Estate Liam Rowan Dillon [2023] QSC 27 [2023] 10 QLR
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Estate Liam Rowan Dillon [2023] QSC 27
PARTIES: VIRGINIA CORAL MAIDEN
(Applicant )
v
JANE GRIMLEY
(Respondent )
FILE NO/S: 1147/22
DIVISION: Trial Division
PROCEEDING: Application
ORIGINATING
COURT:
Supreme Court at Rockhampton
DELIVERED ON: 22 February 2023
DELIVERED AT: Rockhampton
HEARING DATE: 3 February 2023
JUDGE: Crow J
ORDER: 1. Subject to the formal requirements of the Registrar,
that letters of administration in intestacy for the
estate of Liam Rowan Dillon be issued to Virginia
Coral Maiden.
CATCHWORDS: SUCCESSION – INTESTACY AND DISTRIBUTION ON
INTESTACY – ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE –
ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS – CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING PRIORITY– where the applicant made an
application for letters of administration in intestacy and the
respondent lodged a caveat against the grant of letters of
administration – respondent filed own application for letters of
administration in intestacy – whether the respondent was a
spouse of the deceased at the time of his death pursuant to
section 32DA of the Acts Interpretations Act 1954 (Qld).
COUNSEL: M Rothery for the applicant
T Arnold for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Rees R & Sydney Jones for the applicant
Purcell & Associates for the respondent
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[1] Liam Rowan Dillon passed away on 19 September 2020 aged 29 years. Mr Dillon’s
mother, Virginia Coral Maiden, made an application for letters of administration in
intestacy on 7 September 2022. On 18 November 2022, Jane Mary Grimley lodged a
caveat against the grant of letters of administration in intestacy in favour of
Ms Maiden and also filed her own application for letters of administration in
intestacy.
[2] Ms Grimley applies on the basis that she was Mr Dillon’s surviving spouse.
[3] Section 6(3) of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) provides that a grant of letters of
administration of an estate of a deceased person can be made to such person as the
court may think fit. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 610(1) provides for
a descending order of priority of persons to whom the court may grant letters of
administration on intestacy, however, r 610(3) confirms the general statutory
discretion under s 6(3) of the Succession Act, namely that the court has a discretion
to grant letters of administration to any person in priority to any other person
mentioned in sub-rule (1).
[4] In this case, Ms Grimley alleges she is entitled to priority as the deceased’s surviving
spouse under r 610(1)(a) in priority to Ms Maiden as the deceased’s mother under
r 610(1)(d).
[5] “Spouse” is defined in r 596 as follows:
spouse, in relation to a deceased person and despite the Acts
Interpretation Act 1954, section 32DA(6), means a person who, at the
time of the deceased’s death—
(a) was the deceased’s husband or wife; or
(b) had been the deceased’s de facto partner for a continuous period
of at least 2 years ending on the deceased’s death.
[6] Section 32DA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) defines a de facto partner as
follows:
32DA Meaning of de facto partner
(1) In an Act, a reference to a de facto partner is a reference to either
1 of 2 persons who are living together as a couple on a genuine
domestic basis but who are not married to each other or related
by family.
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(2) In deciding whether 2 persons are living together as a couple on
a genuine domestic basis, any of their circumstances may be
taken into account, including, for example, any of the following
circumstances—
(a) the nature and extent of their common residence;
(b) the length of their relationship;
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists or existed;
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence,
and any arrangement for financial support;
(e) their ownership, use and acquisition of property;
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life,
including the care and support of each other;
(g) the care and support of children;
(h) the performance of household tasks;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of their relationship.
(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be
regarded as necessary in deciding whether 2 persons are living
together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis.
(4) Two persons are not to be regarded as living together as a couple
on a genuine domestic basis only because they have a common
residence.
(5) For subsection (1)—
(a) the gender of the persons is not relevant; and
(b) a person is related by family to another person if the
person and the other person would be within a prohibited
relationship within the meaning of the Marriage Act 1961
(Cwlth), section 23B, if they were parties to a marriage to
which that section applies.
(6) In an Act enacted before the commencement of this section, a
reference to a spouse includes a reference to a de facto partner
as defined in this section unless the Act expressly provides to
the contrary.
[7] In the present application, an issue of fact arises as to whether Ms Grimley was a
spouse as defined by r 596 and s 32DA of the Acts Interpretation Act, that is, whether
as a fact Ms Grimley had been Mr Dillon’s de facto partner for a continuous period
of at least 2 years ending on Mr Dillon’s death on 19 September 2020.
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[8] Ms Maiden does not dispute that Ms Grimley was a de factor partner of her son for a
long period of time, however, she submits as the relationship had ended prior to her
son’s passing, then Ms Grimley is not a spouse as defined.
[9] Ms Grimley attests and I accept that she did rent a residence with Mr Dillon from
some time in 2011 until the date of his death, 19 September 2020. Ms Grimley attests
that she and Mr Dillon had their own vehicles, their own separate bank accounts and
their own pets. Ms Grimley attests and I accept that she and Mr Dillon would share
expenses including rent. Ms Grimley swears that Mr Dillon had emotional issues and
was possessive in their relationship and that “later in the relationship, things were not
good”. Ms Grimley says that she and Mr Dillon were fighting and so Ms Grimley
formed the view that she needed to leave the relationship1.
[10] Ms Grimley says that she would go to her parents’ residence in Blackwater overnight
or for a few days but never removed her belongings from the rental house in Emerald.
Ms Grimley says she never intended permanently to separate2. Ms Grimley says that
soon after 20 August 2020, she had a conversation with Mr Dillon in which she told
him that she needed some time apart3. Ms Grimley then deposed4 “It was not my
intention that we would be separated indefinitely but I felt he had to deal with his own
problems if we were to have any future.”
[11] Ms Grimley says that after that conversation they continued to reside together and
they continued to share the same bed.
[12] It appears that in the week prior to 17 August 2020, Mr Dillon was stood down from
his employment as a bulldozer operator at BMA Blackwater. Ms Grimley was not
told by Mr Dillon that he was stood down from his employment until she received a
text message from her father who also worked at BMA Blackwater5.
[13] In a text to Mr Dillon’s sister, Shannon on 17 August 2020, Ms Grimley texted
“Hi Shannon I want to fill you in on what’s going on with Liam. Please
do not let this come back to me. I am legitimately worried about Liam
and I need to get out. So he lost his job last week, he’s been telling
1 Paragraph 66 of Affidavit of Jane Mary Grimley filed 18 November 2022.
2 Paragraph 67 of Affidavit of Jane Mary Grimley filed 18 November 2022.
3 Paragraph 72 of Affidavit of Jane Mary Grimley filed 18 November 2022.
4 Paragraph 74 of Affidavit of Jane Mary Grimley filed 18 November 2022.
5 See Exhibit JMG7.
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lies. All of it is lies. He was telling his boss he took 20 prescription
medication. … He’s a danger to himself and others. …”
[14] Shannon Dillon’s response was
“He told me something about this. Said he didn’t cope with the break
up so he didn’t sleep or eat and got sent home. Reckoned he needed a
doctor’s certificate to get back…”
[15] Shannon’s reply indicating the breakup of the relationship was included in
Ms Grimley’s material. On 17 August 2020 after 8pm, Ms Grimley sent a text to
Ms Maiden stating
“Liam skipped work last night and came home. While I was at
Shannon’s he called me and told me that he was at work when he was
really at home. He’s being weird and angry. He insisted on sleeping in
the bed last night and I just wanted to leave. I hope he sticks to what
he tells me. At this stage he is making it worse for himself. I think if
this friendship has to work, he needs to leave me alone for a bit… I
was just thinking maybe you could convince him to maybe stay at your
house for a little?...”
[16] These texts are of some importance as they indicate that there had been “a breakup”
of the relationship in mid-August 2020 and that it was Ms Grimley’s desire that
Mr Dillon not sleep in her bed, and leave the house so their “friendship” had a chance.
[17] On 18 September 2020, Ms Grimley emailed a Form 13 quitting the joint residence
at 26 Blue Gum Drive. The landlord, Linda Adams, has sworn an affidavit. I accept
Ms Adams’ evidence. Ms Adams observed that in tenancy inspections on 15 January
2020, 5 March 2020 and 19 June 2020, Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley appeared to be
sharing the same bedroom, however, by August 2020 Ms Adams deposed to several
conversations she had with Ms Grimley about Ms Grimley leaving the premises.
Exhibit 4 is a text between Ms Grimley and her friend, Tia Closset. Ms Grimley gave
evidence that prior to 27 August 2020, she agreed with her friend, Tia Closset, to
move out of her residence with Mr Dillon at Blue Gum Drive. Ms Closset informed
Ms Grimley that she had found a suitable house and had the application forms, to
which Ms Grimley asked her to “Fill them out”. This exhibit also contains an
important exchange between Ms Grimley and Ms Closset. Ms Grimley had
forwarded Ms Closset the texts she received from her father, Mr Anthony Grimley,
which recorded “Hi Jane, just a heads up, Liam was terminated (sacked) last night,
not barred. Stay safe, call me if you need help. Hopefully he goes to his dad’s.” After
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Ms Closset read this forwarded text, she texted back to Ms Grimley “Has he said what
happened?” to which Ms Grimley replied “Nope, a completely different story. I think
I might go to police. He tried to commit suicide at work.” Ms Closset then texted back
“Oh my Lord, was that before or after you broke up?” To which Ms Grimley replied
“Apparently both”.
[18] Exhibit 4 is important because it establishes that prior to 27 August 2020, Ms Grimley
had made firm plans to leave the residence at Blue Gum Drive and her friend
Ms Closset had in fact found an appropriate house. In terms of the public aspects of
the relationship, Ms Grimley had made it plain that she had broken up with Mr Dillon.
Ms Grimley was aware, or at least believed, that Mr Dillon was suicidal, she was
determined to leave Mr Dillon.
[19] In extremely emotional evidence, Ms Grimley said on several occasions she had
wanted to separate from Mr Dillon and move out of the premises away from
Mr Dillon, but not break up in the sense that if Mr Dillon was able to overcome his
mental health problems she may have recommenced her relationship with Mr Dillon.
Ms Grimley contended that after 20 August 2020 she had committed to live separately
from Mr Dillon but stated that she could in time possibly come back to live with Mr
Dillon.
[20] There is an absence of medical information as to the precise nature of Mr Dillon’s
mental health problems. Ms Grimley believed that Mr Dillon had developed an
addiction to prescription painkillers. Ms Grimley explained that Mr Dillon had
changed in personality after his shoulder surgeries and he appeared to her to be
addicted to prescription painkillers. Ms Grimley believed that Mr Dillon’s attempt to
commit suicide while at work was on an overdose of prescription painkillers.
[21] Earlier texts from Ms Grimley to Ms Closset as contained in Exhibit 6 are also of
some importance. On 20 August 2020, text correspondence commences at 5:48am
with Ms Grimley commencing the texts as follows:
5:48am Ms Grimley
So Liam rocked up home last night while I was at Shannon’s.
He rang me and told me he was at work. He needs to leave the
house. He is sleeping in my bed and I don’t want him to.”
7:48am Ms Closset
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“Oh no… did he say why he was sleeping in your bed?”
Ms Grimley
“Because he needs to make the bed in the spare room. Bullshit
excuse. I messaged his mum to see if she could maybe convince
him to go to hers.”
Ms Closset
“He’s probably in denial.
Ms Grimley
“Yeah he goes just because we are separated doesn’t mean I
can’t sleep in the same bed. He was angry last night. Which I
knew it would come around to it. I feel like he’s not going to
leave me alone.”
Ms Closset
“Yeah I thought that might happen. Time to move.”
Ms Grimley
“I knew it would happen. It’s only first night. Do I tell Lauren
and Tony. I will if it gets really bad.”
[22] Five of the texts of 20 August 2020 show that Ms Grimley had, by that stage, decided
to end her de facto relationship with Mr Dillon. The house at 26 Blue Gum Drive had
three bedrooms – the main bedroom with an ensuite, the second bedroom, and a third
bedroom which Mr Dillon used as an office. Ms Grimley made reference to “her
bedroom”, the main bedroom, and not “our bedroom”. She made reference to not
wanting Mr Dillon to sleep in her bed. It is plain by 20 August that Ms Grimley was
trying to achieve a separation from Mr Dillon, however it appears Mr Dillon was
somewhat reluctant. This was verified by Ms Maiden who said that she spoke to her
son, Mr Dillon, and encouraged him to accept the fact that his relationship with
Ms Grimley was over and to move on.
[23] Text messages show Ms Grimley’s firm desire to end the relationship and move on
and Mr Dillon’s reluctance to accept that fact. Ms Grimley’s texts reveal that
Mr Dillon was angered by the fact that he was required to sleep in a separate bedroom.
It seems to me the proper inference from Exhibit 6 is that by 20 August 2020,
Ms Grimley and Mr Dillon had separated as a couple, although this is somewhat
complicated by Ms Grimley’s evidence that in the four weeks after 20 August 2020,
she did have sexual intercourse with Mr Dillon on approximately six occasions.
Ms Grimley did not say in that period of a little over a month when those sexual
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encounters occurred, nor in terms of their longer relationship, whether that
represented any alteration in their sexual relationship. These issues were not
addressed in evidence.
[24] It does seem to me in the circumstances, however, that the proper inference is that by
20 August 2020, the sexual relationship between Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley was
substantially reduced. Ms Grimley had placed a lock upon the door to the master
bedroom and required Mr Dillon to sleep in the spare room. It appears from Exhibit 6
that Mr Dillon did not take kindly to this alteration.
[25] Exhibit 5 is the text from Ms Grimley to Ms Closset at 5:49am on 17 September 2020.
It records
“Hey bro. Depending on the situation about to happen I might have to
come stay with you. Liam is still refusing to let me off the lease so
Lynda is going to send a notice to leave. I will be filling out my own
form to take myself off the lease, despite Liam’s say. I won’t be talking
to him any more about it. It’s just going to happen. I think a removalist
is a good idea. That way we can do both of us at the same time. Hope
you are okay…”
[26] The timing of this text is important. It would appear that Lynda Adams sent the
Form 13 allowing Ms Grimley to quit the lease on 17 or 18 September. On
18 September, Ms Grimley emailed the Form 13 quitting the least at Blue Gum Drive,
not only to Ms Adams but also emailed it to Mr Dillon. It is plain therefore, by Friday
18 September 2020 that the relationship was over. Ms Grimley did not stay at 26 Blue
Gum Drive that evening but rather spent the night at her parents’.
[27] Ms Grimley had intended to and did attend at a work function in Capella on Saturday
19 September 2020 and it was during that day that Mr Dillon took his own life.
[28] Ms Adams deposed that to her observation Ms Grimley did in fact move out of the
premises some weeks before 18 September 2020. This is further supported by the
observations of a neighbour, Ms Julie Edwards, who observed that Ms Grimley’s car
was not much at 26 Blue Gum Drive in the three to four weeks prior to the deceased’s
passing. I accept the evidence of Ms Adams and Ms Edwards as they are independent
witnesses.
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[29] Importantly in her police statement dated 27 September 2020, Ms Grimley said
“Approximately six weeks ago, Liam and I separated. We have had previous periods
of separation throughout our relationship.”
[30] The admission of Ms Grimley in her police statement of 27 September 2020 of a
separation in the relationship in mid-August is consistent with the evidence, which I
accept.
[31] Ms Grimley says that her admission in paragraph 10 of her police statement was an
admission made in error and brought upon by the stress of the circumstances
surrounding the passing of Mr Dillon. Whilst I accept that Ms Grimley was stressed
at the time she provided her statement, I do not accept that the admission in
paragraph 10 that the relationship had ended in mid-August was an error.
[32] Danielle Lisa Thompson had been a close friend of Mr Dillon for the 10 years prior
to his death. Ms Thompson recalls a period of three to six months in 2012 where she
and her partner lived with Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley, then for a further five or six
months in mid-2015 Ms Thompson also lived with Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley.
[33] Ms Thompson recalls it was in late 2015 when Mr Dillon underwent a shoulder
operation and that she was the person who took Mr Dillon to Brisbane for his shoulder
operation and cared for him whilst they were in Brisbane. In 2015 when
Ms Thompson was living with Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley, Ms Grimley and
Mr Dillon maintained separate bedrooms. The living arrangements at both houses
were that there was an equal contribution towards household expenses.
[34] Ms Thompson who also worked at BMA Blackwater Mine recalled an incident
shortly before August where she had a conversation with Mr Dillon at the Blackwater
Mine. After the conversation, there was an exchange of text messages. In one such
text sent by Mr Dillon to Ms Thompson, apart from Mr Dillon asking for the
telephone number of another female that he was interested in, Mr Dillon texted “… I
forgot to ask you please not to tell anyone about Jane. She is very ashamed about
cheating. I agreed to keep that detail between us. Only a few people even know that
we are separated.”
[35] In messages that Mr Dillon posted on Facebook Messenger on 11 September 2020,
Mr Dillon wrote: “…Had to borrow money to pay rent …”
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[36] Paul Seiuli was a close friend of Mr Dillon, having grown up with him and attended
school with him. Mr Seiuli’s affidavit also attaches Facebook Messenger
correspondence of 11 September 2020, which records “… My girlfriend of 10 years
left me… We split for a month. I should have stayed single. We have had issues over
the years but I was always there for her when she needed me. Unfortunately it was a
one-way street, there is no hope for us now though. She is off her meds and going full
crazy. I guess there is nothing I can do about it but focus on my future.”
[37] Mr Dillon visited Mr Seiuli in Townsville in mid-2020 and he observed that on
occasions when Mr Dillon went out to nightclubs, Mr Dillon was actively looking for
girls to meet.
[38] The sister of Mr Dillon, Shannon Dillon, attaches to her affidavit text message
correspondence between herself and Ms Grimley. There was a discussion about the
breakup between Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley and as a result, Shannon Dillon made an
offer that Ms Grimley and her animals could come and stay with her. In the reply text,
Ms Grimley said:
“…I knew something was not right with him last night. His story was
not making sense. He doesn’t need anything because he was a danger
to himself and others. Apparently this has been going on longer than
the breakup. And they wanted him gone…”
[39] On 8 September 2020, there were further text messages which record, amongst other
things, Ms Grimley saying “I found a place I’ll be moving in three weeks. Lauren and
Tony are helping me a lot.”
[40] Ms Maiden has attached to her affidavit several bank statements of Mr Dillon. They
show that Mr Dillon registered on a “dating” website on 19 August 2020 and paid for
registration on two different dating websites on 15 September 2020. Bank statements
also show that Mr Dillon was paying rent, as well as paying for electricity. On
17 September, Mr Dillon repaid his mother $700 for money she had loaned him.
Ms Maiden, who resided in Clermont, observed that from about April 2020, when
Ms Grimley obtained full time employment in Capella, that Ms Grimley spent far less
time in the residence at Blue Gum Drive in Emerald and that from about May 2020
she “rarely stayed in the Blue Gum Drive house.”
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[41] Ms Maiden deposes that throughout the whole time of the rental of the Blue Gum
Drive House, Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley maintained separate bedrooms, with the
third bedroom being used as an office. I do not accept this evidence as Ms Maiden
did not live in the house. However, I do accept Ms Maiden’s evidence that from May
2020, when she visited the Blue Gum Drive house, Ms Grimley was rarely present
and that on the odd occasion when she was present, she would not interact, but rather
would retreat into her bedroom. Ms Maiden recalls one night when she stayed in the
Blue Gum Drive house overnight, that she slept in Mr Dillon’s bedroom while Mr
Dillon slept on a recliner chair in the lounge room.
[42] Hannah Louise Sweeney, a long-time friend of the deceased, attaches email
correspondence that she had with the deceased on 10 September 2020 where the
deceased, Mr Dillon, said of his relationship with Ms Grimley that there was “a really
bad split”.
[43] In S v B6 Dutney J (with whom McPherson JA and Williams JA agreed) said:
“[33] De facto relationships are by nature fragile. The robust
institution of marriage survives until formally dissolved by legal
process, even though the parties are no longer a couple and
exhibit none of the observable indicia of a domestic
arrangement. It has been recognised, however, that the
persistence of those indicia are fundamental to the continuance
of a de facto relationship. In Hibberson v George2. Mahoney JA,
with whom Hope and McHugh JJA agreed, spoke of the de facto
relationship as follows:
There is, of course, more to the relevant relationship than living
in the same house. But there is, I think, a significant distinction
between the relationship of marriage and the instant
relationship. The relationship of marriage, being based in law,
continues notwithstanding that all of the things for which it was
created have ceased. Parties will live in the relationship of
marriage notwithstanding that they are separated, without
children, and without the exchange of the incidents which the
relationship normally involves. The essence of the present
relationship lies, not in law, but in a de facto situation. I do not
mean by this that cohabitation is essential to its continuance:
holidays and the like show this. But where one party determines
not to ‘live together’ with the other and in that sense keeps apart,
the relationship ceases, even though it be merely, as it was
suggested in the present case, to enable the one party or the other
to decide whether it should continue.
6 S v B (No 2) [2004] QCA 449 at [33], [48]-[50].
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[…]
[48] Applying the passage of Mahoney JA in Hibberson v George,
which I set out earlier, a de facto relationship ends when one
party decides he or she no longer wishes to live in the required
degree of mutuality with the other but to live apart. It does not
seem to me that it is necessary to communicate this intention to
the other party providing the party that is desirous of ending the
relationship acts on his or her decision. I do not think it is
necessary that the other party agree with or accept the decision.
Once the parties cease to jointly wish to reside together in a
genuine domestic relationship, a situation usually ascertained
by looking objectively at the whole circumstances of the
relationship, the de facto relationship ceases. The relationship
ceases even though one party is still anxious to try to save it.
[49] In order to bring this claim within the provisions of Pt 19 of the
PLA the respondent, who was the plaintiff at trial, needed to
prove the existence of the relationship as at 21 December 1999
when the Part commenced. Perhaps because of the appellant’s
denial at trial that a de facto relationship had ever existed, the
evidence focussed on the creation of the de facto relationship.
In any event, apart from events which suggest any such
relationship had ceased there is a paucity of evidence as to the
nature of the relationship as at 21 December 1999. In this regard
there is a difference between a marriage and a de facto
relationship. In a marriage, the parties remain married and are
presumed to be living as a “couple” unless the party wishing to
end the relationship proves a separation for the statutory period.
In a de facto situation it is the party asserting the relationship
that must prove cohabitation of the required quality. In Pavey v
Pavey on which the respondent relied, the Full Court of the
Family Court in dealing with what constitutes “separation”
between two parties to a marriage who continue to reside in the
same residence said at 75,213–75,214:
In such cases, without a full explanation of the circumstances,
there is an inherent unlikelihood that the marriage has broken
down, for the common residence suggests continuing
cohabitation. Such cases therefor require evidence that goes
beyond inexact proofs, indefinite testimony and indirect
inferences. The party or parties alleging separation must satisfy
the Court about this by explaining why the parties continued to
live under the one roof, and by showing that there has been a
change in their relationship, gradual or sudden, constituting a
separation.
[50] The reverse applies in the case of a de facto relationship in the
sense that the party asserting the continuing relationship must
prove the positive aspects of the relationship rather than the
party asserting separation being required to prove the
negatives.” [footnotes omitted]
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[44] In my view, the evidence shows that by mid-August 2020, Ms Grimley was
determined not to “live together” with Mr Dillon and in that sense, kept herself apart
so that their relationship had ceased.
[45] In terms of the circumstances referred to in s 32D(a) of the Acts Interpretation Act,
in my view, the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley
were not living as a couple on a genuine domestic basis from mid-August 2020 as:
(a) They had held a common residence for approximately 9 years, however, during
that period at times, as evidenced by Ms Thompson, in 2015 Ms Grimley and
Mr Dillon maintained separate bedrooms and from mid-August 2020 at least,
Ms Grimley and Mr Dillon maintained separate bedrooms.
(b) Whilst therefore there was a long-term (approximately 9 years) relationship,
the nature and extent of the common residence varied from circumstances of
sharing a bed to maintaining separate bedrooms. I accept that by mid-August
2020, Ms Grimley had placed a lock upon the main bedroom at the residence
of Blue Gum Drive and Mr Dillon was required to and did sleep in a separate
bedroom for most of the time from mid-August 2020 onwards.
(c) I accept Ms Grimley’s evidence that there was a sexual relationship between
Ms Grimley and Mr Dillon after 20 August 2020 in that they had sexual
intercourse on five or six occasions, however, as discussed above, the inference
is that that represented a decrease in their usual sexual relationship due to their
strained emotional circumstances.
(d) There is no evidence to support a finding that there was financial dependence
between Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley. Mr Dillon earned significantly more than
Ms Grimley however he had lost his employment (or at least ceased being paid)
by mid-August 2020. The bank accounts attached to Ms Maiden’s affidavit
shows that despite his loss of employment, Mr Dillon had sufficient monies in
his bank (from his tax return and borrowings from Ms Maiden) to financially
support himself.
(e) Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley, it would appear, did not have joint property, but
bought their own motor vehicles and chattels into the relationship and took
them at the conclusion of their relationship.
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(f) There is not any significant evidence as to the performance of household tasks.
(g) Mr Dillon and Ms Grimley did not have any children.
(h) An important feature against the continuation of a de facto relationship is that
both Ms Grimley and Mr Dillon had publicly acknowledged to their friends
that the relationship had ceased. Ms Grimley was determined to move out and
had acquired a separate residence and Mr Dillon had actively sought another
female partner.
[46] By mid-August 2020 there was no mutual commitment to a shared life, including the
care and support of each other. As Ms Grimley stated, their relationship was over,
and she was moving out. Ms Grimley gave evidence that their relationship may have
been re-established in time, but only if Mr Dillon was able to overcome his mental
health difficulties. At least by mid-August 2020, Ms Grimley knew that Mr Dillon
was in a precarious state – she believed him to be suicidal and she believed him to be
addicted to prescription drugs, she was determined to and did leave Mr Dillon. At
that point, there was no mutual commitment to a shared life.
[47] The respondent argues that what had occurred in August and September of 2020 was
merely a temporary separation and that “illness and separations that follow are
common occurrences in committed relationships – and have found to be not
determinative of break downs.”
[48] I accept that Ms Grimley’s intention to physically separate is not of itself destructive
of her de facto relationship with Mr Dillon. A short term break up does not mean that
the de facto relationship would not continue. The difficulty for Ms Grimley is that
there is no evidence to suggest that the breakup was to be a short term breakup. The
evidence is to the contrary.
[49] In paragraph 74 of her affidavit Ms Grimley makes it plain she and Mr Dillon had in
fact separated and that she and Mr Dillon would not be reconciling unless he was able
to overcome his illness.
[50] The evidence that I accept leads me to conclude that by late August 2020, Mr Dillon
and Ms Grimley did not have a mutual commitment to a shared life to the exclusion
of others. Ms Grimley was not committed to a shared life with Mr Dillon and
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Mr Dillon was reluctantly accepting their relationship was over. Mr Dillon had, for
some months, commenced the process of looking for another partner. As Ms Grimley
frankly conceded, she and Mr Dillon may have got back together in the future
although she could not be sure. What was plain was that at the very least Ms Grimley
required Mr Dillon to “sort himself out” which seems to me to be a reference to
Ms Grimley’s belief that Mr Dillon was addicted to prescription drugs and had mental
health issues which required treatment. This could not be thought to be a simple
process which could be achieved in a short time frame. Mr Dillon had been under the
care of a psychiatrist for some time and, to Ms Grimley’s observation, was getting
worse. As Ms Grimley was at pains to point out, this was a matter that she required
Mr Dillon to overcome by himself. It was not something that would be faced as a
couple within the context of a shared life as a couple.
[51] The evidence, which I accept, supports the accuracy of Ms Grimley’s admission at
paragraph 10 of her police statement of 27 September 2020 that it was in mid-August
2020 that her relationship with Mr Dillon had ended. I conclude therefore that
Ms Grimley was not the de facto partner of Mr Dillon for a continuous period of at
least 2 years, ending on Mr Dillon’s death. It is appropriate therefore that letters of
administration on intestacy be granted to Virginia Coral Maiden.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QSC/2023/027