Carle v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (No. 2) [2025] QIRC 76

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION: Carle v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (No. 2) [2025] QIRC 076 PARTIES: Carle, Cindy (Applicant) v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) (Respondent) CASE NO: TD/2024/90 PROCEEDING: Unfair Dismissal – Application for Reinstatement Interlocutory application – Application for suppression order DELIVERED ON: 19 March 2025 MEMBER: HEARD AT: O'Neill IC On the papers ORDER: 1. The application is dismissed CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT – APPLICATION IN EXISTING PROCEEDINGS – Application by the Applicant for suppression order – where the Applicant seeks publication suppression and closed hearing – where the Respondent neither consents nor opposes the application – where principles of open justice apply – consideration of principles of open justice and circumstances where Commission may -- 1 of 15 -- 2 exercise discretion to suppress publication and order a closed hearing – application for suppression order dismissed. LEGISLATION: CASES: Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), ss 451, 531, 580 Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) s 97 Alpert v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence) [2023] FCA 784 Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263 J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2024] QIRC 68 Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 31 Nesbit v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] ICQ 5 Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs) [2021] QIRC 327 Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 20 -- 2 of 15 -- 3 Reasons for Decision [1] The substantive application involves an application for reinstatement filed by Ms Cindy Carle ('the Applicant') to her former position with the State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) ('the Respondent') as a Senior Advanced Care Paramedic. The application for reinstatement was filed in the Industrial Registry on 9 September 2024. [2] On 3 March 2025 the Applicant filed in the Industrial Registry a Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings seeking: 'a suppression order in relation to these proceedings to ensure that it is a close (sic) court, that no details, including the nature of the application, any evidence submitted, and the final outcome, are disclosed in any manner that could become known to the respondent in previous Domestic Violence proceeding …' [3] The Respondent neither consents nor opposes the application brought by the Applicant. [4] The issue for my determination is whether the Commission should exercise a discretion to make suppression orders in the terms sought by the Applicant. [5] For the reasons that follow I do not consider it appropriate to exercise a discretion to make suppression orders as sought by the Applicant and I dismiss the application. Background [6] The Applicant commenced employment with Queensland Ambulance Service ('QAS') in 1998 and was dismissed from her position as a Senior Advanced Care Paramedic on 21 August 2024 following a disciplinary process. [7] On 13 February 2023, whilst the Applicant was rostered to work a shift at the Cairns Ambulance Station from 7:15 pm to 5:15 am, the Applicant is alleged to have misappropriated an in-date ampoule of Midazolam Accord1 from the station drug safe and replaced it with an expired ampoule of Hypnovel. Hypnovel is another brand of Midzolam which was not used by the QAS at the relevant time in February 2023. [8] The actions of the Applicant were discovered on 14 February 2023 when a primary response kit containing the out-of-date ampoule of Hypnovel was signed back into the drug safe in the Medication Room. Later in 2023, the Applicant was identified in CCTV footage as the person who had swapped the ampoules over. [9] On 10 April 2024, the Applicant entered a plea of guilty in the Cairns Magistrates Court to the following offences: 1 Midazolam is a benzodiazepine used for sedation: Form 12A – Employer response to application for reinstatement, Schedule A, (3). -- 3 of 15 -- 4 a. Charge 1: Stealing by clerks and servants pursuant to section 398(6) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (CC Act) on 13 February 2023; b. Charge 2: Offence to buy or possess s4 or s8 medicines or hazardous poisons pursuant to section 34 of the Medicines and Poisons Act 2019 (MP Act) on 13 February 2023; and c. Charge 3: Offence to buy or possess s4 or s8 medicines or hazardous poisons pursuant to section 34 of the MP Act on 25 October 2023.2 [10] The Applicant received a sentence of a recognisance requiring the Applicant to be of good behaviour for a period of six months and a $900.00 fine with no conviction recorded.3 [11] A disciplinary process ensued, and an initial show cause letter dated 15 July 2024 from Deputy Commissioner Arbouin was provided to the Applicant requiring her to show cause why disciplinary findings should not be made against her, and why her employment should not be terminated. [12] The Applicant provided her show cause response by correspondence from her solicitors, O'Reilly Stevens Lawyers dated 29 July 2024. [13] By correspondence dated 21 August 2024, Deputy Commissioner Arbouin advised the Applicant that in respect of each allegation that the allegations were substantiated and that the Applicant was guilty of misconduct. Deputy Commissioner Arbouin determined that the most appropriate disciplinary action was the termination of the Applicant's employment immediate upon receipt of the disciplinary action letter. [14] A mention of the matter was listed for 21 February 2025 to address an application by the Respondent for legal representation. On the morning of that mention, the Applicant emailed a Form 2 – General application seeking suppression orders. [15] At the mention on 21 February 2025 the Applicant was advised that she should file a Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings supported by an affidavit setting out the evidence she relied upon in support of the application. As noted above, the Applicant filed the current application on 3 March 2025. [16] The affidavit filed by the Applicant in support of the application for suppression orders merely states: The information included in the accompanying QIRC Form 4 – Requesting a Suppression Order be granted due to concerns about previous, continued and possible further Domestically Violent behaviour by the named person, is true and correct, and a truthful concern to the applicant. 2 Ibid, (13). 3 Ibid, Attachment 8. -- 4 of 15 -- 5 Relevant legislation and authorities [17] Section 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') bestows general powers on the commission, and relevantly provides: 451 General powers (1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commission in proceedings may— … (c) make an order it considers appropriate. [18] Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) ('the IRT Rules') provides the Commission with a power to de-identify judgements and redact information for judgements if there is good reason to do so. Rule 97 relevantly provides as follows: 97 Publishing decisions etc. (1) The registrar may publish on the QIRC website – (a) a decision of the court, commission, or registrar; and (b) the notice of the making or the amended of a bargaining instrument. (2) The registrar must, if the commission directs, publish an amendment of an instrument on the QIRC website. Note – For other documents the registrar must publish on the QIRC website, see sections 160, 215, 230 and 459 of the Act. (3) The court, commission or registrar may, in the public interest or for another reason the court, commission or registrar considers appropriate – (a) withhold publication of a document; or (b) modify a document, before publication, in a way that does not affect the essence of the document. [19] The Queensland Court of Appeal in the case of J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2),4 ('J v L & A Services Pty Ltd') established six principles governing the exercise of discretion to issue suppression orders which are as follows: 1. Although there is a public interest in avoiding and minimising disadvantages to private citizens from public activities, paramount public interest in the due administration of justice, freedom of speech, a free media and an open society require that court proceedings are able to be reported and discussed publicly. 4 [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10. -- 5 of 15 -- 6 2. The public may be excluded and publicity prohibited when public access or publicity would frustrate the purpose of a court proceeding by preventing the effective enforcement of some substantive law and depriving the court's decision of practical utility… 3. The permitted exceptions to the requirement of open justice are not based upon the premise that parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing court proceedings by an apprehension that public access or publicity would deprive the proceeding of practical utility, but upon the actual loss of utility which would occur, and the exceptions do not extend to proceedings which parties would be reasonably deterred from bringing if the utility of the proceedings would not be affected. Courts do not have access to the information needed to determine whether or not parties are reasonably deterred by openness or publicity from bringing particular kinds of proceedings; for example, sexual complaints. Legislatures are better equipped than courts to make informed decisions on such matters. 4. No unnecessary restriction upon public access or publicity in respect of court proceedings is permissible. 5. Different degrees of restraint are permissible for different purposes. Although the categories tend to coalesce, they are broadly as follows: (a) Exclusion of the public or a substantive restraint upon publicity is not permissible unless abstractly essential to the practical utility of a proceeding; for example, prosecutions for blackmail or proceedings for the legitimate protection of confidential information… (b) A limited exclusion or restraint is permissible if necessary to ensure that a proceeding is fair; for example, witnesses may be required to absent themselves from hearings, parts of jury trials may take place in the absence of the jury and limited or temporary restrictions on publicity may be imposed during the course of jury proceedings. (c) An incidental, procedural restriction is permissible if necessary in the interests of a party or witness in a particular proceeding; for example, identities of witnesses or details of particular activities which are not directly material such as engaging in covert law enforcement operations or providing information to police may be suppressed. 6. ... information may not be withheld from the public merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm, or other 'collateral disadvantage', to use the expression adopted in R. v. Tait. Additionally, when it is the interests of a party or a witness which is relied on as the basis for a proposed restraint, those considerations must be balanced against other factors, including the interests of others involved in the proceeding and others who may be affected. Open justice is non-discriminatory, whereas exceptions to the principle of open justice deny equal rights to the disputing litigants and provide a benefit to some litigants which is unavailable to members of the general public… [20] In Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd5 ('Aurizon') the respondent sought to have the names of the individual workers who were involved in the dispute to be de-identified. The application was supported by the applicant union. His Honour, Vice President O'Connor relevantly held as follows: 5 [2021] QIRC 263 [40]-[46]. -- 6 of 15 -- 7 [40] The starting point in considering an application to suppress or to withhold names of witnesses or parties is a fundamental principle of open justice; 'that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. This is a central feature of the administration of justice under the common law. [41] The open justice principle operates not only as an overarching principle guiding judicial decision-making and various aspects of procedure, it also gives rise to a number of substantive open justice rules that, in the usual course of events, a court must follow. Such rules include: first, that judicial proceedings are conducted, and decisions pronounced, in 'open court'; second, that evidence is communicated publicly to those present in the court; and third, that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, including by the media. [42] However, the rules to which the open justice principle gives rise are not absolute. Whilst the principles of open justice will usually require the publication of the names of those involved in the proceedings, there are numerous statutory exceptions. [43] The Commission has the power to de-identify judgments and redact information from judgments if there is a good reason to do so. Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) recognises that power. … [44] It is accepted that the discretion to anonymise a decision might be exercised in favour of not identifying persons who are the victim of sexual assault or discrimination, children, or persons whose private financial affairs are relevant to a decision. It is also accepted that the discretion may be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to avoid prejudice to the administration of justice in particular proceedings or to avoid some other relevant harm. [45] In my opinion, the application to withhold the names of the two workers can be best explained on the basis that in the absence of a restriction on publicity, damage will be caused to the individuals to such an extent and of such a kind as requiring some relief, in the interests of justice. [46] As was observed by Mahoney JA in John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v The Local Court of New South Wales, these are the 'unacceptable' consequences that sometimes arise in litigation. Of course, as observed by Pincus JA in J v L A Services Pty Ltd (No 2), 'there is a balancing exercise involved, with an initial heavy weighting in favour of publicity – an exercise involving considerations of fairness'. (citations omitted) [21] In Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor6, Deputy President Merrell reviewed the principles of open justice and the power of the Commission to make a suppression order by reference to a number of authorities as follows: [14] The relevant principles were recently referred to by Snaden J in Alpert v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence)7 where his Honour stated: 6 [2024] QIRC 20. 7 [2023] FCA 784 ('Alpert'). -- 7 of 15 -- 8 11 I recently had occasion to survey the authorities that establish the principles that govern applications such as this one. In Naude v DRA Global Limited [2023] FCA 493, [13]-[15], I made the following observations, namely: In R v Davis (1995) 57 FCR 512 (Wilcox, Burchett and Hill JJ), this court observed (at 514): Whatever their motives in reporting, [the media’s] opportunity to do so arises out of a principle that is fundamental to our society and method of government: except in extraordinary circumstances, the courts of the land are open to the public. This principle arises out of the belief that exposure to public scrutiny is the surest safeguard against any risk of the courts abusing their considerable powers. As few members of the public have the time, or even the inclination, to attend courts in person, in a practical sense this principle demands that the media be free to report what goes on in them. The exclusion of public access to the processes with which a court deals is only to be effected in exceptional cases: The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377, 379 [8] (Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ; hereafter “Country Care Group”); David Syme & Co v General Motors-Holden’s Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 294, 299 (Street CJ), 307 (Hutley AP, Samuels JA agreeing). In John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Local Court (NSW) (1991) 26 NSWLR 131, Kirby P (in dissent but not on this issue) said (at 142-143): It has often been acknowledged that an unfortunate incident of the open administration of justice is that embarrassing, damaging and even dangerous facts occasionally come to light. Such considerations have never been regarded as a reason for the closure of courts, or the issue of suppression orders in their various alternative forms… A significant reason for adhering to a stringent principle, despite sympathy for those who suffer embarrassment, invasions of privacy or even damage by publicity of their proceedings is that such interests must be sacrificed to the greater public interest in adhering to an open system of justice. Otherwise, powerful litigants may come to think that they can extract from courts or prosecuting authorities protection greater than that enjoyed by ordinary parties whose problems come before the courts and may be openly reported. It is well accepted that “…mere embarrassment, inconvenience or annoyance will not suffice to ground an application for suppression or non-publication”: Keyzer v La Trobe University (2019) 165 ALD 93, 99 [29] (Anastassiou J). It is a feature of open justice that those to whom court processes refer may thereby suffer embarrassment or distress; but “…that is a price the community has to pay for the undoubted benefit of court proceedings being, except in very exceptional circumstances, conducted in public”: Williams v Forgie (2003) 54 ATR 236, 239 [14] (Heerey J). … 21 The propositions just stated were met with muted, if any opposition and, with respect, rightly so. This would not be the first time that a court should recognise what is inherent within them. In AA v BB (2013) 296 ALR 353, 389 [182], Bell J recognised that: Making a non-publication order may be necessary in cases where, in the absence of an order, parties would be deterred from bringing proceedings for the vindication of their legal rights, such as cases involving victims of blackmail, negligence or sexual assault where the person would suffer public ridicule or acute personal embarrassment if his or her identity were to be disclosed in legal proceedings... -- 8 of 15 -- 9 (references omitted) 22 Dixon J made an equivalent observation in PPP v QQQ (as the representative of the Estate of RRR (deceased)) [2011] VSC 186, [34], namely: Commonly, parties might be deterred from bringing or concluding proceedings unless public disclosure of their identities could be prevented or because part of the injury complained of may be exacerbated by public disclosure. Thus, it is regarded as being necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice that orders be made to encourage such plaintiffs to litigate their allegations, seek redress through the courts and, in proper cases, do so without unreasonable risk of aggravation of their injuries… 23 So, too, has this court been moved to recognise the point of principle. In Porter v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2021] FCA 863 (hereafter “Porter"), Jagot J observed (at [84]): …The administration of justice may be prejudiced in a variety of ways. If, for example, people cannot come to a court confident that some kinds of information can be protected from disclosure if necessary (such as commercially confidential information valuable to a person or a third party, or sensitive information about a person’s health, or personal information about parties or third parties of no more than prurient interest to others) then public confidence in and access to justice may itself be undermined. 24 Equivalent observations have been made in this court in connection with the disclosure of sensitive commercial information: Clark v Digital Wallet Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 877, [21] (Abraham J). In Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Origin Energy Electricity Ltd [2015] FCA 278, Katzmann J observed (at [148]): It is in the interests of the proper administration of justice that the value of confidential information not be destroyed or diminished. Otherwise, the parties and members of the public might lose confidence in the Court and the Court’s processes “might open the way to abuse”… (My emphasis added) [22] I am also guided by the following observations made by his Honour, Deputy President Merrell in Smith v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice and Multicultural Affairs)8 ('Smith'): (a) information may not be withheld from the public merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm or other collateral disadvantage; (b) additionally, when it is the interests of a party or witness which is relied on as the basis for a proposed restraint, those considerations must be balanced against other factors, including the interests of others involved in the proceeding and others who may be affected; (c) open justice is non-discriminatory, whereas exceptions to the principle of open justice deny equal rights to the disputing litigants and provide a benefit to some litigants which is unavailable to members of the general public; (d) public scrutiny is a strong disincentive to false allegations and a powerful incentive to honest evidence, and publicity may attract the attention of persons with material information who 8 [2021] QIRC 327 at T.1-8, lines 12 to 39 citing J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 at page 45. -- 9 of 15 -- 10 are unaware of the proceeding; (e) if information is suppressed, proceedings would inevitably become the subject of rumours, misunderstandings, exaggerations and falsehoods, and a particular unsatisfactory manifestation of this difficulty occurs when uncertainty as to the particular person concerned lead to speculation concerning other members of a relevant group; (f) it is important to remember that what appears to be a more liberal approach involving the exercise of a discretionary power in the interests of an individual involves an erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms of the general public; (g) the occasional misuse or abuse of these rights and freedoms and other disadvantages associated with public information and discussion, which is sometimes misinformed, together with any resultant harm are part of the cost of living in a free, democratic society; and (h) it is common for sensitive issues to be litigated and for information, which is extremely personal or confidential to be disclosed, and it is of obvious concern that such a paramount principle as the requirement of open justice should not be whittled away on a case-by-case basis according to individual judges’ subjective views on the merits or demerits of claims to privacy of individual litigants. (My emphasis added) [23] In the Smith decision, Deputy President Merrell also considered it to be a relevant factor to the exercise of the discretion that the nature of the appeal also militated against the making of an order sought by the Appellant. The Smith matter involved a public sector appeal against a disciplinary finding. Deputy President Merrell noted that disciplinary findings had been made against Ms Smith as a public service employee. His Honour noted that there can be no dispute that disciplinary proceedings are for the protection of the public.9 This was a further factor his Honour relied upon in rejecting the application for a suppression order. [24] Whilst expressing sympathy for the appellant, his Honour confirmed that the appellant's privacy concerns did not overcome the principles of open justice. His Honour noted that the publication of private and embarrassing information was part of the nature of public decisions.10 [25] In Montesin v Brisbane City Council ('Montesin'),11 her Honour, Deputy President Hartigan rejected an application for re-opening of a re-instatement application and suppression orders. 9 Ibid, T.1-10, lines 30-41 citing Nesbit v Metro North Hospital and Health Service [2021] ICQ 5, at paragraph 99. 10 Ibid, T.1-10, lines 16-30. 11 [2024] QIRC 68. -- 10 of 15 -- 11 [26] In the substantive application there had been an application by the respondent, Brisbane City Council for leave to have legal representation. That application gave rise to a reported decision, which had been published on the Supreme Court library website in February 2022.12 [27] The applicant subsequently on 14 October 2022 requested that the substantive re- instatement application be discontinued. [28] The applicant via a google search became aware that a search of his name provided a link to the earlier decision on the Supreme Court library website. The applicant filed his application seeking a suppression of the decision on 13 December 2023, some 14 months after the substantive proceeding had been discontinued. [29] In support of the application the applicant referred to one occasion in which he was assaulted whilst working and other occasions where he was threatened by members of the public. The applicant also raised concerns regarding the safety of his school age children, because they used public transport, in particular, council buses. In addressing those concerns, her Honour noted: [41] The Applicant then attempts to draw a connection between the fact that the Decision is available online as posing a safety risk to the Applicant as he is fearful it makes it possible for him to be identified as a local government employee and "possibly tracked down and harmed". [42] The Applicant also refers to the fact that his children catch public transport, and he fears for their safety as well. [43] Other than the Applicant's bare assertion that he holds a fear, there is no evidence relied on by him that provides a factual foundation for the concern that he holds. [44] Relevantly, the Applicant does not point to any occasion since 8 February 2022, when the Decision was published, to provide a basis for the relief sought.13 Applicant's Submissions [30] As an attachment to the application, the Applicant provides the following grounds as supporting the Commission making a suppression order in this matter: 1. Risk of Harm – The Applicant states that she has been a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by her former partner. The Applicant states that the Magistrates Court ruled that there was a factual basis for domestic violence having occurred. The Applicant also refers to her daughter having been named in a police protection order. The Applicant submits that she has significant concerns for her safety and wellbeing should her former partner become further 12 Montesin v Brisbane City Council [2022] QIRC 31. 13 Ibid, [41]-[44]. -- 11 of 15 -- 12 aware of these proceedings or their outcome. She submits that there is a genuine risk that disclosure could lead to further harassment, intimidation or harm to herself or to her family. 2. Prevention of further victimisation – The Applicant contends that her former partner has previously engaged in coercive, threatening, and abusive behaviours. She submits that any knowledge of these proceedings may further exacerbate his behaviour and result in retaliation, placing her at further risk of emotional, psychological, or physical harm. 3. Protection of Privacy - Given the sensitive nature of the circumstances, the Applicant requests that all information relating to this matter be restricted to relevant legal authorities and parties with express permission to access it. The Applicant submits that this includes court records, transcripts, and any reference to her personal details, location or involvement in these proceedings. 4. Public Interest Considerations – Suppressing information in this case aligns with the principles of justice and victim protection, ensuring that survivors of domestic violence can seek legal recourse without fear of exposure or reprisal. The Applicant submits that allowing her former partner access to this information would undermine the intent of the legal protections afforded to victims of domestic violence. 5. Her former partner has already been made aware and/or sought information regarding this matter and has proceeded to threaten and intimidate both the Applicant and her daughter. 6. The Applicant states that the Queensland police are currently investigating the potential misappropriation of information, the threats, intimidation and harassment. [31] The Applicant concludes that considering those concerns, she respectfully urges the Commission to issue a suppression order preventing the publication of any identifying information related to the current proceeding. The Applicant contends that this is necessary to uphold her safety, security, and right to seek legal protection without fear of further harm. Consideration [32] Given the fundamental importance of the principle of open justice as confirmed in the summary of the authorities I have set out above, I had concerns that there was a paucity of evidence provided by the Applicant to support her application. -- 12 of 15 -- 13 [33] Further, the submissions that the Applicant has made were of a very general and broad nature and failed in any meaningful way to establish how the Applicant or her daughter's safety would actually be placed at risk by the matter being heard in open hearing and by publication of the decision. [34] Pursuant to s 531(2) of the IR Act, in proceedings the Commission: (a) is not bound by the rules of evidence; and (b) may inform itself in the way it considers appropriate in the exercise of its jurisdiction. [35] The matter had already been listed for mention on Friday, 14 March 2025. At that mention I took the opportunity to try and clarify certain aspects of the matters relied upon by the Applicant in support of her application for suppression orders. In response to questions from the Commission, the Applicant confirmed the following: • There is not currently a domestic violence order in place. • Final orders have been made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia which enable the Applicant's former partner to have contact with his daughter. • Change over for contact purposes occurs at an agreed McDonald's restaurant. • The hearing of the Applicant's sentencing on the criminal charges occurred in open court. • No orders were made by the Magistrate restricting access to the court file or the Verdict and Judgment Record. • The Applicant has a presence on social media and on other sites. [36] The Applicant was also questioned about the basis of her concerns for her and her daughter's safety and well-being as expressed in ground one of the submissions in support of the application and the threats and intimidation referred to in ground five. [37] The Applicant indicated that since she had been suspended she had received multiple text messages from her former partner which indicated an awareness of her name being listed in law lists and that he had some awareness of the court and commission proceedings. [38] When questioned about the nature of the intimidation and threats made by her former partner, the Applicant confirmed that they were in the nature of her former partner raising the potential of him applying to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia in light -- 13 of 15 -- 14 of the new information about the Applicant's circumstances. I confirmed with the Applicant that the threat was her former partner raising the possibility of exercising his legal rights in the Federal Circuit and Family Court and she confirmed this. It can be assumed that the former partner was considering seeking some alteration or variation to the final orders currently in place. [39] The first observation that can be made is that given the criminal proceedings were conducted in open court, information about the charges brought against the Applicant and the outcome of the criminal proceedings are already all in the public domain. [40] The fact that there is no current domestic violence order is something that must be considered when weighing the concerns expressed by the Applicant about her safety and well-being. [41] I also give some weight to the fact that the Federal Circuit and Family Court have made final orders which include contact provisions for the former partner. [42] In relation to the contention made by the Applicant in ground two of there being a risk of further victimisation, emotional, psychological or physical harm, this case is similar to that of Montesin, where there have been assertions made by the Applicant which are not supported by evidence. I do not consider that the Applicant's former partner raising the possibility of exercising a legal right by applying to the Federal Circuit and Family Court is a sufficient basis to suppress the publication of the decision, and the file, and to order a closed hearing. [43] In relation to ground three, and the privacy concerns raised by the Applicant, the authorities I have cited above confirm in no uncertain terms that an individual's privacy concerns are not a sound basis to set aside the principle of open justice. Information may not be withheld from the public to save a party from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial harm or other ''collateral disadvantage''.14 I consider that the risk of the Applicant's former partner exercising his legal rights in some manner would fall under the banner of the type of ''collateral disadvantage'' referred to by the Court of Appeal in J v L & A Services. [44] I note the public interest considerations raised by the Applicant in ground four regarding the principles of justice and victim protection. Whilst these are very valid considerations, it is still necessary for an applicant seeking suppression orders to provide evidence justifying the making of suppression orders. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has satisfied her burden of proof of establishing a sound evidentiary basis for suppression orders being made by the Commission. 14 J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1993] QCA 012; [1995] 2 Qd R 10 at 44-45. -- 14 of 15 -- 15 [45] Further, the summary of the authorities set out earlier in this decision also confirm the existence of a competing public interest that the Court of Appeal in J v L & A Services identified to be a paramount public interest in the due administration of justice, freedom of speech, a free media and an open society which require that court proceedings be open to the public and able to be reported and discussed publicly. Given the evidence in support of the application, the Commission considers that the principle of open justice is the paramount public interest in this matter. Conclusion [46] I am satisfied that for the reasons set out above, the discretion for the Commission to make suppression orders has not been enlivened in this particular case. [47] I consider that the Applicant has failed to establish a sound basis for the principle of open justice to be set aside in this matter. Order [48] Accordingly, I make the following order: 1. The application is dismissed. -- 15 of 15 --