Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General v Gavin Anthony Dickson [2024] QCATA 38
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-
General v Gavin Anthony Dickson [2024] QCATA 38
PARTIES: DIRECTOR-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL
(applicant/appellant)
v
GAVIN ANTHONY DICKSON
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S: APL071-22
ORIGINATING
APPLICATION NO/S:
CML185 of 2020
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
DELIVERED ON: 28 February 2024
HEARING DATE: 23 August 2023
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Senior Member Fitzpatrick
ORDERS: The Appeal Tribunal orders that:
(a) the decision of the Tribunal made 21 February
2022 is set aside.
(b) an exceptional case exists such that it would
not be in the best interests of children for the
Chief Executive to issue a working with
children clearance, within the meaning of s
221(2) Working with Children (Risk
Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld).
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – ERROR OF LAW
– WHAT IS – DISTINCTION BETWEEN QUESTION OF
LAW AND QUESTION OF FACT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE
– EVIDENCE NOT AVAILABLE AT HEARING –
WHEN ADMISSIBLE
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL-GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION
OF COURT BELOW – IN GENERAL – STRONG
REASONS FOR INTERFERENCE – GENERALLY –
where appellant seeks rehearing – additional evidence in
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the form of national police check results report – where blue
card negative notice issued due to various offences and
domestic violence order breaches – whether there is an error
of mixed fact and law – whether an exceptional case exists
so that it would not be in the interests of children to issue a
positive notice – whether the tribunal below erred in law in
its conclusion based on available evidence
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009
(Qld)
Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening)
Act 2000 (Qld)
Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Grant (No
2) [2022] QSC 252
Re TAA [2006] QCST 112
Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child
Guardian v Lister (No 2) [2011] QCATA 87
Flegg v Crime and Misconduct Commission & Anor [2014]
QCA 42
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
CDI v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172
Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20, [10].
McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia
Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577
APPEARANCES &
REPRESENTATION:
Applicant: A Bain of Crown Law
Respondent: Self-represented
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] The applicant, known as Blue Card Services, made a decision that within the terms of
s 221(2) of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000
(Qld) (‘WWC Act’),1 there was an exceptional case and that the respondent Mr
Dickson should be issued a negative notice with respect to the issue of a Blue Card.
[2] On 21 February 2022 the Tribunal below ordered that the decision of Blue Card
Services be set aside and replaced with the Tribunal’s decision that there is no
exceptional case.
[3] Blue Card Services filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal that decision.
The ground of appeal is that the decision made by the Member at first instance was
unreasonable based on the evidence available to the Member at the hearing. That
ground of appeal raises an error of law.
1 Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) s 221(2) (‘WWC Act’).
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[4] Blue Card Services submit that errors of fact also occurred in relation to findings as
to protective factors, when one considers the evidence before the Member.
[5] I accept that Blue Card Services raise a question of mixed fact and law and that leave
to appeal is required.2 To obtain leave Blue Card Services must show that the appeal
is necessary to correct a substantial injustice and there is a reasonable argument that
there is an error to be corrected.3 A further basis on which leave is granted is if there
is a question of general importance upon which a decision of the appeal tribunal would
be to the public advantage.4
[6] The appeal hearing proceeded pursuant to s 147 of the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ('QCAT Act’)5 as a rehearing on the evidence
before the Member below. I acceded to the application by Blue Card Services to refer
to additional evidence. Two applications were made, first on 7 October 2022 and later
on 2 December 2022.
Additional evidence
[7] The additional evidence is conveniently set out in a National Police Check Results
Report current as at 6 July 2023 which was tendered at the appeal proceeding. The
Report lists a number of offences which post-date the hearing below. Plainly, the
additional evidence as to alleged offences and a conviction was not available at the
hearing.
[8] The offences are:
(a) on 14 October 2022 failure to appear at the Southport Magistrates Court in
relation to alleged contraventions of a domestic violence order (aggravated
offence) said to have occurred on 22 March 2022, 25 March 2022; 27 August
2021, 9 September 2021; 3 April 2022; 4 September 2022; 29 July 2022, 4
August 2022; 4 May 2022 and 7 May 2022
(b) on 29 October 2022 a fine of $1,000, no conviction recorded, with respect to
charges of failure to appear in accordance with an undertaking, contravention
of a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) on 19 October 2022, wilful
damage domestic violence offence on 19 October 2022, and a further
contravention of domestic violence order (aggravated offence) between 17
October 2022 and 28 October 2022.
[9] The submissions which accompany the application to rely on additional evidence filed
7 October 2022 are supported by the affidavit evidence of Jennifer Capper, Acting
Principal Legal Officer, Blue Card Services, filed 7 October 2022 which attaches
communications with the Queensland Police Service and relevant court briefs and
associated documents. The submissions which accompany the application filed on 2
December 2022 is supported by a further affidavit of Jennifer Capper attaching
relevant court briefs and associated documents. Importantly the last application relates
to the matters for which Mr Dickson was finally dealt with by the Court.
[10] The additional evidence includes Mr Dickson sending texts to another person to relay
to Mr Dickson’s aggrieved wife which contained threats of violence to her, when the
2 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 142(3)(b).
3 Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20, [10].
4 McIver Bulk Liquid Haulage Pty Ltd v Fruehauf Australia Pty Ltd [1989] 2 Qd R 577, 578, 580.
5 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 147 ('QCAT Act’).
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ex-wife had the protection of a domestic violence order. Mr Dickson was also dealt
with by the Court for an offence in contravention of an order relating to a different
aggrieved person. The offence involved Mr Dickson attending the victim’s workplace
armed with a knife. He slashed the victim’s bicycle tyres. The bicycle was used to ride
to and from work.
[11] I accept that the additional evidence reveals that since the hearing below Mr Dickson
has allegedly committed numerous domestic and family violence offences involving
his ex-partner, his children and another person between 22 March 2022 and 4
September 2022 and that he has been dealt with by the Court for contravention of
domestic violence orders and wilful damage. The further alleged offending
commenced less than 3 months after the review and occurred over about 6 months.
[12] I accept the submission that the alleged offending is similar in nature to the offences
considered by the Member below in the review hearing; that the alleged offences have
not been prevented by any self-management skills, and the further alleged offending
includes verbal abuse of Mr Dickson’s ex-wife in the presence of his children. The
matters dealt with by the Court include threats of violence and actual damage to
property.
[13] I accept that the additional evidence is important because:
(a) it is relevant to the determination of whether Mr Dickson’s case is exceptional
in the sense contemplated by s 226(2) of the Working with Children (Risk
Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld);
(b) it is consequently relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in
determining the application for leave to appeal or appeal; and
(c) it is credible because it has been obtained from the Queensland Police Service.
[14] Mr Dickson has been given an opportunity to address the additional evidence and
whether the Appeal Tribunal should refer to that evidence. Mr Dickson has made
written submissions and made oral submissions at the hearing.
[15] Mr Dickson’s response to the additional evidence is set out in his application filed 8
December 2022. It is apparent that the conflict in Mr Dickson’s family relates to
contact with his children and that context is proffered as a reason for the offending.
He admits slashing his girlfriend’s tyres because he was angry but says that he was
later remorseful. Mr Dickson says that his contraventions were minor.
[16] Mr Dickson strongly objects to Blue Card Services providing additional evidence of
contraventions after the hearing suggesting that Blue Card Services have delayed
matters in order to take advantage of subsequent contraventions.
[17] At the hearing Mr Dickson said that he accepted the charges and convictions but said
they resulted from his custody battle and that his ex-wife has not given access to his
children. Mr Dickson said there has been no violence, no abusive or physical violence.
He did accept the content of the text messages but said his children were not involved.
[18] I do not accept that Mr Dickson has established a good reason not to consider the
additional evidence.
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[19] Where evidence relates to matters that occurred after the first hearing there is no
requirement to show special grounds to justify its reception.6
[20] However, for the reasons submitted by Blue Card Services I consider the evidence is
relevant to a rehearing of the matter and I will have regard to the material summarised
in the National Police Check Report and attached to the affidavits of Ms Capper.
The Member’s reasoning
[21] The Member’s reasons set out that Mr Dickson was issued a negative notice because
of recent and repeated offending in breach of domestic violence orders, offences
which involved children including attending his former home and trying to gain entry
resulting in an allegedly split door; texting his son and attending Nippers where his
children were present in contravention of a domestic violence order. Mr Dickson was
convicted for these offences.
[22] Risk factors relevant to Mr Dickson included a lack of insight evidenced in Mr
Dickson’s oral submissions to the Tribunal. The Member observed that he did not
appear prepared, nor were his witnesses prepared. She noted that the background to
Mr Dickson’s offences involved or were done in the presence of his own children and
his actions were not a one-off. They were repeated, albeit in a concentrated period of
time. It was noted that Mr Dickson disputed none of the domestic violence orders,
other than one which was granted when he was not present.
[23] The Member considered protective factors and relied on the evidence of Mr Santosha,
a mental health counsellor who had seen Mr Dickson on nine occasions between
March 2018 and early 2022. The Member noted that Mr Santosha said Mr Dickson
now has a significant level of insight into what happened in the past with his former
wife, that he has undertaken cognitive behavioural therapy, co-parenting
communication training and conflict resolution skills training. The Member said that
Mr Santosha’s evidence is that he had not seen the reasons document from Blue Card
Services but knew that the blue card had been cancelled because of domestic related
violence issues.
[24] The Member said that she took comfort from knowing that Mr Dickson is voluntarily
attending treatment and appears to have the tools to prevent him from or minimise the
risk of transgressions in the future.
[25] The Member noted there had been no contravention of the domestic violence orders
since charges in 2020, and that the contraventions occurred in the context of a
marriage breakdown, displacement of the family, liquidation of a business and
financial concerns. The Member did not consider the incidents included physical or
prolonged emotional abuse.
[26] The Member considered another protective factor to be an improved relationship with
Mr Dickson’s ex-wife. The Member accepted the evidence of Mr Dickson that he had
learned from his mistakes and that through cognitive behaviour therapy he has the
tools to minimise recidivism.
6 CDI v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172.
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[27] The positive reference from Mr Ratajac, a former employer was found to be
compelling, despite him not being able to answer questions directly which related to
the reasons for the decision of Blue Card Services.
[28] The Member thought the protective factors outweigh the risk factors in a qualitative
sense and determined that the decision by Blue Card Services that Mr Dickson’s case
is an exceptional case within the meaning of s 221(2) of the Working with Children
(Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) be set aside and replaced with the
Tribunal’s decision that there is no exceptional case.
Submissions by Blue Card Services
[29] At the hearing of the appeal proceeding Blue Card Services maintained only its first
ground of appeal that the decision made by the Member at first instance was
unreasonable based on the evidence available to the Member at the hearing.
[30] It is submitted that the conclusion reached to set aside the decision of Blue Card
Services was inconsistent with the factual findings made by the Member, the objective
evidence led and heard at the hearing and ultimately the decision lacked reasonable
justification.
[31] Blue Card Services say that within the analysis of error in the exercise of a discretion
explained in House v The King7 the Member reached a result which was unreasonable
on the facts so that here has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion and a
substantial wrong has occurred. That is an error of law. It is submitted that the Member
was in error in her finding that Mr Dickson had insight into his behaviour and that he
had the tools to manage his behaviour. That is said to be an error of fact. The Member
thought that further contraventions of the domestic violence orders were unlikely, but
the additional evidence shows that there have been additional contraventions. They
are relevant issues of fact.
[32] Blue Card Services point to the following matters:
(a) Mr Dickson had been the respondent of various temporary and then a final
protection order naming his ex-wife and children. That order was in place until
19 November 2023.
(b) The first witness Mr Ratajac previously worked with the respondent but said
that he did not know why Mr Dickson had been issued with a negative notice
and had no understanding of Mr Dickson’s criminal history.8
(c) Mr Ratajac had little contact with Mr Dickson for about two years prior to the
hearing. That was the period when breaches of the domestic violence orders
occurred.
(d) The witness Mr West knew nothing of any domestic violence.
(e) The witness Mr Vandak did not understand there had been any domestic
violence.
[33] It is submitted that little if any weight should have been given to the witnesses in terms
of protective factors because they did not know the details of Mr Dickson’s behaviour
7 (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.
8 T, p 17, l5-6; T, p17.
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the subject of the negative notice and were not aware of all the circumstances of
breach of the domestic violence orders, so that one could safely rely on their opinions
as to Mr Dickson’s good character.
[34] In relation to Mr Santosha’s evidence, it is said that he admitted he did not know the
specifics of the case related to domestic violence.9 He said that he was not a domestic
violence specialist and that he does not work in the context of men’s behavioural
change.10 Rather, his expertise is in grief counselling associated with the breakdown
of a relationship. Further it is said Mr Santosha’s evidence as to improvement in
accountability for Mr Dickson’s behaviour was heavily qualified in that was what Mr
Dickson told him.11
[35] It is submitted that Mr Santosha’s evidence should be viewed in light of Mr Dickson’s
own evidence which failed to accept that his conduct amounted to domestic violence
or that he bore any responsibility for his conduct.12 That is said to be consistent with
the observation of the Member that:
Mr Dickson squandered the opportunity to paint himself in a positive light by
answering the majority of questions in a defensive manner. Indeed my view of
Mr Dickson is that he did not understand nor fully appreciate the opportunity
given to him in the hearing, to show how he has learned from the police
incidents that have led him here. Rather, Mr Dickson seems slightly annoyed
at the process…
[36] Blue Card Services say that the Member considered it a protective factor that Mr
Dickson had an improved relationship with his former wife. It is submitted that there
was no evidence from the former wife. There was other evidence from Mr Dickson
that he continued to cast blame on her and alleged that she was manipulating the
system and their children.13 Given this evidence it is submitted that the Member
should not have accepted a bare assertion of an improved relationship as a protective
factor.
[37] Blue Card Services say that the ultimate conclusion of the Member is at odds with the
evidence and the rest of her findings as to defensiveness, lack of insight and having
squandered the opportunity presented to him to demonstrate how he might behave
differently in a similar situation. Further, evidence as to attendance for counselling
revealed it was sporadic at best and should not have provided any level of comfort
that would minimise risks in the future. There was no evidence of ongoing
counselling.
[38] In all it is submitted that it was unreasonable to conclude that the protective factors
were of sufficient quality to overturn the decision. Having regard to the mandatory
matters in s 226(2) of the WWC Act, it is submitted that the case is an exceptional one
given Mr Dickson had been convicted and charged with offences related to domestic
violence, the offences were committed within the past 3.5 years, occurred over a
period of time rather than being an isolated incident. The offending sometimes
occurred in front of his children. Also, Mr Dickson showed a lack of insight and lack
of understanding as to how his behaviour impacts others. That is said to be relevant
9 T, p 57, l 25-29.
10 T, p 59, l 4-10.
11 T, p 57, l 34; T, p58, l 36.
12 T, p 36, l 15; T, p36, l 43-45; T, p 37, l 1-7.
13 T, p 64, l 14
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to Mr Dickson’s employment which involves an aspect of mentoring and training
young people.
Mr Dickson’s submissions
[39] Mr Dickson’s submissions are set out an application to the Tribunal filed 18 August
2022 and in submissions filed 8 December 2022. Additionally, he made oral
submissions in the appeal hearing.
[40] Mr Dickson gives an explanation for the domestic violence order being made in
February 2018 arising out of his refusal to leave the family home and later allegations
that he contacted his son on his birthday and hugged him at Nippers. He says that he
did not know the terms of the order and that it was in any event a minor breach.
[41] In the later submissions Mr Dickson blames his wife for breaching Court orders in
relation to contact with his children. No supporting evidence is given of that
allegation, but the family breakdown is offered as an excuse for his contraventions of
any domestic violence order.
[42] Mr Dickson points to the prejudice to his working life and participation in his
children’s sporting and school activities through loss of his blue card.
Consideration
[43] I consider the ground of appeal is made out. I find that the conclusion of the Member
below was made without an intelligible justification.14
[44] As to the error of law, the assessment of the evidence of Mr Dickson which concluded
that he did not present himself in a good light and that he gave no evidence of insight
into how he was in this position is at odds with the ultimate conclusion that Mr
Dickson now had insight into his behaviour and had the tools to avoid any further
contraventions of the domestic violence order. That ultimate conclusion was reached
by reference to Mr Santosha’s evidence. The Member acknowledged that Mr Santosha
did not know the contents of the reasons for the decision made by Blue Card Services.
The Member does not say why that did not diminish the weight which could be
accorded to Mr Santosha’s evidence. The Member did not address why she had
confidence in Mr Santosha’s evidence in the face of his concession that he was not an
expert in domestic violence or behaviour change and had only seen Mr Dickson
sporadically over a five-year period.
[45] In the circumstances the evidence of Mr Santosha as to Mr Dickson now having
insight into his behaviour and having tools to prevent repetition of that behaviour
cannot be safely relied upon, because his opinion is given without relevant expertise
and without reference to all the facts.
[46] Similarly, it was not reasonable to rely upon the evidence of Mr Dickson’s former
employer who had not seen Mr Dickson for two years and who did not know the
contents of the reasons for the decision made by Blue Card Services. Any opinion
offered to the Tribunal by Mr Ratajac must necessarily be of limited weight given he
did not have all the facts on which to base his opinions. Again, that was not addressed
by the Member.
14 Flegg v Crime and Misconduct Commission & Anor [2014] QCA 42, [14]-[16].
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[47] Finally, there was no evidence, apart from Mr Dickson’s evidence, as to an improved
relationship with his wife. The result is that it was unsafe for the Member to
characterise the evidence of an improved relationship as a protective factor.
[48] As to the asserted errors of fact I have in conducting a rehearing by reference to the
evidence below, especially that noted in Blue Card Service’s submissions, and by
reference to the additional evidence, reached my own conclusion that there was no
sufficient evidence on which it could be found that Mr Dickson showed insight into
the nature or cause of his conduct which resulted in being charged and convicted of
contraventions of domestic violence orders. I find that the Member was in error in so
concluding. The additional evidence bears out that Mr Dickson did not at the time of
the hearing or for a number of months thereafter have the necessary insight into the
impact of his behaviour on others and the self-regulation skills necessary to prevent
contravening the domestic violence orders in place at the time.
[49] The significance of Mr Dickson’s insight into his own conduct is that if he is aware
of the consequences of his actions on others, he is less likely to re-offend than a person
who has no insight. This Tribunal has consistently accepted this proposition because
of the impact of adults’ actions on children.15
[50] I do not consider the evidence given by Mr Dickson nor the submissions made by him
in the appeal proceeding demonstrate any insight into the cause of his behaviour which
resulted in contravention of domestic violence orders, nor as to the impact of his
behaviour on his ex-wife and children.
[51] The additional evidence is credible and prejudicial to Mr Dickson. The evidence
reveals a man with limited self-control who behaves in a threatening and abusive way
when confronted by issues which make him angry. I do not think the context of
disputes over child custody provide any excuse. On the contrary the context makes it
more important that Mr Dickson can demonstrate he is able to deal with setbacks in
his family relationships in a mature and non-threatening way, so that one cannot say
it is not in the best interests of children that he may work with children. The wilful
damage conviction is particularly concerning because it involved use of a knife and
was a spiteful and destructive act. It does not help Mr Dickson to say that he was
angry, but subsequently remorseful.
[52] I accept the submissions of Blue Card Services that by reference to s 226 of the WWC
Act, the offences which occurred prior to the 21 February 2022 review decision and
the offences which occurred after that date engage s 221(2) of the Act. I find that Mr
Dickson is an exceptional case within the terms of the Act such that it would not be
in the best interests of children for him to be issued with a positive notice.
[53] I consider it a matter of general importance to ensure that decisions which impact the
best interests of children are free from error. Because of the findings of error leave to
appeal is granted.
15 Re TAA [2006] QCST 112, [97]; Commissioner for Children and Young People and Child Guardian
v Lister (No 2) [2011] QCATA 87, [52].
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[54] Under s 147 of the QCAT Act the Appeal Tribunal may set aside the decision and
substitute its own decision, which I will do. I do not consider that there is utility in
remitting the matter for a re-hearing.
[55] In making this decision I have given consideration to the terms of the Human Rights
Act 2019 (Qld) and the human rights set out in the Act.16 Mr Dickson’s relevant human
right is the right to a fair hearing.17 Mr Dickson has been accorded a full opportunity
to respond to all submissions in this matter and was heard at the oral hearing which
was conducted in accordance with the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Act 2009 (Qld). I do not consider that there has been any limitation of his human right.
Order
[56] The Appeal Tribunal orders that:
(a) the decision of the Tribunal made 21 February 2022 is set aside.
(b) an exceptional case exists such that it would not be in the best interests of
children for the Chief Executive to issue a working with children clearance,
within the meaning of s 221(2) Working with Children (Risk Management and
Screening) Act 2000 (Qld).
16 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
17 Ibid s 31; Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Grant (No 2) [2022] QSC 252.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2024/038