Deans v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 108

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Deans v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 108 PARTIES: Deans, Christina (Appellant) v State of Queensland (Department of Education) (Respondent) CASE NO: PSA/2025/38 PROCEEDING: Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a conversion decision DELIVERED ON: 30 April 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: O’Neill IC On the papers ORDERS: That pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. CATCHWORDS: PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – appeal against conversion decision - where appellant requested permanent appointment to a higher classification – where conversion request was rejected – where the respondent relies on its genuine operational requirements as the basis for rejection – consideration of phrase ''genuine operational requirements'' in Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 120 whether decision fair and reasonable – decision fair and reasonable. -- 1 of 15 -- 2 LEGISLATION: CASES: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B, s 562C Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 120 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27B Directive 03/23 Review of acting or secondment at a higher classification level Department of Education State School Teachers' Certified Agreement 2022, cl 10.5.3 Ahmad v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2022] QIRC 167 Barker v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 224 Bradshaw v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 104 Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16 Cushing v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 252 Forrest v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 085 Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018) Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203 -- 2 of 15 -- 3 Nangit v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy) [2021] QIRC 038 Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252 Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446 Thorne v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 015 Reasons for Decision Introduction [1] Ms Christina Deans ('the Appellant') appeals a decision of the State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('the Respondent') to refuse her permanent appointment to a higher classification level. [2] The Appellant is substantively employed by the Respondent on a permanent, full-time basis as an Experienced Senior Teacher (General) at Clontarf Beach State School. [3] The Appellant has been acting at a higher classification position of Guidance Officer at Griffin State School, Metro North Region since 19 January 2023. Her acting arrangement in the higher classification position currently has an end date of 12 December 2025 when the substantive incumbent in the role is due to return following a temporary period of performing duties in another role. [4] The Appellant first made a request for conversion to permanency in the Guidance Officer role on 9 May 2024. This request was denied by correspondence dated 28 May 2024 on the basis that there was an incumbent permanently employed in the role and that there was no operational requirement for two employees in that role.1 [5] On 13 February 2025 the Appellant made a further request to be permanently appointed to the higher classification level, in accordance with the provisions of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act') and Directive 03/23 – Review of acting or secondment at higher classification level ('the Directive'). [6] On 5 March 2025, Mr Damien Cricchiola, Executive Director, Integrity and Employee Relations ('the Decision-Maker'), wrote to the Appellant advising her that pursuant to s 1 Appellant's Appeal Notice filed 14 March 2025, Attachment 1. -- 3 of 15 -- 4 120(5) of the PS Act that the Respondent would not appoint the Appellant to the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis. The reasons for this decision mirrored the earlier decision dated 9 May 2024. [7] On 14 March 2025, the Appellant filed an appeal challenging the decision. Having regard to the submissions made by the parties and the material before me, the decision was fair and reasonable and, for that reason, pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'), I confirm the decision. [8] My reasons follow. The decision letter [9] In the correspondence dated 5 March 2025, the Decision-Maker confirmed that the Respondent had decided not to employ the Appellant at the higher classification level on a permanent basis, citing the genuine operational requirements of the Department. The Decision-Maker wrote: In considering the factors provided for in section 120(4) of the PS Act, a chief executive is responsible for determining the genuine operational requirements for the public sector entity having regard to the context of the operation and service delivery needs of the entity. In this case I have determined that it is not appropriate to permanently employ you in the higher classification level position as an existing employee is absent from the position to perform another role within the Department. The Commission has generally considered that the return of a substantive employee to the position represents a genuine operational requirement to support the temporary employment of an employee at a higher classification level.2 The consequence of appointing you the higher classification position would be that two permanent employees would then occupy the one position of Guidance Officer, Griffin State School upon the substantive employee’s return. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the department’s resources does not require two employees in this position. The genuine operational requirements of the department therefore support the retention of your employment on a temporary basis only, prior to the return of the substantive incumbent to the position. [10] In coming to this decision, the Decision-Maker noted that the Appellant: was currently acting at a higher classification level position in the Department where she was employed; has acted at the higher classification for at least a year; and was suitable for appointment to the higher classification level position. 2 Barker v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2020] QIRC 224. -- 4 of 15 -- 5 [11] The Decision-Maker further noted that it was not possible to identify the number of times the Appellant's engagement at the higher classification role had been extended. [12] The Decision-Maker made specific reference to the earlier decision of Ms Rynell Hastie- Burroughs dated 28 May 2024 to refuse the Appellant's earlier request for conversion. [13] In consideration of these factors as well as the Appellant's human rights, the Decision- Maker ultimately refused the Appellant's request for permanent appointment to the higher classification level due to the genuine operational requirements needs of the Department. Grounds of Appeal [14] In the Appeal Notice filed on 14 March 2025, the Appellant records the following reasons for her appeal: The total continuous period I have been acting in the above higher classification level position in the Department is two (2) years, one (1) month and two (7) weeks and I am currently on my 6th extension to contract. Operationally I understand the logistics that I am backfilling a permanent Guidance Officer allocated to Griffin State School (Annette Sanders). I have confirmation from Annette that she will not be returning to Griffin State School which has also been confirmed by Senior Guidance Officer, Katrina Clary. Both my Principal, Leisa Woods ,and Senior Guidance Officer, Katrina Clary, are advocating for my move to permanency at Griffin State School to provide some stability in the school and to allow my old school who are holding my substantive position (Clontarf Beach SS) clarity around their staffing. I would appreciate further consideration of temp > perm conversion please given the timeframes and direct knowledge of the substantive employees (sic) position on returning to Griffin SS. Jurisdiction Appeal principles [15] As provided in section 562B(2)(3) of the IR Act, the appeal must be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against. The appeal is not conducted by way of re-hearing,3 but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at by the Department and the associated decision-making process.4 [16] Findings made in the decision which are reasonably open on the relevant material or evidence before the decision-maker should not be expected to be disturbed on appeal. 3 Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5; Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 567(1). 4 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(2). -- 5 of 15 -- 6 [17] The stated purpose of such an appeal is to decide whether the decision was fair and reasonable. The issue for my determination is whether the decision by Mr Cricchiola to deny conversion of the Appellant's employment to permanent was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.5 What decisions can the QIRC Member make? [18] As provided in section 562C of the IR Act, the Commission may determine to either: • confirm the decision appealed against; • set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or • set the decision aside and substitute another decision. Decision against which an appeal may be made [19] On 13 February 2025, the Appellant requested appointment to the higher classification level, pursuant to s 120(1) of the PS Act and cl 6 of the Directive. [20] Section 131 of the PS Act identifies the categories of which decisions an appeal can be made against. Section 131(1)(a) of the PS Act provides that an appeal may be made against "a conversion decision". [21] In this case, that is a decision "under section 120 … not to employ a public sector employee at a higher classification level, if the employee had been acting at, or seconded to, the higher classification level for a continuous period … of at least 2 years."6 [22] I am satisfied that the decision is one that is able to be appealed pursuant to s 131 of the PS Act, and further, that the Appellant is entitled to appeal. [23] Section 134 of the PS Act allows for public sector appeals to be heard and decided by the Industrial Relations Commission. [24] Section 564(3) of the IR Act requires an appeal to be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given . [25] The Appellant received the decision letter on 5 March 2025 and the Appeal Notice was filed in the Industrial Registry on 14 March 2025. I am satisfied that the appeal has been 5 Page v John Thompson and Lesley Dwyer, As Chief Executive Officer, West Moreton Hospital and Health Service [2014] QSC 252, [60]-[61]; Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B. 6 Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 129(e). -- 6 of 15 -- 7 brought within the required time. Relevant Provisions [26] The legislative scheme for the review of a decision to convert an employee to a higher classification level position, in the above circumstances, is contained in the IR Act, PS Act and Directive 03/23. [27] Section 120 of the PS Act provides: 120 Employee may request employment at higher classification level after 1 year of continuous acting or secondment (1) If the public sector employee has been acting at, or seconded to, a higher classification level for a continuous period of at least 1 year, the employee may ask the employee's chief executive to employ the employee in the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis, after— (a) the end of 1 year of acting at, or being seconded to, the higher classification level; and (b) the end of each subsequent 1-year period. (2) The employee's chief executive must decide the request within the required period. (3) The employee's chief executive may decide to employ the employee in the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis only if the chief executive considers the employee is suitable to perform the role. (4) In making the decision, the employee's chief executive must have regard to— (a) the genuine operational requirements of the public sector entity; and (b) the reasons for each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the person during the person's continuous period of acting at, or secondment to, the higher classification level. (5) If the employee's chief executive decides to refuse the request, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating— (a) the reasons for the decision; and (b) the total continuous period for which the employee has been acting at, or seconded to, the higher classification level in the public sector entity; and (c) how many times the employee's acting arrangement or secondment has been extended; and -- 7 of 15 -- 8 (d) each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the employee during the employee's continuous period of acting at, or secondment to, the higher classification level. (6) … (7) … (8) in this section— continuous period, in relation to an employee acting at, or seconded to, a higher classification level, has the meaning given under a directive. required period, for making a decision under subsection (2), means— (a) the period stated in an industrial instrument within which the decision must be made; or (b) if paragraph (a) does not apply—28 days after the request is made. suitable, in relation to an employee performing a role, has the meaning given under a directive. Suitable, in relation to an employee performing a role, has the meaning given under a directive. (Emphasis added) [28] Clause 7 of the Directive provides as follows (emphasis added): 7. Decision-making 7.1 When making a decision in consideration of the factors provided for in section 120(4) of the Act, a chief executive is responsible for determining the genuine operational requirements of the public sector entity. Submissions [29] The Commission issued a Directions Order on 14 March 2025 calling for submissions from both parties following receipt of the appeal notice. The submissions are summarised below. Appellant's submissions [30] The Appellant provided submissions by emails dated 18 March 2025 and 20 March 2025. The submissions are summarised as follows – • The Appellant has held the position for 2 years 3 months and 18 days consecutively and is currently in her 6th extension to the contract. -- 8 of 15 -- 9 • The Appellant's Senior Guidance Officer and Principal are both advocating for her to be granted permanency in the role and have advised her to submit the appeal. • The substantive employee, Annette Sanders, has confirmed directly she does not wish to come back to Griffin State School. • The substantive employee was relieving above level for a considerable time, however for 2025 is Guidance Officer in a local state school where she wishes to stay. • The Appellant' s substantive school, Clontarf Beach State School, would also like to fill her position and offer permanency to temporary employees filling the Appellant' s role there. • The school is trying to offer its families at Griffin State School some consistency and follow trauma informed best practise which means ensuring a safe, consistent support person for longitudinal service supports. It is psychologically unsafe for vulnerable families to have to re-tell their trauma, substance abuse, DFV background and support needs to changing, temporary support staff. The school wants to be sure its community has stability and limit any further impact for its families who often feel they have to 'start again' when their main support person moves on. • In the email dated 20 March 2025 the Appellant emphasised the nature of the vulnerable cohort of students at Griffin State School and the ground work she has undertaken over two years to build trust within the school community which will be lost if she moves on. The Appellant noted that in 2024 the school had a change of Principal, Head of Specialist Services (who looks after children with disabilities) and three Deputy Principals. The Appellant contends that some stability would benefit the community. Respondent's submissions [31] The Respondent's submissions7 are summarised as follows – • The Respondent submits the Decision was fair and reasonable on the basis that: a) the Decision complied with the relevant sections of the PS Act and the Directive; b) the Decision had due regard for the Appellant's human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019; and 7 Respondent's submissions filed on 11 April 2025. -- 9 of 15 -- 10 c) it was reasonably open to the Decision-Maker to not to approve the Appellant's request on a permanent basis due to the Department's genuine operational requirements. • The Respondent refers to His Honour, Deputy President Merrell's decision in Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women)8, which outlines the definition of 'genuine operational requirements'. • The Respondent submits that it is not viable or appropriate to employ the Appellant in the position at the higher classification level on a permanent basis given the position is substantively occupied by another incumbent. • Specifically, the Appellant is backfilling a substantive permanent full-time Guidance Officer at Griffin State School, who is relieving at another school in the Metro North Region. This arrangement has an end date of 12 December 2023. • In these circumstances, the Respondent submits that it is reasonable to conclude that the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the Respondent's resources does not require two permanent employees in the one position. The genuine operational requirements of the Respondent therefore supported the Decision. [32] The Respondent goes on to submit that even if the substantive employee chooses to vacate the position, at the time of the Decision, Metro North had identified two permanent Guidance Officers requiring priority permanent placement under clause 10.5.3 of the Department of Education State School Teachers' Certified Agreement 2022 ('the Certified Agreement'). [33] The Respondent cites the decision of Industrial Commissioner Pratt in Forrest v State of Queensland (Department of Education),9 in which the Commission made the following observations regarding the Respondent's obligations pursuant to clause 10.5.3 of the Certified Agreement: [32] I have no difficulty in finding that, that the plain meaning of clause 10.5.3 of the Certified Agreement is that the Respondent had an obligation to prioritise employees seeking transfer and relocation. The clause means what it says and that is, quite simply, exactly what it says in my opinion. … … [38] … There seems to me to have been a lack of consideration for the Appellant, who was, by the Respondent's own admission, suitably qualified to assume the position he was applying for conversion to. There was, however, a legal obligation upon the Respondent to prioritise the transfer and relocation process. That was a genuine operational requirement which gave 8 [2020] QIRC 203. 9 [2025] QIRC 085. -- 10 of 15 -- 11 rise to the Decision in my opinion. Consequently, I find that the Decision is fair and reasonable. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal and order that the Decision is confirmed.10 [34] In relation to the Appellant's reliance on the suggested intentions of the substantive incumbent to not return to the Guidance Officer position at Griffin State School and to remain in the position she is currently relieving in, the Respondent makes the following submissions: • The Appellant's submissions are not supported by any evidence. • The position in question must be regarded as being substantively filled. • In Cushing v State of Queensland (Department of Education)11('Cushing'), Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon examined a substantive employee's possible desire not to return to their position as justification to support a request for conversion to higher duties: [72] While it appears the return of the substantive occupant is unlikely, it remains the case that at the time Ms Cushing' s application was being considered, the position was permanently held by an employee who has a known return date of 9 December 2023. The substantive occupant of the role retains a right to return to that role, and if l were to appoint Ms Cushing to the role at the higher classification, I may well create a situation where from 9 December 2023, there are two permanently employed individuals reporting to work for the same single Business Manager role at the school.12 Consideration [32] To determine this appeal, I am required to assess whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. [33] Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)13 ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.14 [34] In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.15 His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal 10 Ibid, [32] and [38]. 11 [2023] QIRC 252 (Pidgeon IC). 12 Ibid, [72]. 13 [2022] QIRC 16. 14 Ibid, at [25], citing Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446. 15 Colebourne (n 13) at [21]-[22] and [25]. -- 11 of 15 -- 12 reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.16 Are there genuine operational requirements preventing the Appellant's appointment? [35] The phrase 'genuine operational requirements' is not defined in either the PS Act or in the Directive. [36] Guidance as to the meaning of this phrase has been provided by Deputy President Merrell in Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women).17 In that decision His Honour observed as follows: (Emphasis added) [37] The phrase 'genuine operational requirements of the department' is not defined in the PS Act or in the Directive. As a consequence, that phrase must take its meaning from the words used in it and the context in which it appears in the PS Act; and consideration of the context includes surrounding provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the instrument, the instrument as a whole and it extends to what the instrument seeks to remedy. The same considerations apply to the construction of the same phrase in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive. [38] The adjective 'genuine' relevantly means '…being truly such; real; authentic.' The phrase 'operational requirements of the department' is obviously a broad term that permits a consideration of many matters depending upon the particular circumstances of the department at a particular time. In considering the context of s 149C(4A)(a) of the PS Act, the chief executive of a department, under the PS Act, is responsible for, amongst other things: • managing the department in a way that promotes the effective, efficient and appropriate management of public resources; and • planning human resources, including ensuring the employment in the department of persons on a fixed term temporary or casual basis occurs only if there is a reason for the basis of employment under the PS Act. … [40] The phrase 'genuine operational requirements of the department' in s 149(4A)(a) and in cl 6.2(a) of the Directive, construed in context, would at least include whether or not there was an authentic need, having regard to the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the public resources of the department, to appoint an employee, who has been assuming the duties and responsibilities of a higher classification level in the department for the requisite period of time, to '…the position at the higher classification level.'18 [37] I have a significant degree of sympathy for the Appellant in circumstances where both the Principal and Senior Guidance Officer at Griffin State School want her permanently 16 Ibid, at [23] citing Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008. 17 Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203. 18 Ibid. -- 12 of 15 -- 13 in the Guidance Officer role, and she has been told by the substantive incumbent of the role that she does not intend to return to Griffin State School. [38] Despite the incumbent position holder having told the Appellant that she has no intention of returning to the position at Griffin State School, I agree with the conclusions reached by Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon in Cushing in similar circumstances. Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon observed that whatever the subjective intentions of the incumbent regarding not returning to the role, the substantive incumbent remains permanently employed in substantive role.19 [39] In the present case, no matter what the intentions of Ms Sanders are about not returning to Griffin State School, she remains permanently employed as the Guidance Officer at Griffin State School with an apparent return date in December 2025. [40] Further, there is no guarantee that the intentions of the substantive incumbent about not returning could change before December 2025. Until the Guidance Officer position at Griffin State School is vacated or relinquished by the substantive incumbent, there is someone permanently appointed to that position. [41] I further note that in a number of authorities, the Commission has previously concluded that a higher classification position having an incumbent occupant in circumstances where there is a known expected end date to the temporary engagement is a genuine operational reason making it not viable or appropriate to appoint the person acting in the role to the higher classification position.20 [42] I accept the Respondent's submission that it is reasonable to conclude that the effective, efficient and appropriate management of the Respondent's resources does not require two permanent employees in the one position. I am therefore satisfied that the genuine operational requirements of the Respondent prevented the Appellant's permanent appointment to the position. [43] This finding is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. I note however, that I consider there is also merit to the Respondent's contentions based on clause 10.53 of the Certified Agreement. That is, even if the Guidance Officer position at Griffin State School was vacant, the Respondent is legally obligated to consider the position of permanent Guidance Officers requiring priority permanent placement pursuant to clause 10.53 of the Certified Agreement. I agree with the conclusions of Industrial Commissioner Pratt 19 See the comments of Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon in Cushing v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 252 at [70]. 20 See, eg, Ahmad v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2022] QIRC 167 (Hartigan DP); Nangit v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy) [2021] QIRC 038 (Merrell DP); Thorne v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 015 (Power IC); Cushing v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 252 (Pidgeon IC). -- 13 of 15 -- 14 in Forrest v State of Queensland (Department of Education),21 which I have excerpted at paragraph [33] above. This provides a further genuine operational requirement which would prevent the Appellant's appointment to the position. [44] I find that the decision-maker has correctly considered and applied the decision criteria in accordance with the PS Act and the Directive and that the decision-maker's reliance on genuine operational requirements to refuse conversion was fair and reasonable in the factual context of this case. Compliance with requirements of s 120 of the PS Act [45] The Respondent is required to comply with s 120(5) of the PS Act, which provides as follows: (5) If the department’s chief executive decides to refuse the request, the chief executive must give the employee a notice stating— (a) reasons for the decision; and (b) the total continuous period for which the employee has been acting at, or seconded to, the higher classification level in the public sector entity; and (c) how many times the employee’s acting arrangement or secondment has been extended; and (d) each decision previously made, or taken to have been made, under this section in relation to the employee during the employee’s continuous period of acting at, or secondment to, the higher classification level. [46] Clause 10.1 of the Directive provides that decisions made to refuse a request pursuant to s 120 of the PS Act must comply with the requirements of s 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). The decision maker's reasons were brief and limited; however, I am satisfied that the decision conforms with this requirement. [47] The Respondent provided a decision notice outlining the reasons for the decision and confirmed that the Appellant has acted in a higher classification role for two years, one month and two weeks. [48] The decision also confirmed that there had been one previous decision on 28 May 2024 declining an application for appointment at a higher classification on the basis of genuine operational requirements. [49] Pursuant to s 120(5)(c) of the PS Act, the decision should also confirm how many times the employee's acting arrangement or secondment has been extended. In the decision, the Decision-Maker has noted that despite enquiries being made with the Appellant's region and consulting the Respondent's Total Solution Series system (the payroll system), it was 21 [2025] QIRC 085. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 not possible to identify with any certainty the number of times that the Appellant's contract had been extended. [50] As noted by Industrial Commissioner Dwyer in Bradshaw v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)22: … evidence of a failure by a decision maker to conform with the express terms of a statute or directive will not, of itself, render a decision unfair and unreasonable. Whether it does or does not will depend entirely on the circumstances in which the omission has arisen, and whether it has given rise to any objective unfairness and unreasonableness.23 [51] The reason for the failure to comply with s 120(5)(c) of the PS Act has been explained by the Decision-Maker. I am satisfied that this is a technical non-compliance that has not given rise to any objective unfairness or unreasonableness. [52] Further, I am satisfied that the decision makes clear to the Appellant why her application has been refused, that consideration was given to her human rights, and that she was informed of her appeal rights. [53] I am satisfied that the Respondent has complied with the obligations with respect to s 120(5) of the PS Act, other than s 120(5)(c) of the PS Act for the reasons identified above. Conclusion [54] For the reasons I have given above, the decision was fair and reasonable. [55] On that basis the decision appealed against is confirmed. [56] I order accordingly. Order That pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the decision appealed against is confirmed. 22 [2025] QIRC 104. 23 Ibid, [23]. -- 15 of 15 --