First National Real Estate v Riordan [2020] QCATA 54
QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CITATION: First National Real Estate v Riordan [2020] QCATA 54
PARTIES: FIRST NATIONAL REAL ESTATE
(applicant/appellant)
v
KELLY RIORDAN
(respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S: APL175-19
MATTER TYPE: Appeals
DELIVERED ON: 21 April 2020
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Member Richard Oliver
ORDERS: Leave to appeal is refused.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL
PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL
LIES – ERROR OF LAW – PARTICULAR CASES
INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW – DENIAL OF
NATURAL JUSTICE – residential tenancy matter – where
respondent sought a return of the tenancy bond – where
applicant contends denial of natural justice – whether
tribunal addressed and considered the applicant’s claim to
part of the residential tenancy bond – whether any basis to
interfere with the tribunal’s findings of fact – whether any
ground established to grant leave to appeal
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009
(Qld), s 142
Bradlyn Nominees Pty Ltd v Saikovski [2012] QCATA 39
Terera & Anor v Clifford [2017] QCA 181
APPEARANCES: This matter was heard and determined on the papers
pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).
REASONS FOR DECISION
This appeal concerns a decision of the tribunal, in its minor civil dispute jurisdiction,
about the distribution of rental bond in respect of a residential tenancy agreement
entered into between Ms Riordan and First National Real Estate as agent for the owner
of residential premises at Raceview in Ipswich. Ms Riordan filed an application for a
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minor civil dispute claiming a return of the bond of $1,320.00, and additional sums
she says were agreed to be paid by way of compensation to her during the course of
the tenancy.
The matter came on for hearing before an Adjudicator on 18 June 2019 and after
taking evidence from both Ms Riordan and a representative of the respondent, Ms
Walton, the learned Adjudicator made a decision that the full bond be refunded to Ms
Riordan and that in addition, she be paid $830.00 to compensate her for excess
electricity charged because of a faulty air conditioning unit.
On 9 July 2019 First National filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal that
decision, setting out grounds of appeal which are as follows:
1. Applicant was awarded reimbursement for items claimed to have been
purchased – there was no evidence of said purchase/s requested by the
tribunal;
2. The counter application lodged by First National Realty Ipswich was not
considered or referenced. This is considered to go against the principals
[sic] of natural justice and we therefore request an appeal be granted so
that natural justice can be served.
Appeal from a minor civil dispute, s 142(3)(a)(i) of the Queensland Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) provides that an appeal against the decision
can only be made if the party has first obtained leave of the appeal tribunal.
For the appeal tribunal to give leave to appeal, the appellant must identify some error
of law or other good reasons to interfere with the decision of the original tribunal as
constituted. The issues raised on the question of whether to grant leave to appeal have
been summarised in the recent case of Terera & Anor v Clifford;1 they are whether:
(a) an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice;
(b) there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected; and
(c) on the question of whether leave to appeal might be given, the court usually
makes some preliminary assessment of the prospects of the proposed appeal. As
was said in Queensland Building & Construction Commission v Meredith, there
dealing with an appeal from the appellate tribunal of QCAT:
Section 150(3) of the QCAT Act permits an appeal to this Court against
a final decision of the Appeal Tribunal only on a question of law and only
1 [2017] QCA 181; see also Bradlyn Nominees Pty Ltd v Saikovski [2012] QCATA 39.
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if the party who wishes to appeal has obtained leave to appeal from this
Court. The very structure of this provision forcefully implies, first, that
leave to appeal may be given only with respect to a question of questions
of law and, secondly, that in considering the exercise of the discretion to
grant leave to appeal, this Court will have high regard for the prospects
of success that the applicant for leave has of demonstrating error on the
part of the Appeal Tribunal with respect to the question or questions of
law concerned. There must be reasonable prospects of success to warrant
a grant of leave.2
There is one other consideration. The application for leave to appeal or appeal is not
a rehearing on the merits of the matter that was before the primary decision maker/s
to achieve a different outcome.
The second ground of appeal clearly raises an issue of law if it can be established that
First National was denied natural justice or procedural fairness in the course of the
hearing responding to the case made by the applicant for refund of the bond and
compensation. The applicant has provided written submissions in respect of the appeal
filed on 2 September 2019 and in paragraph 1 sets out a schedule of the monies
claimed at the original hearing. In support of that, there is a submission as to why
these monies are payable but the submission does not address how First National was
not given an opportunity to present its case. There is a submission in paragraph 8 in
which it contends that First National ‘did not believe the counter application submitted
was considered during this hearing’.
The transcript of the proceeding, which First National may not have had at the time it
filed its application for leave to appeal, demonstrates that its counterclaim was
considered. Ms Walton represented First National at the hearing. There is the
following exchange at page 7 of the transcript:
ADJUDICATOR: Okay, stop. Now, if I could now turn to you, please, Ms
Walton. What claims are you making?
MS WALTON: So we’re just making to know that we would like, obviously
the bond to be refunded to our office to cover the items and getting the property
down to entry condition.
ADJUDICATOR: Well, tell me – what are those items?
MS WALTON: So there was cleaning required, based off the exit report of
$120.
ADJUDICATOR: Yes.
MS WALTON: Carpet cleaning was required of $154.
ADJUDICATOR: Yes.
MS WALTON: There was some yard mowing that had to be done, $125.
ADJUDICATOR: Yes.
2 Terera & Anor v Clifford [2017] QCA 181, [10] (footnotes omitted).
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MS WALTON: There is also in the bedroom off the kitchen, the carpet needs
to be replaced because there is a smell of pet urine.
ADJUDICATOR: Has it been replaced?
MS WALTON: It hasn’t at this stage, no, but that is $330 so that’s just pending.
ADJUDICATOR: Has the property been re-tenanted? …
MS WALTON: Not at the moment. The property is for sale.
ADJUDICATOR: Yes next.
MS WALTON: And then there is the wall repair to where the air con is.
ADJUDICATOR: Why is that needed?
MS WALTON: So the air conditioner was leaking, which, you know, we know.
ADJUDICATOR: It’s not the tenant’s problem yes.
MS WALTON: But the tenant had used the air con while it was leaking and, in
turn, has obviously caused more damage inside the wall, which has made it soft
and mouldy. We had the insurance assessor come out and he has confirmed,
although not covered under insurance, that his [sic] is malicious damage. But
will look at replacing the air con but not the wall, so the owner is seeking
payment for that.
There was during the course of the hearing further discussion about the tenant’s
liability for replacing the damaged wall as a result of water leaking from the faulty air
conditioner. First National accepted that the air conditioner was faulty, and ultimately
the Adjudicator found that after three attempts to repair the air conditioner, it was not
a cost that ought to have been borne by the tenant. Furthermore, it was recognised that
the air conditioner was used during the peak heat period of summer between January
2019 and 10 May 2019. These findings of fact were open to him on the evidence.
The point of all the above is, that First National’s counterclaim was considered, there
were submissions made in respect of each of those claims and ultimately the
Adjudicator made a finding of fact that the evidence fell short. Ms Riordan took
possession of the premises when they had not been cleaned, it was agreed she would
clean the premises when she went in and for that there was to be some reimbursement.
All of these matters were considered thoroughly during the course of the hearing of
this minor civil dispute, bearing in mind that it is the obligation of the tribunal:
In a proceeding for a minor civil dispute, the tribunal must make orders that it
considers fair and equitable to the parties to the proceeding in order to resolve
the dispute but may, if the tribunal considers it appropriate, make an order
dismissing the application.3
In the application for leave to appeal, First National’s submissions do not address
those matters upon which the appeal tribunal will give leave. It simply makes a further
submission as to why the tribunal should make orders that the bond be refunded to
First National for the various costs to be taken out, and additional costs. Furthermore,
3 QCAT Act s. 13(1)
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in the appeal, rather than at first instance, First National have sought to file and rely
on further evidence to support its case. That could have been done at the original
hearing.
As for the first ground of appeal, the tribunal does not require strict proof although it
is always helpful to have evidence to support any claims made. What was before the
tribunal was an internal email between First National staff which supported Ms
Riordan’s position that the premises were in a state of disrepair when she took up
occupancy and a credit was to be given to her because of that, and also the fact that
the oven was not working during the whole of the tenancy. Also there was a credit for
the extra electricity costs. The learned Adjudicator considered all of these matters and
addressed them in his reasons.
As no error of law has been identified, and there is no obvious reason to interfere with
the learned Adjudicator’s findings of fact4 during the course of the hearing, and his
decision, leave to appeal is refused.
Order
1. Leave to appeal is refused.
4 Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott [2016] HCA 22.
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Official source: https://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QCATA/2020/054