Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v SBV [2021] QSC 146

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND CITATION: Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v SBV [2021] QSC 146 PARTIES: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (applicant) v SBV (respondent) FILE NO/S: 8432 of 2015 DIVISION: Trial Division PROCEEDING: Application ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland DELIVERED ON: 17 June 2021 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 7 June 2021 JUDGE: Williams J ORDER: The order of the Court is that: 1. The interim supervision order made 7 June 2021 is rescinded. 2. The respondent be subject to a further supervision order for a period of 3 years until 17 June 2024, on the conditions set out in Annexure A. CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCE – SENTENCING ORDERS – ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS – DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER – GENERALLY – where the respondent was released in February 2016 from custody subject to a supervision order for a period of five years – where declaration pursuant to s 24(2) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (DPSO Act) that the respondent’s supervision order had been extended to June 2021 – where the applicant seeks an order pursuant to Division 4A of the DPSO Act that the respondent be made subject to a further supervision order for a period of five years – where the respondent accepts that the evidence favours the imposition of a further supervised release order – where the respondent contends that any such order would be for a period of two years – whether the respondent is a serious danger to the community -- 1 of 30 -- 2 in the absence of a further supervision order pursuant to Division 4A – whether adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the respondent’s release on the proposed further supervision order Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13, s 13A, s 17, s 19B, s 19C, s 19D, s 21A, s 24 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ [2017] QSC 302, considered Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Foy [2014] QSC 304, considered Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Kanaveilomani [2013] QCA 404, cited Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Lawrence [2009] QCA 136, cited Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Loudon [2017] QSC 146, considered Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v SBV [2021] QSC 53, considered Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sutherland [2006] QSC 268, cited COUNSEL: J Rolls for the applicant C Smith for the respondent SOLICITORS: GR Cooper, Crown Solicitor for the applicant Legal Aid Queensland for the respondent [1] This is an application for an order pursuant to Division 4A of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (DPSO Act). The applicant, the Attorney- General for the State of Queensland, is seeking an order that the respondent be made subject to a further supervision order for a period of five years. In light of the further psychiatric evidence at the hearing of the application, the applicant now accepts that the evidence supports a finding that a supervision order for a period of three years would achieve the purposes of the DPSO Act.1 [2] The respondent is subject to a supervision order made on 1 February 2016 under the DPSO Act.2 On 22 January 2021, it was declared by Davis J that pursuant to s 24(2) of the DPSO Act the respondent’s supervision order had been extended so that it expired on 11 June 2021.3 At the conclusion of the hearing on 7 June 2021 an interim supervision order was made on the same terms as the existing supervision order until 4pm on 18 June 2021. [3] The respondent accepts that the evidence favours the imposition of a further supervised release order. The respondent originally contended that any supervision order should be for a period of two years, but this was also revised to three years in light of the further psychiatric evidence at the hearing of the application. Further, the 1 T1-23.14-21. 2 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v V [2016] QSC 13 (Mullins J). 3 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v V [2021] QSC 5. -- 2 of 30 -- 3 respondent also sought some other changes to the existing supervision order, which are discussed further below. [4] Pursuant to the orders made on 19 March 2021, the respondent has undergone examinations by Dr Beech and Dr Brown and further reports have been provided for the purposes of this hearing. Background and index offences [5] The relevant background and details of the index offences were set out in the reasons published in respect of the preliminary hearing on 19 March 2021.4 For convenience, I set this out again here: “[5] The applicant is currently 50 years of age. [6] The index offences are that on 16 November 2014 the respondent was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for 26 offences of a sexual nature committed against three young boys. On 10 April 2015, the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal and reduced the sentence effectively to four years. [7] The offending occurred over a period from October 1997 to March 2001. Whilst on bail in respect of charges for this offending, the respondent was released on bail and fled Australia on 25 April 2002. A bench warrant was issued on 6 June 2002. [8] On 6 November 2003, the respondent was charged in Mexico for crimes comparable to rape, corruption of minors, and child prostitution. The offending involved three male children all under the age of 12. [9] On 29 January 2008 the respondent was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in Mexico. [10] On 13 December 2011, he was granted early release and was held in custody pending extradition to Australia on 2 February 2012. [11] Upon his return to Australia the respondent was sentenced before the District Court at Ipswich in relation to the index offences. [12] On 11 June 2014 the respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sodomy, one count of sodomy, one count of indecent treatment of a child under the age of 12, 19 counts of indecent treatment of a child under the age of 16,5 two counts of expose a child under the age of 12 to an indecent object and one count of possession of a child abuse computer game. 4 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v SBV [2021] QSC 53. 5 Including three counts of indecent film, four counts of procure to commit and two counts of expose. -- 3 of 30 -- 4 [13] The sentencing judge imposed a term of imprisonment on the respondent of seven years imprisonment for sodomy and terms of imprisonment between three to six years for the indecent treatment offences, and 12 months imprisonment for the computer game offence. All terms were to be served concurrently. [14] On 10 April 2015 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted sentences of four and three years imprisonment in respect of the six and seven year terms of imprisonment previously imposed with the terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently. [15] The respondent was due for release on 3 February 2016. [16] On 1 February 2016 Mullins J made an order releasing the respondent subject to a supervision order pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the DPSO Act. The supervision order was for a period of five years, expiring on 3 February 2021. [17] On 31 July 2017 the respondent was found to have contravened the supervision order in a number of respects including not complying with a reasonable direction of Corrective Services officers, by establishing contact with a male person under 16 without prior approval, failing to advise of any repeated contact with a male person under 16 and retaining and collecting images of children. The Chief Justice ordered that the respondent be released from custody subject to the supervision order made in 2016 with amendments. [18] On 22 January 2021, Davis J declared that pursuant to s 24(2), the respondent’s supervision order now expired on 11 June 2021. [19] In addition to the criminal history in respect of the index offences, the respondent also has a criminal history in Queensland as follows: (a) On 13 July 2017 the respondent was convicted of two counts of breaching s 43AA of the DPSO Act. He received a sentence of two months imprisonment to be suspended for a period of 12 months. These offences were the subject of a contravention proceeding. (b) On 16 April 2018 the respondent was dealt with by the Brisbane District Court in relation to an offence which occurred on 24 April 2002, being one count of indecent treatment of a child under the age of 16, which involved taking a photograph of a child under 12 years of age. The respondent was sentenced to a period of 12 months imprisonment suspended for a period of two years.” Statutory Scheme [6] Division 4A of the DPSO Act is relevant to the current application. -- 4 of 30 -- 5 [7] Pursuant to s 19B(1) of the DPSO Act, the Division applies to a “released prisoner” subject to a supervision order. The schedule defines “released prisoner” as a prisoner released under a supervision order. [8] Pursuant to sections 19B(2) and (3) of the DPSO Act, the Attorney-General may apply for a further supervision order for the released prisoner within the last six months of the effect of the current order. [9] Further, pursuant to s 19C of the DPSO Act, the application must state the period of the supervised release sought and be accompanied by any affidavit material to be relied upon by the Attorney-General. [10] Section 19D of the DPSO Act states as follows: “19D Application of provisions for division 3 orders (1) Division 1 (other than section 5(1) and (2)), division 2, section 13, section 15 and divisions 3B and 3C apply for the application and the operation of any further supervision order for the released prisoner— (a) as if a reference in the provisions to a division 3 order were a reference to a further supervision order; and (b) as if a reference in the provisions to an application for a division 3 order were a reference to an application under this division; and (c) as if a reference in the provisions to the prisoner were a reference to the released prisoner; and (d) as if a reference in the provisions to a prisoner’s release day were a reference to the day that the current order expires; and (e) as if the reference in section 5(5) to 2 business days were a reference to 7 business days; and (f) as if the psychiatrist’s assessment under section 11(2)(a) were an assessment of the level of risk that the released prisoner will, after the expiry of the current order, commit another serious sexual offence if a further supervision order is not made; and (g) as if the references in section 13(5) to the making of an order were only a reference to the making of a further supervision order for the released prisoner; and (h) as if the reference in section 16 to the ordering of release from custody were a reference to the making of a further supervision order; and (i) with other necessary changes. -- 5 of 30 -- 6 (2) If the court is satisfied the application may not be finally decided until after the current order expires, it may make an interim supervision order for the released prisoner. (3) The power under subsection (2) applies for the application instead of the power to make the orders mentioned in section 8(2)(b) or 9A(2) as applied under subsection (1).” [11] As a result of the terms of s 19D, the process to be adopted in respect of obtaining a further supervision order is a modification of the process for an original order in Divisions 1, 2 and 3 of the DPSO Act. [12] The application is an application for a “further supervision order”, that is it is the making of a new order and not an extension of an existing order. Accordingly, it is relevant to consider the requirements for making an order under Division 3 of the DPSO Act. [13] Section 13 of the DPSO Act states as follows: “13 Division 3 orders (1) This section applies if, on the hearing of an application for a division 3 order, the court is satisfied the prisoner is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a division 3 order (a serious danger to the community). (2) A prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1) if there is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence— (a) if the prisoner is released from custody; or (b) if the prisoner is released from custody without a supervision order being made. (3) On hearing the application, the court may decide that it is satisfied as required under subsection (1) only if it is satisfied— (a) by acceptable, cogent evidence; and (b) to a high degree of probability; that the evidence is of sufficient weight to justify the decision. (4) In deciding whether a prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1), the court must have regard to the following— (aa) any report produced under section 8A; (a) the reports prepared by the psychiatrists under section 11 and the extent to which the prisoner cooperated in the examinations by the psychiatrists; -- 6 of 30 -- 7 (b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological or other assessment relating to the prisoner; (c) information indicating whether or not there is a propensity on the part of the prisoner to commit serious sexual offences in the future; (d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour on the part of the prisoner; (e) efforts by the prisoner to address the cause or causes of the prisoner’s offending behaviour, including whether the prisoner participated in rehabilitation programs; (f) whether or not the prisoner’s participation in rehabilitation programs has had a positive effect on the prisoner; (g) the prisoner’s antecedents and criminal history; (h) the risk that the prisoner will commit another serious sexual offence if released into the community; (i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk; (j) any other relevant matter. (5) If the court is satisfied as required under subsection (1), the court may order— (a) that the prisoner be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment (continuing detention order); or (b) that the prisoner be released from custody subject to the requirements it considers appropriate that are stated in the order (supervision order). (6) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (5)(a) or (b)— (a) the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community; and (b) the court must consider whether— (i) adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practicably managed by a supervision order; and (ii) requirements under section 16 can be reasonably and practicably managed by corrective services officers. -- 7 of 30 -- 8 (7) The Attorney-General has the onus of proving that a prisoner is a serious danger to the community as mentioned in subsection (1).” [14] Accordingly, to make a further supervision order it is necessary to establish, by acceptable cogent evidence to a high degree of probability, that the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a supervision order. [15] Further, a prisoner is a serious danger to the community, if there is an unacceptable risk that the prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if released from custody or released without a supervision order being made (s 13(2) DPSO Act). [16] The relevant risk is the risk of commission of a serious sexual offence, that is an offence of a sexual nature involving violence or against children. [17] It is recognised by s 13(6) of the DPSO Act, that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure adequate protection of the community. An unacceptable risk is the risk which does not ensure adequate protection of the community. [18] Bowskill J in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ6 made the following comments in relation to what constitutes an “unacceptable risk”: “[12] As to what constitutes an ‘unacceptable risk’, that is ‘a matter for judicial determination, requiring a value judgment as to what risk should be accepted against the serious alternative of the deprivation of a person’s liberty’. The test is not satisfied by evidence of any risk that the released prisoner may commit a further serious sexual offence. What must be established by the Attorney-General, to the requisite standard, is an unacceptable risk, the determination of which involves a balancing of competing considerations. The notion of an unacceptable risk recognises that some risk can be acceptable consistently with the adequate protection of the community. [13] In considering whether a risk is unacceptable it is necessary to take into account, and balance, the nature of the risk and the degree of likelihood of it eventuating, with the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates … [14] As observed in Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2013) 41 VR 359 at [6]: ‘Whether a risk is unacceptable depends upon the degree of likelihood of offending and the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates. There must be a sufficient likelihood of the occurrence of the risk which, when considered in combination with the magnitude of the harm that may result and any other relevant circumstance, makes the risk unacceptable.’ [15] For present purposes, what is required is an assessment of the risk of the released prisoner committing a serious sexual 6 [2017] QSC 302. -- 8 of 30 -- 9 offence in the absence of a further supervision order. Relevantly, the object of the DPSOA is to ensure adequate protection of the community (s 3(a)). That does not mean the purpose of the legislation is to guarantee the safety and protection of the community. If that were the case, every risk would be unacceptable…” (footnotes omitted) [19] The determination as to whether the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a Division 4A order is to be made at the time that the original supervision order is due to expire and the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that a further supervision order is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community.7 [20] Section 19C of the DPSO Act requires the applicant to state the period of supervised release sought in the application. Here a further supervision order of five years duration was sought originally, but in light of the further psychiatric evidence at the hearing of the application this was revised to three years. [21] It is relevant to consider s 13A of the DPSO Act which requires the Court to state the period for which a supervision order is to have effect and provides that a supervision order must have a minimum of five years duration. However, s 13A does not apply to Division 4A orders. By virtue of s 19D, only sections 13 and 15 of Division 3 apply to Division 4A orders. Therefore, a further supervision order with a duration of a period of less than five years is open when a further supervision order is being made. [22] Further, by virtue of s 19D in considering whether adequate protection to the community can be reasonably and practically managed by a supervision order, the requirements under s 16 of the DPSO Act as to whether those requirements can be reasonably and practically managed by the Corrective Services officers are also a relevant consideration to an application for a further supervision order. [23] Pursuant to s 17 of the DPSO Act, reasons must be given for the making of a further supervision order at the time of making the order. [24] In respect of s 21A of the DPSO Act, no submission from an eligible person has been received as no eligible person is able to be identified.8 [25] As an application under section 19D of the DPSO Act is a modified process, the comments of Boddice J in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Foy9 are of some assistance in approaching the relevant factors to be considered on the application: “[17] Section 19D of the [DPSO] Act gives this Court a discretion to make a further supervision order in respect of an offender subject to an existing supervision order. The discretion to be exercised is to make a further supervision order, or to decline to make that further supervision order. Unlike s 13 of the 7 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Kanaveilomani [2013] QCA 404 at 118-120. See also Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Lawrence [2009] QCA 136. 8 See affidavit of R Embrey filed 8 April 2021. 9 [2014] QSC 304. -- 9 of 30 -- 10 [DPSO] Act, the discretion does not involve a consideration whether to make a continuing detention order.10 [18] In exercising the discretion under s 19D of the [DPSO] Act, all relevant factors must be considered by the Court. Those factors include not only the matters specified in s 13 of the [DPSO] Act but also factors since the making of the initial supervision order, such as the Respondent’s performance on the existing supervision order, and the impact of the imposition of a further supervision order on the Respondent. [19] … The fact an application under s 19D does not involve consideration of whether a continuing detention order should be made, does not render the factors relevant to a consideration of whether a supervision order ought to be made, and on what terms, as set out in s 13 of the [DPSO] Act, inoperable when exercising the discretion under s 19D of the [DPSO] Act.” Psychological treatment [26] Mr Nicholas Smith, clinical psychologist, has been providing psychological treatment to the respondent since March 2017. Mr Smith prepared a report outlining the treatment of the respondent between 8 March 2017 and 30 March 2020. [27] A further report in respect of the respondent has also been prepared by Mr Smith dated 30 May 2021. [28] Mr Smith’s report in 2020 in respect of the respondent identifies: (a) The respondent has engaged well in treatment. (b) The respondent “presents as taking responsibility for his offending in Australia”. (c) The respondent is showing an improvement in insight. (d) The respondent does not display any indicators of escalating risk of reoffending. (e) The respondent’s continuing treatment, management and supervision requires “vigilance consistency, scepticism and regular communication”.11 [29] Mr Smith’s most recent report dated 30 May 2021, updates Mr Smith’s assessment including as follows: (a) The respondent has continued to engage well in treatment. (b) The respondent has been consistently open to interventions and advice. (c) The supervision order would “reinforce” what the respondent has already learned. 10 For a discussion of the discretion under s 13 of the [DPSO] Act see Fardon v Attorney-General (2004) 223 CLR 575. 11 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions at [41]-[43]. -- 10 of 30 -- 11 [30] Mr Smith’s view is that any further supervision order ought to be “less restrictive of his movements”.12 Psychiatric evidence Dr Scott Harden [31] Dr Scott Harden, consultant psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 16 November 2020.13 [32] Dr Harden had originally interviewed the respondent on 5 November 2015 and again on 11 May 2017, in respect of the original Division 3 order and the contravention proceedings. Dr Harden again interviewed the respondent on 21 August 2020. [33] Dr Harden’s assessment of the respondent included as follows: (a) On the STATIC-99R, the respondent achieved a score of 6, which placed the respondent in the “well above average” risk category relative to other adult male sex offenders. However, after over four years in the community on a supervision order without reoffending, the respondent “probably [fell] to the average risk category”. (b) On the Stable-2007, in 2015, the respondent achieved a score of 11/26, which placed him in the moderate needs group. On rescoring in 2020, the respondent achieved a score of 6, which was a significant reduction, but still placed him in the same group. (c) On the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, in 2015, the respondent achieved a score of 9. Upon reapplication of this instrument in 2020, the respondent achieved a score of 5, which Dr Harden described as “not elevated”. (d) On the SVR-20, the respondent achieved a score placing him in the low – moderate range in this measure of sexual violent risk. [34] Further, Dr Harden expressed the following views in respect of the respondent: (a) The respondent had a clear preference for boys in the period “immediately after puberty”. The offences involved grooming and forming emotional relationships with some of the victims. The respondent had gained the trust of caregivers. (b) The respondent had made “various significant progress” in treatment programs he had received. He was able to describe previous cognitive distortions, remorse and the realisation of harm that he had caused. He understood he needed to avoid contact with boys. (c) The respondent did not meet the diagnostic criteria for paedophilia. His attraction was to boys in the immediate post-pubertal period. The respondent met the criteria for a diagnosis of, other specified paraphilia disorder (hebephilia) to be made. Further, the attraction to post-pubertal boys was not exclusive as the respondent had a sexual attraction to adult females as well. 12 Applicant’s Outline of Submissions at [45]. 13 Report of Dr Scott Harden dated 16 November 2020. -- 11 of 30 -- 12 (d) The respondent did not have a personality disorder, but he had personality features that appear to be obsessional in nature. Some features are obsessive compulsive. The respondent also had some avoidant and narcissistic personality traits. (e) The respondent’s unmodified risk of sexual reoffence in the community is in the moderate or average range. The risk includes the respondent’s deviant attraction and emotional identification with male adolescents. He has also exhibited previous problems with cooperation and supervision. (f) If the respondent was to reoffend it would be against boys in the immediate post-pubertal period. He would require victim access over a substantial period of time to emotionally groom them. He is unlikely to offend impulsively or against people not known to him. Any risk of physical harm is unlikely. (g) A supervision order would reduce the risk of sexual reoffence to low. (h) It is recommended that the respondent have ongoing psychological therapy. (i) The respondent should not have any unsupervised contact with boys under 16. Transient contact is unlikely to create a significant risk to those he encounters in such circumstances. (j) The conditions of any order should not be such to unduly interfere with employment, accommodation or association with other adults. Dr Michael Beech [35] Dr Michael Beech, consultant psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 23 May 2021. This report was prepared pursuant to the orders made on 19 March 2021. [36] Dr Beech summarised the earlier risk assessments in a table which states as follows: Year Assessor Static Psychopathy Diagnosis Risk 2015 Nurcombe Low to moderate No Paedophilia Moderate to high 2015 Grant Moderate to high No Paedophilia Moderate to high 2016 Harden Moderate-high No Hebephilia Moderate to high 2017 Harden Moderate to high Moderate to moderate-high 2017 Grant Moderate to high Moderate to high 2017 Arnold Paedophilia & Narcissistic personality High [37] Dr Beech observed following perusal of the Integrator Offender Management System records as follows: “In general, I think the comments of others are apt – [the respondent] can be argumentative, manipulative, focused on detail and the letter of the order, complying with supervision but not in a cooperative -- 12 of 30 -- 13 manner. As the authors of Stable-2017 might put it, [the respondent] would not appear to be working with his supervisors.”14 [38] Dr Beech assessed the respondent and expressed views as follows: (a) The totality of offending points to a diagnosis of paedophilia as well as another paraphilia of hebephilia, being an attraction to pubescent males. (b) On the Static 99R, the respondent achieved a score of 5 which placed him in the band of offenders described as above average risk. (c) While it may be appropriate to apply a discount for offenders who have been offence free in the community after release, the respondent should not be seen as released for the purposes of the Static-99 given the intensive supervision order to which he has been subject which limits his contact and movement in the community. Therefore no “five year discount” should be applied when considering the respondent’s risk. (d) On the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol, noted a chronicity of sexual violence, extreme minimisation or denial of some offending, problems with self-awareness, problems with stress or coping problems resulting from child abuse, sexual deviance and problems with intimate relationship and supervision as being matters relevant to the respondent. (e) On a Stable 2007, the respondent achieved a score of 8, placing him at moderate risk. (f) The Static 99R and Static 2007 together place the respondent in the moderate to high risk group. (g) On the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, the respondent achieved a score of 8 which was indicative that he is not psychopathic. (h) The respondent’s risk of sexual offending is moderate, being below his static score. The dynamic factors reduce the static risk. The long-term risk relates to sexual preoccupation, anti-social personality, social interaction and sexual deviance. (i) The respondent was 27 years old when he first offended. He was 33 when he committed his last offences. He has been in prison or in the community since 2003. (j) There are no indicators of sexual preoccupation. He has formed some limited adult support relationships. He has pursued studies. (k) The respondent has engaged in counselling. He has obtained a positive report. (l) The respondent’s risk factors were limited self-awareness, poor problem solving, limited community support, no clearly defined plan for the future, no stable accommodation and problems with social relationships and directions. There was also some avoidance of responsibility related to earlier sexual offending. (m) There are several risk scenarios: 14 Report of Dr Michael Beech dated 23 May 2021 at p 4. -- 13 of 30 -- 14 (i) Without supervision, the respondent would “gravitate to minors and offend at the urge of his sexual paraphilia once surveillance is removed”. This scenario is “unlikely”. (ii) That age, maturity, incarceration and counselling have led to personal stability, better coping and self-awareness. The respondent has a knowledge and skill as to managing emotions and making considered decisions and avoiding risks. (iii) An “in-between” scenario, namely when enduring periods of loneliness and stress, in the absence of appropriate emotional and intimate support, he becomes stressed and does not cope. His limited self-awareness and poor judgment might draw him to into contact with male minors. He might see himself as manipulated or unable to establish and maintain boundaries. He would use permission statements to continue the contact. From there repeated contact would lead to a re-emergence of the hebephilic attraction and ultimately offending. (n) The most likely victims are pubescent males and the offending would involve some form of sexual behaviour. (o) The respondent’s ability to manage himself absent supervision has not been tested. He has sparse support, and limited self-awareness. His deviance is life- long. Although the risks persist “… the absence of sexual preoccupation and other factors have had a significant risk lowering effect”. [39] Dr Beech concludes as follows:15 “One risk scenario is that without supervision he would quickly gravitate to minors and offend at the urge of his sexual paraphilia once surveillance is removed. I think that is an unlikely scenario. The most positive scenario is that age and maturity, incarceration, and counselling have had led to personal stability, better coping, and self- awareness that he knows how to manage his emotions, make considered decisions, and perceptively avoid risks. In between is his greatest risk: that he would, during periods of loneliness or stress, and in the absence of appropriate emotional and intimate support, become stressed and not cope. His limited self-awareness and poor judgement might draw him into contact with male minors. Although he might see himself as manipulated or unable to establish or maintain boundaries, he would use these permission statements to continue the contact. From there, repeated contact would lead to a re-emergence of a Hebephilic attraction that would culminate in offending. The victims are most likely to be pubescent males. The offending itself would involve most forms of sexual behaviour. The victims would suffer at least psychological difficulties. [The respondent] is now 50 years old. He has had limited access to the community and his ability to manage himself absent supervision, has not been tested. The sparse supports and limited self-awareness are likely to continue and his deviance is most likely life-long. For that reason, I think that the risks will persist but the absence of sexual 15 Report of Dr Michael Beech dated 23 May 2021 at pp 20-1. -- 14 of 30 -- 15 preoccupation and other factors have had a significant risk-lowering effect. A supervision order would reduce the risk to low. If a further order was made, then I would recommend a two year period where • He should have ongoing counselling • He should not establish and maintain unsupervised contact with a male minor • He should not be precluded from going to public areas that are not specifically or predominantly child-focussed • He should allow electronic devices to be inspected but not have limits on internet access • Long-term accommodation is facilitated • He should not work with male minors • He should report regularly and frequently • He should provide details about his movements but not necessarily an advance schedule of all movements” Dr Karen Brown [40] Dr Karen Brown, consultant psychiatrist, prepared a report dated 24 May 2021. This report was prepared pursuant to the orders dated 19 March 2021. [41] Dr Brown’s assessment of the respondent included as follows:16 (a) The diagnosis for paedophilia is not strictly met. The convictions indicate the presence of a significant sexual deviance described as hebephilia or other disorders of sexual preference. (b) An obsessional personality with a preoccupation with detail and difficulties with task completion. (c) The respondent does not meet the criteria for obsessive compulsive personality disorder or any other personality disorder. He does have, however, a lifelong pervasive personality disturbance such that “he cannot function all major life domains (personal, social or occupational)”. (d) There is no evidence of autism spectrum disorder. This has been a diagnosis previously made but is not supported. (e) Any reported difficulties understanding supervision conditions are not due to autism but rather are due to “an ongoing minimisation of his offending and associated risks, such that he disregards the supervision order”. (f) On the Static 99R, the respondent achieved a score of 5 which suggested that his risk of reoffending is in the moderate to high or above average range. 16 Report of Dr Karen Drown dated 24 May 2021. -- 15 of 30 -- 16 (g) On the Psychopathy Checklist, the respondent achieved a score of 10 out of 40 which was not elevated. It was well below the score required for a diagnosis of psychopathy. (h) On the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol, there was evidence of chronicity of sexual violence and a diversity of sexual violence with psychological and physical coercion. The instrument also identified some psychological adjustment with evidence of denial with extreme minimisation of sexual violence, problems with self-awareness and problems resulting in child abuse. There was evidence of sexual deviance but there were no significant problems noted with social adjustment. (i) The respondent has not properly engaged with the process of supervision for the past five years. He has breached the conditions of his supervision order “on numerous occasions”. (j) The respondent completed extensive group and physical sexual offender treatment programs. He still has outstanding treatment needs, particularly in the areas of self-awareness and cognitive distortions. (k) The respondent’s unmodified risk of sexually offending is at least moderate and possibly moderate to high. (l) Risk factors remain unaddressed, despite treatment. These include a failure to acknowledge sexual deviant drives, minimisation of offending, problems with supervision. (m) The risk would be “significantly increased” if the respondent had access to teenage boys. The respondent is unlikely to offend against a male child he has just met, rather sexual contact is most likely to occur after a period of grooming. He is also at risk of viewing or making child pornographic materials. (n) The respondent’s offending is driven by a marked sexual deviance. It was premeditated, involving a long period of grooming, sexual acts, voyeurism, use of intoxicants used during making child exploitation material. (o) Although he has engaged with treatment, the respondent continued to minimise the incidents and deflect blame to victims. (p) The supervision order has been difficult as the restrictions have impeded the respondent’s ability to gain employment and housing. The respondent continues to demonstrate a lack of self-awareness for his ongoing denial. The respondent’s presentation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. (q) Although the supervision order is frustrating, it is serving to reduce the risk to low. Without it, given the respondent’s risk factors, the deviant sexual drives become more prominent, and he will be a significant risk. (r) The risk of the commission of a serious sexual offence can only be managed in the community with the continuation of the supervision order. For the supervision order to be discontinued, the respondent needed to make gains in treatment and properly understand the need for the order. This is unlikely to occur in the short term. (s) The supervision order should endure for a period of five years at which time the respondent will be 55 years old. Supervision should not restrict the -- 16 of 30 -- 17 respondent’s ability to gain employment and/or permanent accommodation. However, he should not have contact with children, not have access to a camera and his on-line activities should be “robustly monitored”. Therapy should continue. [42] Dr Brown concluded as follows: “It is my view that [the respondent’s] unmodified risk of sexual reoffending is at least moderate and possibly moderate to high. The RSVP indicates risk factors that remain unaddressed, despite years of group and individualised sexual offender treatment. Risk factors include failure to properly acknowledge sexual deviant drives, minimisation of offending (and other cognitive distortions) and problems with supervision. Sexual offending risk would be significantly increased if [the respondent] had access to teenage boys, particularly if they were vulnerable. As per previous reports, he is unlikely to offend against male children that he has just met, rather contact offending is most likely to occur after a period of grooming. He is also at risk of viewing or making child pornographic material as he has done in the past. I am unconvinced that [the respondent] was naïve at the time of his offending with respect to the seriousness of the offences and/or the harm he was causing to his victims and others, (as there is no clinical explanation for this in a mentally well man of normal intelligence), rather I am of the opinion that the initial offending was driven by a marked sexual deviance and premeditated, such that is involved a long period of grooming prior to very serious child sexual offending involving multiple sexual acts, voyeurism, use of intoxicants and viewing and making child exploitation material. Similarly I am unconvinced that [the respondent] was not aware that he was involved in the making of child exploitation material when he took photos of the 8 year old boy on the beach, whilst he was on bail and it is quite possible that he went to Mexico in order to continue sexually offending. Although [the respondent] has engaged with treatment, he continues to minimise the incidents and deflect blame onto the victims. He has found the supervision order hard to manage, as the restrictions have impeded his ability to gain employment and housing (and therefore arguably limited his reintegration), however he has breached the order many times and in my opinion this indicates his underlying disregard for the supervision process. [The respondent] now states that he is no longer at risk of reoffending, but in my opinion, although he is aware of some of the various cognitive distortions and permission statements he used at the time of the offending, he has not properly acknowledged the extent of his sexual deviance and his core explanations as to the reasons for his offending (autism, immaturity, naivety) do not fit with any observable mental illness or disorder and therefore demonstrate lack of self awareness and ongoing denial. -- 17 of 30 -- 18 [The respondent] still has outstanding treatment needs and his presentation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Although the supervision order is frustrating for him, it is also serving to reduce his risk of reoffending to a low and manageable level. Without it, given his outstanding risk factors, it is my view that his (essentially unacknowledged) sexually deviant drives will become more prominent and he will be at significant risk of either online or contact sexual offending. He may also decide to leave the country in order to avoid detection. I therefore recommend that the risks can only be managed safety [sic] in the community with continuation of the supervision order. For this to be discontinued, [the respondent] needs to make some gains in treatment and properly understand the need for, and adhere to, the conditions of the order. As he is unlikely to do so in a short timeframe, I recommend that the supervision order is continued for a period of five years, at which time, [the respondent] will be 55 years old (and therefore his risks will have further reduced due to his age). I advise that supervision should not, if at all possible, restrict his ability to gain employment and permanent accommodation. He should not have contact with children, not have access to a camera, and his online activities should continue to be robustly monitored. Therapy should continue and focus upon his outstanding treatment needs as identified in this report.”17 Oral evidence at hearing [43] Dr Brown, Dr Beech and Dr Harden all attended the hearing in person and were all sworn at the same time to give evidence. [44] The questions in both evidence in chief and cross-examination were focused on the following: (a) The duration of the further supervision order; (b) The appropriate terms of the further supervision order to manage the risk, particularly in respect of: (i) Whether the respondent should be limited to only one mobile phone or device, in addition to the requirement to disclose any device to Corrective Services within 24 hours. [Draft further supervision order at [19]] (ii) Whether the respondent: (A) should be required to obtain written permission from Corrective Services prior to use of a device to access the internet; or (B) should be required to disclose any use of a device to access the internet within 24 hours of the first use of such device. [Draft further supervision order at [21]] 17 Report of Dr Karen Brown dated 24 May 2021 at pp 29-30. -- 18 of 30 -- 19 (iii) Whether the respondent should be required to disclose in advance to Corrective Services what he plans to do each week. [45] Dr Brown’s further evidence can be summarised as follows: (a) In respect of the duration of the supervision order, her preference is five years (consistent with the reasons given in her report) but she accepts there is a difference of opinion on that. She is, however, “reasonably happy” with a three year period and considers it would be adequate if the respondent is able to manage three years and not contravene seriously through that period of time necessitating a return to custody.18 (b) In respect of the number of devices to access the internet, Dr Brown considers that the more devices the respondent has access to the greater the risk as it makes it more difficult to monitor his internet usage. Corrective Services should know about each device and the respondent should be required to disclose each device. For management of the risk it is not necessary to limit the number of devices to just one.19 (c) In respect of the alternatives of prior written permission or disclosing within 24 hours internet access, Corrective Services need to be aware of what devices the respondent is accessing, however that is achieved.20 If the respondent is accessing a number of different devices in a range of different settings that may be a “red flag” for Corrective Services. The important requirement is disclosure of devices used to access the internet so that can be examined and monitored by Corrective Services.21 (d) In respect of disclosing a weekly plan in advance, that condition is not required as the respondent has to disclose associations and is GPS monitored as to where he goes. It is also very restrictive as it does not allow for changes in plans that could result in inadvertent contraventions.22 [46] Dr Beech’s further evidence can be summarised as follows: (a) In respect of the duration of the supervision order, he considers a duration of two or three years would be appropriate. He considers that five years is longer than necessary. The respondent has been under a very strict regime of supervision, and Dr Beech thinks the respondent needs a period now where he can be still supervised but have more freedom of movement and association and be monitored during that time.23 (b) In respect of the number of devices to access the internet, the more devices the respondent has, the more difficult it is to monitor internet access. May be some benefit to include.24 (c) In respect of the alternatives of prior written permission or disclosing within 24 hours internet access, the conditions should allow electronic devices to be 18 T1-8.46-T1-9.8. 19 T1-10.8-35. 20 T1-11.46-T1-12.6. 21 T1-12.31-44. 22 T1-15.6-16; T1-16.1-18. 23 T1-9.18-25. 24 T1-10.38-T1-11.20. -- 19 of 30 -- 20 inspected and a requirement that the respondent disclose the devices he accesses within 24 hours. That is, disclosure within 24 hours rather than prior permission is appropriate.25 (d) In respect of disclosing a weekly plan in advance, there should be detailed disclosure of movements but not necessarily in advance. No need for a condition that the respondent disclose a weekly plan in advance.26 [47] Dr Harden’s further evidence can be summarised as follows: (a) In respect of the duration of the supervision order, Dr Harden considers on balance three years is appropriate. The respondent needs increased community integration and needs to spend a couple of years in a community-based placement and the extra year allows extra time for “time lost” due to outside factors. Dr Harden agrees with the views of Dr Brown and Dr Beech “that what is required is for him to reintegrate more effectively in the community and for supervision to act as a risk reducer without acting as an impairment to his rehabilitation.”27 (b) In respect of the number of devices to access the internet, there is no need to specify the number of devices allowed in the conditions. The key to risk reduction is being able to monitor access and knowing how many devices.28 (c) In respect of the alternatives of prior written permission or disclosing within 24 hours internet access, the condition should require disclosure of internet access without a requirement of prior permission. Further, the respondent’s GPS monitoring also assists in reducing risk if the respondent is going to covertly try to access the internet. Substantial unmonitored access to the internet would be required to facilitate offending. 29 (d) In respect of disclosing a weekly plan in advance, this is not necessary in respect of the respondent. This type of requirement is suited to people who have difficulty managing unstructured time and need structure to decrease the risk of “drifting into other things”. It is reasonable that the respondent be required to disclose his movements.30 [48] The psychiatrists also referred to the mitigating effect of other proposed conditions including: (a) Paragraph 6 of the Further Supervision Order - obey any reasonable direction of a Corrective Services officer. (b) Paragraph 23 of the Further Supervision Order - must disclose to a Corrective Services officer details of an email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms or social networking sites used. 25 T1-12.14-27. 26 T1-15.20-30. 27 T1-9.31-41. 28 T1-11.24-27. 29 T1-13.39-T1-14.46. 30 T1-15.34-45. -- 20 of 30 -- 21 (c) Paragraph 7 of the Further Supervision Order - requires the respondent to “tell the truth” if asked by a Corrective Services officer about where he is, what he has been doing, what he is planning to do and who he is spending time with. Proposed further supervision order [49] Following the further psychiatric evidence at the hearing, the proposed further supervision order was revised as follows: (a) To provide for a duration of 3 years. (b) There is no express limit on the number of devices but there is a requirement to disclose all devices within 24 hours of when the respondent gets the device. (c) There is no requirement for prior permission before accessing the internet but there is a requirement for disclosure of any use of a device to access the internet within 24 hours of the first use of any device to do so. (d) There is no requirement to inform Corrective Services in advance of a weekly plan. There is a separate condition requiring disclosure of who the respondent has met and relevant contact details. [50] The revised proposed supervision order is set out at Annexure A to these reasons.31 [51] Subject to the Court being satisfied as required under the DPSO Act, the parties agree that the release of the respondent into the community on the terms of the proposed further supervision order would be appropriate. Consideration [52] Jackson J in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Loudon32 identified that the relevant questions that arise on an application for a further supervision order are as follows: “[3] … [U]nder s 19D the questions to be decided on an application for a further supervision order are a modified form of those that arise on an application for a final order under Part 2 Division 3 of the DPSOA. First, is the court satisfied that the respondent is a danger to the community within the meaning of s 13(1) of the DPSOA? Second, if the court is so satisfied, should the court order that the respondent as a released prisoner be subject to the requirements it considers appropriate that are stated in a further supervision order of the kind made under s 13(5)(b) of the DPSOA?” [53] The application for a further supervision order has been made within the last six months of the current order and is in respect of a “released prisoner”. Following the preliminary hearing, the matters were set down for hearing for a determination to be made. Further psychiatric assessments have been obtained. 31 Further minor changes were agreed after the hearing and a final copy provided to Chambers on 10 June 2021. 32 [2017] QSC 146. -- 21 of 30 -- 22 [54] The procedural requirements in respect of the application for a further supervision order have been met. [55] As indicated previously, the respondent accepts that the evidence favours the imposition of a further supervision order. [56] The psychiatric evidence establishes that the respondent presents at the moderate to moderate/high range of risk of the commission of a serious sexual offence. Further, the manifestation of that risk would be a sexual assault of a male pubescent child. [57] A number of factors are relevant to the assessment of whether the respondent presents an unacceptable risk to the community in the absence of a further supervision order, including: (a) The respondent is 50 years of age; (b) The respondent has been diagnosed with sexual paraphilia, paedophilia or hebephilia, or both; (c) The respondent has had limited access to the community; (d) The respondent requires ongoing treatment; (e) The respondent should be required to not establish and maintain contact with pubescent males; (f) The respondent has contravened his supervision order; (g) The respondent has minimised his past offending. [58] The psychiatric evidence establishes that the imposition of a supervision order will reduce the respondent’s risk of the commission of a serious sexual offence, being a sexual offence involving a child, to low. [59] Further, the evidence establishes that the respondent has ongoing treatment needs. Whether the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order pursuant to Division 4A? [60] The first question is whether the respondent is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order pursuant to Division 4A? [61] This issue is not contentious between the parties or between the three psychiatrists. [62] Based on the evidence of Dr Brown, Dr Beech and Dr Harden and the other affidavit evidence read in support of the application which I accept, I am satisfied that there is acceptable, cogent evidence, which satisfies me to the high degree of probability required that the respondent remains a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order made under Division 4A of the DPSO Act. [63] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the respondent remains a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order pursuant to Division 4A of the DPSO Act. -- 22 of 30 -- 23 Whether adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the respondent’s release on the proposed further supervision order? [64] The second question is whether adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the respondent’s release on the proposed further supervision order? [65] The paramount consideration is the adequate protection of the community. [66] The risk being protected against is the risk of the respondent, without a further supervision order, committing a serious sexual offence and that risk must be of an unacceptable magnitude. The legislative scheme must accept that some level of risk is acceptable, consistent with the concept of adequate protection of the community. [67] The conditions in a supervision order should only be as onerous as is necessary to protect the community from serious sexual offences being committed by the respondent. [68] The assessment of the risk and what terms of a supervision order would provide for the adequate protection of the community is not a matter for expert, particularly psychiatric, opinion. It is a matter for the Court. As recognised by McMurdo J in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Sutherland [2006] QSC 268 at [30], the exercise requires a: “… value judgment as to what risk should be accepted against the serious alternative of the deprivation of a person’s liberty.” [69] While that is the case, I note that each of the three psychiatrists have provided their opinions in respect of the duration of a further supervision order and appropriate conditions. While there is some divergence in views, on balance the common views are reflected in the proposed supervision order set out at Annexure A. I accept the evidence of the three psychiatrists in respect of the appropriate conditions to manage the relevant risks in respect of the respondent. [70] Further, if, on all the evidence, a supervision order would be likely to reduce the risk to an “acceptably low level” then the supervision order should be made: Attorney- General for the State of Queensland v Beattie [2007] QCA 96 at [19]. [71] In making the “value judgment” required, I have considered and accept the views expressed by Dr Brown, Dr Beech and Dr Harden, and the evidence read in support of the application. I find that the adequate protection of the community can be reasonably and practically managed by the terms of the proposed further supervision order set out in Annexure A. [72] Further, I am satisfied that the requirements under section 16 of the DPSO Act can be reasonably and practicably managed by Corrective Services officers. Order [73] Accordingly, being satisfied that the respondent, is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order made pursuant to Division 4A of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS THAT: -- 23 of 30 -- 24 1. The interim supervision order made 7 June 2021 is rescinded. 2. The respondent be subject to a further supervision order for a period of 3 years until 17 June 2024, on the conditions set out in Annexure A. -- 24 of 30 -- 25 Annexure A SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND REGISTRY: Brisbane NUMBER: 8432/15 Applicant ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND AND Respondent SBV FURTHER SUPERVISION ORDER Before: Williams J Date: [17] June 2021 Initiating document: Application filed 4 February 2021 (CFI 66) THE COURT is satisfied that [the respondent], is a serious danger to the community in the absence of a further supervision order made pursuant to Division 4A of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. THE COURT ORDERS THAT the interim supervision order made 7 June 2021 (CFI No 92) is rescinded. The rules in this order are made according to the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003. THE COURT ORDERS THAT [the respondent] must follow the rules in this order for 3 years, until [17] June 2024. TO [the respondent]: 1. You must obey the rules in this supervision order. 2. If you break any of the rules in this supervision order, the police or Queensland Corrective Services have the power to arrest you. Then the Court might order that you go back to prison. -- 25 of 30 -- 26 3. You must obey these rules for the next three years. Reporting 4. On the day of the making of this order, you must report before 4 pm to a Corrective Services officer at the Community Corrections office closest to where you will live. You must tell the Corrective Services officer your name and the address where you will live. 5. A Corrective Services officer will tell you the times and dates when you must report to them. You must report to them at the times they tell you to report. A Corrective Services officer might visit you at your home. You must let the Corrective Services officer come into your house. To “report” means to visit a Corrective Services officer and talk to them face to face. Supervision 6. A Corrective Services officer will supervise you until this order is finished. This means you must obey any reasonable direction that a Corrective Services officer gives you about: a) where you are allowed to live; and b) rehabilitation, care or treatment programs; and c) who you may have contact with; and d) anything else. A “reasonable direction” is an instruction about what you must do, or what you must not do, that is reasonable in that situation. An instruction that means that you will break the rules of this supervision order is not a “reasonable direction”. If you are not sure about a direction, you can ask a Corrective Services officer for more information, or talk to your lawyer about it. “Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking with them face to face, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting, using a telephone, computer, social media or in any other way. 7. You must answer and tell the truth if a Corrective Services officer asks you about where you are, what you have been doing or what you are planning to do, and who you are spending time with. 8. If you change your name, where you live or any employment, you must tell a Corrective Services officer at least two business days before the change will happen. A “business day” is a week day (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday) that is not a public holiday. No sexual offences 9. You must not break the law by committing a sexual offence. -- 26 of 30 -- 27 Where you must live 10. You must live at a place approved by a Corrective Services officer. You must obey any rules that are made about people who live there. 11. You must not live at another place. If you want to live at another place, you must tell a Corrective Services officer the address of the place you want to live. The Corrective Services officer will decide if you are allowed to live at that place. You are allowed to change the place you live only when you get written permission from a Corrective Services officer to live at another place. This also means you must get written permission from a Corrective Services officer before you are allowed to stay overnight, or for a few days, or for a few weeks, at another place. 12. You must not leave Queensland. If you want to leave Queensland, you must ask for written permission from a Corrective Services officer. You are allowed to leave Queensland only after you get written permission from a Corrective Services officer. Curfew direction 13. A Corrective Services officer has power to tell you to stay at a place (for example, the place you live) at particular times. This is called a curfew direction. You must obey a curfew direction. Monitoring direction 14. A Corrective Services officer has power to tell you to: a) wear a device that tracks your location; and b) let them install a device or equipment at the place you live. This will monitor if you are there. This is called a monitoring direction. You must obey a monitoring direction. Employment or study 15. You must tell a Corrective Services officer within two business days of starting a job, studying or volunteer work. 16. You must tell the Corrective Services officer these things: a) what the job is; b) who you will work for; c) what hours you will work each day; d) the place or places where you will work; and e) (if it is study) where you want to study and what you want to study. 17. If a Corrective Services officer tells you to stop working or studying, you must obey what they tell you. -- 27 of 30 -- 28 Motor vehicles 18. You must tell a Corrective Services officer the details (make, model, colour and registration number) about any vehicle you own, borrow or hire. You must tell the Corrective Services officer these details immediately (on the same day) you get the vehicle. A vehicle includes a car, motorbike, ute or truck. Mobile phone 19. You must tell a Corrective Services officer the details (make, model, phone number and service provider) about any mobile phone, or other device capable of being used as such, that you own or have, within 24 hours of when you get the device. 20. You must give a Corrective Services officer all passwords and passcodes for any mobile phone you own or have. You must let a Corrective Services officer look at the phone and everything on the phone. Computers and internet 21. You must disclose to a Corrective Services officer any use of a computer, phone or other device to access the internet within 24 hours of the first use of that device. 22. You must give a Corrective Services officer any password or other access code you know for the computer, phone or other device. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using the computer, phone or other device. You must let a Corrective Services officer look at the computer, phone or other device and everything on it. 23. You must give a Corrective Services officer details (including user names and passwords) about any email address, instant messaging service, chat rooms, or social networking sites that you use. You must do this within 24 hours of when you start using any of these things. No contact with any victim 24. You must not contact or try to contact any victims of sexual offences of which you have been convicted. You must not ask someone else to do this for you. “Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting. You must not do any of these things in person, by telephone, computer, social media or in any other way. Rules about rehabilitation and counselling 25. You must obey any direction a Corrective Services officer gives you about seeing a doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or other counsellor. -- 28 of 30 -- 29 26. You must obey any direction a Corrective Services officer gives you about participating in any treatment or rehabilitation program. 27. You must let Corrective Services officers get information about you from any treatment or from any rehabilitation program. Contact with adults 28. You must tell a Corrective Services officer the name of new persons you have met. This includes: people who you spend time with, work with, make friends with, see or speak to (including by using social media or the internet) regularly. 29. You may need to tell new contacts about your supervision order and offending history. The Corrective Services officer will instruct you to tell those persons and the Corrective Services officer may speak to them to make sure you have given them all the information. Contact with children 30. You are not allowed to have any contact with children under 16 years of age. If you want to have supervised or unsupervised contact with a child under 16 years of age you must first get written permission from a Corrective Services officer. If you do not get written permission, you are not allowed to have contact with the child. “Contact” means any type of communication, including things like talking with them face to face, texting, sending letters or emails, posting pictures or chatting, using a telephone, computer, social media or in any other way. “Supervised” means having contact with the child while another person is with you and the child. “Unsupervised” means having contact with the child while there is no other person with you and the child. 31. If you have any repeated contact (that is, more than one time) with a parent, guardian or carer of a child under the age of 16, you must: (i) tell the person(s) about this supervision order; and (ii) tell a Corrective Services officer the details of the person(s). You must do this immediately. This means you have to tell the person, and tell a Corrective Services officer, on the same day you have contact with the person. 32. Queensland Corrective Services has power to give information about you, and about this supervision order, to any parent, guardian or caregivers that you have contact with. 33. Queensland Corrective Services also has power to give information about you, and about this supervision order, to an external agency (such as the Department of Child Safety). 34. You must not: -- 29 of 30 -- 30 a) attend any school; b) join any club or organisation in which children are involved; c) participate in any club or organisation in which children are involved. If you want to do any of these things, you must first get written permission from a Corrective Services officer. If you do not get written permission, you cannot do any of these things. Other specific conditions 35. You must not collect photos/ videos/ magazines which have images of children in them without prior approval of a Corrective Services officer. If you have any you may be asked to get rid of them by a Corrective Services officer. 36. You are not to get child exploitation material or images of children on a computer or phone from the internet. 37. You must develop a management plan with your psychologist or psychiatrist to address any risk of sexual re-offence. You must talk about this with a Corrective Services officer when asked. Signed: Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland -- 30 of 30 --