Duggan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] ICQ 13
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Duggan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2024] ICQ 13
PARTIES: CORNELIUS DUGGAN
(appellant)
v
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR
(respondent)
FILE NO: C/2023/46
PROCEEDING: Appeal
DELIVERED ON: 28 May 2024
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 7 May 2024
MEMBER: Davis J, President
ORDERS: 1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS: INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – WORKERS’
COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO
COMPENSATION – WHAT IS AN INJURY – Where the
appellant worked as a groundsman at a primary school –
where the appellant was the subject of two complaints made
by a teacher at the school – where the complaints were made
nine months apart – where the principal informed the
appellant of the complaints as they happened – where the
appellant suffered psychological injury as a result of being
informed of the complaints – where the appellant sought
workers compensation for the injury incurred – where the
appellant alleges the date of injury was the date of the second
complaint – where the respondent alleges the date of injury
was the date the appellant was issued with a workers
compensation medical certificate – where the Queensland
Industrial Commission found the date of injury was the date
of diagnosis of injury – where the Commission found the
injury was excluded pursuant to s 32(5) of the Workers’
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 – where the
Commission dismissed the appellant’s application – where
the appellant appealed to the Industrial Court of Queensland
– where the Industrial Relations Act 2016 limits rights of
appeal to where the grounds are errors of law or jurisdiction
except by leave – where the appellant complained of factual
errors by the Commission – whether there was error by the
Commission – whether the injury is excluded by s 32(5) of
the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 –
-- 1 of 14 --
2
whether the injury arose during the course of reasonable
management action – whether the management action was
taken in a reasonable way by the principal – whether that
thereby precludes the appellant from claiming workers
compensation.
LEGISLATION: Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32,
s 561
CASES: Duggan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC
309, related
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, cited
Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129; [2019] HCA 28, cited
Turay v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13,
cited
Turnbull v New South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2
NSWLR 281, cited
Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Glass (2020) 4 QR 693;
[2020] QCA 133, cited
COUNSEL: T O’Brien for the appellant
C Clark for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Optimum Legal for the appellant
Mr Clark was instructed directly by the Workers’
Compensation Regulator
[1] The appellant, Cornelius Duggan, made a claim for compensation under the
provisions of the Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (WCR Act).
That claim was rejected by WorkCover, whose decision was upheld by the Workers
Compensation Regulator (the Regulator).
[2] From the Regulator’s decision, Mr Duggan appealed to the Queensland Industrial
Relations Commission (the Commission) where he was unsuccessful.1 It is from the
Commission’s decision that Mr Duggan appeals to this Court.
Background
[3] Brisbane Catholic Education (BCE) operates St Martin’s Catholic Primary School at
Carina.
[4] Working at the school at relevant times were:
(a) the appellant, who was employed as a groundsman;
(b) Geoffrey Sullivan, the principal of the school; and
1 Duggan v Workers Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 309.
-- 2 of 14 --
3
(c) a teacher whom I will call W.T..
[5] In about October 2018, W.T. complained to Mr Sullivan that Mr Duggan had made
some comment to her which she considered inappropriate and made her
uncomfortable (the first complaint). That comment made by Mr Duggan was
apparently a compliment addressed to W.T..
[6] W.T. did not complain to Mr Duggan directly so Mr Duggan’s first knowledge of the
first complaint was through Mr Sullivan.
[7] Mr Sullivan’s response to the first complaint was to proceed informally rather than to
follow a formal complaint process. He spoke to Mr Duggan and directed him not to
approach or speak with W.T. except in an emergency.
[8] Avoiding W.T. was no doubt challenging for Mr Duggan. Teachers naturally have
the run of the entire school and Mr Duggan would have had no knowledge of W.T.’s
expected movements. Mr Duggan’s work was varied. He was the school gardener
and handyman, but also performed various other tasks such as opening the school and
classrooms in the morning, and generally checking the school and its grounds.
Therefore, his duties took him all over the school at random times.
[9] Mr Duggan heard nothing further until 27 June 2019 in relation to any complaints.
On that day, Mr Sullivan spoke to Mr Duggan about a further complaint made by
W.T. (the second complaint).
[10] The second complaint was reduced to writing and dated 25 June 2019. Relevantly, it
was in the following terms:
“2019
I didn’t seem to have any issues with Con this year until recently.
Monday 13/5/2019
I had taken my [class] to the Dominic Centre for a dance lesson. This
was to go over the dance that they were learning for the fete.
There were only the [class] in the hall. At one point, Con came into
the hall and stood on phone went out and came back in a number of
times. At one point he stood for about 3 minutes and appeared to be
just watching. He was in the hall for about 15 minutes.
Thursday 6/6/19
It was about 8am when we were doing staff photos on this day. Con
was there and I heard him doing his French voice and talking in that
way to some of the other staff. Whilst he didn’t say anything directly
to me, it made me feel quite uncomfortable as this is what he was doing
to me in 2018.
Conclusion
I would like Con to stay away from me. If he is around me, he needs
to remain professional and not make inappropriate remarks about me
or my appearance. If we need to have a conversation, I would like
there to be a third person with us.”
-- 3 of 14 --
4
[11] Mr Sullivan’s contact with Mr Duggan on 27 June 2019 was Mr Duggan’s first
knowledge of the second complaint. W.T. did not confront Mr Duggan with the terms
of the second complaint or other complaints that she had made against him to
Mr Sullivan between the making of the first complaint and the second complaint.
[12] From 27 June 2019, there were various communications between Mr Duggan and
Mr Sullivan. These are analysed later.
[13] On 2 July 2019, Mr Duggan consulted a general practitioner, Dr Linden, who certified
Mr Duggan as suffering a medical condition and as being unfit for work until 19 July
2019.
[14] On 18 July 2019, Mr Duggan consulted another general practitioner, Dr Joseph, who
worked at the same clinic as Dr Linden. Dr Joseph diagnosed Mr Duggan as
depressed. He prescribed Zoloft, an anti-depressant drug, and referred Mr Duggan to
a psychologist.
[15] Mr Duggan asserted that he suffered a psychological or psychiatric injury as a result
of the complaints made by W.T. in the workplace. He claimed compensation under
the WCR Act. WorkCover, the Regulator and the Commission have all dismissed the
claim.
The dispute before the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
[16] By the completion of the hearing in the Commission, Mr Duggan had restricted his
case. He submitted that it was only the circumstances of the second complaint made
by W.T. which were the cause of his injury, not the first complaint.
[17] The Regulator accepted:
(a) that Mr Duggan is a worker;
(b) he has an injury; and
(c) he suffered the injury in the course of his employment.
[18] However, an “injury” is only a compensable injury under the WCR Act if it falls
within the definition of “injury” found in s 32. A psychiatric or psychological
disorder, such as Mr Duggan’s injury, is not a compensable injury if the exclusion in
s 32(5) applies. That is as follows:
“ 32 Meaning of injury
…
(5) Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a
psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of,
any of the following circumstances ---
(a) reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way
by the employer in connection with the worker’s
employment;
(b) the worker’s expectation or perception of reasonable
management action being taken against the worker;
-- 4 of 14 --
5
(c) action by the Regulator or an insurer in connection with
the worker’s application for compensation.
Examples of actions that may be reasonable management actions
taken in a reasonable way ---
• action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, redeploy,
retrench or dismiss the worker
• a decision not to award or provide promotion,
reclassification or transfer of, or leave of absence or benefit
in connection with, the worker’s employment”
[19] The sole issue before the Commission was whether the injury suffered by Mr Duggan
arose out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way, by BCE
through Mr Sullivan.2
[20] In the course of determining that issue, a dispute arose as to the date of the injury.
Mr Duggan contended that the date of the injury was 2 July 2019, when Dr Linden
certified him as unfit for work. The Regulator contended that the relevant date was
27 July 2019. The distinction was said to be important because Mr Sullivan took
management action in relation to W.T.’s complaints well after 2 July 2019. The
Regulator relied on those steps taken by Mr Sullivan as demonstrating the
reasonableness of the management action and the reasonableness of the way it was
taken.
[21] The Commission determined that the date of the injury was 18 July 2019 and that
Mr Duggan’s claim was excluded under s 32(5) of the WCR Act.
Nature of the appeal
[22] Section 561 of the WCR Act gives a right of appeal to this Court. Section 561
provides an avenue of appeal which is independent of the rights of appeal from the
Commission created by the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act).3 Therefore, the
terms imposed by s 557 of the IR Act, which limit grounds of appeal to this Court to
errors of law and jurisdiction, except by leave, do not apply.
[23] This appeal is one by way of rehearing as that term is commonly understood.4 This
Court therefore reviews the case, drawing its own inferences and conclusions but
while recognising the advantages enjoyed by the Commission in hearing the case at
first instance.5
The grounds of appeal
[24] Four grounds of appeal were articulated in the application to appeal, but only three
were pressed.
[25] The three grounds advanced on appeal were:
2 Workers Compensation Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 32(5)(a).
3 Workers Compensation Regulator v Glass (2020) 4 QR 693 at [13]-[15].
4 Turay v Workers Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13 at [80]; and see generally Turnbull v New
South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281.
5 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25]; and Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129 at [55], followed in
Turay v Workers Compensation Regulator [2023] ICQ 13 at [49] and [50].
-- 5 of 14 --
6
(i) “The Commission has erred by failing to consider relevant material
including the Appellant’s history of being subjected to a direction that
he not approach or speak with Ms WT unless in an emergency, when
considering the cause of the subject injury.” (Ground 1)
(ii) “The Commission has erred by finding that the cause of the subject
injury was not the making of a second complaint by Ms WT on or around
27 June 2019.” (Ground 2)
(iii) “The Commission has erred in finding the date of the injury as 18 July
2019 and not 2 July 2019.” (Ground 3)
Ground 1: The Commission failed to consider relevant material including
Mr Duggan being the subject of the direction in October 2018
[26] Dealing with Ground 2 below I refer in detail to the evidence of Dr Chalk. Dr Chalk’s
evidence was that the cause of the injury was the circumstances of the second
complaint not the first, but that the first complaint made Mr Duggan more vulnerable
to suffering an injury of the kind he ultimately suffered.
[27] Set out at paragraph [40] of these reasons is a passage from Dr Chalk’s report of 25
January 2021. The Industrial Commissioner referred to that evidence and then
observed:
“[116] The confluence of factors that Dr Chalk is referring to is not
directly nominated by him. However, it can be inferred that
they are those factors referred to in the question posed to the
Doctor. I consider that Dr Chalk was at pains to make clear
that Mr Duggan's injury did not arise from the matters
associated with the first complaint. Here, he describes the
"second event" as being the catalyst for the injury.”
[28] It is obvious that the Industrial Commissioner has proceeded on the basis that “the
confluence of factors” includes the circumstances of the first complaint but it is the
second complaint which was the direct proximate cause of the injury. That was
Mr Duggan’s case before the Commission6 and Mr O’Brien, acting for Mr Duggan,
accepted that was Mr Duggan’s case on appeal.7
[29] The actions taken by Mr Sullivan after receipt of the second complaint were
unremarkable. On 27 June 2019, the day of receipt of the second complaint,
Mr Sullivan alerted Mr Duggan to it being received. On the same day, Mr Sullivan
emailed Mr Duggan advising of the availability of assistance through the Employee
Assistance Program. Arrangements were made for Mr Sullivan and Mr Duggan to
meet at the “Men’s Shed” on 1 July 2019 to discuss the matter, but on 29 June 2019
Mr Sullivan read the complaints to Mr Duggan.
[30] On 1 July 2019, Mr Sullivan emailed Mr Duggan reminding him of the 2018 direction
not to speak to or approach W.T. and reminding him to be professional towards her.
6 Duggan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 309 at [131].
7 See also Duggan v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2023] QIRC 309 at [63].
-- 6 of 14 --
7
[31] Any reasonable interpretation of that email is that Mr Duggan was being told no more
than to maintain the status quo. Mr Sullivan was attempting to ensure that the matter
did not escalate further.
[32] That action prompted a response from Mr Duggan which included requesting the
following:
“1. A letter from you or Catholic Education stating that the complaint
by [W.T.] is unsubstantiated; and
2. A letter from you as to what processes the school will be
implementing to ensure I am able to perform my work duties
without interference or fear of further vexatious complaints from
[W.T.].”
[33] Given that the second complaint had only just been made and there had been no time
to properly investigate it, Mr Duggan’s requests were unreasonable. As previously
explained, he consulted Dr Linden the next day and left the workplace.
[34] Mr Sullivan took other steps after 1 July and before the date of the injury (18 July
2019) but it is unnecessary to consider those matters.
[35] Mr Sullivan was obviously required to alert Mr Duggan to the making of the second
complaint. He did so promptly. He did so at a place and in an atmosphere (the Men’s
Shed) where he could speak confidentially and privately with Mr Duggan. There is
no basis upon which it can be said that the management action taken by Mr Sullivan
was not reasonable or not reasonably undertaken.
Ground 2: The Commission found that the cause of the injury was not the
making of the second complaint on 27 June 2019.
[36] The Industrial Commissioner found that it was the communication and handling of
the second complaint which caused the injury. Mr Duggan submits that it was the
making of the second complaint which caused the injury. This is of some
significance. The making of the second complaint was an action by W.T. not
Mr Sullivan. Therefore, so the submission goes, the injury was not caused by
management action by Mr Sullivan and therefore consideration of the exclusion in
s 32(5) of the WCR Act does not arise.
[37] Mr Duggan seeks to make out Ground 2 by relying upon the evidence of Dr Chalk.
[38] Ground 2, on its face, is somewhat illogical. The injury suffered by Mr Duggan was
a psychiatric or psychological one. It was suffered due to his reaction to the content
and nature of the allegations which constituted the second complaint. As earlier
observed, W.T. did not make the second complaint to Mr Duggan. It was made to
Mr Sullivan who then passed on the details to Mr Duggan. Therefore, the direct and
proximate cause of the injury must have been Mr Duggan learning of the second
complaint from Mr Sullivan. When properly understood, this is the effect of
Dr Chalk’s evidence.
-- 7 of 14 --
8
[39] In his first report of 10 October 2019, Dr Chalk opined:
“I am of the view that his employment is the major significant
contributing factor in causing his condition and that his condition has
arisen primarily as a result of how management handled the complaint,
although clearly the management action would not have occurred had
the original complaint not emerged.”
[40] In his second report of 25 January 2021, Dr Chalk offered this:
“In my view, his difficulties have arisen as a consequence of the
confluence of factors described. Whilst I think that Mr Duggan was
certainly vulnerable and having some difficulties prior to the second
event, in my view, it was the second event that was the catalyst for his
clear decompensation and the development of his adjustment
disorder.”
[41] In his third report of 12 February 2021, Dr Chalk, when asked to clarify aspects of
his earlier report said:
“In further clarification of your report dated 25 January 2021, can
you please advise whether in your professional opinion, was the
making of the second complaint against Mr Duggan the major
significant contributing factor to the injury suffered?
Yes.”
[42] Even before his cross-examination, it was clear what Dr Chalk’s opinion was,
namely:
(i) Mr Duggan was vulnerable because of the first complaint which left him
anxious at work;8
(ii) the communication of the second complaint was the major significant
contributing factor to the injury; and
(iii) the communication of the second complaint obviously would not have
occurred if the second complaint had not been made.
[43] The Commissioner made these findings:
“[142] In expressing this opinion Dr Chalk did not resile from the
opinion he expressed in his earlier report that management’s
handling of the complaint was the major significant
contributing factor. He also repeated his opinion in cross-
examination.
[143] Accordingly, I do not consider that the intent of Dr Chalk’s
third report was to disturb his earlier opinion with respect to
the cause of the injury. I consider that Dr Chalk’s view is
that the injury arose out of management’s handling of the
second complaint. I consider such an opinion is consistent
8 This is the substance of Ground 1.
-- 8 of 14 --
9
with the factual evidence I have referred to above.”
(footnotes omitted)
[44] Those findings are said by Mr Duggan to be at odds with what Dr Chalk said in cross-
examination and set out in the following passages of the Commission’s judgment:
“[142] In expressing this opinion Dr Chalk did not resile from the
opinion he expressed in his earlier report that
management’s handling of the complaint was the major
significant contributing factor. He also repeated this
opinion in cross-examination.
[143] According, I do not consider that the intent of Dr Chalk’s
third report was to disturb his earlier opinion with respect to
the cause of the injury. I consider that Dr Chalk’s view is
that the injury arose out of management’s handling of
the second complaint. I consider such an opinion is
consistent with the factual evidence I have referred to
above.”
and
“Now that was your diagnosis?---That’s right.
In the aftermath of these difficulties?---Mmm.
Now the difficulties that you’re referring to were the making
of a complaint and how management dealt with it?---That’s
right.”
and
“Okay. Okay. On the second page, this question was put to
you. It’s at line 4:
Further clarification of your report dated the 25th January
can you please advise whether in your professional opinion
was the making of the second complaint against Mr Duggan
a major significant contributing factor to the injuries
suffered?---Yes.”
[45] Mr O’Brien’s submission misunderstands the effect of the cross-examination.
Counsel for the Regulator was attempting to eliminate the circumstances of both the
making of the first complaint and its communication to Mr Duggan as a cause of the
injury.
[46] Having quarantined the circumstances of the second complaint, the evidence was then
clear. It was the communication of the second complaint by Mr Sullivan to
Mr Duggan which caused the injury, but obviously that communication would never
have occurred unless the second complaint was made in the first place.
[47] The findings of the Commissioner are consistent with the evidence. No complaint
can be validly made about those findings and there is no substance in Ground 2.
-- 9 of 14 --
10
Ground 3: The Commission erred in finding that the date of the injury was 18
July 2019
[48] The Commission found the date of injury as 18 July 2019 not 2 July 2019.
[49] As earlier observed, Mr Duggan gave evidence in his own case. He called Dr Chalk,
a practising psychiatrist, to give evidence on his behalf. Neither Dr Linden nor
Dr Joseph gave evidence. The clinical notes prepared by them during their
consultations with Mr Duggan were tendered before the Commission.9
[50] Dr Chalk opined:
(i) that Mr Duggan suffered an adjustment disorder with anxious mood; and
(ii) his employment was the major contributing factor in causing the
condition; and
(iii) “it was the second event that was the catalyst for his clear
decompensation and the development of his adjustment disorder” 10.
[51] Dr Chalk gave no opinion as to the date on which the injury arose.
[52] Dr Linden’s clinical notes of his consultation with Mr Duggan on 2 July 2019 were11:
“…
History:
working as a groundkeeper
note on medication and phx cardiac issues
allegedly made a comment about a colleagues jewellry
she was offended
some work issues with Cath Ed
feels under duress
under M adsett cardiac issues”
[53] Dr Joseph saw Mr Duggan on both the 18th and 24th of July 2019. The clinical notes:
(a) for 18 July were12:
“History: 1. Terrible ongoing circumstances at work – in Oct 18,
as a single couteous gesture, he complemented a teacher on the
jewellery she was wearing – no underlying agenda of sexual
harassment, just a spontaneous gesture of one-off courtesy
BUT this has triggered a process of official warning, not to come
into physical/visual/auditory contact of that teacher
Con is distressed, humiliated, despondent
has been off work
Low labile mood, depressed
Counselled
Start Zoloft
9 Exhibit 14.
10 The second complaint.
11 The notes are faithfully reproduced notwithstanding the appearance of obvious errors.
12 The notes are faithfully reproduced notwithstanding the appearance of obvious errors.
-- 10 of 14 --
11
Offred referral to a Psychologist
[redacted]
[redacted]
Rx Doxy 100mg 2 wks, Celestone-M crm
…”
(b) And for 24 July 2019:
“History: Despondent re. workplace incident and the ongoing
process
Can’t face returning to work
Zoloft helping mood
Long counselling sessions
To see a Psychologist – access to Psychologist via Catholic
Education at no cost
Will increase Zoloft to 100mg after 2 weeks
Treatment/Plan: Zoloft Tablets 50mg Tablets deleted
Zoloft Tablets 100 mg Tablets 1 tab mane after breakfast”
[54] Mr Duggan gave no evidence in chief as to his conversations with Dr Linden or
Dr Joseph. The clinical notes were tendered during cross-examination.13
[55] Mr Duggan was cross-examined about his communications with Mr Sullivan,
including a discussion where Mr Duggan told Mr Sullivan that he would be on
medical leave from 3 to 19 July. That was consistent with the medical certificate
issued by Dr Linden.
[56] Perhaps unusually, Mr Duggan was then cross-examined on the clinical notes made
by Dr Linden on 2 July 2019 and Dr Joseph on 18 July 2019. Those notes were of
course not Mr Duggan’s documents. No objection was taken and this exchange
occurred:
“Okay. All right. All right. On Tuesday, the 2nd of July, he – you
contacted him?---Yes.
Hi Geoff, sorry for the interruption of your break. I’ve left a
voice message and I thought I should follow up with a text so
you’re aware that I’ll be on medical leave from tomorrow, the
3rd through the 19th of July. Regards, Con.
?---Yes.
Okay. And by that time, you’d sent him that generic medical
certificate that you were suffering a medical condition, which has
already been tendered?---Yes.
Okay. All right. Now, have you got the medical records there at all?-
--Yes.
On page 7---?---Yes.
---you went to see a GP on Tuesday, the 2nd of July and you spoke to
a Dr Michael Linden, that’s spelt L-i-n-d-e-n, at 10.08am. Do you see
that?---Yes.
13 T1-32.
-- 11 of 14 --
12
And it records as follows:
Working as a groundkeeper. Note, on medication PHx ---
That’s previous history “of cardiac issues”? --- Yes.
Okay.
Allegedly made a comment about a colleague’s jewellery. She
was offended.
Okay. Do you agree with – what I’m essentially asking you is do you
agree that this is an accurate record of what you told the doctor?---It’s
probably not complete but yes, it is.
Well, it’s not word for word?---No.
We accept that but in as much as it summarises it, is it a fair summary?
That’s---?---Did I say to him that I’d been put in a situation for
complimenting a staff member? Yes, I did what it alludes to.
Okay. It says:
Some work issues with Cath Ed
?---Yes.
Okay. What were you referring to there?...Cath Ed is who I’m
employed by, BCE.
Okay?---St Martin’s School.
Okay. It says there “feels under duress”?----Yes.
Okay. Is it fair to say that at that stage, what you were conveying to
the doctor that you were feeling under a bit of pressure?---A bit of
pressure might be a little on the light side, yes.
Okay. All right. And it says:
Under M Adsett for cardiac issues.
?---Yes.
Is that the cardiologist, Dr Adsett, is it?---It’s one of the cardiologists
I see, yes.
Okay. All right. Okay. Well, just for present purposes, let’s go above
– to the consultation above on the 18th of July, which is what, 16 days
later?---Yes.
This is with the doctor, Peter Joseph. We’ll come to that in due course
but it was only at that stage that you told them that you were
“distressed, humiliated, despondent, had been off work, a low mood,
depressed,” that you were counselled, that you were given an
antidepressant and that you were offered a referral to a psychologist?-
--Yes.
Things had got a lot worse by the 18th of July, hadn’t they?---No.
-- 12 of 14 --
13
Well, put it this way; on the 2nd of July, you weren’t – there’s no talk
about you being depressed, distressed, humiliated or despondent, was
there?—It’s not mentioned there, no.
No. You weren’t given any antidepressant medication?---No, I
wasn’t.
Okay. And for that matter, you weren’t given any referral to a
psychologist?---No, I wasn’t.”
[57] Mr Duggan was not re-examined in relation to his conversations with Dr Linden and
Dr Joseph. The Industrial Commissioner was left with the short evidence under
cross-examination by Mr Duggan and the clinical notes of Dr Linden and Dr Joseph.
[58] It is fair to say that Mr Duggan, in cross-examination, gave hints that more may have
been said to Dr Linden and Dr Joseph than was recorded. He also said that his
condition did not deteriorate (at least in his assessment) from 2 to 18 July 2019.
Perhaps this could have been explored in re-examination. Mr Duggan could have
been asked whether he said anything to the doctors which was not recorded in the
clinical notes. He could have been asked to describe fully his symptoms as they
existed on 2 July and 18 July, but he was not.
[59] The Industrial Commissioner’s findings were:
“[124] In nominating 2 July 2019 as the date of injury Mr Duggan
points to his attendance on his general practitioner that day
who provided him with a medical certificate.
[125] However, the clinical notes from that attendance do not
support that date as the date of injury. Relevantly, although
the complaint is referred to and Mr Duggan describes feeling
“under duress” there is no particularisation of symptoms
consistent with the injury.
[126] Further, I am not satisfied that the evidence of Mr Duggan
established that he was suffering symptoms that supports a
conclusion that the date of injury is 2 July 2019.
[127] In contrast, the consultation on 18 July 2019, does record
Mr Duggan reporting symptoms consistent with the claimed
injury. It is reported that Mr Duggan is distressed,
humiliated, despondent and presents with “low labile mood,
depressed”. On this occasion, Mr Duggan was prescribed
Zoloft, and referred to a psychologist.
[128] On this evidence I consider the date of injury to be 18 July
2019. Whilst the Regulator relies on 27 July 2019, it does
so because that is the date on which Dr Joseph issued the
“Workers’ Compensation Medical Certificate”.
[129] On the evidence however, I consider that Mr Duggan’s date
of injury is consistent with his presentation to Dr Joseph on
18 July 2019.”
-- 13 of 14 --
14
[60] As observed by the Industrial Commissioner, the clinical notes of 2 July 2019 are
consistent with upset and distress but do not evidence a clinically definable
psychiatric or psychological injury. The notes of 18 July 2019 do.
[61] In those circumstances, the finding by the Industrial Commissioner that the injury
occurred on 18 July 2019 was all but inevitable.
[62] Mr Duggan challenges those findings based on a passage in the second report by
Dr Chalk. Dr Chalk’s reports are dated 10 October 2019, 25 January 2021 and 12
February 2021.14 Dr Chalk first saw Mr Duggan in October 2019.
[63] In the second report15, Dr Chalk gives the following history as he recorded it:
“…
Essentially, there was an initial complaint that he had inappropriately
complimented one of the female teachers and this was delivered to him
by his boss, Jeff Sullivan. He was told to avoid the teacher and he did
that for nine months. Apparently, a formal complaint was then raised
in 2019, the basis of which was that he had been in a hall where this
teacher was because the principal had asked him to do a job; he had
appeared in a staff photograph and the teacher could “allegedly hear
me talking”.
Mr Duggan reported, in the aftermath of this, he described “losing the
plot”. He went off work and applied to WorkCover …”
[64] The incident to which Dr Chalk is referring is Mr Sullivan advising Mr Duggan of
the second complaint on 27 June 2019 and then Mr Duggan going off work. It is clear
that on 2 July Mr Duggan consulted Dr Linden.
[65] Mr O’Brien seized upon the words “losing the plot”. He submits, in effect, that
“losing the plot” is synonymous with “suffering the injury”. Therefore, he argues the
injury occurred at the latest on 2 July 2019.
[66] That submission ought to be rejected. There is no proper factual basis for it. “Losing
the plot” is consistent with the distress reported by Dr Linden. With or without the
history of Mr Duggan “losing the plot”, the first evidence of a clinically observable
psychiatric or psychological condition appears in the notes of 18 July 2019.
[67] In my view, the Industrial Commissioner was right to date the injury at 18 July 2019.
[68] The appeal should be dismissed. Mr Clark for the Regulator indicated that no order
for costs would be sought in the event of the appeal being dismissed.
[69] Orders:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
14 Exhibits 23, 24 and 25.
15 25 January 2021.
-- 14 of 14 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/ICQ/2024/013