Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy v Ward [2023] QCATA 56
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: Department of Communities, Housing and Digital
Economy v Ward [2023] QCATA 56
PARTIES: DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES, HOUSING
AND DIGITAL ECONOMY
(appellant)
v
KELLY-MAREE WARD
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S: APL355-21
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
DELIVERED ON: 18 May 2023
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Member Richard Oliver
ORDERS: 1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The tribunal’s decision of 8 November 2021 is set
aside.
3. A termination order is made on the grounds of
failure to leave.
4. I direct the issue of a Warrant of Possession to the
Principal Officer of Police at the relevant Police
Station in the State of Queensland in the
following terms:
(a) This warrant takes effect on the 12 June 2023
and whereas the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal has made the
termination order above, you are authorised
for a period of 14 days from the above date
expiring on 26 June 2023 to:
(i) Enter the premises and give possession
of the premises to the respondent
herein and;
(ii) Exercise such powers under this
warrant with necessary and
reasonable help and force.
-- 1 of 5 --
2
(iii) Enter under this warrant to be made
between the hours of 8:00am and
5:00pm
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL
LIES – Where applicant provides social housing – where
applicant and respondent entered into residential tenancy
agreement – where tenant convicted of possession of drugs
whilst in the property – where disturbance and use of the
property inconsistent with the terms of the tenancy
agreement – where applicant issued a Notice to Leave –
where failure to leave and Termination Order sought –
where application dismissed – whether discretion to dismiss
miscarried – whether relevant considerations taken into
account.
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 s
142(3)(a)(i)
Residential Tenancy and Rooming Accommodation Act
2008 ss 290A and 340
Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20
Terera v Clifford [2017] 181
APPEARANCES &
REPRESENTATION:
This matter was heard and determined on the papers
pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative
Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Ms Ward was the beneficiary of the Applicant’s (“Department”) social housing policy
and 8 July 2021 entered into a residential tenancy agreement with the Department for
a three bedroom detached house Clontaff. The occupants of the house under the
tenancy agreement were Ms Ward and her three teenage daughters. Her daughters,
although the subject of Child Safety orders, chose to stay with their mother, and they
were of an age where their choice was acknowledged. Ms Ward had a long history of
criminal and anti-social behaviour and was in fact on parole for drug offences at the
time of the tenancy agreement.
[2] The tenancy agreement was for a three-year period with a nominal rent of $177.80/wk.
The usual provisions of the tenancy agreement applied. Clause 19 of the tenancy
agreement provided that the tenant must:
- not use the premises for an illegal purpose;
- cause nuisance by the use of the premises; or
………………
- interfere with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of a neighbour of the tenant;
or allow another person on the premises to interfere with the reasonable peace,
comfort or privacy of the neighbour of the tenant.
[3] Very soon after the commencement of the tenancy, the Department received
complaints about Ms Ward’s conduct. A shipping container and donga were deposited
-- 2 of 5 --
3
in the yard. A large fence was constructed without approval. Neighbours complained
about noise and multiple individuals remaining on the premises at all hours of the day.
Complaints were made to the Moreton Regional Council about the structures on the
property.
[4] Police were called to the residence on multiple occasions. On 15 September 2021
police attended with a search warrant and found dangerous drugs on the premises. Ms
Ward was charged with possession of dangerous drugs, pleaded guilty and was fined.
After this there were further complaints made by neighbours.
[5] Because of the drug charges the Department sought to terminate the tenancy
agreement and issued a Notice to Leave under the Residential Tenancy and Rooming
Accommodation Act 2008 (“RTRA Act”). Ms Ward failed to comply, and then the
Department filed an application in the Tribunal seeking a Termination Order and
Warrant of Possession in reliance on the failure to leave under s 340 of the RTRA Act.
In particular, the termination was sought because the notice to leave was in respect of
a serious breach at public or community housing.
[6] The application came on for hearing on 8 November 2021. After hearing from both
parties, and in particular, Ms Ward’s explanation for her conduct, the application was
dismissed. It is evident from the transcript that there was no serious factual dispute
about Ms Ward’s conduct since she commenced the tenancy. She admitted the
possession, conceded people just walked in off the street and the structures were in
the yard. The dog fence was built without written authority and she was concerned
that if she lost the tenancy she would have nowhere to live.
[7] The learned adjudicator’s reasons demonstrate the difficulty in coming to a decision
in these circumstances which effectively would put Ms Ward and her three children
on the street without accommodation. He took into account the complaints of the
Department, the unauthorised use of the premises being the container and donga
located in the yard and the construction of the fence. However, he accepted that Ms
Ward, although guilty of possession of a dangerous drug, there was no charge of using,
which inevitably would have been a breach of parole.
[8] The learned adjudicator accepted that the container had been removed, the donga not
used as a habitable space and the fence had been taken down. Although there were
complaints by neighbours about noise, disturbance with people attending the premises
at all hours with police being called the principal ground was the possession charge.
He concluded in all the circumstances, she should be given a second chance and
exercised his discretion to dismiss the application.
[9] The Department filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal on 18 November
2021. The grounds of appeal are essentially that the Tribunal did not give sufficient
weight to the evidence presented at the hearing in particular “the admittance of the
tenant that drugs have been used in the property, the sale and purchase of drugs are
illegal use of the premises. The grounds go on to say:
The court is limited in changing the decision of the department as illegal activity is not
allowed in public housing. Serious Breach has been identified as illegal behaviour. QPS has
laid charges and the tenant has been found guilty in court. Under this category, the court
only required the proof the form 12 is valid and validly served and has supported evidence
which in this case are charge sheets.
-- 3 of 5 --
4
[10] As this is an appeal brought under s 142(3)(a)(i) of the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 in respect of a decision in a proceeding for minor
civil dispute an appeal may be made only if the party has obtained leave of the tribunal.
In Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20 at [10] the Court of Appeal
reiterated the general principles:
The principles governing a grant of leave to appeal are well-established. In short, an
applicant for leave to appeal must show:
(a) the appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice;
(b) there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected.
There must be reasonable prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave. Therefore, in
deciding whether to grant leave to appeal the Court usually makes some preliminary
assessment of the prospects of the proposed appeal. 1
[11] In this case there is no real dispute of fact. The tenant was in serious breach of the
tenancy agreement which could not be remedied. Also, and insofar as it is relevant,
there were breaches of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
[12] This then leads to the question as to whether or not the learned adjudicator erred in
the exercise of discretion. The question can be considered against what the High Court
said in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499:
The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be
determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges
compose in the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of
the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that
some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts on a
wrong principle, if he allows extraneous irrelevant matters to guide or affect him,
if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material
consideration, then his determination should be reviewed, and the appellate court
may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for
doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result
embodied in his order, but, if on the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the
appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to
exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance.
[13] The most obvious consideration here in the exercise of discretion, given the admitted
serious conduct, is the personal circumstances of Ms Ward. She had moved from
social housing in Zillmere to Clontaff to accommodate her three daughters. She had
little regard for the responsibilities of being provided with accommodation by
allowing a donga and container to be placed at the property. She had dogs, and again,
the accommodation was not for maintaining animals but for her family. She allowed
visitors day and night, ostensibly to check on her and her children, but the evidence
of her conduct tells a different story, in particular the regular attendance of police at
the property. By taking up his housing opportunity, she is depriving many others who
are also in need.
[14] The learned member in exercising the discretion took into account that Ms Ward was
not convicted of using drugs and also that Ms Ward would adhere to her obligations
under the tenancy agreement in the future, by reason of the bringing of the application
1 Citing Terera v Clifford [2017] QCA 181
-- 4 of 5 --
5
for termination. In doing so he did not give sufficient weight to the other important
and serious considerations referred to above. In particular, the seriousness of the
breaches of the tenancy agreement and her conduct during the course of the tenancy.
One can understand the sympathetic approach and the desire to give Ms Ward a
second chance, but where there is a serious breach or breaches of the tenancy
agreement the RTRA Act provides a remedy to lessor’s which cannot readily be
overlooked. The Department was entitled to the termination order.
[15] I have come to the decision that the discretion here did miscarry on the grounds that
the leaned member, did not take into a relevant consideration being the seriousness of
the breach and the overall conduct of Ms Ward during the tenancy as summarised in
the affidavit of Tina Kilgower filed in the original proceeding. Also the rights of the
Department to a termination order in circumstances where there were valid and
legitimate grounds for issuing the Notice to Leave.
[16] As this involves a question of law, leave to appeal will be granted, the appeal is
allowed, and a termination order made with a warrant for possession to issue.
-- 5 of 5 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2023/056