Aggarwal v Health Ombudsman [2024] QCAT 385
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: Aggarwal v Health Ombudsman [2024] QCAT 385
PARTIES: RUPIN AGGARWAL
(applicant)
v
HEALTH OMBUDSMAN
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO: OCR101-24
MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters
DELIVERED ON: 2 December 2024
HEARING DATE: 2 September 2024
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Judicial Member Dick SC
Assisted by:
Prof S Brun, Medical Practitioner Panel Member
Dr K Hames, Medical Practitioner Panel Member
Dr W Grigg, Public Panel Member
ORDERS: The application to review a decision filed 22 April
2024 is upheld.
Pursuant to s 24(1)(a) of the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), the
decision of the Health Ombudsman made 5 April
2024 is amended as follows:
(a) Condition 3 of the Schedule of Conditions is
replaced with the following:
1. The practitioner must not have contact
with, treat or continue to treat, a patient
after becoming aware the patient may be
experiencing, or has experienced, any
form of domestic and family violence and
must take all reasonable steps to ensure
the patient is transferred to another
registered health practitioner acceptable to
the patient for ongoing care. The patient
must be advised either by the practitioner
or his place of practice that the practitioner
is unavailable to continue their treatment.
2. Unless otherwise directed by the Health
Ombudsman, within five (5) days of the
end of every calendar month the
-- 1 of 12 --
2
practitioner must provide a report to the
Office of the Health Ombudsman
regarding the number of patients who
have been transferred to another registered
health practitioner for the reasons set out
in condition 1, and must verify the report
contents with his employer. The report
must include:
(a) de-identified patient names (initials
only);
(b) the date the practitioner became
aware of the patient’s history; and
(c) the date the patient was transferred
to another registered health
practitioner.
‘Contact’ with a patient includes
consultation, interview, examination,
assessment, prescribing for, advising, or
otherwise treating a patient, whether it is
in person or on a communication device.
‘Communication device’ is defined as
any hardware that transmits voice, video
or text including those that transmit
information via electronic booking
applications.
‘Domestic and family violence’ means
when one person behaves in a way that
controls or dominates another person in a
relevant relationship and causes fear for
their safety and/or wellbeing - see Part 2,
Division 1 and Division 2 of the Domestic
and Family Violence Act 2012 for the full
definition of domestic violence and
relevant relationship.
CATCHWORDS: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES — HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS — MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS —
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS — PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE BOARDS, TRIBUNALS, ETC — where the
applicant was subject to immediate registration action by the
Health Ombudsman owing to being charged with a criminal
offence — where the immediate registration action was
imposed on the basis of being “otherwise in the public
interest” — where the applicant sought review of the
decision — meaning of “public interest” — where the
conditions restricted the applicant’s practice — where the
applicant practices in an “area of need” — where less
onerous action could be taken to serve the purpose of the
-- 2 of 12 --
3
immediate registration action — decision under review
amended
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS — QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL — where the Tribunal
exercises its review jurisdiction — merits review — whether
the decision was the correct and preferable decision
Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) ss 3, 25, 58, 59
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009
(Qld) ss 19–24
Colagrande v Health Ombudsman [2017] QCAT 107
Ellis v Medical Board of Australia [2020] VCAT 862
Farschi v Medical Board of Australia [2018] VCAT 1619
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; 170 CLR 104
I v Medical Board of Australia [2011] SAHPT 18
Liddell v Medical Board of Australia [2012] WASAT 120
Lindsay v NSW Medical Board [2008] NSWSC 40
Medical Board of Australia v Liang Joo Leow [2019] VSC
532
MLNO v Medical Board of Australia [2012] VCAT 123
Ord v Nursing & Midwifery Board of Australia [2014]
QCAT 688
Pearse v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 392
Porteous v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2021] QCAT
286
WD v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 614
APPEARANCES &
REPRESENTATION:
Applicant: M J McCarthy instructed by Bell Criminal Lawyers
Respondent: J R Jones instructed by the Office of the Health Ombudsman
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] On 5 April 2024, the respondent imposed immediate registration action on the
applicant’s registration as a medical practitioner.
[2] One of the conditions imposed was:
3. The practitioner must not practise except in the following circumstances:
a. To provide a service for the purpose of a skin check and/or
diagnosing or treating skin cancer where the patient has:
i. booked a consultation with the practitioner that is
identifiably for the purpose of a skin check and/or seeking
diagnosis or treatment of skin cancer; or
ii. been referred to the practitioner by another registered health
practitioner for the purpose of a skin check and/or seeking
diagnosis or treatment of skin cancer.
-- 3 of 12 --
4
b. To provide a ‘voluntary assisted dying service’ to a patient who
has been referred to the practitioner to access or receive a voluntary
assisted dying service.
[3] In respect of condition 3b, the applicant’s ‘voluntary assisted dying practitioner’ status
was suspended on 18 June 2024 until a full review can be undertaken by the
Queensland Voluntary Assisted Dying Practitioner Eligibility Panel.
[4] The applicant seeks a review of the respondent’s decision and submits the immediate
registration action is not required.
Background
[5] The applicant is a registered medical practitioner who, at the time of the immediate
registration action, was practising as a general practitioner (GP) in the Lockyer
Valley.
[6] The applicant is aged 46 and after moving to Australia in 2006, he joined the Lockyer
Valley practice.
[7] He has no prior adverse findings or action in relation to his medical practice and no
criminal history.
[8] In December 2023, he was charged with two alleged offences of choking, suffocation
or strangulation in a domestic setting.1 The events are alleged to have occurred on
one date in March 2020. The complainant was his wife at the time of the alleged
offending. The applicant and the complainant separated in 2022 and, apart from
engaging in post-separation family dispute resolution, there has been no direct contact
since December 2022.
[9] The Tribunal has before it a copy of a Queensland Police Service Court Brief (QP9)
which sets out the allegations. The QP9 does not contain sworn statements and no
evidence was called at the hearing of this application on 2 September 2024.
[10] The QP9 states, inter alia:
The victim states that on this occasion, she was at their home address when the
defendant choked her at their house on two occasions within a short time frame
the same evening…
[11] The QP9 notes that the complainant’s mother witnessed both events. It also notes that
in April 2020 the applicant and his wife attended counselling and refers to notes made
by the counsellor. The notes are discussed in depth in the applicant’s submissions.
[12] The applicant denies that the alleged choking occurred. The charges are currently at
the stage of a part-heard committal and the parties agree that a trial in the District
Court is unlikely to be listed within two years (at the minimum).
The counselling records
[13] The applicant submits that the specific allegations of choking are not reflected in the
records and that the QP9 should be scrutinised carefully. An immediate action
1 Contrary to s 315A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).
-- 4 of 12 --
5
decision does not entail a detailed enquiry but the material available should be
scrutinised carefully in order to determine the weight to be attached to it.2
[14] Put simply, the submission is that the fact that the notes do not contain a specific
allegation of choking supports the applicant’s denial of choking.
[15] This submission is tempered by the fact that this may have been (and probably was) a
joint counselling session to assist in saving the relationship which was still extant. It
is not unknown for victims of domestic violence to be reticent, sometimes for a
lengthy period, as to the details of the violence. There remains the fact of
corroboration by an eyewitness, albeit the mother of the complainant.
The legislative framework
[16] The functions of the Health Ombudsman include receiving health service complaints
and identifying and dealing with health service issues by undertaking investigations,
enquiries, and other relevant actions.3 Section 3(1) of the HO Act sets out as its
objects:
(1) The main objects of the Act are—
(a) to protect the health and safety of the public; and
(b) to promote –
(i) the professional, safe and competent practice by health
practitioners; and
(ii) high standards of service delivery by health service
organisations; and
(c) to maintain public confidence in the management of complaints
and other matters relating to the provision of health services.4
[17] Section 4 provides as follows:
(1) The main principle for administering this Act is that the health and safety
of the public are paramount.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the health and safety of the public is the
main consideration for—
(a) the health ombudsman, when deciding what relevant action to take
to deal with a compliant or other matter; and
(b) the director of proceedings, when deciding whether to refer a
matter to QCAT; and
(c) QCAT, when deciding a matter referred to under this Act.
[18] Part 7 of the HO Act confers disciplinary powers on the Health Ombudsman to take
“immediate registration action” in certain circumstances. Such action is defined to
include suspension of a practitioner’s registration or the imposition of conditions upon
registration. Section 58(1) of the Act sets out the relevant criteria for exercising this
power:
2 WD v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 614 (‘WD’).
3 Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld) (HO Act) s 25(a) and (b).
4 HO Act s 3(1).
-- 5 of 12 --
6
The health ombudsman may take immediate registration action under this
division in relation to a registered health practitioner if—
(a) the health ombudsman reasonably believes that—
(i) because of the practitioner’s conduct, or performance, the
practitioner poses a serious risk to persons; and
(ii) it is necessary to take the action to protect public health of safety;
or
…
(d) the health ombudsman reasonably believes the action is otherwise in the
public interest.
[19] If the Health Ombudsman proposes to take immediate registration action in relation
to a registered health practitioner, she must give the practitioner a notice stating the
proposed action and invite the practitioner to make a submission about the proposed
action.5
[20] The Health Ombudsman must have regard to any submissions made by the
practitioner before deciding whether to take immediate action.6
[21] However, under s 59(4), if the Health Ombudsman is satisfied it is necessary to do so
to ensure the health and safety of the individual or the public, the Health Ombudsman
may take immediate registration action without complying with those show cause
process steps.7
The legal tests
[22] The legal tests for the Tribunal when considering an application to review a decision
to take immediate action are summarised by the then-Deputy President of the tribunal,
Horneman-Wren SC DCJ as follows:
1. an immediate action order does not entail a detailed enquiry;
2. it requires action on an urgent basis because of the need to protect public
health and safety;
3. the taking of immediate action does not require proof of the conduct, but
rather whether there is a reasonable belief that the registrant poses a
serious risk;
4. an immediate action order may be based on material that would not
conventionally be considered as strictly evidentiary in nature, for
example, complaints and allegations;
5. the mere fact and seriousness of the charges supported by the untested
statements of witnesses in a particular case may well be sufficient to
create the necessary reasonable belief as to the existence of the risk;
6. the material available should be carefully scrutinised in order to
determine the weight to be attached to it;
5 HO Act s 59(1).
6 HO Act s 59(3).
7 HO Act s 59(4).
-- 6 of 12 --
7
7. a complaint that is trivial or misconceived on its face will clearly not be
given weight;
8. the nature of the allegations will be highly relevant to the issue of whether
the order is justified.8
[23] The approach set out in WD “must, of course, be applied in the context and
circumstances of each particular case”.9
[24] The respondent further submits that the Tribunal is required to hear and decide a
review of a reviewable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits, so as to
produce the “correct and preferable decision”.10
Reasonable belief
[25] A reasonable belief “does not require proof of conduct” but rather “an inclination of
the mind towards assenting to rather than rejecting a proposition.”11
[26] The respondent cites from George v Rockett:
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something
need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to
say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of
probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief
is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the
mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds
which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the
circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.12
[27] Further, the underlying facts giving rise to the relevant reasonable belief do not have
to be established on the balance of probabilities.13
[28] As such, the Tribunal ought to consider the evidence of the applicant’s conduct and
performance, as a whole, when determining whether it holds a reasonable belief that
his conduct and performance pose a serious risk to patients.
Serious risk
[29] The term “serious risk” is not legislatively defined. The parties agree it means “of
grave aspect, weighty or important; giving rise for apprehension; critical; to be
considered as an extreme example of its kind.”14
[30] The applicant adds that determining whether he poses a serious risk requires
identifying the particular aspects of his conduct or performance which are said to
cause that risk.
8 WD (n 2), [8], citing Pearse v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 392, I v Medical Board of
Australia [2011] SAHPT 18, Lindsay v NSW Medical Board [2008] NSWSC 40 and Liddell v Medical
Board of Australia [2012] WASAT 120.
9 Ord v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2014] QCAT 688, [9].
10 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act), s 20(2) and s 20(1).
11 Porteous v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2021] QCAT 286 (‘Porteous’), [9]. Pearse v Medical Board
of Australia [2013] QCAT 392 (‘Pearse’), [37].
12 [1990] HCA 26; 170 CLR 104, 116 [14].
13 Porteous, [10].
14 Porteous, [19].
-- 7 of 12 --
8
[31] The immediate action ought to be the least onerous necessary to address the relevant
risk.15 While the health and safety of the public must remain paramount, the impact
of the immediate action on the health practitioner cannot be underestimated.16
[32] The risk which may exist is the psychological harm to a victim of domestic violence
if they were treated by the practitioner and later come to realise he was then the subject
of such charges.
Public interest
[33] The term “public interest” does not have a fixed or precise content.
[34] The respondent directs the Tribunal to observations made in Medical Board of
Australia v Liang Joo Leow [2019] VSC 532, at [85] and [94] and quoted in Ellis v
Medical Board of Australia [2020] VCAT 862 at [58].:
…
The meaning of public interest is informed by the example. It is necessary for
the Tribunal to proceed on the basis that public confidence in the provision of
services by health practitioners is an aspect of the public interest. However, the
Tribunal does not need to apply the example as if it were a statutory test.
Specifically, the Tribunal was not required to analyse the issue of whether
public confidence would be maintained, as opposed to whether, and to what
extent, public confidence would be impacted and whether the extent of any such
impact would require, in the public interest, that immediate action be taken.
…
The concept of public confidence has no fixed meaning or content. It is a
difficult concept to measure. In assessing how the public might view the facts,
it is important that visceral responses, as prevalent or legitimate as they might
be, do not dominate at the expense of a considered response, having regard to
all of the competing factors.
…
[35] The respondent argues that allowing the applicant to continue practising while facing
these charges will undermine public confidence and trust in the medical profession.
This is particularly so given the vital role played by general practitioners in the early
identification, support and treatment of domestic violence victims.
The interim nature of immediate registration action
[36] The parties agree that the power to take immediate action is interlocutory in nature.17
The Tribunal is not required to resolve the allegations nor to make a final
determination on any sanction. The Tribunal is required to scrutinise the evidence
before it carefully to assess the risk alleged by the respondent and the weight to be
placed on the evidence.
15 Pearse, [16], [18].
16 Pearse, [19], citing with approval MLNO v Medical Board of Australia [2012] VCAT 123, [5]. See
also, Colagrande v Health Ombudsman [2017] QCAT 107, [18].
17 Liddell v Medical Board of Australia [2012] WASAT 120, [23]–[25].
-- 8 of 12 --
9
[37] Immediate action, where taken, should take a form which protects the public safety
and/or the public interests with as little damage to the practitioner as is consistent with
the maintenance of that public safety and/or public interest.18
[38] There is a public interest in members of the health profession, in whom training and
expenditure has been made, being able to practise. There is a public interest in ‘area
of need’ professionals being able to practise. There is a public interest in
proportionality, particularly where a matter is unlikely to finalise quickly. There is a
public interest in ensuring immediate action is only taken when it is necessary to do
so.
[39] Here, the followings points are noted by the Tribunal:
(a) the charges do not relate to a patient;
(b) at a trial the credit of the witnesses will be an issue;
(c) the presumption of innocence is relevant but not determinative;
(d) the Tribunal’s decision is not about whether he has committed the criminal
offences;
(e) the charges are serious;
(f) the mere fact and seriousness of the charges, in a particular case might be
sufficient to create the necessary reasonable belief as to either the existence of
a risk and/or that action is otherwise in the public interest;
(g) visceral responses, as prevalent or legitimate they may be, do not dominate at
the expense of a considered response having regard to the circumstances.
The respondent’s argument
[40] The respondent argues that the Tribunal’s review may involve an overlap between the
‘public interest’ and ‘serious risk’.
[41] The respondent submits that:
(a) public confidence may be reflected in the reputation of the profession and the
willingness of members of the public to access medical treatment;
(b) it may be necessary to take immediate action to reassure the public that the
regulatory system is safe and adequate to protect the public and the reputation
of the profession as a whole;
(c) where criminal charges against a practitioner are concerned, public interest
considerations will include the nature of the charge and the conduct underlying
it;
(d) the fact of charges having been laid, coupled with the serious nature of those
charges, may provide sufficient factual basis for immediate action to be taken
in the public interest;
(e) unresolved criminal matters may raise serious questions about whether a
practitioner is able to effect good medical care for a particular class of patient
18 Farschi v Medical Board of Australia [2018] VCAT 1619 (‘Farschi’), [48].
-- 9 of 12 --
10
and be able to identify and respond appropriately to perpetrators of the relevant
offences;
(f) public interest is not a one-sided concept. Factors which must also be weighed
up include:
(i) the public interest included maintenance of a regulatory system which
responds in a proportionate manner when allegations are made;
(ii) there is a public interest in members of health professions, in whom
training and expenditure has been made, being able to practise;
(iii) there is a public interest in “area of need” professionals being able to
practise;
(iv) there is a public interest in proportionality, particularly where a matter is
unlikely to finalise quickly; and
(v) there is a public interest in ensuring immediate action is only taken when
it is necessary to do so; and
(g) the significant role played by general practitioners in front line services for
domestic and family violence is also an important factor in the public interest
consideration.
The applicant’s argument
[42] The applicant argues that if the applicant were to only practise in relation to skin
cancer, his patients and the practice would be deprived of the many thousands of
consultations he would normally provide. This is eloquently supported by letters from
his colleagues and particularly from the Practice Manager.
[43] As noted earlier, area of need is a consideration.
[44] There has also been a considerable financial impact on the applicant. His income has
been significantly reduced. The respondent is alleged to pay the mortgage on his
former home and to accommodate himself.
[45] He is responsible for many expenses in relation to his 12-year-old daughter and he
supports his elderly parents who live in India. This is another relevant, but not
determinative consideration.
Decision
[46] The Tribunal accepts that there is a public interest in protecting members of the public
who may be adversely affected by being treated by the applicant whilst he is facing
serious charges for domestic violence. Also engaged is the protection of the public
confidence in the medical profession.
[47] The Tribunal accepts that if a person who has been the victim of domestic violence
were to be treated by the applicant and came later to realise he was facing charges, it
may cause psychological harm. In those circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view
that the existence of such risks involves a matter of public health and makes it
necessary to take immediate action.
[48] On the other hand, there is a public interest in:
-- 10 of 12 --
11
(a) members of the health profession who have been trained to do so, being able to
practice;
(b) proportionality, particularly where a matter is unlikely to finalise quickly; and
(c) ensuring immediate action is taken when it is necessary to do so.
[49] Following the course of an adjournment, the parties have communicated concerning
the wording of a condition. It should be said immediately that the Health Ombudsman
has not accepted the condition and has suggested the wording if the Tribunal is minded
to impose it.
[50] The Tribunal is satisfied the proposed condition is appropriate, in particular because
the charges are not likely to be finalised for at least two years.
Orders
The application to review a decision filed 22 April 2024 is upheld.
Pursuant to s 24(1)(a) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
2009 (Qld), the decision of the Health Ombudsman made 5 April 2024 is
amended as follows:
(a) Condition 3 of the Schedule of Conditions is replaced with the following:
1. The practitioner must not have contact with, treat or continue to treat, a
patient after becoming aware the patient may be experiencing, or has
experienced, any form of domestic and family violence and must take all
reasonable steps to ensure the patient is transferred to another registered
health practitioner acceptable to the patient for ongoing care. The patient
must be advised either by the practitioner or his place of practice that the
practitioner is unavailable to continue their treatment.
2. Unless otherwise directed by the Health Ombudsman, within five (5) days
of the end of every calendar month the practitioner must provide a report
to the Office of the Health Ombudsman regarding the number of patients
who have been transferred to another registered health practitioner for the
reasons set out in condition1, and must verify the report contents with his
employer. The report must include:
(a) de-identified patient names (initials only);
(b) the date the practitioner became aware of the patient’s history; and
(c) the date the patient was transferred to another registered health
practitioner.
‘Contact’ with a patient includes consultation, interview, examination,
assessment, prescribing for, advising, or otherwise treating a patient,
whether it is in person or on a communication device.
‘Communication device’ is defined as any hardware that transmits voice,
video or text including those that transmit information via electronic
booking applications.
‘Domestic and family violence’ means when one person behaves in a
way that controls or dominates another person in a relevant relationship
-- 11 of 12 --
12
and causes fear for their safety and/or wellbeing — see Part 2, Division 1
and Division 2 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012
for the full definition of domestic violence and relevant relationship.
-- 12 of 12 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCAT/2024/385