Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Musso [2022] QSC 184

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Musso [2022] QSC 184 PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (applicant) v FILIPPO JAMES MUSSO (respondent) FILE NO/S: BS No 2583 of 2018 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 8 September 2022 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 16 August 2022 JUDGE: Cooper J ORDER: 1. The supervision order made by Wilson J on 20 August 2021 be amended in the form set out in the Schedule to these reasons. 2. The respondent be released from custody subject to the requirements of that amended supervision order until 23 August 2031. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER – GENERALLY – where the respondent was released from custody under a supervision order made pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) – where the respondent contravened a number of the requirements of the supervision order and was returned to custody where he continuously self-harmed – where the Attorney-General applies in the alternative for an order that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for care, control or treatment, or for an order that the respondent be released subject to an amended supervision order – where psychiatric evidence describes the respondent’s risk of committing a serious sexual offence as ranging from high without a supervision order to low-moderate or below average with a supervision order – whether an -- 1 of 27 -- 2 amended supervision order provides adequate protection of the community from the commission of a serious sexual offence by the respondent Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13, s 16, s 20, s 22, s 27, s 43AA Attorney-General (Qld) v Musso [2018] QSC 191, related Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Nemo [2020] QSC 140, considered Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396; [2006] QCA 324, cited Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Musso [2019] QSC 310, related Kynuna v Attorney-General (Qld) [2016] QCA 172, cited Turnbull v Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 54, applied COUNSEL: J Tate for the applicant P J Wilson for the respondent SOLICITORS: Crown Solicitor for the applicant Cridland & Hua Lawyers for the respondent [1] On 23 August 2021, the respondent was released from custody under a supervision order made pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (“the Act”). It is common ground that, following his release, the respondent contravened a number of the requirements of his supervision order. [2] The Attorney-General now applies for a further order under s 22 of the Act. That section applies if the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that a prisoner released on a supervision order is likely to contravene, is contravening, or has contravened a requirement of that order. Where the section is engaged, s 22(2) provides that the respondent must satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contraventions of the existing supervision order, be ensured by that existing order. If the respondent fails to do that the court must rescind the supervision order and make a continuing detention order pursuant to s 22(2)(a). History [3] The respondent is presently 29 years of age. He was 20 years old at the time he committed the index offences which engaged the operation of s 13 of the Act. Prior to that offending, he had a criminal history dating back to 2010, the most serious offence being armed robbery. [4] The Attorney-General first filed an application for orders against the respondent under the Act on 8 March 2022. [5] The application was decided by Davis J on 24 August 2018.1 1 Attorney-General (Qld) v Musso [2018] QSC 191. -- 2 of 27 -- 3 [6] The index offences considered on that application included one count of torture, one count of assault occasioning bodily harm, one count of extortion, one count of sexual assault and one count of attempted fraud. The index offences include the only sexual offending in which the respondent has engaged. [7] The circumstances surrounding the index offences were set out in detail by Davis J.2 It is not necessary to set them out again. [8] In considering whether the respondent presented a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order, so as to enliven the discretion to make an order under s 13(5) of the Act, Davis J stated that:3 “Here, the respondent has been diagnosed by all three psychiatrists as having a personality disorder with anti-social and narcissistic traits. All psychiatrists assessed his risk of violently, sexually offending without supervision as high. All three saw the risk of violent offending as a primary concern, but saw that offending as likely to have a sexual element where the victim of the violence is female. There is evidence of violent behaviour in prison and non-compliance with authority.” [9] The psychiatrists who assessed the respondent and provided reports for the purpose of that first application were Dr Harden, Dr Timmins and Dr Arthur. [10] Turning then to the question what order should be made, Davis J stated: “[104] … All three psychiatrists expressed concern as to whether the respondent’s current state of mind was such that he could comply with a supervision order. Concerns were also expressed that he might flee. If at large without supervision, the risk of the respondent committing a further serious sexual offence is high. [105] All psychiatrists thought that either the MISOP or HISOP should be completed by the respondent, with preference to the HISOP which is not available in the community. The psychiatrists were of the view that any courses should be completed in custody. Views were expressed that the treatment might destabilise the respondent initially and thereby increase risk of reoffending. I accept that evidence. [106] Turning my mind then to s 13(6)(b)(ii), there is the evidence of Mr Bear and Mr Tannock that Corrective Services could not manage the respondent in the community, which I accept. I have considered whether conditions could be imposed to enable the respondent to be managed within the community. I cannot imagine conditions which could be imposed which could ensure adequate protection of the public against the risk which the respondent poses of committing a serious sexual offence. [107] I am not satisfied that adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the release of the respondent on supervision. The 2 Ibid at [14] – [17]. 3 Ibid at [99]. -- 3 of 27 -- 4 respondent is an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence unless he is detained. …” [11] For those reasons, Davis J ordered that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment pursuant to s 13(5)(a) of the Act. [12] On 19 August 2019, the respondent and two other prisoners engaged in a riot at the Wolston Correctional Centre. In the course of that riot, the respondent assaulted a correctional services officer and engaged in acts of self-harm by cutting his wrists and throat with razor blades. The respondent was subsequently sentenced by Judge Loury QC to two years imprisonment for the offence of riot, with lesser terms of imprisonment for the assault on the corrective services officer and a later assault of a police officer by spitting on her, with the sentences to be suspended after eight months with an operational period of two years. [13] On 25 November 2019, Brown J decided an application pursuant to s 27 of the Act for a review of the continuing detention of the respondent.4 Both Dr Arthur and Dr Harden prepared further reports for the purpose of that review. Evidence was also provided by Dr Andrews, the respondent’s treating psychologist, addressing his response to therapy. [14] Brown J affirmed the decision of Davis J that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order. In concluding that the respondent should continue to be subject to the continuing detention order, Brown J stated: “[70] While Mr Musso’s counsel submits that it should not assumed from his violation history in custody that he would not comply with the requirements of the supervision order upon release, the psychiatric evidence supports the fact that it is the most probative evidence of how he would conduct himself upon release. It is also evident that Mr Musso would still be subject to considerable stressors upon his release, including a lack of structure, as was set out in the affidavit material of QCS. There is a reasonably high likelihood those stressors would trigger non-compliance with the supervision order and similar conduct to that seen in the last six months while in custody. The fact non-compliance may result in his return to custody is not likely to be a significant restraint on Mr Musso’s conduct, given that he does not yet have insight into the detriment that his own conduct causes him, despite his intellectual abilities. While the possibility of Mr Musso wearing an ankle bracelet may reduce the risk of him absconding, unless QCS or the police are on hand if he becomes overwhelmed by his environment, angry or threatened, given his lack of emotional self-regulation, there is a high risk that, if the incident involves a woman, his response will be sexually violent. On the present evidence it is unlikely that Mr Musso would comply with reasonable directions given to him. His risk of committing a further serious sexual offence would only be reduced to moderate if the supervision order were efficacious in containing his behaviour. 4 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Musso [2019] QSC 310. -- 4 of 27 -- 5 [71] While a supervision order is not required to be watertight, it must be efficacious in constraining a respondent’s behaviour by sufficiently reducing the risks of the commission of serious sexual offences to ensure the adequate protection of the community. I am presently not satisfied that any supervision order could be effective in doing so, given the matters outlined above. I am not satisfied, given his violation history in custody and his complex psychiatric conditions, that Mr Musso presently could be reasonably and adequately managed by QCS under the mandatory conditions provided under s 16 of the Act. [72] While I do not consider that Mr Musso can reasonably and practicably be managed by a supervision order at present, the evidence suggests that if he continues to progress with Dr Andrews, there is every reason to consider he will be able to reach a level of emotional self-regulation so the risk of reoffending can be reasonably and practicably managed under a supervision order. It is evident that Mr Musso still requires further individual therapy and a period of conduct without threats or violence towards others before he can be reasonably and practicably managed and the adequate protection of the community can be ensured under a supervision order. This is supported by his long-standing and complex psychiatric problems, evidenced not only in Dr Harden and Dr Arthur’s opinions but also in previous psychiatric and psychological opinions which are referred to in the applicant’s submissions, as well as his history of violations since the previous order.” [15] On 20 August 2021, Wilson J decided a further application pursuant to s 27 of the Act for a review of the continuing detention of the respondent. Dr Arthur and Dr Harden prepared further reports for the purposes of that hearing. There was also further evidence from Dr Andrews about the course of the respondent’s therapy. [16] The psychiatrists continued to hold the view that the respondent’s risk of sexual reoffending in the absence of a division 3 order was high and, having regard to that evidence, Wilson J also affirmed the decision that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order. [17] However, both Dr Arthur and Dr Harden expressed the opinion that a supervision order would provide for the adequate protection of the community. The psychiatrists both identified the risk that the dramatic change from the low-stimulus environment of the detention unit in which the respondent was then held in custody to release into the community would cause the respondent to breach the conditions of a supervision order by engaging in aggressive behaviours towards others and would be a challenge for corrective services staff to manage in the community, particularly in relation to self-harming behaviours. [18] At the hearing before Wilson J, the Attorney-General accepted that the psychiatrists did not regard the risk of ongoing self-harm on the respondent’s part if released into the community as being connected to the risk of him committing a serious sexual offence in the future. The review application was conducted on the basis that the risk -- 5 of 27 -- 6 of self-harm and the risk of serious sexual offending are separate and distinct and require different management regimes. [19] Ultimately, Wilson J accepted that there had been sufficient improvement in the area of the respondent’s self-harming behaviours to make it appropriate for the respondent to be released subject to the requirements of a supervision order for a period of 10 years. Throughout his period of release the respondent resided at the contingency accommodation referred to as the Wacol precinct. Contravention of the existing supervision order [20] Patricia Dennis, an Acting Principal Adviser at the High-Risk Offender Management Unit (“HROMU”) within Community Corrections, Queensland Corrective Services (“QCS”) deposed to the following matters, based on records in the respondent’s file held by QCS: (a) throughout the period of his supervision, the respondent made regular calls to the Queensland Ambulance Service (“QAS”) for a range of concerns, including hearing voices telling him to stab himself, having suicidal thoughts and swallowing batteries or razor blades; (b) t he respondent also discharged himself from hospital against medical advice, due to apparent frustration caused by not being offered mental health treatment, with the Community Mental Health Services also declining to accept the respondent for mental health services case management in the community; (c) on 21 January 2022, the respondent contacted the HROMU office and made threats to a QCS staff member, to the effect of “Do you wanna have some fun? Why don’t you come down here ya dog cunt and I’ll show you ... I have a knife right now ...”, including further random insults and expletives to the QCS staff member, as well as a threat to cut his own throat; (d) on the same day, the respondent also contacted the Queensland Police Service (“QPS”) stating he was going to commit suicide with a knife and reported swallowing batteries and razor blades. A significant response by the QPS resulted from the respondent’s call and the QAS subsequently took the respondent to the hospital with QPS assistance. The respondent subsequently discharged himself from the hospital; (e) on 24 January 2022, the respondent presented as extremely elevated on the phone with his Senior Case Manager at QCS. The respondent subsequently left his residence without approval from QCS. The respondent proceeded by foot to the Wacol train station where he threatened to throw himself in front of a train. QCS called the QAS, however the QCS staff on-site were able to talk to the respondent, who accepted their escort to the Ipswich Hospital for assessment. During this incident the QCS staff were regularly told to “fuck off” and were abused by the respondent. The respondent was threatening staff and was non-compliant with directions given by QCS staff with regards to his curfew. The QCS staff were monitoring the situation as -- 6 of 27 -- 7 best as possible, however they are not trained first responders. These events placed the QCS staff at significant risk of harm; (f) subsequent checks made by QCS staff with hospital staff indicated that during his hospital visit, the respondent made threats of rape and presented with homicidal ideations of suicide. The respondent also stated that he will continue to “breach parole” until he “gets what he wants”, which QCS staff understood to mean returning to custody. Further, the respondent stated that he was giving his medication to others at the Wacol precinct and will continue to abscond from the precinct as he knows such action will result in a return to custody; (g) in addition to the above matters, the respondent has been the subject of a number of contraventions of the supervision order since his release to the community relating to intravenous Buprenorphine use and deleting of data from his device; (h) as a consequence of the incidents in January 2022, QCS received information that indicated the respondent had purchased a second mobile phone, which was subsequently obtained by QCS. Initial reviews of the notifications on the mobile phone indicated that the respondent had resumed contact with associations without approval from QCS; (i) the respondent was charged with a number of counts of contravening the supervision order pursuant to s 43AA of the Act in relation to: (i) being found in possession of a number of technological devices, including a second phone; (ii) failing to report associations; (iii) utilising social media; (iv) accessing the internet without approval. (j) the respondent obtained the technological devices whilst he was with his National Disability Insurance Scheme support workers in the community. [21] The written submissions for the Attorney-General identify three requirements of the supervision order which the respondent is alleged to have contravened: condition 14, which subjects the respondent to a curfew direction issued by QCS (such direction having been given on 23 August 2021); condition 20, which restricts the respondent to having only one mobile phone; and condition 40, which prohibits the respondent from starting or showing violence or violent behaviour against anyone, except in self- defence. The material read on the application, including the matters addressed in the evidence of Ms Dennis, indicates that the respondent also contravened other requirements of the order, namely conditions 22, 24 and 36. [22] Ultimately, the precise identification of the requirements which the respondent has contravened is of no moment for the purposes of the present application. That is because the written outline of submissions filed on behalf of the respondent at the hearing before me expressly accepted that the court should find contraventions of the -- 7 of 27 -- 8 existing supervision order proved to the required standard. That concession was properly made in circumstances where the respondent pleaded guilty to, and was convicted: (a) on 4 March 2022, of six offences under s 43AA of the Act alleging contraventions of the supervision order; (b) on 20 May 2022, of a further four offences under s 43AA of the Act alleging contraventions of the supervision order. [23] In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent has contravened a requirement of the supervision order made on 20 August 2021. Accordingly, s 22 of the Act is engaged. I turn then to the question whether the respondent has discharged the onus upon him of demonstrating that, despite the contraventions, the existing supervision order provides adequate protection to the community. Events since return to custody [24] As a consequence of the incidents on 21 and 24 January 2022, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the respondent under s 20 of the Act and he was returned to custody on 26 January 2022. [25] The further reports prepared by Dr Arthur and Dr Timmins for the purposes of this application refer to QCS records which describe a number of incidents after the respondent’s return to custody: (a) on 15 March 2022, the respondent self-harmed by swallowing parts of a toothbrush and ballpoint pens. The respondent was transported to an external medical facility; (b) on 22 March 2022, the respondent self-harmed by biting an existing injury on his right arm causing it to bleed. The respondent used the blood to write the words “fuck you” on the observation window before he was de-escalated; (c) on the same day there was a separate incident in which the respondent claimed to have eaten parts of his toothbrush. He then covered the observation window. He told QCS staff that he did this because he was bored and would like to go to hospital. He threatened to place objects into his genitals in order to get what he wanted but did not carry out those threats; (d) on 27 March 2022, the respondent claimed he had swallowed pieces of his toothbrush and had bitten his right arm causing it to bleed. He refused to comply with an escort to the medical centre. He then covered the observation window with a mattress and stated that he wished to go to hospital. He was subsequently de-escalated; (e) on 30 March 2022, the respondent claimed that he had passed the toothbrush that he had swallowed three days earlier and swallowed it again. He had also bitten his arm causing it to bleed. This behaviour was attributed to the respondent’s wish to be transferred to hospital; -- 8 of 27 -- 9 (f) on 31 March 2022, the respondent placed a mattress up against the observation window. He then threatened a QCS officer by saying words to the effect that he would rape him if he saw the officer on the outside; (g) on 31 March 2022, the respondent claimed to have been inserting a piece of cardboard into his penis. He admitted this behaviour was directed towards his wish to be transferred to hospital; (h) on 13 May 2022, the respondent informed QCS staff that he was self-harming. He had minor cuts to his arm and claimed he had swallowed a razorblade; (i) on 5 June 2022, the respondent told QCS staff that he had swallowed five crayons and a pen, and that he had used a different pen in an attempt to mutilate his genitals; (j) on 20 June 2022, the respondent informed QCS staff that he had used razorblades to cut his arm and had swallowed two of them; (k) on 23 June 2022, the respondent presented with cuts on his forearms and told QCS staff that he had swallowed razorblades; (l) on 30 June 2022, the respondent was admitted to the Princess Alexandra Hospital Security Unit for self-harm. He claimed to have excreted a blade, cut himself with it and swallowed it again. When staff intervened he became elevated and force was required to restrain him. The respondent then began covering the cell camera with a mattress and signed a self-discharge form. Statutory scheme [26] Section 13 of the Act is directed towards the making of orders to ensure the adequate protection of the community against the risk that a prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence. The term “serious sexual offence” is defined in Schedule 1 of the Act to include an offence of a sexual nature involving violence. [27] The jurisdiction to make orders is enlivened once “…the court is satisfied the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order”: see s 13(1). A prisoner will be characterised as a serious danger to the community “if there is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence: (a) if the prisoner is released from custody; or (b) if the prisoner is released from custody without a supervision order being made”: see s 13(2). Where, as here, such a finding was made, the question then is whether a continuing detention order, or a supervision order should be made: see s 13(5). Where a supervision order will ensure the adequate protection of the community from the commission by a respondent of a “serious sexual offence”, then the making of a supervision order ought to be preferred to the making of a continuing detention order.5 [28] Section 22 of the Act concerns contraventions of a supervision order. As already noted, where the contravention has been proved (as here), the section casts an onus upon the respondent to prove that “… the adequate protection of the community can … be ensured by a supervision order”. The term “the adequate protection of the 5 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396 at 405. -- 9 of 27 -- 10 community” as it appears in s 22 bears the same meaning as it bears in s 13 of the Act.6 [29] The relevant “protection” is not protection from any offending, or indeed from any sexual offending. The relevant “protection” is from the commission of a “serious sexual offence”. In Turnbull v Attorney-General (Qld),7 Morrison JA (with whom Philippides JA and Douglas J agreed) said:8 “[36] The consideration required under s 13(6)(b)(i) is whether adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order. The risk which leads to the need to protect the community is because, under s 13(1) and (2), there is an unacceptable risk that Mr Turnbull will commit a serious sexual offence if released without such an order. The means of providing the protection, and avoiding that risk, is a supervision order. When a court is assessing whether a supervision order can reasonably and practically manage the adequate protection of the community, it is necessarily assessing the protection the order can provide against that risk. Before making the order the court has to reach a positive conclusion that the supervision order will provide the adequate protection.” [30] Consequently, the question under s 22 is whether the respondent has satisfied the court on the balance of probabilities that his release back into the community on a supervision order provides “adequate protection of the community” in the sense that he is an acceptable risk of not committing a serious sexual offence. [31] Here, despite contravening the supervision order in the manner described above, the respondent has not committed a sexual offence which would have constituted a breach of the condition which appears in all supervision orders by force of s 16(1)(f) of the Act. He has not committed a “serious sexual offence”, so the purpose of the supervision order being to protect the community against the commission of such offences, has been fulfilled to date. [32] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Nemo,9 Davis J stated that, in circumstances where s 22 requires consideration of whether the supervision order reduces the risk of the commission of a serious sexual offence to an acceptable level, the fact that there might be a likelihood of a breach of the supervision order is but one fact to consider in that determination.10 Any risk of future breach of the supervision order must be considered in the light of its relevance to the protection of the community from the commission by the respondent of a “serious sexual offence”.11 Dr Timmins’ evidence 6 Kynuna v Attorney-General (Qld) [2016] QCA 172 at [60]. 7 [2015] QCA 54. 8 Ibid at [36]. 9 [2020] QSC 140. 10 Ibid at [22], citing Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Fardon [2018] QSC 193 at [60] and [76] – [78]. 11 Ibid at [26], citing Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Fardon [2018] QSC 193 at [76]. -- 10 of 27 -- 11 [33] In her report prepared for the present application, Dr Timmins’ diagnosis of the respondent remains the same as her report for the application heard by Davis J. That diagnosis is of: (a) a Mixed Personality Disorder with borderline, narcissistic and antisocial traits, with the respondent’s PCL-R scoring also indicating the presence of psychopathic traits; (b) Polysubstance dependence, mainly alcohol and cannabis (in sustained remission). [34] Dr Timmins stated that she could find no evidence that the respondent has a deviant sexual drive, but could not rule out that there could be some sexual deviance present, such as rape fantasies. [35] In her final opinion and recommendation, Dr Timmins stated that the respondent has significant personality dysfunction as a result of his upbringing which is likely to cause him issues with “emotional dysregulation, self-harm, vulnerability to perceived rejection, difficulties with boundaries, following processes, rules and expectations, in addition to dysfunctional relationships and ways of coping, all of which were seen in the community and currently in the custodial environment.” [36] Dr Timmins referred to the respondent having become involved with a previous partner upon release into the community and having contacted a number of other women, some who were sex workers. The respondent also appeared to have accessed fetish websites. This information indicated to Dr Timmins that the respondent was relatively sexually preoccupied in the time he was in the community. This was a matter of concern to Dr Timmins. [37] Dr Timmins noted some more positive aspects of the respondent’s time in the community: that although he has a history of use of various substances from his early teenage years, and apart from using Suboxone obtained dishonestly soon after release, he did not return to illicit substance use; that he did not reoffend sexually, although he threatened to rape others leading to his re-incarceration. [38] Dr Timmins expressed her final opinion as follows: “In summary, I am of the opinion that Mr Musso’s risk of sexual reoffending is HIGH if released into the community without a supervision order in place. He is at moderate to high risk of reoffending violently and of returning to substance use on release which will further elevate his risk. Any use of substances by Mr Musso will increase the propensity to use violence, including sexual violence, and thus would raise his risk of offending sexually and violently. Mr Musso’s victims are likely to be anyone with whom he has a relationship with, either intimate or non-intimate and whom he perceives has wronged him somehow. If this happens to be a female, he could commit sexual violence in order to dominate, control and possibly achieve some form of retribution towards the victim. He possibly harbours some sexual deviance towards women in the form of rape fantasies. There would be physical and -- 11 of 27 -- 12 psychological coercion involved in the offending and a high degree of harm to the victim. … His deliberate self-harm behaviour is likely to be an ongoing issue. There seems to be a management plan and Mr Musso is aware he can call the ambulance to go the [sic] hospital. He does, however, need to understand the limitations in what can be done by other people and services. Despite support Mr Musso is likely to struggle to comply with the conditions of the order, either overtly contravening the order or given his tendency to be deceptive, covertly contravening which will inevitably be found out at some point. His risk may be modified by a community supervision order under the Dangerous Prisoner (Sex Offender) Act 2003. He spent six months in the community and although there was harm to himself and threats to harm others, there was no sexual offending and apart from use of some illicitly obtained Suboxone early on, he has not engaged in substance use. He would most likely fall into a Moderate risk category with a Community Supervision order in place. The Order will need to remain in place for at least 10 years.” [39] In her oral evidence in chief, Dr Timmins stated that individuals with a psychopathic personality tend to have a high risk of sexual reoffending in the community.12 The respondent’s psychopathic traits, and the ongoing issues of deceptiveness, manipulation and grandiosity resulting from those traits, make it difficult to manage his risk of sexual reoffending.13 [40] On the subject of the respondent’s self-harm, Dr Timmins said that the respondent might engage in that behaviour for different reasons. The first, arising from his personality disorder, is an attempt to manage his emotional state. The second, arising from his psychopathic traits, is the use of such behaviour to get his needs met.14 [41] Dr Timmins expressed the view that the respondent has the capacity to comply with the requirements of the supervision order for short periods, but that he has periods where his risk to himself and others, including sexual risk, escalates quite rapidly. Dr Timmins also referred to other periods where the respondent covertly tests boundaries and seeks to subvert the supervision order,15 which I understood to be an aspect of his psychopathic traits. [42] Dr Timmins then gave the following evidence:16 “What are we supposed to do with him? There is no evidence that he will comply or has the ability to comply with a supervision order?---I 12 Transcript 1-17. 13 Transcript 1-18. 14 Transcript 1-18. 15 Transcript 1-20. 16 Transcript 1-22. -- 12 of 27 -- 13 think in some regards he will continue to be difficult to manage in the community. Yes?---I think this is related to his personality structure. Yes?---And when someone has such a severe personality structure and they’ve got psychopathy, unless they become aware of themselves and how they do things to – you know, make their life the way it is and start to take responsibility, then it’s not going to change. Someone with psychopathy tends not to take responsibility for themselves. So that’s a problem for Mr Musso. And I think he will just continue with these sorts of rule violations. Testing boundaries. Trying to get his needs met in very dysfunctional but risky ways. And it makes it very difficult to manage him in anything other than a very contained environment, because we are relying purely on the procedural restrictions of the order because the person doesn’t actually take responsibility and engage in what is necessary to assist themselves. So it’s the procedural security of the order at this point in time. We can’t look at internal change as supporting that ongoing maturation?--- Yes. Until the maturation occurs, and that could be maybe when he’s well into his 40s, maybe longer, we are going to rely purely on the procedural restrictions of the order. Unless he goes, ‘Actually, I need to contribute. I need to start taking responsibility. I need to manage myself just as much as other people need to.’” [43] On the question of the threshold at which the respondent should, if released, be regarded as having become an unmanageable risk in the community, Dr Timmins said this:17 “If his Honour releases Mr Musso to the community, should it be a high or a low bar to returning him to custody, and for what sort of things?---I think that there needs to be a reasonably low bar. He’s demonstrated in the period of time in the community that he can be deceptive. That he doesn’t respect the boundaries. That he’s not really going to engage in supervision. And those sorts of things are a concern. When he escalates to overt threats and, you know, threats of sexual violence, those kinds of things, then I think that needs – that the bar needs to be enacted then.” [44] In cross-examination, Dr Timmins confirmed that her opinion that a supervision order would reduce the risk of the respondent sexually reoffending to a moderate level took into account the factors she referred to in her evidence in chief. In particular, Dr Timmins confirmed that while the evidence of Mr Tannock (referred to below) caused her some disquiet, that was disquiet in relation to the respondent’s likely future compliance with a supervision order, not disquiet as to the risk of sexual reoffending while the respondent is on such an order.18 Dr Arthur’s evidence 17 Transcript 1-23. 18 Transcript 1-26. -- 13 of 27 -- 14 [45] In his most recent report, Dr Arthur’s diagnosis of the respondent also remained unchanged from his previous reports. That diagnosis consists of: (a) severe Mixed Cluster B Personality Disorder with antisocial, narcissistic and borderline features; (b) Substance Misuse Disorder, currently in remission in a controlled environment. [46] Dr Arthur also considers it likely that the respondent suffers from chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from developmental trauma and that he fulfils the criteria for a Psychopathic Personality. [47] Dr Arthur noted that, during his time in the community, the respondent displayed ample evidence of disturbed attachments and use of violent threats to establish dominance over his environment and various people in it. He considered that the respondent’s contraventions of the supervision order reflected his high levels of impulsivity, lack of consequential thinking and poor emotional regulation. He referred to the respondent reacting with extreme anger and threats of violence when faced with perceived rejection or withdrawal of support. Dr Arthur described the respondent as remaining highly motivated to seek out relationships which caused Dr Arthur to suspect the respondent has a high level of ongoing sexual preoccupation. For those reasons, Dr Arthur concluded that the respondent’s unmodified risk of sexual recidivism remains high. [48] As to that nature of that risk, Dr Arthur stated: “Were prisoner Musso to reoffend, it would most likely be in the context of an intimate relationship, although potential victims might include other women within his sphere of influence. Triggered by conflict or perceived/actual rejection, he is likely to become emotionally aroused and aggressive. If the conflict has sexual undertones, he may become sexually violent as a way of re- establishing his control over the victim or as a form of punishment. Another trigger may be experiencing conflicting emotions about a woman, particularly if there is ambiguity in the relationship. If his sexual advances are not reciprocated, he may react violently out of shame or anger. It is difficult to predict the imminence of such violence on release but a return to substance abuse or evidence of heightened conflict within relationships would increase this risk significantly.” [49] On the question of the effectiveness of a supervision order, Dr Arthur said as follows: “Despite the contraventions of his supervision order, prisoner Musso did not sexually reoffend whilst in the community, although I acknowledge that he was given little opportunity to do so. I believe that the supervision order acted to identify high risk factors and behaviours in a timely manner and allowed Community Corrections to respond quickly to manage his risk. To his credit, whilst prisoner Musso did engage in verbally aggressive and threatening behaviours, this did not translate into any physical aggression or assaults. -- 14 of 27 -- 15 It is disappointing but not entirely unexpected that he has returned to his previous suite of maladaptive behaviours in custody, although as far as I can tell this has not resulted in any further offences of violence and continues to consist largely of instrumental deliberate self-harm. Whilst prisoner Musso’s personality pathology is still much in evidence, there is some indication of a slow improvement in his levels of self-regulation and attitudes. I believe that with the strict application of the current supervision order, his risk of sexual recidivism would be reduced to ‘below average’, or low- moderate, predominantly via the mechanism of ensuring abstinence from drugs of abuse and limiting victim access.” [50] Dr Arthur also referred to QCS’ limited capacity to facilitate the respondent’s engagement with Community Mental Health Services and expressed concern that the respondent was not provided with any assertive psychiatric management while he was in the community. Dr Arthur agreed with the opinion of Dr Andrews, the respondent’s treating psychologist, about the need for not only psychiatric oversight of the respondent’s medication regime, but also the provision of a treating psychiatrist as an alternative to him seeking out hospital admissions via confrontational deliberate self-harm. [51] In his oral evidence in chief, Dr Arthur stated that it is the procedural security offered by a supervision order that reduces the respondent’s risk of sexual reoffending from high to below average. He went on to accept the proposition that if the supervision order fails, the risk of sexual reoffending returns to a high level and is unacceptable.19 [52] On the question whether the respondent has the capacity to comply with the requirements of his supervision order, Dr Arthur said as follows: “Does Mr Musso have the capacity to comply with the requirements of his supervision order? --- I think that he – he does. I think that – I think, as Dr Timmins pointed out, in times of high emotional arousal or in times of high distress or when his personality disordered coping strategies are active he may not, and what we see – and that’s what we see in people with severe personality disorders. Once their ability to rationalise and deal with things in an emotionally – I won’t say neutral manner, but in a manner allowing them to think about, ‘What am I doing? What are the consequences? What are the outcomes? Do I want those outcomes?’ When people become overwhelmed with emotion they stop doing that, and so then they go, you can say, on autopilot or they regress to their basic coping strategies, which in the case of Mr Musso tend to be acting out behaviours, self-harm, threatening behaviour aggressive or just plain ‘do what I want’ behaviour. So most of the time, if he can be emotionally contained and – he can comply. But in those cases where emotional containment fails, then I think he does lose that capacity for consequential thinking and self-regulation and then he probably doesn’t have the capacity.” 19 Transcript 1-30. -- 15 of 27 -- 16 [53] Dr Arthur was also asked for his opinion as to the threshold or bar past which QCS should consider a return to custody: “And emotional regulation. What sort of low bar and what sort of behaviours should provoke QCS to consider a return to custody?---Look, I think we have to consider this from both the psychopathy side and the personality disorder side. Yes?---So the personality disorder side is that when Prisoner Musso becomes upset, he becomes dysregulated, his behaviour deteriorates. That – that’s hard to control initially, because that’s not something he necessarily has control over. From the psychopathic side, he does have control over these things. He has choices that he makes in order to get an outcome. So I think that we need to set the bar low for those behaviours that are primarily related to his psychopathic personality, and they would be things like threatening, making threats towards other people, certainly acts of violence. So sometimes Prisoner Musso’s self-harm has been – he self-harms when he seeks help, other times it’s been challenging or confrontational in that he self-harms in a way that distresses other people, and I think that that’s part of the reason he does it is in order to generate distress in others. So that type of self-harm, that’s – that should not be tolerated and I think violence should not be tolerated and I think that the rejection of supervision that’s been outlined, the deceptive behaviours and, you know, the undermining behaviours or the subversive behaviours shouldn’t be tolerated, I think, because once he engages in that behaviour, that’s very much his psychopathic personality attempting to manipulate and control the environment, and I think that that means that he’s – if you want to use the term – he’s going underground. He is not – he’s not being honest with people, he’s not telling them what his motivations or his intentions are, and that means that QCS then can’t monitor what he’s doing and why he’s doing it. So I think there are indicators and there should be a low bar for those behaviours. I think the deliberate self-harm will continue and I don’t think that QCS should be sending him back to custody for deliberate self-harm, as - - - Well, that’s more off to hospital?---That’s – that’s right, and as Dr – as Dr Timmins pointed out, there’s a management plan in place. He is able to seek help, he is able to seek appropriate help for his – you know, for that problem, and as long as he continues to do that, I think that’s not a reason for sending him back to custody, but definitely an escalation in violence, and in situations like when he – before he was returned to custody, angry, threatening, threatening harm to others, threatening harm to himself, absconding from the precinct, all of those things are dangerous. Yes?---And all of those things – not – and not just about his emotional dysregulation, but also about his manipulative behaviour.” [54] In cross-examination, Dr Arthur stated that the risk of the respondent contravening the supervision order is high. He did not accept the proposition that his assessment of the risk of sexual reoffending under a supervision order, namely that a supervision order would reduce the risk of the respondent returning to serious sexual offending -- 16 of 27 -- 17 was below average or low moderate, had regard to that risk of the respondent not complying with the supervision order. To the contrary, Dr Arthur’s evidence was that his assessment of the risk of a return to serious sexual reoffending under the supervision order assumed that the respondent would comply with the order. He went on to explain that his assessment of the risk under the supervision order was based on an assumption that QCS is able to prevent the respondent using illicit drugs and minimise his access to potential victims. [55] Dr Arthur’s report includes a summary of relevant matters conveyed by the respondent during his interview for the purposes of Dr Arthur’s most recent assessment. In the course of that interview, the respondent expressed disappointment about the lack of support he received from Community Mental Health Services following his release under the supervision order. The respondent was aware that the HROMU had attempted to facilitate referrals to the Community Mental Health Services on a number of occasions but the service had consistently refused to accept him as a client. The respondent had expected that Community Mental Health Services would have been part of his treatment on his release from custody and was angered by their rejection of him. [56] The importance the respondent places on access to Community Mental Health Services was also evident in responses he provided to Dr Arthur about his future plans. When he was asked what would be different if he was returned to the Wacol precinct under supervision the respondent stated that he is a lot more receptive to help and can sometimes take responsibility, but that he needs the assistance of the mental health services. When he was asked how he felt he would cope with returning to the Wacol precinct, the respondent said he would be fine with it as long as he receives help with his mental health and acknowledged that he is a danger if he is not medicated or in therapy. The respondent claimed to be motivated to remain in the community, in part due to his disappointment with the medical and psychiatric treatment he had received following his return to custody in January 2022. Mr Tannock’s evidence [57] The Attorney-General also led evidence at the hearing from Bruce Tannock, the Manager of Operations at the HROMU with QCS. In that position, Mr Tannock’s role is to manage the South East Queensland district office for the HROMU which is responsible for the management of offenders released to supervision orders under the Act. This involves managing a team of staff and supervisors and working with field staff in connection with the management of individuals subject to such orders. Mr Tannock had direct oversight of management of the respondent in the period from his release to supervision in August 2021 to his subsequent arrest and return to custody in January 2022. [58] In his affidavit, Mr Tannock gave evidence of the restrictions imposed on the respondent during his release including the stage 1 curfew which the respondent was required to comply with during the entire period of his release. This is a 24-hour curfew which confines the person subject to supervision to their premises with passes being given for access to essential services. Mr Tannock noted that, despite the restrictive nature of the supervision order and the stage 1 curfew, the respondent was still able to contravene the requirements of the order in the manner set out in [20] above. -- 17 of 27 -- 18 [59] Mr Tannock also referred to the limits of the management and supervisory capacity of the HROMU and particularly noted that, unlike the position in a custodial setting, QCS community staff do not have the training or powers of control and restraint that might be required in the event the respondent’s behaviour escalates. [60] In his oral evidence in chief, Mr Tannock gave evidence that the respondent breached the conditions of his supervision order regularly and with covert subversion of the supervision strategies employed by the HROMU. He referred to limitations on the effectiveness of supervision. Despite restrictive management during his entire period of release on supervision, including electronic monitoring and curfew restrictions to control his movement within the community, the respondent demonstrated systematic regular attempts to circumvent supervision, to be deceptive and, ultimately, engaged in behaviours that indicated increased risks that were difficult for HROMU to manage.20 [61] Mr Tannock stated that the HROMU attempted to work with the respondent during the initial phase of his release and engaged with Dr Andrews in relation to safety planning and strategies to assist with his reintegration into the community. He said that despite ongoing patterns of contravening behaviour HROMU continued to try and work with the respondent to curb those behaviours through strategies such as issuing notices of contravention.21 [62] These efforts did not lead the respondent to alter his contravening behaviour. As a result, the HROMU progressed through a series of escalating measures from issuing notices of contravention, followed by administrative sanctions, followed by charges under s 43AA of the Act, followed by the issue of the warrant for the respondent’s arrest under s 20 of the Act and the commencement of the present application.22 [63] Mr Tannock’s evidence was that when the respondent was first found to be in possession of numerous technological devices which he was using to communicate, search pornography, access social media and communicate with women he might have been in relationships with, the HROMU had the devices seized by the QPS and the respondent was charged by the QPS for contravention of the supervision order under s 43AA of the Act. Mr Tannock explained that HROMU seeks the assistance of the QPS to lay charges under s 43AA for those matters which are not technical breaches of the supervision order, in that they raise concerns around elevation in risk, but are not at the level that the HROMU considers there is an imminent or an unmanageable risk.23 [64] Again, this did not dissuade the respondent. Soon after the devices were seized the respondent obtained further devices to continue the same behaviour. This was followed by the escalating contraventions in January 2022 which involved the HROMU’s staff dealing with direct threats to them, threats by the respondent to slit his throat in front of them, the respondent breaching curfew by walking off the Wacol precinct and ignoring directions to return. Mr Tannock described this as plain disregard for any of the levers available to the HROMU in managing risk to the 20 Transcript 1-4 to 1-5. 21 Transcript 1-5. 22 Transcript 1-5 to 1-6. 23 Transcript 1-6. -- 18 of 27 -- 19 community. It was these escalating contraventions which ultimately resulted in the respondent’s return to custody under a s 20 warrant.24 [65] Mr Tannock gave evidence as to the type of factors that would arise upon any consideration about the respondent’s progression from a stage 1 curfew to stage 2 and beyond if he is to be released, explaining that this would require not only that the respondent comply with the conditions of his supervision order but that he demonstrate a willingness to want to work with the HROMU towards reintegration into the community and an understanding of how to self-manage the risks leading to the potential commission of a serious sexual offence.25 [66] Ultimately, Mr Tannock expressed two concerns as to whether supervision by the HROMU can reasonably and practicably manage the risk of the respondent sexually reoffending. The first was a concern for the safety and well-being of the HROMU’s staff as a consequence of exposure to behaviours such as the escalated contraventions on 21 and 24 January 2022. The second was that the respondent’s demonstrated subversive behaviour in obtaining technological devices or using illicit substances, irrespective of sanctions that are put in place by the HROMU, and the time that behaviour might go unchecked raises concern as to whether supervision can reasonably and practicably manage the risk that the respondent will sexually reoffend. As to this second concern, Mr Tannock went on to explain that rejection of supervision which is very calculated and behaviours that are manipulative and directed to undermining supervision become problematic for the HROMU because that form of rejection of supervision raises unknown risks which are very difficult for the HROMU to identify, monitor and control.26 [67] In cross-examination, Mr Tannock accepted that the respondent’s contraventions of the supervision order were detected within a period of weeks or months.27 He also indicated that, if the respondent were to be released to supervision on this application, a failure to comply with the requirements of the supervision order would result in a more rapid escalation through the levels of sanction than occurred during his earlier release. That is, based on the HROMU’s experience during the respondent’s earlier release, Mr Tannock would have a lower threshold in future for contraventions which bear upon the ongoing management of the risk of the respondent returning to serious sexual offending. In short, if the respondent engages in a similar type of deception and attempted subversion of the supervision order or engages in threatening or intimidating behaviour in future he would be likely to be returned to custody more quickly.28 The parties’ respective positions [68] In this case, the Attorney-General has applied in the alternative for: (a) the recission of the existing supervision order and an order that the respondent be detained in custody for an indefinite term for care, control or treatment; or 24 Transcript 1-6. 25 Transcript 1-8 to 1-9. 26 Transcript 1-10 to 1-11. 27 Transcript 1-13. 28 Transcript 1-13 to 1-14. -- 19 of 27 -- 20 (b) an order that the respondent be released subject to such amended requirements of the existing supervision order pursuant to s 22(7) of the Act as the court considers appropriate. [69] The amendment proposed by the Attorney-General, following the evidence given by Dr Timmins, involved the inclusion of an express prohibition of threats or intimidation in condition 40 of the existing supervision order. During the course of the hearing, Mr Wilson, who appeared for the respondent, confirmed that the respondent would agree to that amendment in the event he is to be released. A draft of the amended supervision order was provided. [70] The Attorney-General’s written outline of submissions states that while the application in the alternative is maintained, it is acknowledged that the evidence of Dr Arthur and Dr Timmins supports a finding that the adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the respondent’s release from custody on the amended supervision order. [71] However, Mr Tate, who appeared for the Attorney-General, went on to say in his oral submissions that findings that the adequate protection of the community cannot be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order, or that the requirements under s 16 of the Act cannot be reasonably and practicably managed by QCS, are open on the evidence. [72] The respondent did not dispute that his personality disorder means there is a risk that he will contravene the requirements of a supervision order if he is released into the community again. However, the respondent’s ultimate submission was that the relevant test involved only the question whether there is an unacceptable risk that he will return to serious sexual offending if he is released on an amended supervision order. Mr Wilson submitted that the evidence was all one way on that question, to the effect that the specific risk of serious sexual offending would not be unacceptable if the respondent was supervised in the community and, therefore, that the adequate protection of the community can be ensured by an amended supervision order. What order should be made? [73] Having regard to the statutory scheme discussed in [26] to [32] above, I accept that the respondent’s submission correctly states the ultimate question. [74] The respondent accepted that, in addressing that question, I am compelled to consider the anterior questions whether the adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order, and whether the requirements under s 16 of the Act can be reasonably and practicably managed by QCS. However, as I understood the argument, Mr Wilson submitted that evidence about the risk of the respondent failing to comply with the amended supervision order if he is released and the concern expressed by Mr Tannock about the limits of the management and supervisory capacity of the HROMU under an amended supervision order should not alter the conclusion submitted for in [72] above. [75] Where, as discussed above at [28] above, the term “the adequate protection of the community” as it appears in s 22 bears the same meaning as it bears in s 13 of the Act, the assessment to be made under s 22 of the Act requires the same consideration whether adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably -- 20 of 27 -- 21 managed by a supervision order as was described in Turnbull v Attorney-General (Qld).29 That is, in order to be satisfied to the required standard that, despite the respondent’s contraventions, the adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the amended supervision order, I must reach a positive conclusion that the amended supervision order will provide the adequate protection. [76] The psychiatric evidence I have referred to above emphasises the importance of ensuring the respondent’s abstinence from illicit drug use and limiting his access to victims in reducing the risk that he will return to serious sexual offending. I therefore regard the risk that the respondent will contravene the amended supervision order in a similar manner in the future, by engaging in illicit drug use or by using deception to obtain technological devices for the purpose of contacting and forming relationships with women or accessing fetish websites, or by threatening violence to others, as relevant to the protection of the community from the commission by the respondent of a “serious sexual offence”. [77] Telling against a conclusion that the amended supervision order will provide the adequate protection is the evidence of the psychiatrists concerning the limits on the respondent’s capacity to comply with the amended supervision order and the likelihood that he will continue to contravene in similar ways in the future, as well as the evidence of Mr Tannock concerning the limits of the management and supervisory capacity of the HROMU and the effect the respondent’s rejection of supervision is likely to have in raising unknown risks which are very difficult for the HROMU to identify, monitor and control. [78] In favour of the respondent’s submission is the evidence that the supervision order operated as it was intended to during the respondent’s prior release in that the HROMU was able to detect the respondent’s contraventions and take appropriate action to manage the risk so that, notwithstanding his repeated contravention of the supervision order, the respondent did not sexually reoffend. The heightened focus of the HROMU on the respondent’s compliance in future and the lower tolerance for any contravention which raises the risk of sexual reoffending is also significant. [79] Weighing these competing factors, I find on the balance of probabilities that the amended supervision order will enable the HROMU to prevent the respondent using illicit drugs and minimise his access to potential victims so as to reduce the risk of the respondent returning to serious sexual reoffending to the levels set out in the reports of Dr Timmins and Dr Arthur. That is to say, I have reached the positive conclusion that the amended supervision order will provide the adequate protection of the community. I make this finding on the basis that the HROMU will act upon any future contravention which raises the risk of sexual reoffending in the manner described by Mr Tannock in his evidence. [80] It follows that the respondent has satisfied me, on the balance of probabilities, that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contravention of the existing order, be ensured by the amended supervision order. [81] It is important that the respondent recognise the limits of the support he will be provided upon his release under the amended supervision order, particularly in the area of his mental health treatment. 29 [2015] QCA 54 at [36]. -- 21 of 27 -- 22 [82] I referred above to the respondent’s previous reaction to the refusal of Community Mental Health Services to accept him as a client. Both Dr Timmins and Dr Arthur noted that the respondent would benefit from psychiatric treatment, in addition to continuing his therapeutic relationship with Dr Andrews. Dr Andrews expressed a similar view. I accept that evidence and encourage both the HROMU and Community Mental Health Services to seek to facilitate such treatment. [83] Having said that, it is apparent from the material that the HROMU previously sought to facilitate the respondent’s referral to Community Mental Health Services but that the admission requirements of that service did not permit the acceptance of the respondent as a client. It may be that nothing said by this court or the HROMU in future can alter that position. The respondent should be prepared for that outcome. Conclusion [84] For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the adequate protection of the community can, despite the contraventions of the existing supervision order, be ensured by that existing order, as amended in the form set out in the Schedule. [85] I order that: (a) the supervision order made by Wilson J on 20 August 2021 be amended in the form set out in the Schedule to these reasons; and (b) the respondent be released from custody subject to the requirements of that amended supervision order until 23 August 2031. -- 22 of 27 -- 23 SCHEDULE The court orders that Filippo James Musso be released from prison and must follow the rules in this supervision order for 10 years, until 23 August 2031. To Filippo James Musso: [1] You are being released from prison but only if you obey the rules in this supervision order. [2] If you break any of the rules in this supervision order, the police or Queensland Corrective Services have the power to arrest you. Then the court might order that you go back to prison. [3] You must obey these rules for the next 10 years. Reporting [4] On the day you are released from prison, you must report before 4 pm to a corrective services officer at the Community Corrections office closest to where you will live. You must tell the corrective services officer your name and the address where you will live. [5] A corrective services officer will tell you the times and dates when you must report to them. You must report to them at the times they tell you to report. A corrective services officer might visit you at your home. You must let the corrective services officer come into your house. To “report” means to visit a corrective services officer and talk to them face to face. Supervision [6] A corrective services officer will supervise you until this order is finished. This means you must obey any reasonable direction that a corrective services officer gives you about: (a) where you are allowed to live; and (b) rehabilitation, care or treatment programs; and (c) using drugs and alcohol; and (d) anything else, except for instructions that mean you will break the rules in this supervision order. A “reasonable direction” is an instruction about what you must do, or what you must not do, that is reasonable in that situation. If you are not sure about a direction, you can ask a corrective services officer for more information, or talk to your lawyer about it. -- 23 of 27 -- 24 [7] You must answer and tell the truth if a corrective services officer asks you about where you are, what you have been doing or what you are planning to do, and who you are spending time with. [8] If you change your name, where you live or any employment, you must tell a corrective services officer at least two business days before the change will happen. A “business day” is a week day (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) that is not a public holiday. No offences [9] You must not break the law by committing a sexual offence. [10] You must not break the law by committing an indictable offence. Where you must live [11] You must live at a place approved by a corrective services officer. You must obey any rules that are made about people who live there. [12] You must not live at another place. If you want to live at another place, you must tell a corrective services officer the address of the place you want to live. The corrective services officer will decide if you are allowed to live at that place. You are allowed to change the place you live only when you get written permission from a corrective services officer to live at another place. This also means you must get written permission from a corrective service officer before you are allowed to stay overnight, or for a few days, or for a few weeks, at another place. [13] You must not leave Queensland. If you want to leave Queensland, you must ask for written permission from a corrective services officer. You are allowed to leave Queensland only after you get written permission from a corrective services officer. Curfew direction [14] A corrective services officer has power to tell you to stay at a place (for example, the place you live) at particular times. This is called a curfew direction. You must obey a curfew direction. Monitoring direction [15] A corrective services officer has power to tell you to: (a) wear a device that tracks your location; and (b) let them install a device or equipment at the place you live. This will monitor if you are there. This is called a monitoring direction. You must obey a monitoring direction. Employment or study -- 24 of 27 -- 25 [16] You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to start a job, start studying or start volunteer work. [17] When you ask for permission, you must tell the corrective services officer these things: (a) what the job is; (b) who you will work for; (c) what hours you will work each day; (d) the place or places where you will work; and (e) (if it is study) where you want to study and what you want to study. [18] If a corrective services officer tells you to stop working or studying you must obey what they tell you. Motor vehicles [19] You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, colour and registration number) about any vehicle you own, borrow or hire. You must tell the corrective services officer these details immediately (on the same day) you get the vehicle. A vehicle includes a car, motorbike, ute or truck. Mobile phone [20] You are only allowed to own or have (even if you do not own it) one mobile phone. You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, phone number and service provider) about any mobile phone you own or have within 24 hours of when you get the phone. [21] You must give a corrective services officer all passwords and passcodes for any mobile phone you own or have. You must let a corrective services officer look at the phone and everything on the phone. Computers and internet [22] You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to use a computer, phone or other device to access the internet. [23] You must give a corrective services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a corrective services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. [24] You must give a corrective services officer details (including user names and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things. -- 25 of 27 -- 26 No contact with any victim [25] You must not contact or try to contact any victim(s) of a sexual offence committed by you. You must not ask someone else to do this for you. “Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting. You must not do any of these things in person, by telephone, computer, social media or in any other way. Rules about alcohol and drugs [26] You are not allowed to take (for example, drink, swallow, eat, inject, or sniff) any alcohol. You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any alcohol. [27] You are not allowed to take (for example, swallow, eat, inject, smoke or sniff) any illegal drugs. You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any illegal drugs. [28] A corrective services officer has the power to tell you to take a drug test or alcohol test. You must take the drug test or alcohol test when they tell you to. You must give them some of your breath or pee (urine) when they tell you to do this. [29] You are not allowed to visit any business that is licensed to supply or serve alcohol. If you want to go to one of these places, you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer. If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to go. Rules about medicine [30] You must tell a corrective services officer about any medicine that a doctor prescribes (tells you to buy). You must also tell a corrective services officer about any over the counter medicine that you buy or have with you. You must do this within 24 hours of seeing the doctor or buying the medicine. [31] You must take prescribed medicine only as directed by a doctor. You must not take any medicine (other than over the counter medicine) which has not been prescribed for you by a doctor. Rules about rehabilitation and counselling [32] You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about seeing a doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or other counsellor. [33] You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about participating in any treatment or rehabilitation program. [34] You must let corrective services officers get information about you from any treatment or from any rehabilitation program. Speaking to corrective services about what you plan to do -- 26 of 27 -- 27 [35] You must talk to a corrective services officer about what you plan to do each week. A corrective services officer will tell you how and when to do this (for example, face to face or in writing). [36] You must also tell a corrective services officer the name of new persons you associate with. “Associate with” includes: spend time with, make friends with, see or speak to (including by using social media or the internet) regularly. [37] You may need to tell new contacts about your supervision order and offending history. The corrective services officer will instruct you to tell those persons and the corrective services officer may speak to them to make sure you have given them all the information. [38] You must develop a management plan with your psychologist or psychiatrist to address any risk of sexual re-offence. You must talk about this with a corrective services officer when asked. [39] You must tell your case manager of any personal relationships you have started. [40] You are not allowed to threaten, intimidate or start or show violent behaviour against anyone, except in self-defence. -- 27 of 27 --