Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Buckley (No 2) [2022] QSC 88

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Buckley (No 2) [2022] QSC 88 PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (Applicant) v JASON CHARLES BUCKLEY (Respondent) FILE NO/S: BS 13420 of 2021 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application DELIVERED ON: 18 May 2022 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 13 May 2022 JUDGE: Bowskill CJ ORDERS: The Court orders that the respondent be released from prison and must follow the rules set out in the supervision order made today, a copy of which is annexed to these reasons, for seven (7) years, until 26 April 2029. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER – GENERALLY – final hearing of an application for a division 3 order under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, following the making of an interim supervision order – consideration of the period for which the supervision order ought to have effect, and as to requirements of the order Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13A Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP [2019] QSC 77 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v KAH [2019] QSC 36 Bickle v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2015] QSC 64 COUNSEL: J B Rolls, for the applicant I A Munsie, for the respondent -- 1 of 18 -- 2 SOLICITORS: G R Cooper, Crown Solicitor, for the applicant Russo Lawyers, for the respondent [1] On 26 April 2022 I delivered my reasons for making an order that the respondent’s release from custody on 26 April 2022 be supervised under the terms of an interim supervision order: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Buckley [2022] QSC 64. [2] The application for a division 3 order came on for final hearing on 13 May 2022. At that hearing, counsel for the respondent indicated that the respondent does not contest that the threshold for the making of a division 3 order has been met – namely, that the court can be satisfied, on the evidence, that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order, in the sense that there is an unacceptable risk that he will commit a serious sexual offence if released without a supervision order being made (s 13(1) and 13(2)(b) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003). [3] I confirm, for the reasons given on 26 April 2022, that I am satisfied of that. [4] That enlivens the discretion, under s 13(5) of the Act, to make a continuing detention order or a supervision order. [5] The applicant does not contend that the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of a continuing detention order. [6] I am satisfied, again for the reasons given on 26 April 2022, that the evidence before the court supports the exercise of the discretion in favour of making a supervision order. [7] The issues which remain for determination are: (a) for what period of time should the final supervision order have effect; and (b) whether some of the conditions in the interim supervision order ought to be varied, or removed, in the final supervision order. Period of the supervision order [8] Section 13A of the Act provides that: “13A Fixing of period of supervision order (1) If the court makes a supervision order, the order must state the period for which it is to have effect. (2) In fixing the period, the court must not have regard to whether or not the prisoner may become the subject of— (a) an application for a further supervision order; or (b) a further supervision order. (3) The period can not end before 5 years after the making of the order or the end of the prisoner’s period of imprisonment, whichever is the later.” -- 2 of 18 -- 3 [9] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DXP [2019] QSC 77 at [29] Applegarth J said: “If the Court is satisfied that adequate protection of the community can be afforded by a supervision order, then it is necessary to consider its terms and its duration. In considering the period of the order, the Court makes a current assessment of future risks and asks: when will the respondent reach a point at which he is an acceptable risk without a supervision order? The assessment of when a risk will be acceptable or unacceptable is for the Court, not the psychiatrists. However, the opinions of psychiatrists concerning risk and matters within their professional expertise assist the Court in determining the issue for its decision.” (emphasis added) [10] Earlier, in Bickle v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2015] QSC 64, Applegarth J had said, at [37]: “Section 13A(1) requires the Court, in making a supervision order, to state the period for which it is to have effect. But the period that is stated in the order is, at best, an informed prediction by the Court about the period that the person is likely to remain a serious danger to the community in the absence of a Division 3 order…” (emphasis added) [11] In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v KAH [2019] QSC 36, Davis J observed that, despite s 13A(2), the determination of the appropriate duration of the order ought to take into account the statutory scheme, including that the duration of the supervision order may be extended in the event of contravention (see [71]-[72]). [12] In deciding whether to make a supervision order, or a continuing detention order, the paramount consideration is the need to ensure adequate protection of the community. [13] It is important that meaning be given to the word “adequate” in this context.1 The making of a supervision order is not about trying to achieve a guarantee that the risk posed by the respondent will not eventuate. That would not be possible. If that was the aim, supervision orders would never be made.2 The focus is upon the imposition of conditions – and I include within that, the duration that those conditions will be in place for – that will ameliorate, to an acceptable level, the risk posed – such that it can be said “adequate protection of the community” is ensured. The assessment of the measure that will ensure adequate protection of the community involves an equation with two factors: the likelihood of the risk eventuating and the consequences if it does.3 [14] In this case, there is evidence before the court from three psychiatrists, Dr Timmins, who prepared a report in advance of the present application being filed, and Dr Arthur and Dr Phillips, who prepared reports following the preliminary hearing and order made under s 8 of the Act. 1 Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2020] QSC 73 at [22]-[23]. 2 Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396 at [39]. 3 Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2011] QCA 347 at [90]; see also Attorney-General (Qld) v Beattie [2007] QCA 96 at [19]. -- 3 of 18 -- 4 [15] I have already referred in detail to the evidence of the three psychiatrists contained in their reports, in my reasons for making an interim supervision order. [16] For present purposes, I reiterate only parts of that evidence, and refer to their further oral evidence given at the final hearing. [17] In her report, Dr Timmins expressed the opinion that the respondent poses a high risk of sexual reoffending if released into the community unsupervised. Given the articulation of risk, that is a high risk, at its worst, of violent rape, with a high risk of harm to the victim (p 70). She considered that if the respondent complies with a supervision order, his risk would be reduced to moderate (p 72). She did not address the possible duration of any order. [18] In her oral evidence, Dr Timmins made one correction – to the score she had given the respondent on the Static-99R test – saying it should be 8, not 7 as appears in her report (p 67). This does not change the conclusion that the respondent is in the “well above average” or “high” risk of reoffending; nor did it alter any of Dr Timmins’ opinions. [19] Dr Timmins said it was difficult to predict when the respondent would no longer require a supervision order. Her opinion, at the final hearing, was that it was “somewhere between five and ten years”, taking into account the respondent’s history of sexual offences, including voyeuristic activities from a young age; the suggestion of some sexual deviances in his history; his difficult personality; previous alcohol abuse problem; lengthy time in custody; level of risk posed; and the potential for harm if he did reoffend – which she considered “all point towards someone who needs a longer order than a short order”.4 [20] Dr Arthur also made the same correction to his report, to change the score of 7 on the Static-99R to 8 (p 77). Incidentally, that is the same score (8) that Dr Phillips had already arrived at. He also said that this correction did not affect his overall opinion. Both Dr Arthur and Dr Timmins explained that the higher score on the Static-99R changed the “actuarial estimations of the risk of recidivism”, on the basis of that instrument alone – so a person with a score of 8 has a higher predicted five-year recidivism rate, than a person with a score of 7. Of course the psychiatrists’ opinions are not based only on that one instrument, but on a combination of the various instruments available to them, as well as their clinical assessment of the person concerned. [21] In his written report, Dr Arthur expressed the opinion the respondent’s unmodified risk for sexual recidivism is well above average, or high – that being, at worst, a risk of violent, sadistic rape of a woman. He said he believes that a supervision order would reduce the risk from high to “moderately low” (p 80). Dr Arthur said, in his report: “Should [the respondent] remain offence free in the community for 5 years, his risk of sexual recidivism would reduce substantially. This should be sufficient time for him to gain full benefit from psychological treatment, prove his capacity for self-regulation and develop an enduring prosocial lifestyle.” 4 T 1-54. -- 4 of 18 -- 5 [22] In his oral evidence, when asked “at what point in the future do you think that Mr Buckley will not require an order, if his risk would be classified as perhaps low?”, Dr Arthur said: “There’s always a difficult question to answer because we’re – we’re using tools that are imperfect and we’re talking about a period of time where many things can happen. So what I said in my report is that five years, I think, is a sufficient time for somebody to gain full benefit from psychological therapy. Five years is sufficient time for somebody to re- establish themselves into the community, to re-establish relationships, support mechanisms. Five years is a sufficient time for people to prove that they can maintain abstinence from substances and to concretise gains that they’ve made in therapy. So I would say that if Mr Buckley got to five years without offending, if Mr Buckley showed positive gains in therapy, if Mr Buckley was able to – to form those support networks, to show adaptive changes to his coping strategies, I think that that would be a point where I would say his risk is probably average. And by average I mean the same as other sex offenders – other male sex offenders.” [23] Dr Arthur did not go as far as saying that the risk would be “low” at that point.5 [24] Dr Arthur accepted, in cross-examination, that he had said the following in conference with the applicant’s legal representatives prior to the earlier hearing, in answer to the question “why five years?”, and that it reflects his opinion: “Tough call. He has done every program and everything asked of him and his behaviour has modified and not driven by sexual deviance. The reality, if this guy can stay clean for five years and follow the rules, he will be 55 years when the order finishes, where statistically the risk of rape goes down. Five years of no drinking and development [of] pro- social networks. And if he does, he will be well on the road to being a low risk. Couldn’t justify 10 years. If he is going to breach the order, it will be known. He will stuff up and get a sense of if he is developing self-regulation.” [25] Dr Arthur also agreed that he had said if the respondent could be on the order for five years without a breach, he would no longer require an order.6 [26] Dr Phillips, in her report, similarly expressed the opinion that the respondent’s risk of future sexual reoffending falls into the high range, if released without a supervision order. If released under a supervision order, she considered his risk would be in the moderate range. The risk, if it were to eventuate, could involve serious sexual offending, following the pattern of the respondent’s previous offending and could include oral, digital, vaginal or anal rape, accompanied by serious physical violence, with the potential for serious physical and psychological harm to future victims (pp 35-36). In her report, Dr Phillips expressed the opinion that “[g]iven the risk issues involved and the chronicity of his risk factors of sexual violence, it is recommended that a supervision order be for a minimum of 5 years” (p 37). 5 T 1-7. 6 T 1-28 to 1-29. -- 5 of 18 -- 6 [27] In her oral evidence, when asked about the basis of her assessment that the order should be for a minimum of 5 years, Dr Phillips said: “I think it is a minimum of five years. I think an argument could be made for a longer order. The argument for five years is similar to what we’ve just heard from Dr Arthur in that the evidence would suggest that if somebody can remain offence free in the community for a five-year period, that the risk would approximately halve during that time, and that people who are released from – the highest risk period is when – is closer to the time of release. So if he’s going to fail, it’s more likely to happen in that initial five years than later on. But there are studies, particular a 2018 study which suggests that somebody with the type of Static-99 score that Mr Buckley has, that their risks can remain elevated in the community for a longer period of time and so that could justify a longer period of a supervision order. … If somebody had a Static-99 score of seven, which is what a number of the scorers said, that their risk would reduce to the average offender level after a 10-year period. For a Static-99 of eight, which is the score that I gave during my report, it says that 13 years they would return to the average. … I’m only aware of that one study, but I do think that caution does need to be exercised in the use of studies in this area because they’re not necessarily generalisable to the actual individual person who you are seeing, because that study, my understanding, is based on a pooled data of around 8000 offenders, some of whom had treatment, some of whom didn’t. My understanding is that the studies vary between 25 and 75 per cent had treatment, but not all of them, and it doesn’t speak to the quality of the treatment that they’ve had. So Mr Buckley has had the opportunity to have extensive intervention whilst he’s been in custody in terms of the HISOP, individual forensic psychology intervention and will obviously be coming out on a – if he does come out on a supervision order, will have been under much stricter conditions than many people who were included in those studies. So I don’t think that you can necessarily directly take that study and apply it to Mr Buckley’s situation, which is why I think it’s difficult to answer the question, ‘Is five years enough or should it be 10 or even longer?’”7 [28] As to the question, at what point could it be said that the respondent would no longer require a supervision order, Dr Phillips said: “I think it is a difficult question to answer and I think that if he were [to] remain in the community on a supervision order, offence free, for the five years, having adequately engaged in a SOMP, individual and psychological intervention, remained abstinent, established himself in the community with supports, at – by the five-year mark, I think that that would be a – reasonable for him to be able to manage in the community. 7 T 1-40. -- 6 of 18 -- 7 That of course is a matter for her Honour, whether – how long – I don’t think I can answer it more than I have.”8 [29] I observe that there seems to be a tendency, amongst all the psychiatrists, to jump from five years to 10 years, which in turn seems to be because of the actuarial estimations. However, there is a range of possible, appropriate durations for any supervision order, which may be more nuanced than this suggests. [30] Dr Phillips, like Dr Timmins, also made the point that one of the difficult things in this respondent’s case is that he has spent a long time in custody and, whilst he has engaged in a lot of intervention, which is positive, “we really don’t know how he’s going to respond to supervision in the community, how he’s going to cope with the stressor of having come out of custody after such a long period of time, and how well he will be able to manage in the community”.9 [31] Taking into account: (a) the consistent evidence from the three psychiatrists, as to the level of (unmodified) risk posed by the respondent, being well above average or high, and the nature of the risk if that were to eventuate – which is, potentially, of a violent rape causing serious physical and psychological harm to the victim; (b) the evidence of Dr Phillips and Dr Timmins, that this risk would be reduced to moderate, if released under the strictures of a supervision order; with Dr Arthur considering it may reduce to moderately low – and that a moderate risk of the kind posed by the respondent is still a very serious concern; (c) the opinion expressed, in particular by Dr Phillips and Dr Timmins, as to the difficulty of predicting what the position would be after five years, and their tendency towards a view that something more than five years may be more appropriate in the case of the respondent, given all the factors they have each referred to. I acknowledge Dr Arthur’s opinion, which would support a duration of five years, but have been persuaded by the evidence of Dr Phillips in particular, supported as that is by Dr Timmins, that longer than five years is appropriate in this case; and (d) the legal principles referred to above, including that by s 13A(2) I am not to have regard to whether the respondent may become subject of a further supervision order, but that does not mean the statutory context is irrelevant, including the potential for extension of the operation of the order in the event of a contravention, I consider the duration of the order ought to be slightly longer than five years, although the evidence does not support as long as 10 years. I propose to order that the respondent be subject to the order for seven years. I am not persuaded that five years is sufficient to ensure adequate protection for the community, which is the paramount consideration. [32] The final supervision order will commence from the date the order is made (see s 15(a) of the Act). However, as the respondent has already been released from custody, and subject to an interim supervision order since 26 April 2022, the final order made today will be for seven (7) years, until 26 April 2029. 8 T 1-42. 9 T 1-43. -- 7 of 18 -- 8 Conditions of the supervision order [33] The respondent accepts most of the proposed conditions of the final supervision order, which reflect the interim order, but sought to challenge some of them, for reasons outlined in his affidavit filed on 9 May 2022.10 [34] After hearing evidence from the psychiatrists about those matters, counsel for the respondent did not press all the respondent’s contentions in that respect. Those contested conditions which are no longer challenged are: (a) Conditions 16-18, to the extent they require the respondent to get written permission from a corrective services officer before he is allowed to start a job (paid or voluntary) or study. The consistent evidence of the psychiatrists was that these conditions are necessary for the supervision of the respondent upon his release from custody, because they enable corrective services to consider the type of work that the respondent wishes to engage in and ensure that it is appropriate and will not place the community at risk. (b) Condition 29, which prohibits the respondent from going to pubs, clubs, hotels, bottle shops or nightclubs which are licensed to supply or serve alcohol. The respondent’s challenge to this was on the basis that it would prohibit him from going to a café or restaurant, if such a place happened to be licensed. I expressed the view at the hearing that clause 29 is drafted specifically so that it does not extend to a café or restaurant that happens to be licensed. Counsel for the applicant confirmed that understanding. On that basis, the challenge was not pressed. (c) Clause 37, requiring disclosure of any type of pornographic material that the respondent is viewing. All the psychiatrists were consistent in their opinion that this is an important condition. The objection was no longer pressed after hearing the evidence. [35] The matters that remain to be determined are as follows. [36] Clauses 22-24, dealing with “computers and internet”: (a) Clauses 22-24 provide: 22. You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to use a computer, phone or other device to access the internet. 23. You must give a corrective services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a corrective services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. 24. You must give a corrective services officer details (including user names and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You 10 The numbering of the conditions, in the discussion that follows, is that which appears in the interim order, annexed to the reasons published on 26 April 2022. -- 8 of 18 -- 9 must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things. (b) It was apparent from the consistent evidence of the psychiatrists that the importance of this, in the respondent’s case, is the ability of corrective services staff to monitor the respondent’s use of the internet. This is not a case in which there is any reason to prevent the respondent from having access to the internet; rather it is the ability to monitor his use of it, so that any evidence of sexual preoccupation, deviant sexual interest or the use of sex as coping can be detected at an early stage. The respondent’s particular concern with this is the prospect that corrective services would not give him permission to use a phone, for example, to speak to his parents using a video call; or that if he were required to use a computer or phone in the course of employment, that there might be a difficulty from an employer’s perspective in providing access codes or passwords to corrective services staff. (c) Given that the evidence is that there is no reason why the respondent should be prevented from using a computer, phone or other device to access the internet, but that what is required is the ability to carefully monitor his use, these conditions will be reworded as follows: 22. You must disclose any device, including computers, phones or other devices, you use to access the internet within 24 hours of getting the device get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to use a computer, phone or other device to access the internet. If you do not follow these rules, a corrective services officer may stop you from using the computer, phone or other device to access the internet. 23. You must give a corrective services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a corrective services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. 24. You must give a corrective services officer details (including user names and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things. (d) The concern raised by the respondent about employment can, in my view, be addressed by adding a condition after conditions 16-18, which is addressed in the next paragraph. [37] Clauses 16-18 (employment or study): (a) Clauses 16-18 provide: 16. You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to start a job, start studying or start volunteer work. -- 9 of 18 -- 10 17. When you ask for permission, you must tell the corrective services officer these things: (i) What the job is; (ii) Who you will work for; (iii) What hours you will work each day; (iv) The place or places where you will work; and (v) (if it is study) where you want to study and what you want to study. 18. If a corrective services officer tells you to stop working or studying you must obey what they tell you. [38] As already discussed, the respondent’s objection to the requirement to obtain permission before starting a job was not pressed, after hearing the evidence from the psychiatrists. But counsel for the respondent did maintain a concern about how the conditions (22-24) would operate, if the respondent were required to use a computer or phone, in the course of his employment. This could be addressed by adding, after clause 18, an additional condition, as follows: 19. A corrective services officer may give you a direction about how to obey the rules in requirement 24 of this supervision order (about providing passwords or access codes). [39] Clauses 35-36 – “speaking to corrective services about what you plan to do”: (a) Clauses 35-36 provide as follows: 35. You must talk to a corrective services officer about what you plan to do each week. A corrective services officer will tell you how and when to do this (for example, face to face or in writing). You must also tell a corrective services officer the name of new persons you have met. This includes: people who you spend time with, work with, make friends with, see or speak to (including by using social media or the internet) regularly. 36. You may need to tell new contacts about your supervision order and offending history. The corrective services officer will instruct you to tell those persons and the corrective services officer may speak to them to make sure you have given them all the information. (b) The concerns raised by the respondent about these conditions were, firstly, about a requirement to tell an employer about the order, as this would make it difficult to get a job; and, secondly, about whether, read literally, he would be required to disclose fleeting, one off interactions – for example, to provide the name of a person he buys a coffee from in a coffee shop. (c) As to the first matter, it is important to note that condition 36 is not a mandatory requirement that the respondent tell all new contacts about the supervision order -- 10 of 18 -- 11 and his offending history – it is couched in terms that he “may” need to do that, and that corrective services will instruct him if he does. As explained by Dr Arthur, for example, the circumstances in which a person may be instructed to disclose the fact of the order include where the person they are interacting with is vulnerable, or where the relationship is one of intimacy or trust. In an employment context, it may include where the person will come into contact with vulnerable people, or be required to travel, or to go to someone’s home, or work out of hours (which may be inconsistent with a curfew condition). All psychiatrists gave consistent evidence about the importance of corrective services having oversight of what the respondent plans to do and is doing, and the benefits of a degree of flexibility about this, in order to effectively manage the risk he poses. (d) As to the second matter, that is not the intent of the clause, and in my view that can be clarified with the addition of the words: “This does not include: momentary, fleeting, one-off interactions with people.” to the third paragraph of clause 35. (e) All three psychiatrists otherwise expressed a consistent view as to the importance of these conditions, in terms of requiring the respondent to be transparent with corrective services about what his plans are, and who he meets or engages with, so that corrective services can make an assessment as to whether that may or may not be something that increases risk, or whether it might be protective and positive. [40] Clause 39, included within “offence specific conditions”: (a) Clause 39 provides: 39. You must obtain the prior written approval of a Corrective Services officer before possessing any equipment that enables you to take photographs or record moving images. “Equipment” means any type of devices, including things like mobile phones, digital or video cameras, computers, laptops, tablets, surveillance cameras including dashboard cameras and drones. (b) The respondent submitted that this condition was not necessary, because there was no connection between his previous offending and photography. Dr Arthur thought it was relevant, because of the respondent’s history of voyeurism; although acknowledged that history did not involve using any kind of device. Dr Phillips did not consider this clause was necessary, because the respondent’s previous voyeurism did not involve the use of equipment, and she considered the remaining conditions would be adequate. Dr Timmins was of a similar view to Dr Phillips. On that basis, I consider clause 39 should be removed. The oversight provided by clauses 22 to 24 (as presently numbered in the interim order) would adequately address this matter. [41] I record that the parties were given a further opportunity to consider and comment upon the amendments to be made to these clauses and the position I have arrived at takes those comments into account. -- 11 of 18 -- 12 [42] For the foregoing reasons, I will make an order that the respondent be released from prison and must follow the rules contained in the supervision order made today, a copy of which is annexed to these reasons, for seven (7) years until 26 April 2029. -- 12 of 18 -- 13 SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND REGISTRY: Brisbane NUMBER: 13420/21 Applicant ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND AND Respondent JASON CHARLES BUCKLEY SUPERVISION ORDER Before: Bowskill CJ Date: 18 May 2022 Initiating document: Originating Application filed 12 November 2021 (CFI 1) THE COURT is satisfied that Jason Charles Buckley, is a serious danger to the community. The rules in this order are made according to the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. THE COURT ORDERS THAT Jason Charles Buckley be released from prison and must follow the rules in this supervision order for seven (7) years until 26 April 2029. TO Jason Charles Buckley: 1. You are being released from prison but only if you obey the rules in this supervision order. 2. If you break any of the rules in this supervision order, the police or Queensland Corrective Services have the power to arrest you. Then the Court might order that you go back to prison. 3. You must obey these rules for the next seven (7) years until 26 April 2029. Reporting 4. On the day you are released from prison, you must report before 4 pm to a corrective services officer at the Community Corrections office closest to where you will live. You must tell the corrective services officer your name and the address where you will live. 5. A corrective services officer will tell you the times and dates when you must report to them. You must report to them at the times they tell you to report. A corrective -- 13 of 18 -- 14 services officer might visit you at your home. You must let the corrective services officer come into your house. To “report” means to visit a corrective services officer and talk to them face to face. Supervision 6. A corrective services officer will supervise you until this order is finished. This means you must obey any reasonable direction that a corrective services officer gives you about: a) Where you are allowed to live; and b) Rehabilitation, care or treatment programs; and c) Using drugs and alcohol; and d) Who you may have contact with; and e) Anything else, except for instructions that mean you will break the rules in this supervision order. A “reasonable direction” is an instruction about what you must do, or what you must not do, that is reasonable in that situation. If you are not sure about a direction, you can ask a corrective services officer for more information, or talk to your lawyer about it. 7. You must answer and tell the truth if a corrective services officer asks you about where you are, what you have been doing or what you are planning to do, and who you are spending time with. 8. If you change your name, where you live or any employment, you must tell a corrective services officer at least two business days before the change will happen. A “business day” is a week day (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) that is not a public holiday. No offences 9. You must not break the law by committing a sexual offence. 10. You must not break the law by committing an indictable offence. Where you must live 11. You must live at a place approved by a corrective services officer. You must obey any rules that are made about people who live there. 12. You must not live at another place. If you want to live at another place, you must tell a corrective services officer the address of the place you want to live. The corrective services officer will decide if you are allowed to live at that place. You are allowed to change the place you live only when you get written permission from a corrective services officer to live at another place. -- 14 of 18 -- 15 This also means you must get written permission from a corrective service officer before you are allowed to stay overnight, or for a few days, or for a few weeks, at another place. 13. You must not leave Queensland. If you want to leave Queensland, you must ask for written permission from a corrective services officer. You are allowed to leave Queensland only after you get written permission from a corrective services officer. Curfew direction 14. A corrective services officer has power to tell you to stay at a place (for example, the place you live) at particular times. This is called a curfew direction. You must obey a curfew direction. Monitoring direction 15. A corrective services officer has power to tell you to: a) Wear a device that tracks your location; and b) Let them install a device or equipment at the place you live. This will monitor if you are there. This is called a monitoring direction. You must obey a monitoring direction. Employment or study 16. You must get written permission from a corrective services officer before you are allowed to start a job, start studying or start volunteer work. 17. When you ask for permission, you must tell the corrective services officer these things: a) What the job is; b) Who you will work for; c) What hours you will work each day; d) The place or places where you will work; and e) (if it is study) where you want to study and what you want to study. 18. If a corrective services officer tells you to stop working or studying you must obey what they tell you. 19. A corrective services officer may give you a direction about how to obey the rules in requirement 24 of this supervision order (about providing passwords or access codes). Motor vehicles 20. You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, colour and registration number) about any vehicle you own, borrow or hire. You must tell the -- 15 of 18 -- 16 corrective services officer these details immediately (on the same day) you get the vehicle. A vehicle includes a car, motorbike, ute or truck. Mobile phone 21. You are only allowed to own or have (even if you do not own it) one mobile phone. You must tell a corrective services officer the details (make, model, phone number and service provider) about any mobile phone you own or have within 24 hours of when you get the phone. 22. You must give a corrective services officer all passwords and passcodes for any mobile phones you own or have. You must let a corrective services officer look at the phone and everything on the phone. Computers and internet 23. You must disclose any device, including computers, phones, or other devices, you use to access the internet within 24 hours of getting the device. If you do not follow these rules, a corrective services officer may stop you from using the computer, phone or other device to access the internet. 24. You must give a corrective services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a corrective services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. 25. You must give a corrective services officer details (including user names and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things. No contact within any victim 26. You must not contact or try to contact any victim(s) of a sexual offence committed by you. You must not ask someone else to do this for you. “Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting. You must not do any of these things in person, by telephone, computer, social media or in any other way. Rules about alcohol and drugs 27. You are not allowed to take (for example, swallow, eat, inject, smoke or sniff) any alcohol. You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any alcohol. 28. You are not allowed to take (for example, swallow, eat, inject, smoke or sniff) any illegal drugs. You are also not allowed to have with you or be in control of any illegal drugs. -- 16 of 18 -- 17 29. A corrective services officer has the power to tell you to take a drug test or alcohol test. You must take the drug test or alcohol test when they tell you to. You must give them some of your breath, or pee (urine) when they tell you to do this. 30. You are not allowed to go to pubs, clubs, hotels, bottle shops or nightclubs which are licensed to supply or serve alcohol. If you want to go to one of these places, you must first get written permission from a corrective services officer. If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to go. Rules about medicine 31. You must tell a corrective services officer about any medicine that a doctor prescribes (tells you to buy). You must also tell a corrective services officer about any over the counter medicine that you buy or have with you. You must do this within 24 hours of seeing the doctor or buying the medicine. 32. You must take prescribed medicine only as directed by a doctor. You must not take any medicine (other than over the counter medicine) which has not been prescribed for you by a doctor. Rules about rehabilitation and counselling 33. You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about seeing a doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or other counsellor. 34. You must obey any direction a corrective services officer gives you about participating in any treatment or rehabilitation program. 35. You must let corrective services officers get information about you from any treatment or from any rehabilitation program. Speaking to corrective services about what you plan to do 36. You must talk to a corrective services officer about what you plan to do each week. A corrective services officer will tell you how and when to do this (for example, face to face or in writing). You must also tell a corrective services officer the name of new persons you have met. This includes: people who you spend time with, work with, make friends with, see or speak to (including by using social media or the internet) regularly. This does not include: momentary, fleeting one-off interactions with people. 37. You may need to tell new contacts about your supervision order and offending history. The corrective services officer will instruct you to tell those persons and the corrective services officer may speak to them to make sure you have given them all the information. -- 17 of 18 -- 18 Offence Specific Conditions 38. You must disclose and discuss with a corrective services officer any type of pornographic material that you are viewing. Your treating psychologist may provide advice regarding your disclosures. This includes pictures on a computer, photographs, movies, or magazines. 39. You must advise your case manager of any personal relationships you have started. -- 18 of 18 --