Calanca v Parole Board Queensland [2024] QSC 199
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Calanca v Parole Board Queensland [2024] QSC 199
PARTIES: DAMON FRANK CALANCA
(applicant)
v
PAROLE BOARD QUEENSLAND
(respondent)
FILE NO/S: BS 4330 of 2024
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT:
Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 28 August 2024
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 22 July 2024
JUDGE: Copley J
ORDER: Application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW –
GROUNDS OF REVIEW – GENERALLY – where the
applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder –
where the applicant was released on parole subject to
conditions imposed by the Parole Board – where the applicant
breached or allegedly breached conditions of parole – where
the applicant filed an application under s 20(2)(e) of the
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) on the basis that the making of
the decision to cancel the parole order pursuant to s 205 of
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) was an improper exercise
of power – whether irrelevant considerations were taken into
account – whether relevant considerations were not taken into
account – whether the decision in accordance with policy
without regard to the merits of the case – whether the decision
was so unreasonable no reasonable person could have made
the decision
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), ss 3(1), 200, 205, 216,
242E
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), ss 20(2)(e), 23
Calanca v Parole Board [2019] QSC 34, cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986)
162 CLR 24, cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249
CLR 332, cited
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WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 30 ALR 559, cited
COUNSEL: The applicant appeared on his own behalf
S B Robb KC for the respondent
SOLICITORS: The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Parole Board Queensland Legal Services for the respondent
[1] On 5 February 2024 the Parole Board decided to cancel the applicant’s parole. The
applicant has applied for a statutory order of review of that decision.
[2] The application is made on the ground that the making of the decision was an
improper exercise of power,1 for the reasons that:
(a) irrelevant considerations were taken into account in making the decision;2
(b) relevant considerations were not taken into account;3
(c) the decision was made in accordance with a policy without regard to the merits
of the applicant’s case;4 and
(d) the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived
at the decision.5
[3] Reasons explaining why the Board decided to cancel the parole order were provided
on 30 April 2024.6
[4] The reasons concluded:7
“The Board reasonably believed you posed an unacceptable risk of
committing an offence, in accordance with s 205(2)(a)(iii) of the CS
Act, and reasonably believed you failed to comply with the conditions
of your parole order, in accordance with s 205(2)(a)(i) of the CS Act.”
[5] For the reasons set out below the decision to cancel parole was not an improper
exercise of power.
Background
[6] On 11 February 1994 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for life for a count
of murder. On 1 October 2019 he was released on parole subject to conditions. On
5 January 2023 a prescribed Board member suspended the applicant’s parole. The
applicant was returned to custody on 6 January 2023. On 9 January 2023 the Board
confirmed the prescribed Board member’s decision to suspend parole. Between then
and 5 February 2024 the Board met and considered the decision to suspend parole on
nine occasions.
1 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20(2)(e).
2 Judicial Review Act, s 23(a).
3 Judicial Review Act, s 23(b).
4 Judicial Review Act, s 23(f).
5 Judicial Review Act, s 23(g).
6 Affidavit of Makenzie Brennan at paragraph 21 and Exhibit MB-17.
7 Exhibit MB-17, page 86, paragraph 174.
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[7] The conditions of parole relevant to this application are:8
“(r) You must submit and discuss a schedule of your planned,
proposed and any additional past activities, including the
provision of verifying materials or documents on a weekly
basis or as otherwise directed by an authorised corrective
services officer;
(x) You must not commit any act of domestic violence.
(aa) You must report any personal or intimate relationship with
anyone, to an authorised corrective services officer at the
commencement of the relationship.
(bb) You must make complete disclosure of the terms of your order
and the nature of your past offences to any person as nominated
by an authorised corrective services officer. Further, you are to
provide full contact details for any such person to an authorised
corrective services officer to verify that full disclosure has
occurred.
(ff) You must not have access to a device with Internet access
without first obtaining the written approval of the corrective
services officer or the Board. Any such approval will be
conditional upon your agreement to having any device you
access randomly examined, by whatever means are necessary,
to determine whether the device has been used for any
unacceptable purpose.
(gg) You are prohibited from accessing or utilising any social media,
websites, technology, applications, or personal introductory
systems whereby you can find and contact individuals over the
internet (or by any other means) with the objective of
developing a personal, romantic or sexual relationship without
the prior approval of the corrective services officer.
(kk) You must respond truthfully and fully, to enquiries by a
corrective services officer and the Board about activities,
relationships, whereabouts and movements generally.”
Relevant legislation
[8] The Board is established pursuant to s 216 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld)
(“the Act”). Pursuant to s 217 of the Act its functions are to decide applications for
parole orders, other than court-ordered parole orders, and to perform other functions
given to it under the Act or another Act.
[9] Section 200 of the Act provides:
“200 Conditions of parole
(1) A parole order must include conditions requiring the prisoner
the subject of the order–
8 Exhibit MB-17, pages 84-86, paragraph 171.
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(a) to be under the chief executive’s supervision–
(i) until the end of the prisoner’s period of imprisonment;
or
(ii) if the prisoner is being detained in an institution for a
period fixed by a judge under the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 1945, part 3–for the period the
prisoner was directed to be detained; and
(b) to carry out the chief executive’s lawful instructions; and
(c) to give a test sample if required to do so by the chief
executive under section 41; and
(d) to report, and receive visits, as directed by the chief
executive; and
(e) to notify the chief executive within 48 hours of any change
in the prisoner’s address or employment during the parole
period; and
(f) not to commit an offence.
(2) A parole order may contain a condition requiring the prisoner
to comply with a direction given to the prisoner under section
200A.
(3) A parole order granted by the parole board may also contain
conditions the board reasonably considers necessary–
(a) to ensure the prisoner’s good conduct; or
(b) to stop the prisoner committing an offence.
Examples–
a condition about the prisoner’s place of residence,
employment or participation in a particular program
a condition imposing a curfew for the prisoner
a condition requiring the prisoner to give a test sample
(4) The prisoner must comply with the conditions included in the
parole order.”
[10] Section 205 of the Act provides:
“205 Amendment, suspension or cancellation
(1) The parole board may, by written order, amend a parole order–
(a) by amending or removing a condition imposed under
section 200(3) if the board reasonably believes–
(i) the condition, as amended, is necessary for a purpose
mentioned in the subsection; or
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(ii) the condition is no longer necessary for a purpose
mentioned in the subsection; or
(b) by inserting a condition mentioned in section 200(3) if the
board reasonably believes the condition is necessary for a
purpose mentioned in the subsection; or
(c) if the board reasonably believes the prisoner poses a
serious risk of self harm.
(2) The parole board may, by written order–
(a) amend, suspend or cancel a parole order if the board
reasonably believes the prisoner subject to the parole
order–
(i) has failed to comply with the parole order; or
(ii) poses a serious risk of harm to someone else; or
(iii) poses an unacceptable risk of committing an offence;
or
(iv) is preparing to leave Queensland, other than under a
written order granting the prisoner leave to travel
interstate or overseas; or
(b) amend, suspend or cancel a parole order, other than a
court ordered parole order, if the board receives
information that, had it been received before the parole
order was made, would have resulted in the board making
a different parole order or not making a parole order; or
(c) amend or suspend a parole order if the prisoner subject to
the parole order is charged with committing an offence;
or
(d) suspend or cancel a parole order if the board reasonably
believes the prisoner subject to the parole order poses a
risk of carrying out a terrorist act.”
[11] The discretion conferred by s 205(2)(a) to cancel parole depends upon the Board
attaining a reasonable belief which suggests that there must be reasonable grounds
for the belief that any of the circumstances set out in s 205(2)(a) have arisen.9 Section
205(2)(b)-(d) are not relevant to the present case.
[12] To show that there has been an improper exercise of power the applicant primarily
contends that irrelevant considerations were brought into account and relevant
considerations were overlooked in arriving at the decision to cancel parole.
[13] In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, Mason J said:10
“(a) The ground of failure to take into account a relevant
consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to
9 WA Pines Pty Ltd v Bannerman (1980) 30 ALR 559 at 571-572.
10 (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40.
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take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into
account in making that decision …
(b) What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making
the decision is determined by construction of the statute
conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the
considerations to be taken into account, it will often be
necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated
factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant
factors – and in this context I use this expression to refer to the
factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider – are not
expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from
the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context
of judicial review on the ground of taking into account
irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a
statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the
factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the
discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there
may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the
statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the
decision-maker may legitimately have regard … By analogy,
where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has
not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by
the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-
maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless
an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the
subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act.”
[14] Section 205(2)(a)(i)-(iv) sets out circumstances that must exist before the Board may
cancel a parole order. Section 205(2)(a)(i) requires consideration about past events
as it is concerned with whether a prisoner “has failed” to comply with an order.
Section 205(2)(a)(ii)-(iv) requires consideration about whether a state of affairs is
existing at the time the Board makes a decision. Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) concern
situations where a prisoner “poses” particular risks. Subparagraph (iv) concerns the
situation where a prisoner is “preparing” to do a particular act. However, s 205(2)
does not expressly state the factors that the Board must take into account in
determining whether any of these circumstances have arisen.
[15] Formation of a reasonable belief that a prisoner subject to a parole order has failed to
comply with the order11 necessarily depends on the Board taking into account the
conditions attached to a prisoner’s parole order and information or material that bears
upon whether those conditions were not complied with. Formation of a reasonable
belief that a prisoner subject to parole poses an unacceptable risk of committing an
offence,12 requires the Board to take into account those factors which have arisen
since parole was granted which bear upon the assessment of the level of risk posed
by the prisoner.
11 Section 205(2)(a)(i).
12 Section 205(2)(a)(iii).
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[16] The purpose of the Corrective Services Act is community safety and crime prevention
through the humane containment, supervision and release of offenders.13 The
Minister may make guidelines about policies to help the Board perform its
functions.14 The Ministerial Guidelines are a relevant factor and must be taken into
account.15 The Ministerial Guidelines16 are divided into seven sections. Section 1 is
headed “Guiding Principles for Parole Board Queensland”. Paragraph 1.2 states that
when considering whether parole should be granted, the highest priority for the Board
should always be the safety of the community. Section 2 deals with suitability for
parole and lists 11 factors to be considered in determining the level of risk a prisoner
may pose to the community. Section 5 deals with release to parole and exceptional
circumstances parole. Section 6 deals with a number of situations including where a
paroled prisoner has been charged with a further offence; where a paroled prisoner
fails to comply with a condition of parole; and where a paroled prisoner is unlawfully
at large. If a prisoner has failed to comply with a condition of parole the Guidelines
state that the Board should consider whether to cancel the parole order and in
considering whether to do so the Board:17
“… should take the following into account, the –
(a) …
(b) seriousness and circumstances surrounding the prisoner’s failure
to comply;
(c) prisoner’s home environment;
(d) factors outlined in section 6.1(d) and (e); and
(e) if the prisoners (sic) is close to full time discharge whether the
risk to the community would be greater if the prisoner does not
remain on parole.”
[17] Section 6.1 of the Guidelines provide:18
“(d) prisoner’s personal situation, including employment status;
(e) prisoner’s response to supervision to date; and
…”
[18] Before considering the various grounds the applicant relies on to show an improper
exercise of power it is relevant to notice the following.
[19] The applicant admitted to the Board that he had not informed an authorised corrective
services officer about intimate relationships he had commenced and pursued with
three women whilst on parole. The Board said these admitted failures constituted
failures to comply with conditions (aa) and (bb) of the parole order.19 The Board
stated that these failures, together with other failures to make frank and open
13 Section 3(1).
14 Section 242E.
15 Calanca v Parole Board [2019] QSC 34 at [57].
16 Exhibit MB-18.
17 Exhibit MB-18, page 102, paragraph 6.2.
18 Exhibit MB-18, page 101.
19 Exhibit MB-17, page 85, paragraphs 171(c) and (d).
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disclosures to community corrections, had occurred over a significant period of time.
The Board went on to state that such conditions had been imposed to monitor the
applicant, particularly in situations of relationship breakdowns, which it considered
might increase the level of risk the applicant might pose to the community.20 The
reasons provided by the Board show that the admitted failures were among the
reasons why the Board formed the beliefs that the applicant posed an unacceptable
risk of committing an offence and that he had failed to comply with conditions of
parole.21 These admitted failures to comply with conditions of parole were relevant
to the decision to cancel parole.
Taking irrelevant considerations into account
[20] The applicant submitted that in being satisfied that there had been a breach of
condition (r)22 the Board erred in taking into account the weekly schedule he provided
for the week commencing 1 January 2023. His argument was that in preparing the
schedule he could not be expected to anticipate events or circumstances not foreseen
at the time it was completed and therefore the schedule was “irrelevant”.
[21] The Board’s conclusion that condition (r) had not been complied with was based on
the following matters:23
“On 1 January 2023, you submitted a weekly planner (for your
movements from 2 January 2023 to 8 January 2023) in which you
stated you would be going to Ms [X’s] home on 3 January 2023, you
would be having dinner with her at your home on 5 January 2023, you
would stay at her home on 6 January 2023, and you would both visit
your sister on 7 January 2023.
Your parole order was suspended on 5 January 2023. Following the
suspension and prior to your return to custody, you sent two (2) emails
to the Board (on 5 January 2023 at 10:57pm and 11:53 pm) advising
that your relationship with Ms [X] ended four (4) days earlier. You
were returned to custody on 6 January 2023.
The Board had regard to your emails received by the Board on 5
January 2023 and to other information indicating your relationship
with Ms [X] broke down prior to 1 January 2023.”
[22] The Board had received information which showed that the applicant’s relationship
had ended prior to his submission of the schedule. This information was relevant to
whether condition (r) had been complied with. The submission of a schedule
containing activities that the applicant knew were not going to occur was a material
consideration in determining if condition (r) had been complied with. Condition (r)
required the applicant to provide a schedule of planned or proposed activities. The
accuracy of the schedule was relevant to the effectiveness of the supervision of the
applicant.
20 Exhibit MB-17, page 84, paragraph 169(aa).
21 Exhibit MB-17, page 84, paragraph 170.
22 Exhibit MB-17, pages 84-85, paragraph 171(a).
23 Exhibit MB-17, pages 81-82, paragraphs 169(p)-(r).
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[23] The applicant submitted that the Board erred in taking into account text messages he
had sent to the three women with whom he had had intimate relationships. His
argument was that condition (gg) did not prohibit text messages because text
messages did not rely on social media, websites or the other means of communication
specified in condition (gg).
[24] However, the conclusion that condition (gg) was not complied with was not based on
the sending of text messages. The conclusion reached by the Board was that:24
“The Board noted the extract of your phone contents revealed
applications containing chat functions had been downloaded. These
applications included Outlook, LinkedIn, Google Duo and Gmail.”
[25] At an earlier point in the reasons the Board said:25
“Information was received from Community Corrections that upon an
examination of your phone contents by Queensland Police on
6 January 2023, in accordance with condition (ee) of your parole
order, applications were found on your phone. Police located an
application which contained significant evidence of you having
intimate relationships with others. You have not been granted
approval to access this application in breach of condition (gg).”
[26] The information the Board took into account was clearly relevant to whether
condition (gg) had been complied with.
[27] This ground of review fails.
Failing to take relevant considerations into account
[28] The applicant submits that the Board failed to take into account the residence he
proposed he could live at if released on parole again. As already noticed, a prisoner’s
home environment is a matter that the Ministerial Guidelines provide that the Board
should take into account.
[29] The Board said that it considered an assessment of the proposed accommodation at
its meeting in May 2023. The assessment, conducted by Community Corrections,
was that the residence proposed was unsuitable. The Board made no determination
then about the suitability of the address.26 The Board did not fail to take into account
the applicant’s proposed accommodation.
[30] Participation in Schema-based therapy was a condition of parole. This therapy had
been provided by Dr Petroff. The applicant argues that failure to take into account
his compliance with this condition constituted a failure to take a relevant
consideration into account. He also complains that no account was taken of the fact
he consented to Dr Petroff disclosing notes regarding the applicant’s treatment or to
Dr Petroff’s views about the applicant’s participation in this therapy.
24 Exhibit MB-17, pages 85-86, paragraph 171(f)(i).
25 Exhibit MB-17, page 83, paragraph 169(u)(iv).
26 Exhibit MB-17, page 67, paragraph 132.
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[31] The issue for the Board under s 205(2)(a)(i) was whether the applicant had failed to
comply with the parole order. The parolee’s obligation was to comply with all the
conditions included in the parole order.27 In determining whether the applicant had
complied with all the conditions the Board had to have regard to the information
relevant to the particular condition under consideration. Demonstrated compliance
with one condition, such as that requiring participation in a particular form of therapy,
was not relevant to whether a different condition had been complied with.
[32] In any event, the Board took into account that the applicant had participated in
Schema-based therapy and continued to do so until his parole was suspended.28 As
to the provision of consent by the applicant to the disclosure of Dr Petroff’s notes, the
Board was aware that the applicant provided this consent.29
[33] The Board considered a risk assessment report of 11 October 2023.30 The risk
assessment had been undertaken by Dr Sundin. The Board noted that Dr Sundin had
concluded that whilst released on parole the applicant had engaged in a pattern of
deceitful behaviour, failed to plan ahead and that his sense of his own “specialness”
led the applicant to disregard restrictions contained in his parole order. She said his
behaviour whilst in the relationship with Ms [X] highlighted the extent of his
unacknowledged dependency needs. However, her view that the applicant could be
released on parole again subject to further recommended conditions was not accepted.
The Board said it did not accept that recommendation because other advice it had
received was that the conditions Dr Sundin suggested for supervision were not
feasible and because Dr Sundin’s assessment was made on the erroneous foundation
that the applicant had not committed acts of domestic violence whilst on parole.31
Condition (x) provided that the applicant was not to commit any act of domestic
violence.
[34] In making a decision about cancellation of parole the Ministerial Guidelines at
paragraph 6.1(e) required the Board to have regard to the applicant’s response to
supervision. The Board was not thereby obliged to obtain a report from Dr Petroff.
The report from Dr Sundin was relevant to the matters set out in paragraphs 6.1(d)
and (e) of the Ministerial Guidelines.
[35] The applicant submits that the Board failed to take into account his progress in
treatment with Dr Petroff. When deciding the level of risk that a prisoner may pose
to the community the Ministerial Guidelines provide that the Board should have
regard to, among other things, a prisoner’s progress in recommended rehabilitation
programs.32 The reasons show that the Board took into account progress made in
rehabilitation. The Board referred to the fact that in 2021 the applicant had engaged
satisfactorily in treatment with Dr Petroff33 and that in July 2022 Community
Corrections had informed the Board that the applicant had generally been complying
with parole conditions “noting your engagement with Dr Petroff”.34
27 Section 200(4).
28 Exhibit MB-17, page 46, paragraph 72 and page 80, paragraphs 169(k)(i) and (r).
29 Exhibit MB-17, page 68, paragraph 137.
30 Exhibit MB-17, page 78, paragraph 169(c).
31 Exhibit MB-17, pages 83-84, paragraphs 169(w)-(z).
32 Exhibit MB-18, page 97, paragraph 2.1(k).
33 Exhibit MB-17, page 79, paragraph 169(f).
34 Exhibit MB-17, page 80, paragraph (k)(i).
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[36] This ground of review has not been made out.
Decision made in accordance with a policy without regard to the merits of the
applicant’s case
[37] Under this ground the assertion is that the assessment that a proposed place of
residence was unsuitable was arrived at without a physical inspection of the proposed
residence or an interview with the applicant’s proposed housing sponsor.
[38] No rule or policy was identified by the applicant as a rule or a policy rigidly applied.
No rule or policy was identified by the applicant concerning how a proposed place of
residence was to be assessed.
[39] This ground of review has not been made out.
Decision so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at the
decision
[40] The applicant asserts that no reasonable person could have arrived at the decision to
cancel his parole. He contends that it was unreasonable for the Board to decide to
cancel parole on the basis of a belief that he posed an unacceptable risk of committing
an offence when the President of the Board had commended him for following a
relapse prevention plan. He also relies upon the arguments that have been advanced
under other grounds of review that an irrelevant consideration was taken into account
in the Board being satisfied he had breached condition (gg), and, upon the failure to
inspect his proposed accommodation and interview his housing sponsor.
[41] There was an evident and intelligible justification35 for the Board’s decision to cancel
parole on the basis of a reasonable belief both that the applicant had failed to comply
with the parole order and posed an unacceptable risk of committing an offence. In
these respects it is sufficient to notice the matters set out below.
[42] Opinions and recommendations of psychiatrists and psychologists provided prior to
the applicant’s release on parole in 2019 had indicated that a major risk to the
community related to the applicant’s responses to any breakdown in personal
relationships. However, the risk was regarded as manageable through stringent
conditions.36 The Board imposed conditions to allow for the monitoring of contact
the applicant had with others and conditions imposing obligations to disclose intimate
relationships with female persons and to submit a schedule of intended activities.37
[43] The examination of the applicant’s mobile phone on 6 January 2023 revealed that he
had been engaged in intimate relationships.38 The applicant admitted that he had not
informed his parole officer about the intimate relationships he had with three
women.39
35 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 367 [76].
36 Exhibit MB-17, page 78, paragraph 169(d).
37 Exhibit MB-17, pages 78-79, paragraph 169(e).
38 Exhibit MB-17, pages 82-83, paragraph 169(u).
39 Exhibit MB-17, page 65, paragraphs 130(s)-(v) and page 77, paragraph 167(f).
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[44] The Board stated:40
“The information before the Board showed that over a significant
period of time, you had repeatedly failed to make frank and open
disclosures to Community Corrections, particularly regarding intimate
female relationships and to comply with other stringent conditions of
your parole order imposed by the Board to enable Community
Corrections to monitor you closely, particularly in the case of a
relationship breakdown which the Board considered may increase the
level of risk you may pose to the community.
Accordingly, the Board reasonably believed you posed an
unacceptable risk of committing an offence, and reasonably believed
you failed to comply with the conditions of your parole order.”
[45] This ground of review fails.
Order
[46] I make the following order:
1. The application for review is dismissed.
[47] I will hear the parties as to costs.
40 Exhibit MB-17, page 84, paragraphs 169(aa)-170.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2024/199