Calardu Gympie Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2024] QLC 28

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Calardu Gympie Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2024] QLC 28 PARTIES: Calardu Gympie Pty Ltd (applicant) v Valuer-General (respondent) FILE NO: LVA506-23 PROCEEDING: Appeal against objection decision on a valuation under the Land Valuation Act 2010 DELIVERED ON: 12 December 2024 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARD ON: 9, 10 and 11 September 2024 HEARD AT: Brisbane MEMBER: WA Isdale ORDERS: 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The parties will be heard in regard to further orders. CATCHWORDS: REAL PROPERTY – VALUATION OF LAND – OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS – QUEENSLAND – GENERALLY – Where an appeal was brought against an objection decision – where the appellant and the Valuer- General differ on the valuation amount – where the Court was required to determine the correct valuation amount – whether the Valuer-General’s valuation was infected by error – whether the Court is able to determine the correct valuation based in the evidence provided – whether the appeal is to be allowed Land Valuation Act 2010 s 155(1), s 169, s 170 Appeal by landholder against determination of Valuer- General – City of Brisbane (1983) 9 QLCR 44 Appeal by N.R. and P.E. Tow against Determination of Valuer-General, Redland Shire -- 1 of 29 -- 2 Appeals against Determinations of Valuer-General – Shire of Kolan (1977) 4 QLCR 206 Aurizon Property Pty Ltd v the Chief Executive, Department of Transport and Main Roads [2023] QLAC 1 Beydoun v Valuer-General (2018) 39 QLCR 34 BWP Management Limited v Valuer-General (2019) 40 QLCR 232 Intertherm Pty Ltd v The Crown [2023] QLAC 1 J.L. and I. Qualischefski & Ors v Valuer-General (1979) 6 QLCR 167 (1978) 5 QLCR 378 Liat Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Lands (1996-1997) 16 QLCR 687 Valuer-General v Body Corporate for ‘Tennyson Reach’ Community Titles Scheme 39925 (2018) 39 QLCR 302 APPEARANCES: TF Ritchie instructed by Colin Biggers and Paisley, solicitors, for the appellant. DA Quayle instructed by in-house legal, for the respondent. Background [1] The appellant owns land at 35 Edwin Campion Drive, Monkland, 4570. It is at Gympie. It is described as Lot 29 on SP140718 and Lot 38 on SP185896. It has a total area of 1.2069 ha. [2] Pursuant to the Land Valuation Act 2010, the Valuer-General valued the land in the amount of $1,350,000 at the valuation date of 1 October, 2022. This is site value, a concept defined in the Act and which is not the subject of any dispute in this case. [3] The appellant objected to the valuation, which caused a review process to be undertaken. The result of that was a decision on objection dated 13 September, 2023. The decision was that the valuation amount would remain unaltered. [4] The appellant, dissatisfied with the decision on objection, appealed to this Court as permitted by the Act. [5] The nature of the hearing is provided by s 169 of the Act which requires that the hearing must be limited to the grounds stated in the valuation appeal notice, the appeal must be by way of a rehearing and that the appellant has the onus of proof for each of the grounds of appeal. -- 2 of 29 -- 3 [6] Under s 170, the Court may, (a), confirm the valuation appealed against or (b), reduce or increase the valuation to the amount it considers necessary to correctly make the valuation. The grounds of appeal [7] The grounds upon which the appeal was brought are – 1. The site value as assessed is not supported by property sales and is excessive having regard to comparable property sales. 2. The site value does not reflect the physical and legal characteristics of the land and/or constraints on the use of the land. 3. The assessed site value does not achieve or preserve uniformity of value between the assessed site value and valuations of other comparable parcels. 4. The Valuer General’s valuation: (a) is excessive; (b) is not supported by sales evidence; (c) is based on fundamentally erroneous methodology; and (d) fails to take account of factors which ought to have been taken account of including but not limited to those factors identified in ground two and four. (e) is not in accordance with the Land Valuation Act (2010) The conduct of the appeal [8] Three days were devoted to hearing this appeal. The first day was given over to a view of the subject land as well as the sale lands that were used by the valuers in arriving at their opinions of the valuation of the subject land. The view followed the plan agreed to by the parties which allowed the subject and sale lands to be seen not just by themselves but in their context and in relation to each other. The purpose of the view was to assist in understanding the evidence. It was not itself evidence. [9] Days 2 and 3 were given over to the evidence of the valuation witnesses called by the parties. Each called one expert valuer. The evidence was given concurrently. There were no other witnesses. Only part of the third day was needed to conclude the valuation evidence. [10] The parties chose to make written submissions, which closed on 25 October 2024 whereupon the decision in this appeal was reserved. The approach of the Court [11] In cases such as this, the Court must undertake a two-step process – -- 3 of 29 -- 4 …The first step is to determine whether or not the evidence in its totality supports the case put by an appellant that the issued valuation is in error, on the balance of probabilities, so that the onus of proof is discharged. If the onus of proof is discharged, the second phase of the evaluation to be undertaken by the Court comes into play. That is, what is the correct valuation of the subject land? The Court can only get to a consideration as to the correct valuation of the subject land and thus, s 170(b) of the LVA, in circumstances where the onus of proof has been discharged.1 The evidence [12] The parties jointly produced a hearing bundle that contained 7 items, each of which became exhibits. They are – 1. Notice of appeal 2. Appellant’s statement of facts and issues 3. Valuer-General’s statement of facts and issues 4. Appellant’s reply 5. Consolidated brief to valuation experts 6. Joint valuation report 7. Form 58 objection decision. [13] In addition, two further exhibits were tendered. They were – 8. A list of corrections to the joint expert report. 9. A copy of a letter dated 22 August 2024 from Gympie Regional Council to Baywater Holding Pty Ltd concerning a development application for a material change of use to Lot 2 of SP 147039. [14] The brief to the valuers makes clear that the appellant contended that the site value of the subject land at the valuation date should be $880,000 while the respondent contends that it should be $1,350,000. The valuers were referred to the duty to assist the Court, which overrides any obligation to a party to the appeal or to any person who is liable to pay their fees and expenses. [15] The joint valuation report is 173 pages in length. The valuers engaged to prepare it were Mr Coen Ladewig, engaged by the appellant, and Mr Luke Conallin for the respondent. Both are registered valuers in Queensland. The valuers’ conclusions as to value [16] In their joint report, Mr Ladewig concludes that the site value as at 1 October, 2022 is $1,085,000, which is $90 per m². The appellant ultimately contended that this is the 1 Valuer-General v Body Corporate for ‘Tennyson Reach’ Community Titles Scheme 39925 (2018) 39 QLCR 302 [50] per Member Smith, with whose reasons Member Cochrane concurred [70]. -- 4 of 29 -- 5 correct valuation. Mr Conallin expresses his opinion that the value is $1,350,000. This is $112 per m². The valuers’ methodology [17] The subject property was valued by both experts using the direct comparison method on a dollar rate per m² of unencumbered site area basis. The comparison is made to sales, in fee simple but with existing use rights and allowing for any encumbrance. [18] Mr Conallin has also considered direct comparison based on a total value basis. [19] The valuers have used vacant or lightly improved sales which they have analysed so as to discover the vacant site values. Vacant or lightly improved sales [20] The superior utility of a vacant or lightly improved sale as a comparison is well established. In Appeal by landholder against determination of Valuer-General – City of Brisbane, the Land Appeal Court said: It is indeed a fundamental principle of valuation that the best basis for assessment of unimproved value is the use of sales of vacant or lightly improved parcels.2 [21] In Appeals against Determinations of Valuer-General – Shire of Kolan, then President Smith said: The difficulty of analysing sales of improved properties, especially highly improved properties, has often been the subject of judicial comment.3 [22] In Appeal by N.R. and P.E. Tow against Determination of Valuer-General, Redland Shire, the Land Appeal Court said: Courts of the highest authority have laid down that the best test of value is to be found in the sales of comparable properties, preferably unimproved, on the open market round about the relevant date of valuation and between prudent and willing, but not over-anxious parties.4 Sales evidence [23] For there to be sales evidence, there must of course be evidence of a sale. The Land Appeal Court referred to this again in Beydoun v Valuer-General where it said – 2 (1983) 9 QLCR 44, 46. 3 (1977) 4 QLCR 206, 211. 4 (1978) 5 QLCR 378, 381. -- 5 of 29 -- 6 The superiority of sales evidence when valuing land is illustrated by the words of then President Trickett in the Land Court in Fairfax v Department of Natural Resources and Mines: The principles for determining the “market value” of land were established by the High Court in Spencer v The Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418. In that case, the High Court found that the value of land is determined by the price that a willing but not over-anxious buyer would pay to a willing but not over-anxious seller, both of whom are aware of all the circumstances which might affect the value of the land, either advantageously or prejudicially, including its situation, character, quality, proximity to conveniences or inconveniences, it's surrounding facilities, the then present demand for land and the likelihood of a rise or fall in the value of the property. (See Griffith CJ at 432 and Isaacs J at 411). It has been well established that the unimproved value of land is ascertained by reference to prices that have been paid for similar parcels of land. In Waterhouse v The Valuer-General (1927) 8 LGR (NSW) 137 at 139, Pike J said that: Land in my opinion differs in no way from any other commodity. It certainly is more difficult to ascertain the market value of it but – as with other commodities – the best way to ascertain the market value is by finding what lands comparable to the subject land were bringing in the market on the relevant date – and that is evidenced by sales.5 [24] In that case the learned President emphasised the words “reference to prices that have been paid for similar parcels of land”. An actual sale is used as a reference point. 5 (2018) 39 QLCR 34, 38 [19]. -- 6 of 29 -- 7 [25] In the joint report of the valuers, Exhibit 6, there appears at paragraph 420 on page 155, the following table which summarises sales evidence. The column headings show CL for Mr Ladewig and LC for Mr Conallin. Paragraph 420 refers to Mr Ladewig’s valuation. [26] The corresponding table in Mr Conallin’s valuation appears at paragraph 462 of Exhibit 6. It states – -- 7 of 29 -- 8 [27] It will be recalled that in order to arrive at their valuations each valuer used a rate per m² which, when multiplied by the number of square metres, gave their valuation figure. This appears on page 16 of their joint report, Exhibit 6. Mr Ladewig assessed the value at $90 per m² and Mr Conallin arrived at a figure of $115 per m². He then conservatively adopted $112 per m² as his valuation opinion. This is appropriate in a valuation for revenue purposes as it favours the owners. These figures, when applied to the area, produce $1,085,000 from Mr Ladewig and $1,350,000 from Mr Conallin. [28] The Court notes that none of the sales relied on by the valuers is analysed to support a rate per m² of less than $114 per m². [29] Mr Ladewig uses the sales to arrive at a rate of $90 per m². None of the sales support a rate of less than $114 m² in their analysis. [30] Mr Ladewig was cross-examined as to how he arrived at the figure of $90 per m². His explanation made clear that although his valuation is expressed to have been arrived at on the basis of sales, he has arrived at $90 per m² in a manner only very tenuously connected to information disclosed by the sales considered. [31] Mr Conallin arrives at $115 per m² and conservatively applied $112 per m². [32] Exhibit 6, at page 44, contains another informative table. It is not necessary to repeat those parts of the table which are identical to what appears in the one at page 155. -- 8 of 29 -- 9 What it adds to the information already considered is two columns of figures, one showing the variance in $ per m² between the analysed sale price per m² arrived at by the valuers and the other showing this as a percentage. Keeping the sales in the same order, these figures are – Variance $ per m² Variance % 1 $0/m² 0% 2 $0/m² 0% 3 -$204/m² 68% 4 $0/m² 0% 5 -$49/m² 8% 6 $0/m² 0% 7 $0/m² 0% [33] The very large discrepancy between the valuers concerning Sale 3 can be observed in the table of calculations on page 63 of Exhibit 6. Mr Ladewig has made what is described as a risk allowance in respect of an item called “AFL”, which refers to agreement for lease. This is shown as “-38.6% - $625,000.” Mr Conallin has not allowed anything for this item. [34] The reasons for Mr Ladewig’s decision to make this allowance appear in the joint report on pages 62 and 63 thereof. Also appearing here are Mr Conallin’s reasons for not allowing for it. Mr Ladewig states at paragraph 185 that – 185. CL – has relied on the mind of the purchaser at the time of sale, planning to build a l,800m² building for Spotlight with part undercroft parking. The purchaser confirmed via email that the site would be worth $300/m² developed (excavation and retaining done for undercroft) and without the Spotlight tenancy. Confirms they would not have paid $500/m² without the tenant. [35] As part of his response to this, Mr Conallin says, at paragraph 187 – 187. LC – A review of the transaction indicates the tenant was not committed prior to the sale and there was no agreement in place. The purchaser advised they had discussions with Spotlight which did not reach agreement before the sale occurred. The sale was completed, and Spotlight pulled out. A new proposal was submitted by the purchaser and a new tenant (Autobarn LFR) committed to the site after the date of sale. This new proposal is the use that is being built on the site. The purchaser is now working with Spotlight on a different proposal in this locality, on a larger site without Highway exposure. See purchaser emails attached in paragraph 210. [36] The sale was in October, 2021. In July, 2024, for the purpose of the present appeal, the valuers contacted the purchaser. The joint report, at pages 67 to 69, includes copies of e-mails which they sent to Mr Andy Thallon, who was not called to give evidence. On July 2, 2024 at 4:33pm Mr Ladewig sent an e-mail to Mr Thallon asking -- 9 of 29 -- 10 for confirmation that it was an accurate account of their conversation. It is in the following terms – From: Coen Ladewig <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, July 2, 2024 4:33 PM To: Andy Thallon <[email protected]> Subject: 52-54 Edwin Campion Dr, Monkland Hi Andrew, Thanks for the chat, can you please confirm if the below is an accurate account of our conversation. On market transaction. Sale price was $1,621,000 ex GST (25 Oct 2021-23 Dec 21) with a circa 60 day settlement. At the time of sale, had spotlight ready for the site as a tenant for a 1,800m² building with part under croft parking. Given the increased cost of construction and Spotlight not moving on rent, this is no longer viable. You considered land value without a tenant to be $300/m² developed. Would not have paid $500/m² without the tenant New tenant secured now for slab on ground with Autobarn as the tenant. Selling this project, you will only just break even. New project needs some cut to fill and retaining etc onsite, cost circa $30,000. No offsite works considered. Thanks Coen [37] At 5:06 PM on the same day, there was this reply – Andy Thallon <[email protected]> To Coen Ladewig [EXTERNAL. EMAIL] This email was sent from outside your organisation – Be cautious when opening attachments or clicking links. Sounds about right Coen [38] Mr Conallin made his own inquiries, which yielded the following e-mail trail – From: Luke Conallin Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2024 1:27 PM To: [email protected] Subject: 52-54 Edwin Campion Drive, Monkland Hi Andy, Thanks for your time on the background to this sale, could you please confirm if the below is an accurate account of our discussion. Sale terms: a fairly standard sale. Not subject to DA, no special conditions in the contract. Spotlight was interested in leasing the proposed building, had general discussions with them before the purchase of the site. Plans were drawn up for the proposed use. A heads of agreement was circulating but was not -- 10 of 29 -- 11 finalised and an AFL was not completed before Spotlight pulled out, after the site was purchased. The proposed spotlight project had a building with a NLA of 1,800m² with under croft parking. Due to Spotlights requirement for 1,800m² of space the proposal required under croft parking on a site of this size and could not be undertaken as an 'at grade' development. The deal was not viable due to increased construction costs post Covid, interest rates rising and Spotlight not moving on rent. The requirement for under croft parking also added to the cost issue. You advise a viable land value with the increased construction costs and higher interest rates in the order of $300/m² is required given Spotlight will not move on the rental level. This is based on a circa 5,000m² site without Highway exposure that you have purchased or are in the process of purchasing. The Spotlight deal is viable at the lower level on this site without the undercroft component. New proposal on 52-54 Edwin is for an Autobarn LFR development with smaller building and parking at grade. Incentives are 12 months rent free period with some assistance with fit out. Looking at breakeven with increased construction costs and higher interest rates. Site works- new proposal (Autobarn) estimated $30,000 for earthworks cut, fill, retaining walls and other items. The old proposal (Spotlight) required more excavation and retaining to achieve the undercroft parking. Proposal required 1-2 m excavation to the lower lot 5 and 3.3 m retaining wall generally between the two existing lots. Estimated area where the excavation was required was 1,500 m², you advise allow say 2,000 m³ of excavation and fill to be removed and disposed of. Approx cost $50,000. In terms of the retaining wall - 3.3 m high concrete core filled block wall at $220/m² + steel reinforcing ($5,000) + footings ($5,000-$10,000). Estimated 25 m length of wall. Thanks again Luke … From: Luke Conallin <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2024 10:59 AM To: Andy Thallon <[email protected]> Subject: RE: 52-54 Edwin Campion Drive, Monkland Hi Andy, Just following up to confirm the below notes are an accurate record of our conversation regarding sales background at 52-54 Edwin Campion. If anything needs clarification or correction could you please let me know? I'll assume the notes are correct if I don’t hear from you by say end of tomorrow 17/7. Appreciate your [sic] busy and thanks again for your time on this. Kind regards -- 11 of 29 -- 12 Luke … From: Andy Thallon <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, 16 July 2024 6:21 PM To: Luke Conallin Subject: RE: 52-54 Edwin Campion Drive, Monkland … Luke It's all a bit confusing to me why this is all happening. We would not have purchased either site without spotlight committed first. The land is unreasonably expensive. 52-54 Edwin Campion, $300/m² should be the value of the land without spotlight and after all works done for the under croft. The new site is worth closer to $180/m² without spotlight committed Without commitments this land is not very valuable. [39] Neither party called Mr Thallon, and there is no explanation for that nor any suggestion that he was not able to be called to give evidence. The parties provided this email material in Exhibit 6, and there is no suggestion that any part of it is untrue or unreliable in any way. It appears from Mr Conallin’s email of July 11, 2024 that a heads of agreement was circulating but not finalised and an agreement for lease was not completed before the proposed tenant, Spotlight, pulled out, after the site was purchased. [40] Mr Thallon says that he would not have made the purchase without Spotlight committed and that $300 per m² should be the value of the land without Spotlight committed. [41] It appears from the material provided that at the time of purchase the purchaser, with what was then known, paid the purchase price. With the benefit of hindsight, the purchaser, which Mr Thallon is said to be speaking for, has buyer's remorse, regretting what it chose to pay. [42] Mr Thallon has provided an opinion that the value should be $300 per m². There is no indication that he is a person who is qualified to give opinion evidence of valuation and, as has been noted, he was not called. [43] Mr Ladewig, as he states in paragraph 184 of Exhibit 6, has relied on the purchaser’s email comments. He states – -- 12 of 29 -- 13 184. CL – The site has been analysed to $300/m² in line with the purchasers' comments (email), originally having Spotlight committed to the site. A change in construction cost and the inability to increase spotlights(sic) rent, forced the purchaser to change this plan of development. [44] It is plain that Mr Ladewig has adopted the figure of $300 per m² directly from Mr Thallon’s email of 16 July, 2024. [45] This figure has not been arrived at by analysis of the sale, which it purports to have been. It is not an analysis which has produced this figure; it is Mr Thallon. The Court has not been provided with an analysis derived from the expert work of a valuer, a person permitted to give evidence of their opinion. [46] It is concluded that what has been produced by Mr Ladewig in relation to Sale 3 is not an analysis but the uncritical adoption of what is the useless and irrelevant opinion of someone else. [47] It is also observed that what is reported by Mr Ladewig to be an analysis is not an analysis of a sale. [48] The authorities which have been referred to earlier make clear that it is sales that are to be analysed. Mr Ladewig has not analysed the actual sale but has made a very large allowance for something which appears on the evidence to be a circumstance which arose after the sale and which did not influence the sale. To apply an allowance for something which did not have any influence, because it had not happened, at the date of the sale, is an error which invalidates his valuation process and makes its outcome unreliable. [49] In respect of Sale 3, the Court could not accept Mr Ladewig’s analysis and must reject it as unreliable. [50] In relation to Sale 5, the only other sale where the valuers differ on their analysed sale price per m², Mr Ladewig arrived at $635 per m² and Mr Conallin at $586 per m². Both agree that it is overall superior to the subject on a rate per m² basis. The comparability of the sales Sale 1 [51] Both parties agree that Sale 1 is a sale which is comparable to the subject property, -- 13 of 29 -- 14 Sale 2 [52] Both parties agree that Sale 2 is also comparable to the subject. Sale 3 [53] Both parties agree that Sale 3 is comparable to the subject. Sale 4 [54] Mr Ladewig says that this is a comparable sale and that there are no sales of this size or use to show an increase in the market since the date of this sale. Mr Conallin expresses the view that Sales 1, 2, 6 and 7 show that the values have increased.6 Sale 5 [55] Mr Ladewig says that this is not a comparable sale. It sold after the valuation date and has a different highest and best use in that it includes industrial use. The site requires significant works.7 Sale 6 [56] Mr Ladewig disagrees that this sale is of a comparable property. The use is for a car yard and mechanical workshop with showroom and outdoor sales. This is a different highest and best use, in Mr Ladewig’s view. Mr Conallin disagrees with this and is of the opinion that the sale is properly comparable with the subject. Sale 7 [57] Mr Conallin is of the opinion that this sale is comparable to the subject. Mr Ladewig disagrees on the basis that there is a different highest and best use. Mr Conallin holds the view that similar uses have been developed in the Monkland Showroom precinct where the subject land is located. Sale 8 [58] The valuation report refers to a sale at 25 Edward Campion Drive. It has not been used by either valuer and they have agreed that there are other sales which are more 6 Ex 6 P.70 para 211, 217. 7 Ex 6 P.86 para 241. -- 14 of 29 -- 15 helpful.8 Sale 9, at 125 Myall Street, Cooroy, was not used by either valuer and does not need to be considered. The valuation rationales applied by the valuers [59] Mr Ladewig considers the sales in the following way. Sales 1 and 2 indicate that subject should be valued below the rates per m² of these sales in view of the significant size difference. Sales 3, in his view, shows that the subject should be below $300 per m² given the superior exposure of the sale and its size, which is 3,242 m².9 It will be recalled that the subject land is larger, 12,069 m².10 The sale is comparable and located directly opposite the subject.11 [60] Mr Ladewig uses Sale 4, which in his opinion, in view of its superior Bruce Highway exposure and size, indicates that the subject should be valued below this on a rate per m² basis. He sees Sale 5 as also having superior highway exposure, and in view of its size the subject should be valued below the sale’s analysed rate.12 [61] Sale 6 should also, in Mr Ladewig’s view, be seen as indicating that the subject land must be valued at a lower rate per m² than this sale, as the sale property has superior location and superior highway exposure. The sale also has a different highest and best use as a car showroom with servicing and outdoor sales.13 [62] Sale 7 is also viewed by Mr Ladewig as indicating that the subject should be valued at a lower rate in view of the sale property having a superior location for its highest and best use, a different highest and best use to the subject land, as well as its highway exposure and size.14 [63] Mr Ladewig reports that – 425. After making adjustments for factors such as location, size, zoning, exposure, shape and use, I have adopted an appropriate rate of $90/m² of land area for the subject property. 426. 12,069 @ $90/m² = $1,086,210 Adopt - $1,085,000 ($90/m²) 8 Ex 6 P.150 para 363. 9 Ex 6 P.44, the table “Land area” column. 10 Ex 6 P.16, 18. 11 Ex 6 P.152 paras 383–9. 12 Ex 6 P.153 paras 397–403. 13 Ex 6 P.153 paras 404–11. 14 Ex 6 P.154 paras 412–9. -- 15 of 29 -- 16 (One Million, Eighty Five Thousand Dollars) [64] The analysed sales do not examine any sales with a rate per m² of less than $114 per m². Mr Ladewig does not disclose in his valuation report how he arrived at a figure of $90/m² as opposed to some other figure, as there is no sale which is shown to support that value or something close to it. The sales analysed do not establish a range within which the value must lie so that an expert valuer can place it in the range established. There is a range established and then a figure is selected which is significantly below the range. There is no sale which has been analysed to show the floor above which the value must be located. The range is only used to establish that the value is said to be below that range. There is no sales evidence to indicate at what point below the established range the value will be found. The analysed range of values is only useful, in Mr Ladewig’s analysis, to show that the value is not in that range. This is of very little use. The value must be below the range, in Mr Ladewig’s view, but how far below is not indicated by any evidence or analysis that appears in the valuation joint report. There is reference to making adjustments for the matters referred to in paragraph 425 i.e., location, size, zoning, exposure, shape and use, but no information of what adjustment is attributed to what factor or, most importantly, what sales evidence indicates the correctness of an adjustment to a specific figure. [65] Mr Ladewig was questioned about his reasoning when he gave evidence. He then exposed his thought process in making the $90 per m² figure for the first time. [66] The giving of expert evidence in the Land Court is regulated and consistent. Practice Direction 6 of 2020 requires that there is to be a joint expert report that complies with the Land Court Rules and is the statement of evidence for the hearing. Land Court Rule 29 provides that an expert may give evidence-in-chief only by means of this report unless the Court gives leave for oral evidence to be given. [67] Paragraphs 420, 425 and 426 of the joint expert report have already been set out. In this connection, the following exchange is recorded in the transcript – MR QUAYLE: And I – what I’m just – before we move into the sales, I’m just trying to understand – and direct me to it if I’m missing it in the joint report – where the things in 425 – where you say, “Here’s how I get from – here’s how I get 90 – here’s why I pick 90, not 95, or 90, not 100, or 90, not 80.” Is that revealed in the joint report? MR LADEWIG: Um, well, there’s no real mathematical equation to take you from your sale analyses 245 to the subject. -- 16 of 29 -- 17 MR QUAYLE: If you’d just attend to my question, which is in the joint report, is there somewhere we can find your description of the path to $90 a m². MR LADEWIG: Well, it – that’s it in front of you and in the table beforehand in regards to comparability.15 … MR RITCHIE: Well, Mr Ladewig, did you just pluck that figure out of thin air? MR LADEWIG: No, no, no, I did ‑ ‑ ‑ MR RITCHIE: So, Mr Ladewig, could you please tell his Honour – how did you reach that figure of $90 per m² in this case? MR LADEWIG: Sure. Can you, um – can you go back to that page on my valuation, please, of – of the 90.16 [68] The respondent’s counsel objected to the witness explaining for the first time in the witness box what was required to be explained in the written report when the respondent’s valuer had not had the opportunity to address it. The Court allowed the evidence to be given on the basis that Mr Conallin would be given a proper opportunity to consider and respond to it.17 The following exchange is recorded – MR RITCHIE: … Mr Ladewig, is it correct that you have discounted the rate per m² of the subject site as compared to comparable sales 1, 2, 3 and 4 for size? MR LADEWIG: Correct. MR RITCHIE: Could you please explain what process of reasoning you adopted to arrive at a figure of $90 per m² of the subject site in circumstances where the rate per m² for 1, 2, 3 and 4 exceeds that. MR LADEWIG: So the main fundamental was the economies of scale. When looking at the parcels sales 1 and 2 across the road, when you look at the size, you’ve got a – you know, anywhere from 15 to 20 per cent of the subject property in regards to size, and the rates are around that – that two – 250 a metre. So looking at economies of scale – again, not a – not a precise mathematical formula – I thought that, you know, starting with a half-rate of what that was, so around the – halfway to the 250, which would take me to about 125 a metre. So I thought, “125 a metre’s probably the top end, but then where – where do I fall under that?” So then I look for a larger site, and that was sale 4, which is, you know, about half the size of the subject property at about 160. So then I look at that property at 160 and I say, “Well, if my smaller ones have come down to 125, I have to be below that, and I have to be below the 160. Am I half of that? Am I at about 80? Probably not.” But 15 T 1-40 lines 5 to 18. 16 T 1-46 lines 10 to 18. 17 T 1-48 lines 4 to 7. -- 17 of 29 -- 18 now I’ve – I’ve kind of got my 80 and my 125, and then given the size I kind – I thought it – you know, what – I think it should be under 100, ah, I don’t think it should be 80, and that’s kind of where I arrived at – at the $90 a metre, um, you know, having regard to the other items that are listed in that comparability table for exposure. MR RITCHIE: Thank you. Your Honour, that is the evidence on that question that I wish to raise.18 [69] Mr Ladewig is experienced at giving expert evidence in the Land Court. His explanation, omitted from the joint expert report, was allowed to be fully given. [70] The comparability table used by Mr Ladewig is at paragraph 420. There is nothing there around $90 per m². There is no explanation of why “… starting with a half-rate …” was the correct starting point. Additionally, $90 per m² was arrived at because it was under $100 and above $80. This is not able to be accepted as providing a reliable basis of value that the Court could apply. [71] The mental process applied by Mr Ladewig to arrive at the rate of $90 per m² follows on from and in part depends on the decision to apply the $300 per m² for Sale 3. As discussed, doing so was an error as it does not represent a sale which he analysed but is rather a fantasy of something that a purchaser might have wished to have happened but which did not. [72] President Trickett considered this type of approach in Liat Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Lands. The learned President said – It is well established that a valuer must accept the actual sale price of a property which he tends to use as the basis for the valuation of another property. As Pike J of the NSW Land and Valuation Court said in re Collins (1936) Vol IV The Valuer 156: You cannot take a sale at a price, and say, ‘That was the sale price, but in my opinion it is not the correct price; I am going to alter the price paid by this particular purchaser.’ If that is done in the analysis of sales, one might just as well reject the whole of those sales, and simply say what is the witnesses' opinion of the land to be valued.19 [73] In Pike J’s decision, the words quoted by President Trickett were immediately preceded by the words – “You have either got to take the sale as representing the fair market value, or reject it.” 18 T 1-48 lines 13 to 41. 19 (1996-1997) 16 QLCR 687, 706. -- 18 of 29 -- 19 [74] Mr Ladewig chose to do something with Sale 3 that was not open to a valuer. Using it as he did resulted in a data point of $300 per m² that he applied when it was not usable. It lowered what would have otherwise been the analysed value of Sale 3 erroneously. It went into his valuation as an ingredient, which went into the next flawed decision to reduce the value to $90 per m², a figure below the sales as analysed and which included a figure which was unjustifiably lowered, the $300 per m². The errors compound to further impugn the reliability of the conclusion of $90 per m². [75] The two-step process that the Court is currently engaged in requires that the evidence in its totality be considered to determine whether it supports the case put by the appellant that the issued valuation is in error, on the balance of probabilities, so that the onus of proof is discharged. The evidence from the respondent must also be considered in order to do this. [76] Mr Conallin considered that Sale 1, smaller and with inferior access, supports the rate of $115 per m² applied to the subject property. Sale 2, also smaller with inferior access, no corner advantage, inferior frontage but a more regular shape, also supports the rate of $115 per m² applied to the subject. [77] He next considered Sale 6, a larger sale with inferior location, local exposure and frontage. He noted that it enjoys slightly superior distant views from the highway and is superior overall to the subject property. The analysed rate of $120 per m² supports the rate he adopted for the subject property. [78] Sale 7 he considers to be far inferior in location, local exposure, frontage, configuration and access. It is smaller than the subject. He is of the opinion that it supports the rate of $115 per m² for the subject property. [79] Sale 3, analysed to $504 per m², is very close to the subject, in the same Monkland Showroom precinct. It has superior exposure and visibility to the highway. In view of its exposure, position, size and shape, it readily supports the $115 per m² adopted for the subject. [80] Sale 5, a smaller site with superior position and exposure, sold approximately 3 months after the valuation date. The topography is inferior to the subject but more regular in shape. This is an inside lot. The subject has a superior configuration. The sales analyses of the valuers differ. Mr Conallin finds $501 per m² or $586 per m² on -- 19 of 29 -- 20 an effective area. Mr Ladewig concluded that it was $635 per m². Mr Conallin used $586 in the Sales Comparison Table.20 He considered that either $501 or $586 readily support the $115 per m² applied to the larger subject in its inferior location. For present purposes, nothing turns on the different rates per m² found by the valuers in Sale 5. [81] Mr Conallin sets out his sales evidence in a table on page 161 of Exhibit 6. He has not used Sale 4 but considered that the analysed sale price is $160 per m² on an effective area of 6,320 m².21 [82] Mr Conallin’s valuation conclusion appears on page 162 of Exhibit 6, in paragraph 463. He uses the sales to arrive at a range of analysed rate per m² figures. The range is $114 to $586 per m². He adopts a figure of $115 per m², which results in a value of $1,387,935. Consistent with practice in a revenue valuation, he rounds it downwards to $1,350,000, which is in favour of the landowners. This produces the $112 per m² figure. The valuation is yielding $115 per m², within the range established by the sales. The conservative rounding does not detract from the valuation being supported by the range established through analysis of the sales. [83] When in the witness box, Mr Ladewig produced what became Exhibit 9. It is a letter dated 22 August, 2024 from Gympie Regional Council to the applicant for a development application for Lot 2 on SP 147039 – Kelly Drive, Glanmire. It states, inter alia, that it has not been demonstrated that a showroom is an appropriate use for this site, given that it is located in the Medium Impact Industrial zone. It is not consistent with the purpose and intent of that zone. Mr Ladewig informed the Court that he had become aware of this letter the day before he entered the witness box. It indicated the uncertainty of success for the development application. This is Sale 5. [84] The extent of this zone is visible in the coloured plan at page 30 of Exhibit 6. This may be appreciated alongside the aerial photo on page 45 of Exhibit 6, which shows the location of the subject land and the sales. The location of the subject is also marked on the zoning plan on page 30. 20 Ex 6 P.44. 21 Ex 6 P.71 para 221. -- 20 of 29 -- 21 The appellant’s submissions [85] The appellant submits that the evidence shows that the respondent’s valuation is in error in the following respects: (a) Mr Conallin took into account the sales of properties which were not properly comparable to the subject property (Sales 5, 6 and 7). These were industrial sites with different uses to the highest and best use of the Subject Property. (b) Mr Conallin did not take into account the sale of a comparable property (Sale 4). (c) Mr Conallin did not adjust the sale price of a comparable property to make the sale properly comparable to the Subject Property (Sale 3). (d) Mr Conallin did not apply a discount for size with respect to the Subject Property, even though it was common ground that such a discount was appropriate. Concerning (a) [86] In BWP Management Limited v Valuer-General22 the Land Appeal Court said – [21] Whether a sale is truly comparable is a question of fact, not law, and necessarily involves questions of judgment. Considering a sale's comparability is not a binary exercise. It is an oversimplification to say a sale is either comparable or not. There will be gradations of comparability: from identical to irrelevant. Sales that approach the irrelevant end will offer so little assistance that the valuer and the Court should disregard them. … [25] What emerges from the authorities is that a comparable sales analysis is an evaluative process that does not lend itself to a valuer, or a court, summarily accepting or disregarding a sale without considering the particular features of the land sold and the circumstances of the sale. [87] The appellant submits that Mr Conallin’s use of Sales 5, 6 and 7 amounts to using sales that are closer to the category of “irrelevant”. Accordingly, it is submitted that it was not necessary to consider them and that doing so was an error. [88] It is pointed out that Sales 5, 6 and 7 were zoned “Medium Impact Industry” under the Planning Scheme.23 Reference is made to the decision of the Land Appeal Court in Aurizon Property Pty Ltd v The Chief Executive, Department of Transport and Main Roads where that Court referred to the primary rule of valuation that like should 22 (2019) 40 QLCR 232, 238 (References omitted). 23 Appellant’s submissions [15]. -- 21 of 29 -- 22 be compared with like and that this includes all relevant factors, including the zoning.24 [89] It is submitted that Sales 5, 6 and 7 are not properly comparable as they are in a different market, namely the market for industrial-use land, because of the zoning. [90] In the case of Sale 5, the proposed development was at the “industrial end” of large- format retail use while the subject was at the “showroom end” of such uses,25 and it seems doubtful that showroom use would be permitted on Sale 5 by the local authority.26 [91] Sale 6 also has a difference related to showroom use, which is impact assessable on this sale but not subject to that uncertainty on the subject. Mr Conallin was also of the opinion that this sale had less exposure to the Bruce Highway than Mr Ladewig appeared to accept. The Court’s inspection allowed the extent of this exposure to be appreciated in order to understand the evidence of both valuers on this aspect. This enabled the Court to avoid the potential for a different choice of words by each valuer assuming unwarranted significance when, clearly, they both saw the same thing. [92] Sale 7 is submitted to be an unsuitable comparison as a development application has been submitted to use it for industrial purposes. Its exposure to the Bruce Highway was described differently by the valuers, with Mr Conallin’s description indicating less exposure than Mr Ladewig’s. This exposure was observed during the inspection. [93] The appellant submits that little weight should be given to the opinion of the valuers about the prospects of development applications being approved as that is outside of their field of expertise. [94] There is no doubt that zoning is a relevant factor. It does not stand alone and of itself determine comparability. As the Land Appeal Court said in Intertherm Pty Ltd v The Crown – It is a primary rule of valuation that like should be compared with like and this applies in so far as all relevant factors, including zoning, are concerned. This rule was recognised by the Land Appeal Court in the Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v The Crown (SL 30455) handed down on 11th May 1977 and not yet reported. At page 16 of the judgment it was stated "It is difficult to 24 [2023] QLAC 1 [6]. 25 Appellant’s submissions [25]. 26 Ibid [23]. -- 22 of 29 -- 23 compare land situated in different zones. It is desirable to avoid such comparison, if possible,". 27 Conclusion concerning (a) [95] It cannot be accepted that by making use of the sales there has been an error as required to be shown. The usefulness of these sales may properly be disputed but it would not be correct to say, as submitted by the appellant, that they should not be considered for the purpose of valuing the subject. Valuers’ opinions may well differ on the usefulness of these sales, which is a different matter to necessarily excluding them wholly from consideration. The Court is not satisfied that there has been error established in this respect. Concerning (b) [96] Mr Conallin considered that Sale 4 was not comparable to the subject. The sale occurred in July, 2020 and was the sale most remote from the date of valuation, having occurred 27 months prior to that date. Mr Conallin and Mr Ladewig both analysed this sale at $160 per m². Mr Conallin excluded it on the basis that it sold for $1,200,000 in 2014 and then, in 2020, for $1,150,000. This led Mr Conallin to conclude that the sale was low and adversely affected by a covenant.28 [97] Mr Conallin was of the view that the age of Sale 4 was an important factor in favour of not considering it as values had increased significantly since then.29 Mr Ladewig disagreed.30 Mr Conallin based his opinion on the sales in Exhibit 6, unspecified “sales evidence” beyond the sales in the report,31 and an email from Mr Nick Dowling, Managing Director of Colliers, which contained the following – Question – So between mid 2020 (date of sale) and 2021/2022 the market generally increased in Gympie? Answer – Yes, correct.32 27 (1978) 5 QLCR 21, 25 This passage was cited, with appeal, by the Land Appeal Court in Aurizon Property Pty Ltd v the Chief Executive, Department of Transport and Main Roads [2023] QLAC 1 [6]. 28 Ex 6 P.70 para 213 and P.71 para 219. 29 Ex 6 P.70 para 214. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ex 6 P.71, para 218 and P.85 para 410. -- 23 of 29 -- 24 Conclusion concerning (b) [98] The sales considered in Exhibit 6 would, hopefully, show the market when they occurred. In the absence of examples of, say, paired sales where a property is sold and then re-sold, sales at a particular date are not likely to show more than the market then. The opinion of Mr Dowling is general, as the passage quoted says, and to rely on it is to rely on the opinion of someone who did not give evidence in order to form an expert opinion. This is not an acceptable basis. [99] The Court is satisfied that the appellant has established an error on the part of the respondent in respect of (b) in that a sufficient basis was not shown to not take Sale 4 into account in the respondent’s valuation of the subject. It is not suggested that this is outside the scope of the grounds of appeal. Concerning (c) [100] The appellant submits that Mr Conallin was in error in not adjusting the sale price of Sale 3 to make it properly comparable to the subject. Conclusion concerning (c) [101] As has already been considered, failure to act in this way is not indicative of error. Acting in this way, however, is. [102] The appellant contends that – In the hypothetical sale of the Subject Property, the purchaser would not be transacting, and pricing its bid, on an idiosyncratic assumption that it had a committed tenant for the Subject Property. It is therefore necessary for there to be an adjustment to account for this.33 [103] As has been discussed, a sale is not able to be “adjusted” in the manner adopted by Mr Ladewig and retain its character as a sale. The Court is not satisfied that there has been an error established in this respect. [104] The appellant submits that if the sale may not be “adjusted” then it should be disregarded as an imprudent gamble by a purchaser who paid too much. Mr Ladewig's valuation did not disregard Sale 3 but significantly relies on it. There is no evidence from Mr Ladewig concerning what his valuation would have been if he had 33 Appellant’s submissions [54]. -- 24 of 29 -- 25 disregarded Sale 3, which, of course, he did not do anyhow. If the Court were to accept this submission it would be acting contrary to the evidence of the appellant’s expert and purporting to find an error in the respondent’s valuation on a basis never considered by that expert. It is not accepted that proceeding in such a way is consistent with the Court’s task in this first step in the two-step process set out in Valuer-General v Body Corporate for “Tennyson Reach” Community Titles Scheme 39925.34 Concerning (d) [105] The appellant submits that it was common ground that a discount for size should be applied but that only Mr Ladewig did so. Mr Conallin’s valuation was accordingly in error as he failed to have regard to this relevant factor. Conclusion concerning (d) [106] In Exhibit 6, the following appears – Respondent Valuation – Luke Conallin Valuation Rationale 427. The Subject Property has been valued using the Direct Comparison Method of Valuation taking into consideration the characteristics and attributes of the Subject Property and relevant sales. 428. I have compared the analysed sale prices on a rate per square metre of unencumbered or effective site area and on an overall basis.35 [107] Mr Conallin specifically referred to allowing for size in, for example, paragraphs 443 and 461 of Exhibit 6. This illustrates that he did have regard to this relevant factor. Mr Ladewig’s independence [108] The respondent’s written submissions contained the following – The appellant asserts an error based on relativity. Unsurprisingly, given the weight of modern authority on that topic, it does not rely upon that ground in its closing submissions. The valuers were jointly briefed, they were not asked to address relativity. And yet, Mr Ladewig embarked on an exegesis of the issue despite acknowledging it had no bearing on the site value of the subject, because it “is part of the provided Statement of Issues” and “he thought” he had to comment on the Statement of Issues. Why Mr Ladewig addressed a matter advanced by the appellant but not put to the expert valuers is unclear and a matter entirely appropriate of remark. He denied it reflected partisanship but it is difficult, given Mr Ladewig’s experience in similar 34 (2018) 39 QLCR 302, 311 [50]. 35 Ex 6 P.157. -- 25 of 29 -- 26 matters, to see it any other way and it warrants his opinions generally being treated with caution.36 [109] The appellant pointed out in its submissions that the allegation is serious and that Mr Ladewig was co-operative and helpful as a witness and made concessions where appropriate. It was noted that the appellant originally contended for a value of $880,000 and Mr Ladewig assessed the valuation at a higher figure, $1,085,000. It was also pointed out that Mr Conallin had arrived at a value of $1,350,000, the same as the respondent’s issued valuation.37 [110] This matter did not proceed beyond a suggestion that the witness embarked on a consideration of relativity because he thought it suited the appellant’s case and a reply of “no” with the explanation that he thought he had to consider this because it was mentioned in the statements of facts, matters and contentions. This does not provide an adequate basis upon which the Court could conclude that there was any partisanship shown by this witness. The two-step process [111] The question for the Court to answer at this point is does the evidence in its totality support the case put by the appellant that the issued valuation is in error, on the balance of probabilities. If it does, the onus of proof on the appellant has been satisfied and the Court can move to consider the question of what is the correct valuation of the land. Conclusion regarding step 1 [112] Consideration of the whole of the evidence discloses that, as has been described, there are some differences of opinion between the valuers. It has been shown that the valuation opinion arrived at by Mr Conallin is infected with an error. The Land Appeal Court's decision in which the quoted description of the two-step process appears uses the expression “… the issued valuation is in error…”.38 The words “issued valuation" must be understood in the context that under s 155(1) of the Act, 36 Respondent’s submissions [4] (References omitted); T 1-43 lines 2 to 12, Mr Ladewig explained that he thought he had to address relativity because it was mentioned in the statements of facts, matters and contentions. He denied advocating for the appellant, T 1-43 lines 5 to 6, 11, 18 to 19. 37 Appellant’s submissions [65], [66]. 38 Valuer-General v Body Corporate for “Tennyson Reach” Community Titles Scheme 39925 (2018) 39 QLCR 302, 311 [50]. -- 26 of 29 -- 27 what is under appeal is actually “…the objection decision for the objection.” Additionally, it is the evidence before this Court, in its totality, which falls for consideration. [113] There is nothing in Mr Conallin’s valuation or oral evidence, or in any of the evidence, which, when considered along with the evidence provided for the appellant, assists the appellants case, except for Exhibit 9. This letter provides support for the proposition that there is uncertainty in obtaining the council approval being sought. It does not, however, constitute a final and binding decision. The letter raises issues, seeks information and also suggests how a difficulty could be resolved. The letter does not demonstrate that Mr Conallin has made an error and only illustrates that the application in question remains in process and its outcome is uncertain. [114] At paragraphs 263 and 264 on page 90 of Exhibit 6, Mr Conallin considers that the site has potential for part-showroom use. Exhibit 9 has not shown this to be an error. [115] Mr Ladewig's valuation opinion is unable to be regarded as useful for the reasons which have been given. In summary, the use of the $300 per m² figure in considering Sale 3 is not the analysis of a sale, which is what it purports to be. Additionally, its use contaminates the data arrived at from the other sales analyses, introducing an incorrect figure that is much lower than the figure arrived at by Mr Conallin, who did not make this error. [116] The inclusion of the erroneously lower figure in the analysed sales data has lowered the figure used for Sale 3 and the range of values considered by Mr Ladewig. He then used this range as a starting point to make a further reduction in order to set the rate per m² of the subject land at a figure below that of the range he had reference to. There is no sale which has been analysed to demonstrate what was available in the market at or around $90 per m² on or around the date of valuation. His $90 per m² lacks necessary support. [117] Due to the errors in Mr Ladewig’s valuation, this Court is not able to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it supports the appellant’s case that the issued valuation is in error. -- 27 of 29 -- 28 [118] The evidence, in its totality, supports the case put by the appellant that the issued valuation is in error, on the balance of probabilities, so that the onus of proof is discharged due to the error concerning Sale 4. Conclusion regarding step 2 [119] In view of this, the Court must proceed to the second step, to ascertain the correct valuation of the land. It will be recalled that s 170 of the Land Valuation Act 2010 provides – Order on valuation appeal the land Court may –– (a) confirm the valuation appealed against; or (b) reduce or increase the valuation to the amount it considers necessary to correctly make the valuation under this Act. [120] Provision (b) is now relevant. [121] The case for the appellant was presented on the basis that its valuation, as provided by Mr Ladewig, should be substituted for the valuation of the respondent. In view of the shortcomings of the appellant’s valuation, it will not be possible to proceed this way and “correctly make the valuation”. [122] Mr Conallin was not asked what difference, if any, would it make to his valuation opinion if he had considered Sale 4. [123] It is the case, though, that both valuers analysed Sale 4 at $160 per m². [124] Mr Conallin’s opinion was that this sale was “… low and out of line”.39 [125] Mr Ladewig stated that – The most comparable sales evidence in this report are the sales within the Bunworth Park at $245/m² - $300/m² followed by lot 2 Bruce Highway, Glanmire at $160/m².40 [126] Lot 2, Bruce Highway, Glanmire, is Sale 4. [127] On the evidence, it must be concluded that if Mr Conallin included Sale 4 in his valuation, it would have been on the basis that it was analysed at the undisputed $160 per m² and was, in his opinion, a low sale. 39 Ex 6 P.70 para 212(a). 40 Ex 6 P.156 para 424. -- 28 of 29 -- 29 [128] Mr Conallin was not asked to provide his opinion of what, if any, effect on his valuation would have occurred if he had considered Sale 4. [129] The Court must consider the evidence that the parties have chosen to put before it. It is an expert Court but must remain mindful that it is not a third valuer or an investigatory body. The Land Appeal Court, considering its own powers, said – “…Neither this Court nor the Land Court in the subject jurisdiction may assume the role of an investigating tribunal…”41 [130] The position of the Land Court is unchanging in this regard. [131] In view of the state of the evidence, it is not possible for this Court to correctly make the valuation as it is required to. It will not be possible to deduce the effect on Mr Conallin’s valuation of correcting the error and considering Sale 4 without the Court engaging in unacceptable speculation. [132] The present shortcoming in the evidence may be corrected by the outstanding question being asked and answered. [133] In practice, both valuers must now be asked the question, and their opinions on that question considered by the Court, so that the correct valuation can be made. [134] The parties will be offered the opportunity to address this matter before the Court makes the valuation and any necessary other orders. Orders 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. The parties will be heard in regard to further orders. 41 The Land Appeal Court was considering the legislative predecessor of the current Act but this has fundamentally not changed. J.L. and I. Qualischefski & Ors v Valuer-General (1979) 6 QLCR 167, 172. -- 29 of 29 --