BMS v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2021] QCAT 369
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: BMS v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2021] QCAT 369
PARTIES: BMS
(applicant)
v
PHARMACY BOARD OF AUSTRALIA
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S: OCR 017-20
MATTER TYPE: Occupational regulation matters
DATE OF ORDERS: 21 May 2021
DATE OF REASONS: 15 November 2021
HEARING DATE/S: 20 and 21 May 2021
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Judge Allen QC, Deputy President
Assisted by:
Ms C Ashcroft
Mr M Lock
Dr G Neilson
ORDERS: The decision of the Pharmacy Board of Australia on
17 December 2019, pursuant to section 178 of the
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
(Queensland), to impose conditions on the
applicant’s registration, is set aside and substituted
with a decision, pursuant to section 179(2)(a) of the
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
(Queensland), to take no action in relation to the
matter.
The decision of the Pharmacy Board of Australia on
5 November 2020, pursuant to section 125(5) of the
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
(Queensland), to refuse to grant the application to
remove conditions on the applicant’s registration is
set aside and substituted with a decision, pursuant to
section 125(5) of the Health Practitioner Regulation
National Law (Queensland), to grant the application
to remove the conditions on the applicant’s
registration.
The decision of the Pharmacy Board of Australia on
4 February 2021, pursuant to section 126(1) of the
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
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(Queensland), to change conditions imposed on the
applicant’s registration, is set aside and substituted
with a decision, pursuant to section 127(2) of the
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law
(Queensland), to remove the conditions on the
applicant’s registration.
The Tribunal’s decisions have effect from 21 May
2021.
CATCHWORDS: PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS – PHARMACEUTICAL CHEMISTS –
LICENSES AND REGISTRATION – where the applicant
is registered as a pharmacist – where the Pharmacy Board of
Australia made decisions resulting in imposition of
conditions on the applicant’s registration – where the
conditions were imposed after the Board formed a
reasonable belief that the applicant suffered from an
impairment – whether the practitioner suffers from an
impairment
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Queensland),
s 3, s 3A, s 4, s 5, s 125, s 126, s 127, s 178, s 179
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009
(Qld), s 20
Coppa v Medical Board of Australia [2014] NTSC 48
DYB v Medical Board of Australia [2019] NSWCATOD
162
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
Mahboub v Medical Board of Australia [2020] QCAT 459
Medical Board of Australia v Wong [2015] QCAT 439
Qasim v Health Care Complaints Commission [2015]
NSWCA 282
APPEARANCES &
REPRESENTATION:
Applicant: M Anthony of The Association of Professional Engineers,
Scientists and Managers, Australia
Respondent: L Nixon of Turks Legal
REASONS FOR DECISION
Introduction
[1] The applicant is a registered pharmacist. During the period from 30 March 2017 until
4 February 2021, the Pharmacy Board of Australia (Board) made various decisions
affecting the registration of the applicant and having the effect of suspending his
registration for some periods of time and placing conditions on the applicant’s
registration during those periods of time when it was not suspended. The applicant
applied to the Tribunal to review those operative decisions of the Board that resulted
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in his registration being subject to conditions at the time of the hearing on 20 and 21
May 2021.
[2] At the conclusion of the hearing on 21 May 2021, the Tribunal decided to make orders
setting aside the operative decisions of the Board and substituting decisions which had
the effect of removing all conditions on the applicant’s registration. These are the
reasons for that decision.
Background
[3] The applicant first obtained registration as a pharmacist in 2009.
[4] To provide necessary context for a consideration of the application to review later
decisions of the Board, it is necessary to recount the applicant’s notification history
and refer to some earlier decisions of the Board which are not the subject of the
application to review.
[5] In late March and early April 2016, the applicant was employed as a locum pharmacist
at a pharmacy in a small rural Victorian town.
[6] On 7 April 2016, a police officer made a telephone notification to the Australian
Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) that during the preceding 2 to 3
weeks, he had received six complaints from persons about the applicant:
(a) “he was a bit distracted/crazy/eccentric in shop”;
(b) “possible smell of cannabis in the shop while he was there”;
(c) two complaints of “error in dispensing medications”;
(d) “medical practitioner, he stated to her how easy it was to use codeine for things
it isn’t supposed to be used for (eg crushing it up)”;
(e) “after hours someone heard broken glass – he said he wasn’t sure, he said he
thought someone had broken in, that he hadn’t done it himself.”
[7] The police officer reported that he had introduced himself to the applicant who
“seemed nervous and shaky and his sentences did not flow – seemed irrational.”
[8] On 8 April 2016, an inspector from the Victorian Pharmacy Authority made an
unannounced visit to the pharmacy and an audit of controlled drugs did not reveal any
discrepancies.
[9] On 16 May 2016, a response by the applicant’s legal representatives advised that the
applicant denied being intoxicated at work and had not been made aware of any
dispensing error at the pharmacy.
[10] On 23 June 2016, the Board decided to take no further action on the basis the
notification was lacking in substance.
[11] From mid-November 2016 until early February 2017, the applicant was employed as
a locum pharmacist at a pharmacy in a regional city in South Australia and residing
in cabin accommodation at a cabin park. The pharmacy was one of a chain of
pharmacies in South Australia and other states of Australia.
[12] On 24 February 2017, a professional services manager employed by the pharmacy
chain (presumably in a national or state head office and certainly not at the pharmacy
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where the applicant had worked) made a complaint to AHPRA about the applicant to
the following effect:
(a) On 3 February 2017, the manager of the pharmacy where the applicant was
employed phoned her to advise that the applicant “was unwell and may have
been intoxicated” and had been sent home from work that and the previous day.
(b) On 7 February 2017, she travelled to the pharmacy and [name redacted in the
copy of the complaint in evidence] “mentioned a couple of times she had smelt
alcohol on his breath”. The pharmacist in charge could not confirm this as due
to religious reasons she has little exposure to alcohol. The pharmacist in charge
mentioned that the applicant’s work had been good, and he was fine with the
customers except until the previous week when she sent him home. The
applicant did have some unusual ways and had some odd discussions with staff.
(c) On 17 February 2017, she received an email from someone at the cabin park
alleging that the applicant’s cabin contained illicit drugs, scales and at least six
mobile phones and it was rumoured that he was dealing drugs whilst living
there.
[13] On 2 March 2017, an anonymous witness stated to an AHPRA investigator that
cleaners at the cabin park had reported that the applicant’s room “was messy, and
there was a large quantity of prescription type medication in the cabin together with
what appeared to be scales, a heat gun and 6 mobile phones… Other residents reported
hearing phone calls from the cabin which caused them to suspect that [the applicant]
was dealing drugs from the location. They also reported regular callers, which was
unusual given that [the applicant] was not a local resident. This added to their
suspicion.”
[14] AHPRA subsequently received copies of photographs allegedly of the contents of the
applicant’s cabin and apparently showing cannabis, drug use paraphernalia and
medication including a box of Tramadol.
[15] On 6 March 2017, the original notifier stated in a phone conversation with the AHPRA
investigator that:
(a) There were no reported issues in relation to the applicant’s performance other
than he “looked under the weather” on a couple of occasions recently. The
applicant had complained of a bad back.
(b) Strict error reporting systems had reported no errors.
(c) The applicant’s dispensing and treatment of customers did not cause suspicion
or alarm.
(d) There were no reported errors with Schedule 8 medication.
(e) There were no suspicions he was taking medicine from the pharmacy.
(f) It was feasible, although unlikely, that the applicant could have taken
medication from a Return of Unwanted Medication bin.
[16] On 30 March 2017, the Board proposed to take immediate action under section 156
of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (National Law) by suspending the
applicant’s registration and invited the applicant to make submissions to the Board.
The Board advised that it was relying upon the 2016 notification as well as the 2017
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notification. On the same date, the Board also decided to require the applicant to
undergo a health assessment.
[17] In his written response dated 5 April 2017, the applicant denied all the allegations and,
in particular:
(a) denied being asked to leave work on 2 and 3 February 2017 because he was
intoxicated;
(b) advised that he had requested to be relieved of his duties on those dates as he
had not slept due to a back injury;
(c) denied ever attending work in an intoxicated state;
(d) denied his breath at work ever smelling of alcohol;
(e) denied having possession of any illicit drugs or drug paraphernalia in his cabin;
(f) denied using illicit substances or dealing drugs;
(g) denied having possession of any prescribed medication other than that obtained
by lawful prescription; and
(h) as regards the 2016 notification, suggested such complaint appeared to be the
result of persons mistaking the applicant’s quirks and eccentricity as evidence
of intoxication.
[18] On 7 April 2017, the Board decided to take immediate action pursuant to section 156
of the National Law and suspend the applicant’s registration. The Board considered
there were proven objective circumstances to support a reasonable belief that the
applicant had “a health impairment related to the misuse of alcohol and/or,
recreational and/or pharmaceutical drugs” and might practise pharmacy in
circumstances where there was no evidence that the health impairment was adequately
managed.
[19] On 2 May 2017, the applicant provided a hair sample for drug testing. On that date,
the applicant declared recent drug use including:
(a) Marijuana last used 1 month for 2 days;
(b) Ecstasy tablet x 2 last used 2 months on 1 day;
(c) Panadeine Extra last used 1 month for 3-5 days;
(d) Tramal last used 90 days for 1-2 weeks;
(e) Oxycontin last used 90 days on 1 day; and
(f) LSD last used 90 days on 1 day.
[20] On 31 May 2017, the applicant underwent a health assessment by Dr Nigel Prior,
consultant psychiatrist. Dr Prior reported that the applicant provided a history of
feeling isolated whilst working as a locum pharmacist in the pharmacy in South
Australia. He attempted to wean himself off his anti-depressant medication. As he was
experiencing insomnia and low mood, he was smoking cannabis three or four days a
week. He had been doing so particularly over the eight months since he had split up
with his girlfriend. He denied any other illicit drug use at that time. The applicant
reported aggravating a back injury, causing him poor sleep, and resuming use of
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tramadol (left over from a previous supply after a neck injury in 2011) for a three
week period in February and March 2017 as well as Panadeine Extra for a few weeks.
He denied any other opioid use. He denied being intoxicated in the workplace and
considered any problems at work related to his poor sleep and anti-depressant
medication withdrawal. His history of, and treatment for depression, was discussed.
He reported taking sample or patient returned anti-depressant medication from the
pharmacy on occasions. The applicant reported drinking alcohol on a social basis. He
reported his alcohol intake escalating to six to eight beers daily for a week after being
suspended then reducing to six units of alcohol two days a week. Dr Prior recorded
the applicant reporting use of cannabis commencing at high school and recommencing
after the neck injury in 2011 for about eight weeks and then socially at parties on a
three-monthly basis. Dr Prior recorded:
For the past eight months, he has been using it more regularly, smoking a joint daily for four
days a week through until February 2017. He reports he had a one-off use of cannabis in
March 2017. He also acknowledges occasional illicit drug use of LSD and ecstasy tablets.
He has used this socially at music festivals or clubs. His last use of these illicit drugs was in
the [sic] March 2017.
[21] Dr Prior noted the results of the hair drug screen performed on 2 May 2017 which
covered a period from early to mid-January to early to mid-April 2017. The results
showed a small amount of codeine not suggestive of excessive use, a small amount of
oxazepam suggestive of occasional use, a low level of oxycodone suggestive of
occasional use and a moderate level of tramadol not suggestive of excessive use. The
absence of positive results for cannabis, ecstasy and LSD were consistent with the
applicant’s declared infrequent use of such drugs. Serum liver function tests showed
an elevated CDT but did not indicate probable recent alcohol excess.
[22] Dr Prior recorded the April 2016 notification to AHPRA regarding the applicant as
“concerns that he was acting in a distracted, eccentric manner, tripping over stock,
had talked about the ease of obtaining and crushing cocaine1, that he was ‘all over the
place’ and had ‘really wide eyes’.”
[23] Dr Prior diagnosed a Substance Abuse Disorder and a Major Depressive Disorder. Dr
Prior opined that the Substance Abuse Disorder primarily involved cannabis, but also
some other illicit substances such as LSD and ecstasy, with the Cannabis Use Disorder
having reduced from moderate to mild and in early remission, and the Substance
Abuse Disorder involving the other drugs mild and in early remission. Dr Prior
recommended that the applicant continue anti-depressant medication and see a
psychologist regarding his depression. He further recommended treatment for the
Substance Abuse Disorder and at least three more months of documented abstinence
before return to work.
[24] On 23 November 2017, the Board revoked the suspension of the applicant’s
registration and imposed conditions on his registration:
(a) prohibiting use of any substance unless prescribed, approved or administered by
a treating practitioner;
(b) requiring breath alcohol testing and/or urine and hair drug screening;
1 This was incorrect. The terms of this part of the hearsay in the notification referred to codeine, not
cocaine.
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(c) requiring evidence of 3 clear months of documented abstinence from illicit
substance use prior to returning to work;
(d) limiting practice within the hours of 7am to 6pm, not exceeding 24 hours a week
and not undertaking after hours or on-call work;
(e) requiring mentoring; and
(f) requiring treatment by a psychiatrist with expertise in addiction medicine, a
psychologist and a general practitioner.
[25] Then followed a period of about 12 months’ skirmishing between the Board and the
applicant regarding his compliance with the terms of such conditions, in particular the
conditions requiring urine drug screening and medical treatment with the applicant
claiming inability to afford the cost of such testing and treatment. I need not detail the
dispute and competing contentions. I have noted the contents of the relevant
correspondence between the Board and the applicant, including letters of the Board
dated 17 July 2018 communicating the Board’s decisions, on 28 June 2018, including
to caution the applicant for contravention of the urine and hair drug screening
conditions, to take no action in response to some other contraventions of the
conditions, including failing to undertake treatment with a general practitioner and
psychiatrist, to approve Dr Michael Robertson as a treating psychiatrist, and to decide
that the applicant had demonstrated 3 months of abstinence from illicit substance use.
[26] It is important to note the results of urine drug testing from late 2017 to late 2018 as
they formed the basis of a subsequent psychiatric diagnosis of Alcohol Use Disorder
and have informed subsequent diagnoses and the decisions of the Board the subject
of this application to review. The results are summarised in the report of Dr Stimming
dated 18 July 2019:
Pathology Findings from Pathology results summary date 12 June 2019
6.1 Conditions, including regular urine drug pathology and hair testing, were imposed
on [the applicant] on the 23 November 2017. Of the urine samples that were given there
has not been any evidence of illegal drugs or medications not prescribed by his medical
practitioners. There were no dilute urine samples given.
6.2 In examining the pathology summary attached,
6.2.1 [the applicant] had normal urine results in December 2017,
6.2.2 he missed two urine tests in January 2018,
6.2.3 there was no urine testing in February 2018,
6.2.4 he had one significant urine test positive for alcohol (0.14 g%) in March 2018,
6.2.5 he had two insignificant urine tests positive for alcohol (<0.05 g%) in April 2018,
6.2.6 he missed two urine tests and had one significant urine tests [sic] positive for
alcohol (0.13 g%) and one insignificant urine test positive for alcohol (<0.05 g%) in
May 2018,
6.2.7 he missed five urine tests and had two insignificant urine tests positive for alcohol
(<0.05g%) in June 2018,
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6.2.8 he had four insignificant urine tests positive for alcohol in July 2018,
6.2.9 he missed one urine test and had one significant urine test positive for alcohol
(0.09 g%) and two insignificant urine test [sic] positive for alcohol (<0.05 g%) in
August 2018,
6.2.10 he missed one urine test in September 2018,
6.2.11 he missed seven urine tests in October 2018,
6.2.12 he missed two urine tests in November 2018,
6.2.13 he missed two urine test [sic] had two significant urine tests positive for alcohol
(0.09 g%, 0.15 g%) in December 2018.
[27] The applicant was able to obtain some locum work as a pharmacist and additional
employment as a pharmacy assistant during October to December 2018. It is not
contended by the Board that any positive urine alcohol test results coincided with days
the applicant was carrying out duties as a pharmacist or pharmacy assistant. I will
refer to evidence from his then and later employers favourable to the applicant later
in these reasons.
[28] On 13 December 2018, the Board decided to again take immediate action pursuant to
section 156 of the National Law and suspend the applicant’s registration because of
the applicant’s contravention of conditions requiring urine and hair drug screening
and psychiatric and psychological treatment.
[29] On 6 February 2019, the applicant underwent a health assessment by Dr Andrea
Stimming, consultant psychiatrist, who diagnosed an Alcohol Use Disorder Moderate
Severity that would or be likely to detrimentally affect the applicant’s capacity to
practise the profession. Dr Stimming’s report dated 22 February 2019 and her
supplementary report dated 18 July 20192 will be discussed further later in these
reasons.
The operative decisions of the Board
[30] On 17 December 2019, the Board, after considering submissions of the applicant
regarding proposed action3, decided to revoke the suspension of the applicant’s
registration and also decided to impose conditions on the applicant’s registration
pursuant to section 178 of the National Law. In its letter of 23 December 2019
advising the decision, the Board stated that it had formed a reasonable belief that the
applicant had a health impairment that detrimentally affected, or was likely to
detrimentally affect, the applicant’s capacity to practise his profession. The Board
identified the impairment as one of Alcohol Use Disorder of Moderate Severity. The
conditions imposed on the applicant’s registration provided for:
(a) limitations on practice:
2 A decision of the Board on 2 May 2019 to refer the applicant to a Health Panel was rescinded on 21
June 2019 after it was discovered Dr Stimming had been erroneously briefed with pathology data
relating to someone other than the applicant. Dr Stimming was briefed to provide a supplementary
report based on correct data.
3 In response to a letter from the Board to the applicant dated 23 October 2019 advising the applicant of
a decision of the Board on 19 September 2019.
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(i) the applicant could only practise in place/s of practice approved by the
Board;
(ii) the applicant could not be the only pharmacist on site;
(iii) the applicant could only practise between 7am and 6pm;
(iv) the applicant could not exceed 24 hours of practice a week;
(v) the applicant could not undertake any after hours or on-call work;
(b) breath alcohol testing before and after each and every period of practice and as
otherwise directed; and
(c) treatment with a general practitioner and a consultant psychiatrist with expertise
in addiction medicine, an addiction medicine specialist, or a medical officer in
an Alcohol and Other Drugs Service.
[31] On 20 January 2020, the applicant filed in the Tribunal an application to review the
decision of the Board to impose conditions on his registration.
[32] On 5 November 2020, the Board decided, pursuant to section 125(5) of the National
Law, to refuse the applicant’s application to the Board to remove the conditions on
his registration.
[33] On 4 February 2021, the Board decided, pursuant to section 126(1) of the National
Law, to change the conditions on the applicant’s registration by deleting the
requirements that:
(a) the applicant could only practise between 7am and 6pm;
(b) the applicant could not exceed 24 hours of practice a week;
(c) the applicant could not undertake any after hours or on-call work;
(d) the applicant be breath tested after each period of practice; and
(e) the applicant be treated by any practitioner other than a general practitioner.
The law
[34] Each of the three operative decisions of the Board were appellable decisions pursuant
to section 199 of the National Law.
[35] In conducting its review of the Board’s decisions, the Tribunal was to produce the
correct and preferable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.4 The Tribunal
stood in the shoes of the Board in determining the matter afresh, and so was required
to determine whether, pursuant to section 178(1)(a)(ii) of the National Law, it
reasonably believed that the applicant has, or may have, an impairment. In doing so,
regard must be had to the paramount consideration of the health and safety of the
public5 and the objectives and guiding principles of the National Law6, including the
4 Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act), s 20.
5 National Law, ss 3A and 4.
6 National Law, ss 3 and 4.
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objective of protection of the public from incompetent practitioners7 and the guiding
principle that restrictions on the practice of a health profession are to be imposed only
if it is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely and are of an appropriate
quality.8
[36] With respect to the terms of section 178(1)(a) of the National Law, I note that “belief”
is the inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition.9
The condition for the exercise of the power pursuant to section 178 of the National
Law turns on the existence of the relevant reasonable belief and does not require a
finding on the balance of probabilities that the belief is correct or true.10 The words
“has or may have” in section 178(1)(a)(ii) must also be given their natural meaning. I
was not required to hold a reasonable belief that the applicant does have an
impairment; it is sufficient if I reasonably believe he may have. The words “or may
have” clearly indicate that reasonable belief as to the possibility that the practitioner
has an impairment is sufficient.11
[37] Section 5 of the National Law relevantly provides the following definition:
impairment, in relation to a person, means the person has a physical or mental impairment,
disability, condition or disorder (including substance abuse or dependence) that
detrimentally affects or is likely to detrimentally affect… for a registered health practitioner
…, the person’s capacity to practise the profession …
[38] I respectfully agree with the following statement by Horneman-Wren SC DCJ, Deputy
President, in Medical Board of Australia v Wong:12
The expression “that detrimentally effects or is likely to affect… the person’s capacity to
practice the profession” must extend to impairments, disabilities, conditions or disorders
which, as here, when controlled by treatment result in there being no immediate detrimental
affect on the practitioner’s capacity. Where the practitioner suffers from an underlying
impairment, disability, condition or disorder which in the absence of treatment would, or
would be likely to, detrimentally affect the person’s capacity to practice, that person may
have an impairment for the purposes of the National Law. A person, for example, with
ongoing substance dependence does not cease to have an impairment when sober or
abstinent.
[39] I accept the respondent’s submission that proof of an impairment need not necessarily
require definitive findings as to the nature of a mental health condition, particularly in
terms of the criteria in the DSM-5.13
Applicant’s return to work and breathalyser testing
[40] Following upon the revocation of the suspension of his registration by the Board on
17 December 2019, the applicant was eventually able to obtain employment as a
7 National Law, s 3(2)(a).
8 National Law, s 3(3)(c).
9 George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104.
10 Mahboub v Medical Board of Australia [2020] QCAT 459.
11 Coppa v Medical Board of Australia [2014] NTSC 48 at [51]; Mahboub v Medical Board of Australia
[2020] QCAT 459.
12 [2015] QCAT 439 at [72]; see also DYB v Medical Board of Australia [2019] NSWCATOD 162 at
[187]-[190].
13 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; see Qasim v Health Care
Complaints Commission [2015] NSWCA 282 at [64]; DYB v Medical Board of Australia [2019]
NSWCATOD 162 at [192].
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pharmacist with an employer willing to accommodate the restrictions of the conditions
on his registration. The applicant commenced such employment in May 2020 and
remained in that employment at the time of hearing. I will refer to evidence from the
applicant’s employer later in these reasons. At this stage, it is convenient to refer to
one matter of importance before turning to consideration of the expert evidence relied
on by the Board.
[41] The Board did not challenge the accuracy of breath testing logs completed by the
applicant’s employer from 12 May 2020 through to 18 May 2021 recording the results
of breathalyser testing of the applicant on each day he attended work. The applicant
tested nil for BAC on each and every occasion.
Evidence of Dr Stimming
[42] A consideration of the evidence of Dr Stimming was crucial to a determination of the
application to review. Dr Stimming’s diagnoses of an Alcohol Use Disorder provided
the basis for the Board’s finding of a reasonable belief as to the applicant’s
impairment.
[43] Dr Stimming interviewed the applicant on 6 February 2019 and supplied a report to
AHPRA dated 22 February 2019. The applicant denied any substance abuse whilst
working. He said he had only smoked cannabis ten times in his life with one week in
the past where he smoked more often. He denied any alcohol use since Christmas
2018. Before that he said he would drink four beers in the evening socially with friends
on two nights a week. He denied any concerns with his alcohol intake. He denied any
amphetamine use. He said he had used LSD once in his life, many years ago. He
denied any opioid use other than prescribed analgesics after a neck injury in 2011. His
history of, and treatment for, depression was discussed.
[44] Dr Stimming noted the previous notification to AHPRA in April 2016 as “complaints
about his behaviour, tripping over stock and odd conversations about the ‘ease of
obtaining and crushing cocaine14’.”
[45] Dr Stimming noted the results of urine drug pathology briefed to her. It later transpired
they included data regarding someone other than the applicant necessitating a
supplementary report I will refer to later. She also noted as follows:
16.3 Pathology testing of hair sample on the 20 December 2018, urine and blood samples
on the 28 December 2018 did not show any substances of concern. Carbohydrate Deficient
Transferrin (CDT) levels were raised suggesting exposure to alcohol but not raised high
enough to indicate probable recent alcohol excess. Liver and haemopoetic [sic] results did
not suggest compromised functioning from excessive alcohol use.
[46] In her summary, Dr Stimming referred, inter alia, to:
(a) the examination occurring because of the applicant’s failure to comply with
conditions on his registration including attending urine and hair drug testing and
engaging in appropriate treatment with a medical practitioner with expertise in
addiction medicine;
(b) the substance of the notification on 24 February 2017; and
(c) Dr Prior’s diagnosis.
14 Repeating the same error as Dr Prior- see footnote 1.
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[47] The rest of Dr Stimming’s summary and conclusions in her report dated 22 February
2019 was essentially unchanged in her supplementary report dated 18 July 2019,
provided after she had been briefed with corrected pathology data. It is therefore
convenient to move to the summary and conclusions as expressed in the latter report:
7.4 In examining the Pathology results summary date 12 June 2019 (AHPRA #
PD19/373894), of the urine tests submitted, most were performed mid morning and
five urine tests were significantly positive for alcohol with concentrations greater
than 0.05 g%. It is at these levels that there is greater cognitive dysfunction from
alcohol intoxication and that the risk of driving is exponentially elevated. In
addition, [the applicant] missed 22 urine tests.
7.5 It is reasonable to speculate that [the applicant] may have missed some of
these urine tests as he may have been still intoxicated with alcohol, or recovering
from the after effects of alcohol use such as a hang over. It is also reasonable to
assume that when he missed a urine test there may have been a positive or
undesirable result.
7.6 It is telling that at times [the applicant’s] urine was significantly positive for
alcohol (> 0.05 g%) during week day mornings, suggesting that if he was working
as a pharmacist at that time he may have been impaired by alcohol intoxication or
the effects of alcohol from the night before.
7.7 Analysis of the pathology summary for 2018 showed that his urine tests
were significantly positive for alcohol, or he missed tests in nine months of the
year except from February, April and July 2018, suggesting this is a chronic and
long standing problem.
7.8 In conclusion, taking a longitudinal approach, and examining pathology
evidence it is still my opinion that [the applicant] has a physical or mental
impairment, disability, condition or disorder (including substance abuse or
dependence), namely Alcohol Use Disorder Moderate Severity (DSM5, 2013). It
is still my opinion that his Cannabis Use Disorder is in sustained remission and that
his recurrent Major Depressive disorder is currently in remission. It is also my
opinion that this mental disorder of Alcohol Use Disorder would detrimentally
affect or is likely to detrimentally affect h i s capacity to practice the profession.
[48] Dr Stimming provided a further report dated 27 October 2020 in which she stated,
inter alia, as follows:
4.1.1 I based [the applicant’s] diagnosis of Alcohol Use Disorder, Moderate
Severity on the criteria suggested by the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual, Version
5, (DSM-5) published by the American Psychiatric Association.
4.1.2 In order to make a diagnosis of Alcohol Use Disorder, there needed to be a
problematic pattern of alcohol use within a twelve month period leading to
clinically significant impairment. For the qualification of Moderate Severity,
least four to five symptoms out ofthese 11 criteria need to fulfilled:
• Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was
intended.
• There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol
use.
• A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtainalcohol, use alcohol,
or recover from its effects.
• Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol.
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13
• Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfil major role obligations at
work, school or home.
• Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or
interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol.
• Important social, occupational or recreational actives are given up or reduced
because of alcohol use.
• Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent
physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or
exacerbated by alcohol.
• Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: a need for markedly
increased amount of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired effect or a
markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of
alcohol.
• Withdrawal as manifested by either of the following: the characteristic
withdrawal syndrome of alcohol or alcohol (or a closely related substance, such
as benzodiazepine) is taken to relive [sic] or avoid withdrawal symptoms.
4.1.3 Most of these criteria rely on the self report of the practitioner. In the
adversarial nature of an Independent Medical Examination, it is difficult for the
practitioner to disclose such information as there are potentially negative
employment consequences that depend on such disclosure.
4.1.4 Therefore the main evidence that I relied on to make the diagnosis of Alcohol
Use Disorder, Moderate severity were the five "standing out" urine alcohol results
identified by Mr Charles Appleton. I speculate that if [the applicant’s] urine was
positive for alcohol during week day mornings, it suggested that if he was working
as a pharmacist at that time he may have been impaired by alcohol intoxication or
the effects of alcohol from the night before.
4.1.5 In addition, On the 9 November 2018, [the applicant’s] application of
financial hardship was denied by the board as the submitted evidence of living
expenses and limited income suggested he should have some surplus to pay for
regular pathology testing. It is noted that "a substantial amount, nearly $1200.00,
was spent by you over the three months on non-essential items such as alcohol".
4.1.6 The DSM-5 goes on to define early remission as: After full criteria of alcohol
use disorder were previously met, none of the criteria of alcohol use disorder have
been met for at least three months but for less than 12 months.
4.1.7 The DSM-5 defines sustained remission as: After full criteria for alcohol use
disorder were previously met, none of the criteria for alcohol use disorder have been
met at any time during a period of 12 months or longer.
[49] Despite the contents of paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of her report dated 27 October
2020, it became apparent from the evidence of Dr Stimming, during the hearing on 20
May 2021, that she was unable to identify evidence of any criteria necessary to
diagnose an Alcohol Use Disorder Moderate Severity according to the DSM-5.15 It
became clear that Dr Stimming, in reaching her diagnosis, was relying instead on the
following matters:
(a) the notification on 24 February 2017 that the applicant had been practising
whilst intoxicated;
15 T1-59, 64-66.
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14
(b) Dr Prior’s diagnosis;
(c) the urine alcohol results from testing from late 2017 to late 2018; and
(d) some information regarding the applicant’s expenditure on alcohol.16
[50] The fragility of the basis for Dr Stimming’s diagnosis, its speculative nature, and the
lack of conviction of her opinion were apparent from her evidence. I note the
following passages of Dr Stimming’s evidence in particular:
From – my experience and my knowledge seeing the – the evidence and the dysfunction
that [the applicant] was experiencing at the time, I – that – that’s how I made the diagnosis
of alcohol use disorder.17
…
The information that I based on to make the diagnosis of alcohol use disorder was based on
the evidence that was given to me, including his previous urine alcohol results and I was
also told about – I understand he submitted some credit – some financial statements and I
was also told about some of the information from those financial statements.
… In addition, I – I assumed – his initial notification suggested there was some dysfunction
and potential impairment.
… That initial notification to AHPRA suggested that there was some dysfunction in his
ability to work and, therefore, potential impairment. That’s another – that’s more – other
information that I based my diagnosis on.18
…
…I don’t know what exactly happened on – before the 24th of February 2017. If I am told
that his functioning as a pharmacist suggested, maybe, he was intoxicated, then that would
help me in terms of making an opinion on whether he was impaired or not working and
whether the impairment was due to a substance use disorder.19
…
…I don’t know if that behaviour was related to alcohol. I understand after – Dr Prior’s report
suggested that he had a cannabis use disorder and a major depressive disorder. I – therefore,
whatever behaviour he had on that particular incident, I don’t know whether that’s due to
alcohol or cannabis … or anything else.20
…
…My hypothesis is that [the applicant] was suffering from a cannabis use disorder initially
before the 24th of February 2017. I – and, therefore, my hypothesis is that after – after the
31st of May 2017 when he was assessed by Dr Prior, the cannabis use disorder was – went
into remission and maybe, he developed an alcohol use disorder, That’s my hypothesis.21
[51] The reference to information from financial statements appears to relate to records of
transactions from 31 July to 29 October 2018 on a bank account held by the applicant.
Such records show what appear to be transactions at liquor stores, noting date and cost
of transaction. In the absence of details as to what was purchased and by whom it was
16 T1-58, 59-61 and 66-67.
17 T1-58. 10-13.
18 T1-58. 22-33.
19 T1-59. 30-33.
20 T1-59. 41-47.
21 T1-60. 2-6.
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15
consumed - and the applicant was not cross-examined about the records - they provide
no substantial basis to support a diagnosis of an Alcohol Use Disorder.
[52] Dr Stimming appeared to be uncertain as to whether the positive urine alcohol results
occurred on days when the applicant was carrying out his employment:
The urine – the – the standing out urine alcohol samples that – and I – and I understand they
occurred weekdays, during business hours and, therefore, I speculate that if [the applicant]
was working as a pharmacist during that time, he would, potentially, be impaired and that
impairment would be due to an alcohol use disorder.22
…
I – if someone was on holiday and they had a standout alcohol – urine alcohol reading the
next day, I don’t think that is evidence by itself that the person has an alcohol use disorder.
I didn’t administer the alcohol -sorry, the urine drug and alcohol testing and, therefore, I
don’t know what, exactly, the presumption was given to [the applicant] but if this is a
workplace related alcohol and drug testing, I would expect that his urine – sorry, the results
would show results that does not suggest impairment.23
…
It was reliant on the assumption that he could have been working. I didn’t know whether he
was, actually, working or not. It was reliant on the assumption that he could’ve been
working.24
[53] Whether a positive urine alcohol result related to a day the applicant was rostered to
work is of obvious importance in assessing the significance of the result to the issue
of impairment. Whilst a high, or indeed any, alcohol reading on any morning would
suggest excessive alcohol consumption during the previous night and/or early
morning and arguably provide some support for a diagnosis of an Alcohol Use
Disorder, it is of limited utility in supporting a finding of impairment if it results from
a test on a day the applicant is not, and is not expecting to, carry out his employment.
It is of certainly less significance than the consistent nil results obtained as a result of
breath testing of the applicant at his workplace during 2020 and 2021.
[54] As to those results, after being reminded of the DSM-5 criteria for “sustained
remission” quoted at paragraph 4.1.7 of her report dated 27 October 2020, Dr
Stimming gave evidence as follows.:
Dr Stimming, [the applicant] has now provided breath testing logs certifying that over the
period 12 May 2020 to the current time and that is a 12-month period, he’s been submitting
to breath tests administered by his employer on every day that he’s worked and many other
days besides and without exception, over a 12-month period, every breath test was 0.0. Dr
Stimming, would you agree with me that [the applicant’s] logbooks provide good evidence
that he – that if, in fact, he ever had a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder, that he would be in
sustained remission as you have defined it in 4.1.7? --- It is plausible that he is in sustained
remission, however, as I said previously, the risk of relapse is always material.25
[55] This struck me as a grudging concession, especially given Dr Stimming’s inability to
point to the DSM-5 full criteria for diagnosis having ever been met and the absence
of evidence of any of those criteria having been met in the 12 months preceding the
22 T1-60. 11-15.
23 T1-60.45 – 1-61.4.
24 T1-61. 20-24.
25 T1-61.
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16
hearing. It was not merely plausible that the applicant was in sustained remission; it
was demonstrable according to the DSM-5 criteria. The less than forthright
concession was immediately followed by a riposte more in the nature of advocacy
than one would expect from a carefully objective expert witness.
[56] I was generally unimpressed by Dr Stimming’s evidence for reasons of both content
and demeanour.
[57] Dr Stimming’s purported diagnosis according to the DSM-5 did not withstand
scrutiny. The actual bases for her diagnosis did not have sound evidential support or
logical coherence:
(a) The substance of the notification on 24 February 2017 did not provide any sound
evidential foundation and, in light of the applicant’s denials and other evidence,
should not have been afforded the weight given to it by Dr Stimming in her
diagnosis.
(b) Dr Prior’s diagnosis of a substance use disorder in 2017 provided no sound basis
for Dr Stimming’s diagnosis and her “hypothesis” that “the cannabis use disorder
… went into remission and maybe, he developed an alcohol use disorder” was entirely
speculative.
(c) Dr Stimming’s reliance upon the 2018 pathology results was flawed because of
her failure to consider whether findings coincided with days of employment or
not and her reasoning as to sinister reasons why the applicant may have missed
testing was speculative.
(d) Dr Stimming’s limited understanding of the applicant’s financial affairs
provided no sound additional basis for the diagnosis.
(e) Dr Stimming gave no proper weight to the workplace breathalyser results in the
12 months preceding the hearing.
(f) Dr Stimming gave no proper weight to evidence relied on by the applicant,
including positive reports from his employers and the opinions of treating
practitioners.
[58] Dr Stimming did not impress as an entirely objective witness who was willing to make
frank reasonable concessions. To the contrary, she at times appeared unnecessarily
defensive of the opinions expressed in her reports and reluctant to make reasonable
concessions.
[59] Finally, Dr Stimming’s opinion was ultimately expressed in such a qualified way – it
became a “hypothesis” rather than a diagnosis – that, even taken at its highest, her
evidence had very limited probative value.
[60] I did not accept the diagnosis by Dr Stimming of an Alcohol Use Disorder. I did not
accept the opinion expressed by Dr Stimming that the applicant had a condition that
would or might affect his ability to practise his profession.
[61] That conclusion was sufficient to determine the application to review in favour of the
applicant. In the absence of acceptable expert evidence of an Alcohol Use Disorder,
there was no evidential basis for the formation of a reasonable belief of an impairment.
However, I should refer to other evidence that satisfied me to the contrary, that is, that
based a positive finding that the applicant did not have an impairment, especially as
-- 16 of 21 --
17
such evidence also supported my conclusion that the Dr Stimming’s opinion evidence
should not be accepted.
Applicant’s evidence
[62] The applicant swore an affidavit on 10 September 2020 and gave sworn evidence
during the hearing.
[63] The applicant deposed to the terms of a conversation with a patient during his locum
employment in Victoria in 2016 regarding codeine, providing a plausible, innocent
explanation for that aspect of the April 2016 notification.26 He deposed as follows:
On 2 and 3 February 2017, I requested to be relieved of my duties because I had not slept
well on nights before. The pain in my back was disturbing my sleep, and I was also sick. I
was not intoxicated, and I was not asked to leave work because staff believed me to be
intoxicated.27
[64] The applicant’s assertions were not contradicted by any direct evidence and were not
challenged by cross-examination.
[65] The applicant disputed the accuracy of his history of drug use as reported by Dr
Prior.28
[66] The applicant deposed as to his inability to afford the cost of the urine drug screening
being the explanation for missed tests.29 His financial circumstances and inability to
find a local bulk billing psychiatrist specialising in addiction medicine led to his non-
compliance with treatment conditions imposed by the Board.30 The conditions on his
registration and delays by AHPRA in approvals of practice locations severely limited
the applicant’s ability to obtain employment and caused him financial distress.31
[67] The applicant deposed to only becoming aware that the urine drug screening included
testing for alcohol upon reading Dr Stimming’s report of 22 February 2019.32
[68] The applicant confirmed that he had attended his workplace for breath testing on days
he was not rostered to work, even though not required to do so.33
[69] The applicant gave evidence that he never made a dispensing error or caused harm to
a patient during his career as a pharmacist.34 Such assertion was not contradicted by
other evidence or challenged by cross-examination.
[70] The applicant was cross-examined extensively about inconsistencies in histories of
his drug and alcohol use given by him to various persons during the preceding five
years.35 He denied telling Dr Prior that he taken sample or patient returned anti-
26 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, para 5 (HB754).
27 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, para 12 (HB755).
28 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, paras 16 and 18 (HB755 and HB756).
29 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, paras 22-27 (HB756) and 35-36 (HB757).
30 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, paras 29-33 (HB754).
31 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, paras 24-25, 34, and 53 (HB756, HB757 and HB759)
and T1-9- 11.
32 Affidavit of applicant sworn 10 September 2020, para 43 (HB758).
33 T1-11. 35- T1-12. 5.
34 T1-36.
35 T1-14-26
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18
depressant medication from the South Australian pharmacy on occasions.36 He denied
telling Dr Prior other matters Dr Prior reported.37 These parts of the applicant’s
evidence were adverse to his credibility. I regarded the applicant as an unreliable
historian as to past use of drugs and alcohol, particularly in 2017 and earlier years. I
considered he was being less than full and frank as to the detail of those historical
matters. I took such finding adverse to the applicant’s credit into account when
assessing his credit generally.
[71] Ultimately, however, I regarded the applicant otherwise as an honest and reliable
witness. I accepted his evidence as to the conversation regarding codeine in 2016. I
accepted his evidence as to the circumstances under which he absented himself from
work for two days in February 2017. I accepted the applicant’s evidence as to the
circumstances leading to him missing urine drug tests during 2018 and did not share
the suspicions of Dr Stimming of a sinister reason. I accepted the evidence of the
applicant that he had never been intoxicated in the workplace.
[72] I have already referred to the evidence of nil alcohol readings by breathalyser testing
each and every day the applicant worked as a pharmacist during the 12 months
preceding the hearing and on additional days when the applicant attended his
workplace only for the purpose of being tested. I considered that to be cogent evidence
contrary to the Board’s contention of impairment.
[73] The applicant’s principal supervisor provided positive reports to AHPRA throughout
such period38, as did other pharmacists for whom he worked on occasions during such
period.39
[74] Reports from the applicant’s treating general practitioner,40 psychologist41 and drug
and alcohol counsellor42 provided no evidence to support a finding of impairment.
[75] In a report dated 25 August 201943, the applicant’s treating psychologist stated that
“he does not meet the criteria for Cannabis Use disorder nor alcohol use disorder nor
any other mood nor psychotic state that would make him a risk to the public whilst
working as a pharmacist.”
[76] In a report dated 17 August 202044, the team leader of the Community AOD Service
stated that the applicant “doesn’t currently or has ever met criteria as a person with
drug an or alcohol use issues”, noting he is an unusual client “in that he doesn’t present
with any drug and/or alcohol use issues, which would usually be our primary criteria.”
[77] The applicant sought an expert opinion from Dr Gary Persley, consultant psychiatrist.
Dr Persley interviewed the applicant on 27 March 2020. In a report dated 4 June 2020,
36 T1-28-29.
37 T1-32.
38 In addition to the numerous regular reports, see the statement dated 21 April 2020 (HB742).
39 See statements dated 18 April 2020 (HB741) and 22 April 2020 (HB743).
40 See, e.g., reports dated 5 April 2019 (HB595), 5 March 2020 (HB626), 18 September 2020 (SHB149)
and 8 April 2021 (SHB155).
41 See, e.g., report dated 25 March 2019 (HB598).
42 See, e.g., reports dated 12 February 2020 (HB623), 10 March 2020 (HB738), 30 March 2020
(SHB139), 13 May 2020 (SHB142), 17 August 2020 (SHB145) and file note of call on 17 February
2020 (SHB132).
43 HB725.
44 SHB145.
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19
Dr Persley noted the earlier diagnoses by Dr Prior and Dr Stimming. He stated, inter
alia, as follows:
During my interview [the applicant] acknowledged that he drinks alcohol socially and
recreationally. The carbohydrate deficient transferrin test (CDT) indicated exposure to
alcohol but not suggestive of high usage. CDT is an indicator of exposure to alcohol but not
quantitative.
…
The current central issue is that [the applicant] acknowledges that he consumes alcohol on
what he regards as a recreational and social basis. He is not currently suffering with a major
depressive disorder and a substance abuse disorder has been excluded. He has not complied
with all the conditions established by the Board.
[78] Dr Persley noted the positive report from the applicant’s principal employer before
stating as follows:
From a clinical perspective I would consider it reasonable that he return to work as a
pharmacist with a practical level of supervision such as supplying breath testing for alcohol
at the commencement of his shift and this be recorded in a logbook. He would attend a
psychiatrist with an interest in addiction medicine on a monthly basis for six months and
then at the discretion of the psychiatrist.
[79] In a subsequent report dated 29 August 2020, Dr Persley stated as follows:
This updated report is prepared upon receipt of recent information including a breath
testing log and the report from the Community AOD Treatment Service.
I note that a breath test log conducted at [the Pharmacy] from May through to 17
August 2020 recorded zero for all breath testing for alcohol. I note the team leader
from the Community AOD Treatment Services stated in their report that: “[the
applicant] doesn’t currently or has ever met criteria as a person with drug or alcohol
use issues”.
From a clinical perspective based upon my initial interview and now supported by
the contemporaneous information from the treating service and also on the basis of
regular random breath testing, there does not seem to be a basis that [the applicant]
should continue to have any restrictions placed upon his return to work as a
pharmacist. The specialist AOTD service state [sic] there is not a condition to treat.
I was confident that he did not suffer with depression at the time of my assessment.
To the best of my knowledge he has not been subjected to any complaint about errors
in his dispensing of medication. He has received a personal reference which
indicated that he has received positive feedback in the workplace.
[80] In his evidence during the hearing, Dr Persley agreed that the subsequent nil results
from breathalyser testing confirmed his opinion expressed in his report of 29 August
2020 that there was no basis for continued restrictions on the applicant’s work as a
pharmacist.
[81] During cross-examination, Dr Persley agreed that Alcohol Use Disorder is a chronic,
relapsing and remitting medical disorder with the risk of relapse a material life long
risk. He agreed that relapse in depression could increase the risk of relapse of Alcohol
Use Disorder. He agreed that an increase in working hours could increase the risk of
relapse such that a graduated return to work with some initial further breath testing
and continued medical treatment would be recommended.
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20
[82] This evidence from Dr Persley was clearly on the assumption that the applicant
suffered from an Alcohol Use Disorder that was in remission. Dr Persley never
himself diagnosed the applicant with an Alcohol Use Disorder. I gained the
impression from his written and oral evidence that he was prepared to act upon an
assumption of the accuracy of the diagnosis by Dr Stimming in expression of his own
opinions as to the need for any current restrictions on the applicant’s practice. I did
not regard Dr Persley’s evidence as supporting a finding that the applicant ever
suffered from an Alcohol Use Disorder. I regarded his evidence as supporting a
finding that the applicant was not suffering an impairment at the time of hearing.
Conclusion
[83] I agreed with the Board’s decision in June 2016 that the April 2016 notification was
lacking in substance. It did not become more substantial in hindsight in light of the
February 2017 notification and could not, at the time of the hearing, provide any
proper support for a finding that the applicant suffered an Alcohol Use Disorder and
consequent impairment.
[84] The evidence that the applicant was intoxicated at work in February 2017 was tenuous
and, in light of the applicant’s sworn denial, could not, at the time of the hearing,
provide any proper support for a finding that the applicant suffered an Alcohol Use
Disorder and consequent impairment.
[85] I consider the diagnosis by Dr Prior in 2017 of a Substance Abuse Disorder to be
somewhat dubious, even if the history of use was accurately reported. However, I need
not resolve that matter. There was no subsequent evidence of illicit drug use and all
the evidence is to the contrary that the applicant continued to suffer a Substance Abuse
Disorder. The Board, effectively, did not contend for a finding other than that an
Alcohol Use Disorder caused the applicant’s impairment.
[86] For reasons given earlier, I did not accept Dr Stimming’s diagnosis of an Alcohol Use
Disorder. Indeed, I found it likely that the applicant had never suffered an Alcohol
Use Disorder, given the lack of any substantial evidence to support such a diagnosis
and the wealth of evidence to the contrary.
[87] I did not hold a reasonable belief that the applicant may have an “impairment” within
the meaning of that term as defined in the National Law. Therefore, the correct and
preferable decision was to make orders setting aside the decisions of the Board and
substituting decisions with the effect that all conditions that had been imposed on the
applicant’s registration were removed.
[88] Had I accepted the correctness of a diagnosis of an Alcohol Use Disorder in remission,
I would nonetheless have reached the same conclusion. Such a disorder being in
sustained remission, I would not have formed a reasonable belief that such disorder
detrimentally affected or was likely to detrimentally affect the applicant’s capacity to
practise as a pharmacist. I would have rejected the Board’s contention that a gradual
relaxation of conditions was required to safeguard against the risk of relapse because
of increased stress from increase in working hours. I would have preferred the
submission of the applicant that the stress of continued restriction of his registration
far outweighed any potential risk associated with an increase in working hours.
[89] I commend the applicant for his persistence and determination in his efforts to satisfy
the Board of his fitness to practise, to the extent of undergoing counselling when even
the counsellors questioned its utility and subjecting himself to even more breath
-- 20 of 21 --
21
testing than required. It is clear that the applicant, understandably, found the four year
period of suspensions and restriction of his registration frustrating and stressful. It is
to the applicant’s credit that he continued to engage with the regulatory and Tribunal
process in a positive way despite that frustration and stress.
-- 21 of 21 --
Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCAT/2021/369