as opposed to merely fanciful prospects of success.5 Determination of an application for summary dismissal is a value judgment to be made in the particular circumstances 1 QCAT Act, s 48(3). 2 Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, [60]. 3 Yeo v Brisbane Polo Club Inc [2013] QCAT 261, [5]-[7] citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] 78 CLR 62. 4 Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118, [25] per French CJ and Gummow J. 5 Ibid. -- 3 of 5 -- 4 of the case, in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix; in other words, requiring a ‘practical judgment’ of the case at hand. It does not require a ‘mini trial’, but rather a ‘critical examination of the available material to determine whether there is a real question of law or fact that should be decided at trial’.6 [16] I am satisfied based on the material filed in the Tribunal to date and the Complaint made to the QHRC that the proceedings are misconceived. Mr Clegg’s real complaint is one about the condition of his housing and issues he has with his neighbours, in particular in relation to the way a particular female resident ‘stirs up’ his dog. [17] There is no discernible basis for alleging, in relation to those issues, that there has been discrimination by the respondent against Mr Clegg or any answerable claim of any breaches of the HRA. I note that the QHRC did not accept allegations of race, sex or age discrimination raised by Mr Clegg’s QHRC material. While I acknowledge the Tribunal is not bound by the QHRC’s characterisation of a complaint, I agree with their assessment. Doing the best I can, the matters that appear to form the basis of Mr Clegg’s Complaint relate to Logan Housing being ‘run by Kiwis’, his repair requests not being dealt with expeditiously or at all because he doesn’t ‘wear a skirt’ and his neighbour taunting his dog and keeping a light on 24/7 to ‘stir’ him up. The contentions seek $250,000 (later increased to $300,000) in ‘compo’ for his ‘shoulder and neck’. The compensation he seeks appears to relate to a personal injury allegedly suffered at the relevant tenancy which is the subject of a separate PIPA claim. There is no apparent causal link with any unlawful discrimination by the respondent. [18] I am satisfied, for the reasons above, that the Complaint is misconceived and lacking in substance. Accordingly, I would dismiss the Complaint under ss 47(1)(a) and (b) of the QCAT Act. [19] Further, with regard to s 48 of the QCAT Act, I accept the submissions of the respondent that they have been disadvantaged by Mr Clegg’s actions, in particular by his repeated non-compliance with Tribunal Directions. While the Tribunal has an obligation to ensure parties understand the practices and procedures of the Tribunal,7 parties also have an obligation to comply with directions and properly prepare their case. Each party is also under a statutory obligation to ‘act quickly in any dealing relevant to the proceeding.’8 The Tribunal’s resources are also, as the High Court has observed in relation to court resources, in high demand and that ‘the resolution of disputes serves the public as a whole, not merely the parties to the proceedings.’9 As French CJ said in Aon Risk: Moreover, the time of the court is a publicly funded resource. Inefficiencies in the use of that resource, arising from the vacation or adjournment of trials, are to be taken into account. So too is the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system.10 [20] Turning to the factors in s 48(3): To what extent is Mr Clegg familiar with the tribunal’s practices and procedures? 6 Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256, [46]. 7 QCAT Act, s 29(1)(a)(i). 8 QCAT Act, s 45. 9 Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University 239 CLR 175, [113]. 10 Ibid, [5]. -- 4 of 5 -- 5 [21] I acknowledge that Mr Clegg is a layperson who may not have ready access to technology judging from his handwritten submissions. However, Mr Clegg has written 21 pages of submissions and managed to institute other civil law proceedings. [22] Mr Clegg also attended a compulsory conference at the tribunal in May 2024 at which the processes and procedures of the tribunal would normally be discussed. Mr Clegg certainly had the opportunity to ask any questions he may have had at that conference. [23] The tribunal also issued directions which spelled out for Mr Clegg what elements he needed to address in order to formulate his claim. He was also given many opportunities by the Tribunal to provide that information. [24] I am satisfied that Mr Clegg is sufficiently familiar with tribunal practices and procedures so as not to excuse his non-compliance with directions. Does Mr Clegg have capacity to understand, and act on, the tribunal’s orders and directions? [25] I am satisfied that, although Mr Clegg is a layperson, that he has capacity to understand and act on tribunal orders and directions. He has emailed the tribunal upon receiving notice of a compulsory conference seeking leave to attend by telephone and on another occasion to say he could not attend due to being in transit. He has also filed a number of interlocutory applications seeking adjournments and extensions of time. [26] Mr Clegg has also emailed the registry repeatedly about his ongoing issues with Logan Housing. [27] Mr Clegg’s applications and correspondence with the registry show Mr Clegg does understand the tribunal’s orders and directions and is capable of responding to them. Is Mr Clegg acting deliberately? [28] Mr Clegg’s non-compliance is deliberate in the sense that he would rather continue to email miscellaneous complaints about Logan Housing and his neighbour and file interlocutory applications than file contentions addressing the substantive directions. Conclusion on s 48 [29] In the circumstances, for the reasons above, I am satisfied: (a) the factors in s 48(3) have been met; (b) Mr Clegg has no reasonable excuse for his non-compliance; and (c) the non-compliance has unnecessarily disadvantaged the respondent and the tribunal by unnecessarily delaying the proceeding; and (d) if the referral was to remain on foot despite Mr Clegg’s conduct, the tribunal would not be meeting its mandate to conduct matters fairly, quickly, and economically, nor to use its resources appropriately for the public as a whole. [30] Accordingly, I would also find that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to s 48 of the QCAT Act. Conclusion [31] In the circumstances I will order that the Complaint be dismissed. -- 5 of 5 --