A v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 342

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: A v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 342 PARTIES: A (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent) CASE NO: WC/2025/228 PROCEEDING: Application in existing proceedings DELIVERED ON: 8 December 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Merrell DP On the papers ORDERS: The orders contained in paragraph [24] of these reasons for decision. CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – where the Appellant, an employer, appeals to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission against a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator accepting an application for workers' compensation by an employee of the Appellant – the application for workers' compensation concerned the Appellant's management action in the workplace investigation by it of allegations that one of its employees engaged in assaults of a sexual nature against another employee – application in existing proceedings by the Appellant to supress its name and the names of the two employees, and for other related orders – principle of open justice – whether the Commission should exercise discretion, pursuant to r 97(3) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 to grant the suppression order sought by the Appellant – whether other orders sought by the Appellant -- 1 of 6 -- 2 should be granted – Appellant's application in existing proceedings granted LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 451 Industrial Relations (Tribunal's) Rules 2011, r 97 CASES: Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263 John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] A ('the Appellant') is the employer of B. On 21 February 2025, by way of a telephone call, B lodged an application for workers' compensation with WorkCover Queensland for a psychological injury. By a further telephone call on 24 February 2025, B attributed his psychological injury to various actions taken by the Appellant in relation to its workplace investigation of allegations of sexual assault made by another employee of A ('the Complainant') against B. [2] In a written decision dated 9 May 2025, WorkCover Queensland rejected B's application on the basis that he had not sustained an injury pursuant to section 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. Subsequently, on 11 June 2025, B lodged an application for review with the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Regulator'). [3] By review decision dated 4 September 2025, the Regulator set aside the decision of WorkCover Queensland and made a decision that B's application for workers' compensation was one for acceptance ('the review decision'). The review decision was that B's psychological injury of depression arose out of management action undertaken in an unreasonable way by the Appellant in its workplace investigation of the allegations made by the Complainant against B. [4] By notice of appeal filed on 23 September 2025, the Appellant appeals against the review decision. The Appellant contends that there is no factual or legal basis to support a conclusion that it carried out management action in an unreasonable manner. [5] By application in existing proceedings filed on 28 October 2025, the Appellant applies for the following orders from the Commission: • that the parties and named individuals be anonymised; • that the appeal file be sealed; and, -- 2 of 6 -- 3 • that the Commission's hearing of the appeal be closed to the public ('the Appellant's application'). [6] For the reasons that follow, I will grant the Appellant's application. Background [7] In 2023, B commenced employment, on a casual basis, with the Appellant. B remains employed by the Appellant and is not a party to these proceedings. [8] On 2 January 2025, the Appellant received a complaint from the Complainant alleging that B had, on two occasions, engaged in an assault of a sexual nature against the Complainant. The Appellant then commenced a workplace investigation of the allegations. [9] On 22 January 2025, the Appellant invited B to attend a formal meeting to discuss the complaint. Subsequently, by way of email, the details of the meeting were confirmed. B was given the opportunity to bring a support person. [10] On 23 January 2025, B attended a meeting with the Chief People Officer of the Appellant in which he was informed of the allegations made against him and was directed to provide a written response to the allegations. [11] On 18 February 2025, the Appellant notified B's representative stating that the allegations could not be made out. The parties' submissions [12] In the Appellant's application, the Appellant provides the following grounds for the orders that they seek: 12. The Appellant respectfully submits that the Commission can be satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise its discretion to grant the orders set out in paragraph 4 above because there is a significant and foreseeable risk of harm to individuals involved in the proceeding if the orders are not made. Furthermore, the Appellant submits that the nature of the allegations to be ventilated during the Appeal heavily militate in favour of the Commission exercising its discretion to make the orders sought. [13] In support of its application, the Appellant, based upon the evidence it filed, submitted: • it is concerned about the psychological impact the appeal may have on both B and the Complainant if sensitive details about the alleged criminal conduct '…are recorded and available on public record'; • B has a history of mental health issues, has a current diagnosis of depression and remains unfit to work; • the Complainant has also struggled with her mental health at the time she raised the complaint and during the workplace investigation; and -- 3 of 6 -- 4 • it has ongoing obligations to both B and the Complainant as they both remain employed by it, including the obligation to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health and safety of both B and the Complainant. [14] The Chief People Officer of the Appellant deposed that the Appellant has '… ongoing, non-delegable, work health and safety obligations' to the Complainant and to B, and that the Appellant is deeply concerned about the impact of the appeal on the Complainant and on B if sensitive and personal details about the alleged conduct, and the identities of the Complainant and B, are recorded and available on the public record. [15] By Directions Order dated 29 October 2025, I provided the Regulator with the opportunity to file a written submission and any affidavit material in relation to the Appellant's application. The Regulator submitted that it did not consent to, and did not oppose, the Appellant's application. Should the application be granted? [16] Section 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') relevantly provides: 451 General powers (1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commission in proceedings may– … (c) make an order it considers appropriate. [17] Rule 97(3) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011('the Rules') relevantly provides: 97 Publishing decisions etc. … (3) The court, commission or registrar may, in the public interest or for another reason the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate– (a) withhold publication of a document; or (b) modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document. [18] Open justice is one of the fundamental principles of our justice system, but it may, on rare occasions, be limited where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice. [19] In John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales,1 McHugh JA relevantly stated: The fundamental rule of the common law is that the administration of justice must take place in open court. A court can only depart from this rule where its observance would frustrate the administration 1 (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 ('John Fairfax'). -- 4 of 6 -- 5 of justice or some other public interest for whose protection Parliament has modified the open justice rule. The principle of open justice also requires that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of what occurs in the courtroom. Accordingly, an order of a court prohibiting the publication of evidence is only valid if it is really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before it. Moreover, an order prohibiting publication of evidence must be clear in its terms and do no more than is necessary to achieve the due administration of justice. The making of the order must also be reasonably necessary; and there must be some material before the court upon which it can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication. Mere belief that the order is necessary is insufficient. 2 [20] In my view, in determining whether orders of the kind sought by the Appellant should be granted, the principle of open justice is the starting point and then consideration is given to whether such orders should be made having regard to the relevant statutory provisions. This was the conclusion reached by Vice President O'Connor in Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd,3 where his Honour stated (citations omitted): [40] The starting point in considering an application to suppress or to withhold names of witnesses or parties is a fundamental principle of open justice; 'that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. This is a central feature of the administration of justice under the common law. [41] The open justice principle operates not only as an overarching principle guiding judicial decision-making and various aspects of procedure, it also gives rise to a number of substantive open justice rules that, in the usual course of events, a court must follow. Such rules include: first, that judicial proceedings are conducted, and decisions pronounced, in 'open court'; second, that evidence is communicated publicly to those present in the court; and, third, that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, including by the media. [42] However, the rules to which the open justice principle gives rise are not absolute. Whilst the principles of open justice will usually require the publication of the names of those involved in the proceedings, there are numerous statutory exceptions. [43] The Commission has the power to de-identify judgments and redact information from judgments if there is a good reason to do so. Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) recognises that power. … [44] It is accepted that the discretion to anonymise a decision might be exercised in favour of not identifying persons who are the victim of sexual assault or discrimination, children, or persons whose private financial affairs are relevant to a decision. It is also accepted that the discretion may be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to avoid prejudice to the administration of justice in particular proceedings or to avoid some other relevant harm. [21] The facts at the heart of the appeal are related to allegations of assaults of a sexual nature by one employee of the Appellant against another employee of the Appellant. On the evidence before me, it is not clear if the allegations have been or are under police investigation. These are reasons in themselves for granting orders of the kind sought by the Appellant. Further, having regard to the unchallenged evidence of the Appellant, if the names of the Complainant and of B, who are current employees of the Appellant, are 2 John Fairfax (n 1), 476-477. 3 [2021] QIRC 263. -- 5 of 6 -- 6 made public, then that creates a risk of psychological harm to both of them. For these reasons, I consider that the disclosure of the names of the Complainant and of B should not occur. [22] Further, the publication of the name of the Appellant would make the identification of the Complainant and of B highly probable. As such, the name of the Appellant should not be disclosed. In addition, the names of the Appellant, the Complainant and of B may be disclosed if the appeal was open to the public. For this reason, the hearing of the appeal should be closed to the public. I will also order that the name of the Appellant be identified in all notices of listing by the Industrial Registrar as 'A'. [23] The Appellant has established satisfactory reasons for me to grant the orders it seeks. Orders [24] I make the following orders: 1. Pursuant to r 97(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunal) Rules 2011, this decision in Matter No. WC/2025/228 is modified before publication by anonymising the name of the Appellant, the name of the applicant for workers' compensation and the name of the person who made a complaint against the applicant for workers' compensation. 2. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, except by the Appellant or the Respondent, the inspection of the file maintained by the Industrial Registrar in Matter No. WC/2025/228, and the copying of any document from the file maintained by the Industrial Registrar in Matter No. WC/2025/228, is prohibited unless otherwise ordered by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. 3. Pursuant to s 451(2)(c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016: (a) in all notices of listing by the Industrial Registrar in Matter No. WC/2025/228, the name of the Appellant be identified as 'A'; and (b) the hearing of the appeal in Matter No. WC/2025/228 will be closed to the public. -- 6 of 6 --