Briton v State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) [2025] QIRC 315

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Britton v State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) [2025] QIRC 315 PARTIES: Britton, Bianca (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2025/227 PROCEEDING: Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a conversion decision DELIVERED ON: HEARING DATE: 18 November 2025 18 November 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: Dwyer IC Brisbane ORDER: The decision is confirmed CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR ⎯ EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – request for permanent appointment at higher classification – position created by temporary funding – funding ended – position ceased to exist – request refused – decision fair and reasonable LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B, 562C -- 1 of 10 -- 2 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 114(3)(i), 120 Directive 02/23: Review of non-permanent employment CASES: APPEARANCES: Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 195 Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203 Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2021] QIRC 087 B. Britton, the Appellant, on her own behalf D. Nay, Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety, on behalf of the Respondent Reasons for Decision (Amended from transcript) Introduction [1] Ms Bianca Britton is substantively employed as a Child Safety Support Officer (AO3) with the Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety (‘the respondent’). [2] More recently, Ms Britton has been acting as a Court Liaison Officer (‘CLO’) (AO5) in Townsville as part of the respondent’s statewide network of CLOs. -- 2 of 10 -- 3 [3] Ms Britton commenced her continuous higher duties role as a CLO in July 2022.1 This appears to approximately coincide with the commencement of funding for an initiative known as Fast Track Sentencing (‘FTS’).2 [4] The FTS initiative funding allowed for the creation of additional CLO roles to service the needs within inter alia the Townsville courts. At some point after 1 July 2024, it was announced that the funding for the FTS initiative was ending. It was proposed to end on 30 June 2025 but was further extended briefly until 30 September 2025. [5] On 3 September 2025 Ms Britton made a request pursuant to s 120 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) (‘the PS Act’) for employment at the higher classification at which she had been working since 2022. [6] On or about 7 October 2025 Ms Britton was advised via correspondence (‘the decision’) that her request was declined. The decision relevantly stated: As you may be aware, the Fast Track Sentencing Initiative approved by the former Government, provided five temporary positions for the Court Liaison Officer team. The initiative came with the additional reporting requirements that made these positions different to the standard positions. The funding for those five positions ended as at 30 June 2025. Statewide Operations sought a short- term extension of positions where an employee was against those roles, this included yourself, while the department awaited the 2025-26 Budget outcomes. As these roles were not funded by Government, unfortunately, all five positions ended as at 30 September 2025. At this time, the genuine operational requirements of this entity do not support your permanent employment to the role you were performing as there is no identified ongoing operational requirements for an additional permanent Court Liaison Officer in Townsville. (Emphasis added) [7] Ms Britton filed an appeal on 23 October 2025. It is this decision that Ms Britton seeks reviewed. Nature of Appeal [8] Under Chapter 11 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (‘the IR Act’), the role of the Commission is to review the decision appealed against.3 The IR Act does not define the term 'review'. The term 'review' will take its meaning from the context in which it appears.4 [9] An appeal under Chapter 11 of the IR Act is not a rehearing of the matter,5 but rather, it is a review of the decision and the decision-making process.6 The role of the Commission 1 Appellant’s submissions filed 11 November 2025 at [2]. 2 Ibid at [9]. 3 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B. 4 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10. 5 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5. 6 Ibid. -- 3 of 10 -- 4 in such an appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. This is provided by s 562B of the IR Act: 562B Public service appeal to commission is by way of review (1) This section applies to a public service appeal made to the commission. (2) The commission must decide the appeal by reviewing the decision appealed against. (3) The purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. (Emphasis added) [10] Section 562C of the IR Act relevantly provides that: 562C Public service appeals—decision on appeal (1) In deciding a public service appeal, the commission may— (a) confirm the decision appealed against; or … (c) for another appeal—set the decision aside, and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate. Submissions [11] The Appeal Notice filed by Ms Britton on 23 October 2025 attached a copy of the decision as well as a Schedule setting out her grounds of appeal. In circumstances where I considered myself fully informed of both the reasons for decision and the grounds upon which Ms Britton considered the decision unfair, I informed the parties at a mention on 30 October 2025 that I did not require written submissions. I resolved to deal with the matter by way of oral hearing. [12] Notwithstanding the views I had expressed, Ms Britton still sought an opportunity to file submissions and, in the interest of allowing her an opportunity to be comprehensively heard, I gave leave for her to file submissions which she did on 11 November 2025. I do not intend to restate those submissions in these reasons. [13] I note that the written submissions filed by Ms Britton expand significantly on the matters addressed in the schedule to the Appeal Notice and traverse many issues not previously raised, but ultimately, not relevant to a public sector appeal of this type. I will address the salient portions of Ms Britton’s written submissions later in these reasons. [14] The matter proceeded to an oral hearing on 18 November 2025. During the hearing I explained to Ms Britton that there were a number of significant barriers to the success of -- 4 of 10 -- 5 her appeal that were readily apparent from the material filed. Over the course of approximately 2 hours these were explained to Ms Britton and her further oral submissions and responses were received. The further submissions and responses of Ms Britton did not reveal any facts or evidence capable of overcoming the barriers already identified. The transcript of the hearing proceedings contains the full details of the issues identified by the Commission and the matters discussed with Ms Britton. [15] In circumstances where I had identified at least one major barrier to the success of Ms Britton’s appeal, I gave her an opportunity to withdraw her appeal. After taking a short adjournment to consider this proposal Ms Britton exercised her right to ask the Commission to proceed to issue written reasons. Consideration [16] The material before the Commission reveals significant portions of Ms Britton’s appeal grounds and submissions to be misconceived or irrelevant. The starting point for understanding these misconceptions is noting that Ms Britton is a permanent employee. Confusion about principles applicable to applicants requesting permanent appointment pursuant to s 120 of the PS Act [17] Firstly, there are numerous references by Ms Britton in her material to the operation and application of Directive 02/23 ‘Review of non-permanent employment’ (‘Directive 02/23’). Ms Britton cited numerous circumstances where the respondent has not complied with this Directive. The problem for Ms Britton is that this Directive has no application to her because she holds permanent employment with the public service as a Child Safety Support Officer. [18] To be fair to Ms Britton, the respondent cites Directive 02/23 in the opening paragraph of the decision. I presume the decision was preceded by email exchanges between the parties whereby Ms Britton requested the permanent appointment. I cannot ascertain which party first introduced consideration of the incorrect Directive or when it was first referred to. In any event, it does not matter. Even if the respondent had incorrectly applied it to their consideration, such an error cannot create obligations on the respondent or confer rights on Ms Britton that do not apply. Moreover, given the circumstances of this decision, the error of the parties is not such that it renders the decision unfair and unreasonable. [19] Secondly, Ms Britton complains that the respondent failed to mandatorily review her employment after two years allegedly in contravention of “s 120 (1)-(2)” of the PS Act.7 Section 120 of the PS Act imposes no such obligation. While the PS Act does contain a provision imposing such an obligation on a chief executive, it has no application to Ms Britton. Ms Britton plainly mistook s 120 for s 115 of the PS Act, which only applies to non-permanent employees. 7 Appeal Notice filed 23 October 2025, Schedule 1. -- 5 of 10 -- 6 [20] Having regard to both of these errors in Ms Britton’s arguments, it would appear she has fundamentally misunderstood that the sections of the PS Act she purports to rely on, (and Directive 02/23) apply to temporary employees, not temporary roles. [21] This misconception has most prominently affected Ms Britton’s understanding. It has caused her more broadly to conflate the notion of an ongoing need for the role she was performing, with an ongoing role. On further reflection I consider this is most likely a consequence of her erroneous application of the principles relevant to conversion of non- permanent employees to her circumstances instead of those applicable to an employee seeking permanent appointment to a higher classification in which they have been acting. It is the former of these that imposes an obligation by a decision maker to consider whether there is an ongoing need for someone to be employed in the role or a substantially similar role.8 [22] Again, to be fair to Ms Britton, the respondent also appears to have erroneously blended this notion into their reasons for decision with its superfluous reference to ‘no ongoing operational requirements’ for additional CLOs. Given the loss of funding causing the loss of the positions and given s 114(3)(i) of the PS Act does not apply to Ms Britton, this conclusion by the decision maker (accurate or not) is irrelevant. Submissions addressing irrelevant matters [23] More generally Ms Britton’s submissions filed on 11 November 2025 descend into a rather elaborate collection of assertions about mismanagement, discrimination, reprisal, and other misconduct by certain managers. As an insight into the fractured state of her employment relationship with the respondent, Ms Britton refers to having filed a Public Interest Disclosure and a Grievance, though it seems that neither of these are progressing. [24] Ms Britton appears to be drawing the Commission's attention to these matters to somehow undermine the integrity of the decision i.e. as if to suggest that there are other factors behind the decision. There is no evidence accompanying the submission that would be of any probative support for this, and in any event, I would hesitate to consider those allegations given they tend to draw the Commission into a consideration of the merit of the decision. [25] To be clear, I am not dismissing Ms Britton’s assertions regarding these matters or making any definitive finding about them. As I explained to Ms Britton at the hearing of this matter, her extensive complaints about the conduct of the respondent go well beyond matters able to be considered in a review of a decision pursuant to s 562B of the IR Act and they are more properly addressed through other proceedings available to her, should she choose to pursue them. 8 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 114(3)(i). -- 6 of 10 -- 7 The really big problem [26] At the outset of the hearing, I established through a submission of the respondent that the AO5 role performed by Ms Britton had assigned to it a position number. The position number related to a position created for and funded by the FTS initiative. I further ascertained that that position number was now archived and designated as ‘inactive’ in keeping with the position being extinguished at the end of the funding. [27] The respondent confirmed that the FTS funding ended on 30 September 2025. Ms Britton objected to this and contended that there was apparently funding for other roles. Ms Britton offered no evidence that the FTS funding was continuing. Ms Britton seemed to confuse the temporary funding with more general budgetary and policy considerations with respect to funding for creation of roles. Her anecdotal examples in support of her assertion all but confirmed this. The comparisons she offered as examples of available funding were neither genuine nor realistic. They related to different courts at different times, in different operational settings. [28] All of this brings us to the fundamental barrier for the success of Ms Britton’s appeal. The problem is best understood by reference to s 120 of the PS Act and the established jurisprudence relevant to requests for permanent appointment at a higher classification, and also genuine operational requirements. I summarised both in Sheppard v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women):9 The decision of Holcombe [23] The submissions of the parties in this matter were filed at around the time of the release of the decision by Commissioner McLennan in the matter of Holcombe v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) (‘Holcombe’) and, unsurprisingly, neither party has made reference to it in their submissions. [24] In Holcombe the Commission found that: The PS Act, at s 149C(1)(c), provides that s 149 applies to a public service employee if they are eligible for appointment to the position. Further, s 149C(3) provides that the employee may ask to be appointed to the position at the higher classification level. The power afforded to the department to permanently appoint Mrs Holcombe is confined to the position into which she has been seconded at the time of the review. That can be contrasted with the entitlement to request a review, which merely requires that, amongst other things, a person be engaged in a higher classification level for a period. The term ‘the position’ is inherently more specific than ‘higher classification level’; many positions could be described as being of a higher classification level. In that way, it can be said that an employee may be entitled to a review after engaging in a number of positions, but the review must be conducted against a precise position. ... 9 [2021] QIRC 087 at [23]-[30]. -- 7 of 10 -- 8 The PS Act at s 149C, in concert with the Directive, creates a framework where if a person has been acting at a higher classification for a particular period, they may be permanently appointed to the position they occupy. There is no contemplation in those materials that the meaning of the position would be so broad as to encapsulate any position with the same title and classification anywhere in the workplace, or the city, or indeed the State. (Emphasis added) … Genuine operational requirements … [30] In Morison the Deputy President observed: … The phrase 'genuine operational requirements of the department' is not defined in the PS Act or in the Directive. As a consequence, that phrase must take its meaning from the words used in it and the context in which it appears in the PS Act; and consideration of the context includes surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the instrument, the instrument as a whole and it extends to what the instrument seeks to remedy. The same considerations apply to the construction of the same phrase in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive. The adjective 'genuine' relevantly means '... being truly such; real; authentic.' The phrase 'operational requirements of the department' is obviously a broad term that permits a consideration of many matters depending upon the particular circumstances of the department at a particular time. In considering the context of s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act, the chief executive of a department, under the PS Act, is responsible for, amongst other things: • managing the department in a way that promotes the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources; and • planning human resources, including ensuring the employment in the department of persons on a fixed term temporary or casual basis occurs only if there is a reason for the basis of employment under the PS Act. … There can be no dispute that the reason Ms Morison is presently acting in the higher classification level in position number 7021866 is that the incumbent of that position is on special leave. However, the incumbent may return from such leave. That was a relevant matter for Ms Matebau to have considered in deciding the request made by Ms Morison. Put another way, in having regard to genuine operational requirements of the Department, it was relevant for Ms Matebau to consider whether, in terms of managing the Department in a way that promoted the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources, Ms Morison should be appointed to position number 7021866 when it was possible the incumbent was likely to return to that position. (Emphasis added) -- 8 of 10 -- 9 [29] While both Morison and Holcombe consider earlier iterations of the PS Act and Directive 02/23, the relevant language is materially the same as the current provisions. Section 120 of the PS Act relevantly provides: 120 Employee may request employment at higher classification level after 1 year of continuous acting or secondment (1) If the public sector employee has been acting at, or seconded to, a higher classification level for a continuous period of at least 1 year, the employee may ask the employee’s chief executive to employ the employee in the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis, after— (a) the end of 1 year of acting at, or being seconded to, the higher classification level; and (b) the end of each subsequent 1-year period. (2) The employee’s chief executive must decide the request within the required period. (3) The employee’s chief executive may decide to employ the employee in the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis only if the chief executive considers the employee is suitable to perform the role. … (Emphasis added) [30] It must be firmly borne in mind that the provisions of s 120 of the PS Act allow an employee to request appointment to the position they have been acting in. It is a request specific to the position, not the classification. [31] In the circumstances, where the funding source for the role previously filled by Ms Britton has ended, and the position is now inactive and archived, there is no position in which she can be employed. [32] In fairness to Ms Britton, the language of the decision is somewhat clumsy and apt to confuse her. The unnecessary reference to ‘no ongoing operational requirement for additional permanent CLOs in Townsville’ is contrary to Ms Britton’s experience working there. But in every practical sense, the substantive reason for the decision is plainly explained in the preceding paragraph of the decision i.e. the funding for the position has ended. Whether there is an ongoing need for the work to be performed is irrelevant in those circumstances. [33] The loss of specific funding supporting a position and the subsequent inactivation of the position is entirely within the circumstances contemplated by the terms ‘genuine operational requirements’ contained in the PS Act and Directive 03/23. Leaving aside the inefficient use of resources that would inevitably occur to create a permanent AO5 CLO position for Ms Britton, the restrictive language of s 120 of the PS Act limits the respondent’s consideration to a position that has ceased to exist. It would be a technical impossibility to grant Ms Britton’s request. -- 9 of 10 -- 10 [34] In those circumstances I can only conclude the decision under review is fair and reasonable. Order [35] In the circumstances I make the following Order: The decision is confirmed. -- 10 of 10 --